It is important that the production and distribution of ballots that are the accountable voting material issued to voters are subject to adequate integrity controls.These controls address two issues, namely:

• the number of ballots;

• the authenticity of ballot papers

In systems using enveloped ballots, following the French or similar models, the need for such strict controls on ballots is not necessarily evident.

Assurance that the number of ballots is correct can be attained by various secure packaging, numbering and counting methods. Assuring the authenticity of ballots issued to voters can be an expensive process if through use of special papers and print methods, or relatively simple and inexpensive through validation at the time of issue.

The types of integrity controls instituted depend on how much reassurance the voting public needs regarding voting integrity. Simple validation methods in the voting station can be effective but may not appear as professionally secure as special paper or secure printing.

Security features are necessary to maintain the integrity of the process. The cost of each of these features varies and the electoral management body may decide to use several methods to ensure maximum security.

As the costs vary from one feature to another and this may impact on the choice made by the electoral management body.

Number of Ballots

Printed ballots are normally subject to a series of reconciliations from the time that they are printed to the time of completion of ballot counts.

Counting the ballots at each stage of the distribution process and during reconciliation in voting stations and the count can be assisted if quantity control systems are instituted at the time of manufacture.

Systems banding ballots loose in packs of standard quantities according to specification. This system is the most simple but the least effective as bands can easily be torn, and accuracy of packaging with this method is often suspected. Shrink wrapping of loose ballots in standard packs provides more packaging security but can also be suspect in accuracy.

Printing ballots with a numbered, perforated stub and collating the ballots in standard, stapled booklet,-usually of fifty or a hundred ballots, provides more surety as to numbers.

The ballot paper itself should never be numbered as this indicates to voters that voting secrecy may not be maintained. If this method is adopted, it is important the electoral management body is satisfied that print contractors are experienced and qualified to produce these ballots in booklets accurately otherwise the additional expense will be to no avail. In some environments this facility may not be available locally.

Full Counts

It is essential that a full count of ballots be conducted on delivery of ballots to the voting station and for counts of both used and unused ballots during reconciliations at the close of voting, to identify any manufacturing errors in numbering of these ballots.

This also includes the use of numbered stub ballots.

Authenticity of Ballots

Ballot authenticity can be assured by using:

• special papers, such as watermarked or ultraviolet light sensitive coated paper;

• special security prints methods, such as micro-printed security codes and colour shift print.

Significant lead times for production may be required for these methods, particularly for watermarked or coated paper, which may not be readily available to the required specifications locally in all countries.

Costs of printing using these special papers or print methods are considerably higher than using normal paper stock and print facilities.

Use of Official Marks

In election systems where each ballot is accountable,the ballot paper is validated on issue by the election official placing an official mark or signing or initialing the back of the ballot paper. This is a cost-effective manner for assuring that only valid ballot papers enter the count, and in most environments provides as effective authenticity controls as special and expensive paper stocks or security print methods.

Perforating instruments or stamps can be official marks used by the election officials. A different, distinctive mark would preferably be provided to each voting station to enable full accountability and integrity checks during counts. These are highly accountable items whose design should be kept secret until use and that should be kept under strict security at all times.

Even more cost-effective--but of slightly less integrity and of less use in less literate societies--is the alternative method of requiring the ballot issuing polling official to sign or initial the reverse of each ballot as it is issued.

Place the official mark or election official endorsement in the same position on every ballot, to allow it to be visible when the ballot is folded by the voter.

The top right hand corner of the reverse of the ballot paper is probably the most expeditious position for quick application by most (right-handed) polling officials. The correct position could be marked by a box or other shape on the reverse side of the ballot.

The additional costs of two-sided printing, however, should be carefully weighed against any likely advantages in accuracy.