In some jurisdictions, for reasons outlined in Different Types and Requirements for Vote Counting, votes are initially counted at voting stations; in some cases they are subsequently recounted at counting centres. There are cases, however, where no counting is done at voting stations, but ballots are transported directly to centralised counting centres after the close of voting.
In a counting centre approach, where ballots from two or more voting stations are mixed together, with results published by counting centre instead of by voting station, it is more difficult to link communities with affiliation. This may help to protect the secrecy of the voting pattern, especially in some small communities (normally the ballots are counted by voting station but the centre approach will give the possibility to merge).
Even in countries where the count is predominantly done at voting stations, one or more counting centres can ease administration for certain types of ballots. This includes absentee votes, mail votes from armed forces, diplomatic missions, refugees, incarcerated persons or persons residing outside their electoral district which may come from various voting stations, local or abroad, or directly from the voters (by mail).
Such ballots can be forwarded to the appropriate counting centre and added to the ballots from applicable elections, making counting easier to organise and easier to protect the secrecy of such absentee votes.
There may be many counting centres or there may be only one national counting centre. The limit to the level of centralisation will be the level at which votes are translated into a number of legislators or seats. In a First Past the Post (FPTP) system the counting centre may be at the electoral district level (at a town hall, for example) but not at the national level.
In a proportional representation system based on regional lists, a counting centre may not be more centralised than the region that the list is based on.
Vote Counting at the Counting Centre
At the close of voting, voting station officers seal the ballot boxes and prepare them to be transported to a counting centre along with related documents such as the ballot account form.
Each ballot box is then sorted and tallied. The content of the ballot box can be counted separately or mixed with two or more boxes together, after reconciliation, to protect the identity of voters.
The statement of the vote for each counting centre is sent to a regional or national counting centre. Representatives of political parties and observers are allowed to receive an official copy of the results.
Releasing interim results is generally much slower when ballots are counted at counting centres. There are several reasons for this, including:
The logistical complexities of moving ballot boxes and related materials to the counting centre can be an obstacle if transportation is difficult, not readily available, or due to adverse weather conditions.
Systems are required to receive and store the ballot boxes efficiently while the need to transport the ballot boxes may make it difficult to maintain transparency and retain confidence in the counting and aggregation systems and the election body concerned.
Resulting delays in the announcement of the results can lead to accusations of manipulation or fraud during the delivery of boxes or the consolidation of the results of the count.
To ensure the success of the counting process, there are administrative considerations and training requirements related to vote counting at counting centres, which need to be addressed early in the electoral process and once decided, they must be respected.
Each of these procedural components has particularities and subtleties associated with their respective processes.
Procedures for counting at counting centres
At the closing of the voting station authorised persons and counting officers stay in the voting station and prepare the ballot box for transportation from the voting station to the counting centre.
The slot of the ballot box is closed and sealed and the first reconciliation of ballots is done before completing the ballot account form. The seals on the ballot box are then verified along with all forms in sealed envelopes attached to the ballot box. The waybill or transport form is completed according to the type of transportation used.
Important security measures need to be taken to ensure that the ballot boxes will arrive safely at the counting centre. Once at the counting centre, unloading of ballot boxes should be carefully planned and supervised and movement of all ballot boxes should be tightly controlled.
All forms related to transportation and movement of the ballot boxes will be completed and verified so that any ballot boxes that are missing can be traced.
Upon arrival at the counting centre, the ballot box is checked by an appointed electoral official responsible for the intake of materials from voting stations. Once the officer has reviewed the handover form, documented and verified that seals are intact, the polling station will be flagged as received and cleared for processing. The material is sent to a planned location in the counting centre for ballot boxes ready to be counted. From there, individual ballot boxes are delivered to the appropriate counting table.
The ballot box is opened and once the contents of the ballot box are emptied, the validity of each ballot is verified and sorted into different piles before being tallied: valid ballots (by candidate or political party), and rejected ballots. To facilitate the decision making process, clear rules of interpretation or guidelines regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting official, and known in advance.
Representatives of political parties and candidates should be able to examine the rejected ballots and, if they do not agree with the decision of the counting official, be allowed to make formal objections which can form the basis for challenging the results of the count.
Using a count sheet, all valid ballots, spoiled ballots, and rejected ballots are counted - none should be destroyed at this stage of the process.
A verification of the count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement of the vote for each ballot box. The ballot box can then be re-sealed and appropriate counting documentation can be completed and either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a separate sealed envelope.
The ballot box is then transferred to a pre-planned location in the counting centre where counted ballot boxes are securely stored. Once there, the person in charge will verify, count, and label each ballot box creating the cumulative audit trail for the counting centre. All the ballot boxes are safely kept at the counting centre until further notice from the electoral management body.
The results recorded on the statement of the vote for each ballot box will be communicated to the person responsible for combining results for the counting centre. While preparing the cumulative statement of the vote for the entire counting centre, progress reports will also be prepared and sent to the central office of the electoral management body as results for electoral districts are available. Results will be transmitted directly to the national electoral management body so they can be released as they come in.
Representatives of political parties and candidates and observers, if present, should be allowed official copies of the progress reports, the statement of the vote for each ballot box, and the cumulative statement of the votes.
The national office of the electoral management body adds the results transmitted as well as results of special ballots, advance votes, mobile voting station votes, etc. All results should be tallied per political party or candidate and publicised as soon as possible. If results are challenged, additional procedures may apply. The EMB should maintain citizens informed of challenged results/processes, and educate them so voters understand what the implications are and which is the process to be followed.
Effective training for counting officers
To be able to implement such procedures regarding vote counting at counting centres, it is essential that appropriate training be conducted. Training requirements, as well as all other administrative considerations (see Context) will need to be forecast in the budget for the election or referendum.
During the training and managing a counting centre it is important to emphasise non-partisanship in the conduct of the work.
Numerous jurisdictions require that all counting workers sign an oath and a confidentiality clause to make this point clear, documented, and understood by all personnel involved. Counting workers should not make any remarks or mention any personal political affiliation or affinity, nor wear any badge or clothing with political slogans or logos.
Since the counting officer at each table will have to handle disputes over any rejected ballots, he will be the first person to deal with representatives of political parties and candidates.
This person (if applicable according to the legislation) will also have to make the final decision in validating or rejecting any ballot. Neutrality and non-partisanship are imperative in this decision-making process.
In many jurisdictions, counting officers can be legally prosecuted if their work is proven to be partisan during the counting process.
Presence of party and candidate representatives at counting centres
To ensure that the level playing field concept is adhered to, it is recommended that all political parties and candidates designate a representative to be present in each counting centre and assign these representatives to scrutinise the counting process. It remains the choice of each party as to whether they send a representative to every counting table or not.
Many jurisdictions consider the presence of political party representatives to be essential to ensure integrity, guarantee consistency, and provide witnesses to the transparency of the process.
When the time comes to make an important decision during the counting process, such as modifications to previously completed forms, then all party representatives involved should sign the forms to demonstrate that they are informed and agree with the decision. It is recommended that official copies of such documents are shared with party representatives and observers present, as well as be posted at a pre-determined location at the counting centre.
Careful application of such procedures provides tangible evidence that the rules are consistent and the process transparent.
Record the History of Each Ballot Box
At the counting centre, just as at the voting station, the election management body should be able to retrace the history of each ballot box from the moment it leaves the local office of the electoral management body until it returns with the counted ballots (especially important when the ballot papers of two ballot boxes or more are mixed together).
An adequate audit trail will allow the electoral management body to maintain full control and ensure that possibilities of fraud via ballot box tampering are extremely limited and can be detected if attempted. Numbering each ballot box is a simple method of implementing such a control system, which could be traced by barcoding the ballot boxes and use barcode readers to record sending and receipt of boxes. Ballot boxes should also be sealed with uniquely numbered security seals that are noted on the hand-over form, thereby ensuring no tampering while in transit. The handover form is also an important component in the chain of custody for a ballot box.
The same number should appear, as well, on each form used at the voting station and at the counting centre. The importance of recording the history of each ballot box may be used as evidence in cases of judicial recount.
Summary of counting processes at counting centres
In general, the major process components of vote counting at counting centres are the following:
