Publication of Official Final Results

Discrepancies between interim results and final official results are to be expected. The most problematic scenario is if when the interim result, based on an almost complete count, indicates a narrow victor and then the final results reveals a swing to another party or candidate. However, developing an accurate and transparent results-generating process that is implemented accordingly and supported by a known results release modality will significantly reduce the risk of violence or refusal to accept the final results by the losing competitor.

Where discrepancies do occur, the electoral management body should issue statements explaining the reasons for the discrepancies, to ensure that public confidence in the system is maintained. In some cases, special meetings between the EMB and leading politicians and activists are advisable.

It is of paramount importance that the EMB explains the difference between partial, interim and final results to the stakeholders. In jurisdictions where the EMB is not certifying the results, this should be made clear too. Equally important, stakeholders must know how they can lodge complaints against the results process even before the results aggregating process begins.

The overall principle is that the appropriate authority should make the official final election results available as soon as possible after the counting process has been concluded, the statement of votes checked, and results validated. Some electoral laws stipulate a fixed day for announcing the official results.

Depending on the geography of the country, the communication networks in place, and the electoral system used, an average of one to two weeks is generally needed before detailed verifications of interim results are complete for making an official announcement. Often the legislation will provide for the designated period in which the results should be publicized.

In many cases the official count can only be concluded once all the ballot papers have been returned to the local electoral management body and all counting steps have been completed, including resolution of any disputes about vote counting (which may result in recounts), and statement of votes validated. Great care must be taken to ensure that the figures are accurate, especially when the margin of victory is narrow. Procedures must be in place to ensure that all appropriate checks and balances have been taken into account before the final results are announced.

Formal documents showing the results of the count are normally prepared, certified, and signed by the responsible electoral district officer, or other appropriate official. These documents are usually officially published, such as in a Government Gazette, tabled in Parliament, or presented to an appropriate official. Some EMBs are making the extra effort of scanning all the statement of votes forms and making them available online for public consumption.

Often, formal election results are declared at a public ceremony. Candidates, political party representatives, the media, observers, other interested persons, and the general public are often invited to attend these ceremonies. In some cases, candidates and political party representatives are given the opportunity to make speeches.

It is desirable to produce detailed publications of election results showing the results of the counting at all levels of voting, from voting stations to regions or electoral districts, and the national level. Most often these are done electronically and the specific result breakdown is provided to parties and candidates. However, in some cases it is desirable to merge some results. As a general principle, EMBs should seek to provide data in a format that allows analysis. Providing results from tens of thousands of polling stations, but only doing so in a human-readable format such as PDF, amounts to a less than complete commitment to transparency.

Make the data available in the most generic format possible – such as CSV (comma separated values) text file or similar.

Merging Results to Protect the Secrecy of the Vote

It may be desirable to merge or amalgamate results from several voting stations to protect the secrecy of the vote. This is generally done if the publication of results at a detailed level might identify the names and votes of particular individuals. This can happen if the number of votes at a voting station is so small that there is a significant risk that all the votes will be for one candidate or party.

This can also be done in cases where there is a real risk that publishing the voting results at a particular voting station could result in retribution against the persons who voted there. This problem can be mitigated by mixing the ballots from two or more voting stations from different areas.

Merging results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other categories of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the head office of the electoral management body, results can easily be merged with other results in order to protect the secrecy of the vote. For internal use only, a special notation can be made in order to keep the verification trail clear.

Role of Judicial Courts

In some countries, judicial courts are only involved in the electoral process after the election, when offenders against the electoral law are brought to trial, or when an electoral result is challenged.

In other jurisdictions, the courts may have a significant role to play in confirming the outcome and official results of the election, where the results are certified only when the court has confirmed them. Such confirmation should be done as soon as possible, in order to avoid political instability and potential delays associated with a transition from one government to another. It is therefore important that not only the EMB, but also the affected courts proactively engages with political stakeholders thereby enabling them to better understand, access and accept their decisions.

The courts may also be directly involved in the official count, along with the electoral management body. This will generally be the case if final approval of the count must come from the courts.

When a lot of technology is used in the electoral process, the judicial courts may also benefit from some training in order to better fulfil their role. It is difficult for a court to find neutral technical expertise in the event that the EMB or the technology vendor is the plaintiff.