Preventing and mitigating electoral violence
Preventing and mitigating electoral violence
Heather Szilagyi, November 18. 2016Question:
This question was originally posted by ACE on behalf of an ACE user.
I am currently conducting research on best practices to prevent or mitigate election-related violence. The guide that contains these suggestions is not only targeted towards EMBs, but also on other stakeholders that play a role in this regard, such as security agencies and civil society organizations or other societal actors that engage in peacebuilding. In general, all references to examples for effective strategies on the prevention and mitigation of electoral violence are welcome. More specifically, I would like to know whether you know of:
1. Best practices for an exemplary and realistic planning of election timelines;
2. Dispute resolution mechanisms (both legal mechanisms and alternatives), collaboration forums of electoral stakeholders, and capacity-building efforts for non-state peacebuilding actors that focus specifically on the voter registration process;
3. Examples for an evaluation of the collaboration between an EMB, security agencies and other stakeholders;
4. Examples for an institutionalization of a permanent dialogue / collaboration between an EMB and security agencies and/or other stakeholders in-between elections; or
5. Examples for the evaluation of the performance and conduct of security sector agencies in securing the elections.
But again: I would be happy to hear about all best practices for the prevention and/or mitigation of election-related violence that you would like to share with me.
Summary of responses:
Practitioners came to a general consensus about the appropriate theoretical approach to electoral conflict prevention and mitigation. Practitioners identified the following strategies as integral to this goal:
- An electoral management body (EMB) independent of candidates and political parties;
- A transparent electoral process and framework for consultation and dialogue between election stakeholders to ensure inclusivity and discourage bias;
- Commitments from all candidates to accept the election results and an independent judiciary to settle disputes;
- The undertaking of preliminary assessments to determine any potential problem regions and particularly vulnerable communities.
Practitioners offered insight into training materials and examples of good practices derived from implementation of these theories in India, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Senegal. In terms of training materials, a practitioner recommended the European Center for Electoral Support Lead Program (available here and currently being implemented in Mexico). Additional attachments regarding the Leadership and Conflict Management Skills for Electoral Stakeholders (LEAD) and Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE) programs can be found at the bottom of the original response.
In order for an election to be credible, all contending parties must have a fair chance of winning and there must be a framework for a re-poll in constituencies affected by violence. In the event of a re-poll, the Electoral Commission of India assures that the same voter list is used by placing indelible ink on the index finger of voters in the first poll and middle finger of voters in the re-poll. Additionally, votes are counted in a central location in the days following polling instead of at each individual polling place to reduce the threat of isolated violence from unsuccessful candidates. These methods help to maintain electoral integrity and reduce the likelihood of election violence.
A practitioner described the efforts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) to institute these practices and mitigate violence in their elections since 2003. Initially, the commission organized consultations and focus-groups with stakeholders prior to holding elections to identify potential problem areas. Another practitioner stated that this method of pre-election diagnostic analysis has also been used in Colombia, particularly against the FARC, as well as in India. In order to institutionalize this practice, the CENI in the DRC created the new Commission of Electoral Integrity and Mitigation to continue these consultations and focus exclusively on election violence mitigation. The practitioner did not indicate whether or not these reforms have been successful.
Further, prior to Senegal's 2012 general election, a pre-election consultation found suspicions regarding the legitimacy of electoral processes and the voter registry. To remedy this, both the ruling party and opposition agreed to an independent audit and the establishment of the Observation and Monitoring Committee, a consultation framework to hold discussions between all stakeholders. On Election Day, the committee created an electoral observation chamber with monitoring technology such that the EMB could monitor results in real time and mitigate any inconsistencies or problems. This eased concerns regarding the legitimacy of the process and was praised as a success in conflict mitigation and prevention.
Contributing Members:
Re: Preventing and mitigating electoral violence
Mirimo Mulongo, November 19. 2016Bonjour,
J'aimerai partager avec vous 2 exemples. La RD Congo alors pays post conflit devait organiser les élections à partir de 2003. La Commission Electorale Indépendante avant mis en place plusieurs cadres de concertation avec toutes les parties prenantes du processus électoral pour chercher à atténuer les violences avant les élections et le Comité international des sages. Pour l'organisation des prochaines élections, la nouvelle Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante de la RD Congo a, en plus des cadres de concertation avec les parties prenantes, mis en place une Commission d'Intégrité et de Médiation Electorale composée des délégués des confessions religieuses avec l'objectif d'atténuer les violences liées aux élections.
Dieudonné Mirimo
Re: Preventing and mitigating electoral violence
Adolfo Cayuso Martinez, December 01. 2016Hello Heather,
I would recommend you to have a look at http://www.eces.eu/lead-training.
LEAD is a modular training on Leadership and Conflict Management Skills for Stakeholders.
The European Center for Electoral support is right now imparting a series of those trainings in Mexico to the electoral and judiciary authorities.
If you want to know more about those tools for election conflict prevention and management, have a look at the website or contact them, who will for sure explain in depth what´s LEAD, the countries it has been applied and how to work with it.
Yours,
Adolfo Cayuso
Re: Preventing and mitigating electoral violence
Ababacar Fall, December 01. 2016La question de la prévention et/ou de l'atténuation de la violence électorale est au cœur du processus électoral. Elle peut intervenir à n'importe quelle moment ; avant, pendant ou après la tenue des élections. Elle interpelle aussi bien les OGE, les acteurs politiques que les médias.
Au Sénégal nous avons connu une expérience fort intéressante dans le cadre de la tenue des élections présidentielles et législatives de 2012 caractérisées par un contexte généralisée de contestation de la candidature du Président sortant mais également des suspicions sur la fiabilité du fichier électoral et des tentatives de réforme non consensuelles du cadre juridique et légal qui codifie le processus électoral. L'instauration d'un dialogue entre le pouvoir et l'opposition a permis non seulement l'acceptation d'un audit indépendant du fichier électoral mais également la mise en place d'un cadre de concertation ou se sont retrouvés toutes les parties prenantes (pouvoir, oppositions, partis indépendants ou non alignés, organisation de la société civile et OGE ainsi que les partenaires techniques et financiers du Sénégal qui ont finance l'audit à titre d'observateurs). Ce cadre de concertation appelé comité de veille et de suivi a permis à travers un dialogue entre les parties prenantes la levée de la quasi totalité des suspicions qui pesait sur le processus, la réforme consensuelle du code électoral mais également la tenue de rencontre entre les différents candidats ou leurs représentants entre les premier et deuxième tour afin que les résultats soient acceptés par tout le monde. Le jour du scrutin des missions d'observation ont été déployées à travers tout le pays et les organisations de la société civile ont mis en place pour la première fois avec le soutien des bailleurs une "situation room" ou chambre de veille électorale avec un dispositif technologique qui permettait de remonter en temps réel les données électorales sur le terrain et les résultats de manière à prendre des mesures de correction appropriées en rapport avec les OGE si des dysfonctionnements étaient constatées. Les journalistes ont été fortement impliqués à travers des rencontres et des séminaires sur la gestion de l'information sensible en période électorale. Pour me résumer je pense que pour prévenir ou atténuer les violences électorales, il faut :
- Avoir des OGE indépendants à équidistance des partis ou candidats
- Conduire le processus électoral dans la transparence pour que les acteurs et les populations aient confiance au processus
- Mettre en place autant que possible un cadre de concertation et de dialogue entre l'administration electorale, les acteurs politiques et les organisations de la société civile
-Mettre les médias devant leurs responsabilités afin que des informations tendancieuses ne puissent être diffusées
- Avoir l'engagement de tous les candidats à accepter les résultats et a ne recourir à aucune forme de violence en cas de contestation des résultats et de recourir au juge electoral pour le règlement des contentieux électoraux.
Nota : Dans le cadre du comité de veille et de suivi, nous avons élaboré un rapport général que vous pourrez retrouver en visitant le site de notre organisation dans sa partie documentation. Le site est : www. gradec.org
ABABACAR FALL
Expert électoral
Sénégal
Re: Preventing and mitigating electoral violence
Dr. Noor Mohammad, December 13. 2016This is an important issue. An election conducted in an environment of large scale violence is not a free and fair election. I have the following suggestions to offer:
1. An evaluation of the electoral system to see if the electoral system promotes violence - If the contending parties don't have a fair chance to win an election, there will be a tendency to disrupt it. This can be addressed by changing the electoral system to an inclusive one.
2. If the electoral system offers fair chance of winning to all contending parties, there should be provision of re-poll in polling stations where violence has vitiated the electoral process and the election cannot pass the test of being free and fair. If the entire constituency has seen violence, there should be a provision of re-poll in the entire constituency. And if re-poll has to be done, it needs the following two requirements:
a. There should be a polling station wise voter list so that the same voters may be called for poll again. In this case the indelible ink has to be applied in the middle finger in place of the index finger where it is applied in the first poll. Election Commission of India has been able to ensure purity of elections in this way.
b. In that case counting on polling stations immediately after poll should not be done because once counting is done , the candidate that wins in that polling station will be aggrieved and may resort to violence. That is why India does not count votes immediately after poll on the poll day. All EVMs are collected in a centralised place where votes are counted in a secured environment in a transparent manner.
3. The more preferred option should be steps that avoid risk of violence. A transparent system should be put in place so that all stakeholders know the rule of the game and they should be consulted at every stage and are taken on board. The confidence that every one will get a fair deal will reduce incentive to resort to violence. Election Commission of India has system of consultation at the Commission, provincial and district levels and grievances raised by them are immediately attended to and all such complaints are disposed off with a speaking order and these orders are put on the Commission's website for every one to see.
4. Another major step in this direction will be to map the vulnerable areas and vulnerable communities well in advance. A confidence building exercise has to be undertaken to ensure that no one exploits vulnerabilities of these vulnerable people. People with history of creating violence are made to sign bonds for good behaviour on the poll day, their arms are deposited during the election period and criminals on bail should be put in jails by suspending their bail during the election time. A videography team can be provided to follow movement of all such fellows who will videograph all their movements and this can be used against them after elections. This will inhibit the trouble makers fairly effectively.
5. Webcasting of all activities in the polling station can be another tool to make the process transparent, collect evidence for fixing the trouble makers and such webcast can be seen by the EMB staff and even the stakeholders or the general public.
6. ERMT of IDEA and Ushahidi kinds of initiatives can also can help in collecting evidence of violence and subsequent corrective measures.
Hope this helps
Re: Preventing and mitigating electoral violence
Francisco Morales Gomez, December 17. 2016La violencia en los procesos democráticos electorales son muestra clara de las siguientes falencias:
1.- Inexistencia de normas legales que sancionen severamente la expresión popular, hay que revisar detenidamente las normas punitivas, seguramente dejan espacios para este tipo de actos como: robo, incendio,etc de urnas que contienen los sufragios del pueblo;
2.- No existe un análisis detenido de las áreas, zonas, distritos o regiones en donde existen síntomas de aparecimiento y ejecución de actos de violencia, contra electores, bajo amenazas de muerte, perdida de bienes, secuestros de candidatos o lideres regionales ( caso FARC en Colombia). Para detectados estos focos implementar programas de seguridad,
3.- Las fuerzas Armadas y Policía deben dar seguridad a los recintos electorales y a todo el sistema de votación, sufragio y trasporte de los documentos electorales, con la participación de los ciudadanos y de los representantes de los partidos y organizaciones políticas y sociales;
4.- La presencia de organizaciones armadas irregulares que amenazan a la población para que se expresen de una u otra forma en favor de un candidato que no goza del respaldo popular y que pretenden indemnizarse en el poder político, debe ser objeto de planes de control severos para que garanticen la expresión soberana del pueblo en la elección de sus dignatarios.
5.- Hay diferentes formas de expresar la violencia por sectores interesados, quienes planifican restar legitimidad a los auténticos ganadores, en donde los organismos de justicia común, cuanto de justicia electoral deben actuar respaldados con la normativa constitucional, legal y reglamentaria; en donde existan sanciones con perdida de la libertad, sanciones económicas severas, pérdida del cargo público, destitución de los dignatarios que ganaron las elecciones bajo presión y amenaza de los electores, etc.
Se debe analizar todos estos elementos para garantizar la inexistencia de violencia en los comicios, con la difusión y educación a la población.
Re: Preventing and mitigating electoral violence
Henry Atem, December 28. 2016Dear Heather,
These attachments should give you a clear idea of the processes and stages involve in planning, mapping, preventing and mitigating possible election threats and conflicts or violence that may arise if these threats are not mapped out and prevented.
Much work has been vested on electoral conflict/violence prevention and management in recent years. LEAD by ECES and a modular course in BRIDGE is exclusively designed for this purpose. An emerging area of concern which has not yet receive as much attention is the electoral risk associated with the introduction of ICT, especially in polling places and in collating and publishing election results. Recent hacking attempts on States voter registration databases in the US, bio-metric voter verification machines not working in a number of polling places in many African elections, problems with collating vote tally in Ghana, poor voter registration databases as claimed in the Gambia etc are all linked to processes that stakeholders must consider in preventing and managing election threats that might in some cases lead to disputes and violence.
I hope these attachments helps.