The Question
This question is posted on behalf of Harald Thorud, member of an international organization and the ACE Practitioners' Network.

I am looking for comparative country experiences in which the voter-turnout has increased (in comparison to the last election) following different initiatives implemented by the national EMBs and/or international partners (such as civic education/media campaigns, etc).

Thank you very much, 
Harald Thorud

Summary of responses
The case of Estonia is cited as one where the introduction of internet voting lead to an increase in voter turnout. Another successful technological initiative was in New Zealand in 2008, where those who received a text message ahead of voting had a 4.7% higher turnout rate than those who had not received one. A message delivered to voters about ballot secrecy in Connecticut, USA, is also said to have had a positive impact on voter participation.

In Thailand, changing the law to allow for advance voting ahead of election day is seen as having increased turnout, while in Kenya a range of initiatives succeeded in increasing the turnout rate to 72.18% in a 2010 referendum (compared to that of 52.36% in a 2005 referendum). These initiatives consisted of consultation with key stakeholders; use of mass media; use of alternative media; local volunteers conducting door-to-door voter education; dissemination of material; mass sending of text messages; use of social media; and election observers.

Another example given is that of Sweden in 2006, where those municipalities with the lowest voter turnout rate in the previous election received funds from the government to boost participation. These funds had very few strings attached and were spent on a variety of activities. Voter turnout subsequently rose in all such municipalities.

Examples of related ACE Articles and Resources
Encyclopaedia:
• Engaging apathetic and disempowered groups

Consolidated replies:
• Voter apathy and revival of genuine political participation

External Resources
• Internet voting in Estonia - Internet voting is necessary to maintain the turnout and integrate voters, E-voting.cc
• Did a txt reminder on election day increase voter turnout? New Zealand Election Commission

• Engaging the Electorate: Initiatives to Promote Voter Turnout From Around the World, International IDEA

• To tackle turnout: lessons from a Swedish setting, Ola Pettersson

Names of contributors
1. Manuel J. Kripp
2. Helena Catt
3. Andrew Ellis
4. Tim Meisburger
5. Beryl Aidi
6. Somsri Hananuntasuk
7. Ahmed Issack Hassan
8. Velko Miloev
9. Ola Pettersson

A very practical example regarding the use of new technologies and voting channels is Estonia. It took time and there are definitely some specific characteristics to the political culture and the use of electronic identity and personal data. But as I clearly indicated in my analysis on our blog, it is a positive example for the use of Internet voting to increase participation. http://www.e-voting.cc/stories/14871513/

Further research was done by Prof. Alexander Trechsel from the EUI in Florence and we have more data from other countries that needs to be analyzed with regards to the influence of technology and additional voting channels.

In general, the data indicates that more choices to vote at least maintain a certain level of turnout.

In a controlled experiment on New Zealand’s parliamentary election day in 2008 those who received a txt (SMS) message from the “orange elections guy” reminding them to vote had a 4.7% point higher turnout than those who did not receive the txt message. 

The full paper reporting the exercise and results is at

http://www.elections.org.nz/study/researchers/participation/did-a-txt-reminder-on-election-day-increase.html

I think you will find useful material in the IDEA publication 'Engaging the Electorate' which you can download from the IDEA website at <www.idea.int/publications/vt_ee/index.cfm>.  This is published under creative commons provisions and you can thus freely reproduce it not for profit.

I'm also uploading a recent paper on an experiment in Connecticut which appears to demonstrate significant impact generated by a communication to electors about ballot secrecy.  Rick Matland at Loyola University in Chicago is keen to try this approach outside a Western context, and I am happy to put anyone interested in touch with him.

It is an interesting question. I think the effectiveness of various measures will be related to the particular cause of abstention (low turnout).  For example:

I forgot, didn't include voting when I planned my day - In this case a text message or other reminder might be effective.

Polling station is too far away, it's too much trouble - In this case, increasing the number of polling stations is likely to have more impact on turnout than civic education.

Election is meaningless, my vote will not count - Here we encounter a moral dilemma, as in many developing democracies this may be a true statement. Do we tell people their vote is meaningful, when it really isn't, merely to encourage turnout? Constitutional or electoral reforms aimed at making elections more meaningful (i.e. increasing voter efficacy) might be a more appropriate means of increasing turnout.

Its too dangerous to vote - In some parts of Afghanistan voting can make you a target. Again, do we want to encourage people to vote in an environment not conducive to free and fair elections? Civic education or other measures aimed at increasing tolerance and reducing threats and violence might be better methods of increasing turnout.

These points are, of course, most relevant in developing or emerging democracies, although the point about meaningful elections is certainly relevant in the US, and probably in the EU as well.

Best,  Tim

Media campaigns alone such as public service announcements do not work effectively. Working with the media has to be more engaging. This includes more interactive programming that initiates dialogue; such as having popular radio presenters interrogate the process and have the audience participate. Further engagements such as grassroots fora are also helpful. 

But as with any communication campaign, for there to be better results, it must be accompanied by service provision. Example in Kenya, in 2010, the then EMB, the Interim Independent Electoral Commission ( IIEC) not only conducted an aggressive media campaign but also brought services closer to the people by increasing registration centres and improving the registration process through introduction of electronic registration in some areas. By the way, this was a fresh voter-registration exercise.  On the voting day itself, there were updates all the time ( especially on the electronic registered voters) on their experiences to encourage those who hadn't gone to vote to do. This I think contributed significantly to the number of people who got registered and the actual voter turnout at the Constitution referendum held in August 2010. 

However there was a hitch in places where queues were extremely long and people learn from experience; because that negative experience may affect voter turnout in the affected areas in the next voting exercise.

But then again, it is important to note that different countries face different circumstances that affect the voter turnout so the EMBs' interventions should be in the context of each country's unique challenges.

I hope this is meaningful

Beryl

This reply is posted on behalf of a former Electoral Commissioner of India

This is somewhat of a tricky area. It is understandable that EMBs will make the claim that it is their effort that brought higher voting. But the credit truly should go to the political parties/candidates as in fact it is they who do the mobilization at the grassroots level and their efforts get reflected in higher polling and by the same token they can, rather their cadres can, dampen polling percentages. That negative aspect/effort can be prevented by an alert EMB which can thwart such attempts - intimidation, threats , violence etc.,etc., - by getting the Administration to be tough with trouble-makers - both real and potential.

In Indian, conditions the EMB has experienced such efforts at intimidation and has successfully prevented it by employing additional police forces drawn from other areas - non-poll bound  - and ensuring that the polling stations are guarded against violence and the voter population especially the vulnerable sections of the society are provided the confidence through tight policing of their areas to prevent intimidation.

In my opinion advertisements in media or other methods employed by EMBs have a very limited impact on voter behaviour or turn-out.

Gopalaswami

From the observation of Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) in Thailand, they solved the problem of low voters turn out by changing the law to allow voters to do "Advance Voting" one week before actuall voting day.  They also put an obligation to voters for "Compulsary Vote" and have oversea voting/absentee voting.  Voter turn out percentage now is higher than before

"Advance voting" should be two days in every 77 provinces and they should keep the marked ballot papers and voter list in proper room or in custody with siganatory of all parties.  The election commission should use the same voter list with voted signatures on the polling day as they used in advance voting day.   All voters and poll officials can vote in advance but they must give good reason why they can not go to vote on the polling day.

This reply was submitted by Chair Ahmed Issack Hassan of the IIEC Kenya

INCREASED VOTER TURNOUT FOLLOWING PLANNED INITIATIVES: THE CASE OF 2010 NATIONAL REFERENDUM IN KENYA.

Introduction

This is a response to the question raised by Harald Thorud and posted on ACE website. Harald sought comparative country experiences of increased voter turnout in elections. The focus of this response is on two referenda that were held in Kenya. The first referendum was held in 2005 and the second in 2010.

Background

In August 2010 Kenya conducted a national constitutional referendum in the backdrop of diminished public interest in politics and elections. This was an inescapable consequence of the post-election violence that followed the general elections held in 2007. A significant number of voters were inclined to view politics and elections as portending chaos and bloodshed; something that was best avoided or, where unavoidable, warranting no more than lukewarm attention.

Considering the prevailing political environment in Kenya, the challenge of successfully registering voters afresh and realizing healthy voter turnouts in the national referendum was the more pronounced task of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC), the new EMB that was established after the dissolution of the Electoral Commission of Kenya. It required innovative voter education strategies with the potency to overcome entrenched apathies and to rekindle public faith in the electoral process.

IIEC was legally obliged to conduct voter education for the purpose of facilitating informed voting, and by expectation, good choice of political leaders. Despite the legal obligation, it required innovative voter education strategies with the potency to overcome entrenched apathies and to rekindle public faith in the electoral process.

Voter education strategies that were employed were generally replicated in the voter registration drive and the run up to the 2010 referendum. The various strategies that were deployed are below:

i) Consultation with key Stakeholders

IIEC worked closely with organized groups that enjoy social clout during the referendum. Among these were government departments and agencies, media, professional organizations, religious groups, women, youth, labour unions and development partners. The rationale for deliberately targeting these groups was largely threefold:-

a) To establish/strengthen working partnerships.

b) To generate ideas on ideal voter education/sensitization strategies

c) To directly appeal to them and their membership/followers to participate in specific electoral activities.

ii) Use of mass media.

IIEC used TV, radio and newspapers to disseminate voter education messages. Whereas the media has the capacity to be an effective means of conducting voter education, it is nevertheless important to design a rollout plan that optimizes this potential. In dealing with the media IIEC used the following approaches:-

a) Pre-campaign consultative forums with media practitioners.

Rather than IIEC making unilateral decisions on the content and delivery strategies of the envisaged voter education, it invited ideas from media owners, managers and journalists on how best to run the campaign. This was done in a consultative forum that proved useful in designing innovative and effective strategies. Besides, such engagement turned out to be useful investment in goodwill among the media fraternity who often went the extra mile to make the campaign successful.

b) Tailoring messages to target audience

There are more than 60 FM stations in Kenya raging from national to regional or community-based that broadcast in vernacular languages. IIEC appreciated that the audience targeted by these stations is often diverse and unique. Allowing stations to domesticate messages while the IIEC ensured accuracy of the message content by providing write-ups that enabled the stations to communicate with voters in the language that they know best

c) Establishing message ambassadors

Where applicable, IIEC appealed to star presenters- especially for FM stations- to lead by example and by practice. For instance, when a popular radio personality informs listeners that he/she has already registered as a voter or has already voted and gives details of the same and urges them to do likewise, there is extra appeal over and above the

d) Using other celebrities/stars power

Relying on well known personalities to appeal for specific action among the public proved useful and successful especially with TV ads. The plan was to use prominent individuals drawn from the government, the private sector, sports, entertainment and religion among others.

e) Professional media monitoring

The EMB employed a professional and independent media monitor to ensure contracted media houses delivered on contract terms.

iii) Use of Alternative media

The EMB employed other means of voter education such as roadshows and in-store digital broadcasts. The former generally comprised of edutainment where the target audience is entertained with music by popular artists with interludes of voter education messages. The former involved relaying voter education messages on digital screens in a leading shopping outlet.

iv) Use of Voter Educators

The EMB recruited ward and constituency-based voter educators. This was informed by evidence that voters are generally more receptive to acquaintances as educators compared to “strangers.” Homegrown educators have the added advantage of firsthand knowledge of residents’ political habits and information deficiencies that may need redressing/mitigation. This is the primary objective of voter education.

v) Information, Education and Communication (IEC) material

The IIEC developed a number of information, education and communication material for use by key stakeholders and the general public. Among these were: Handbooks, brochures, fliers, posters, stickers and banners

vi) Bulk SMS

Over 2.5 million bulk SMS alerts were sent to mobile subscribers. This had direct and personalized message that reminded citizens of ongoing electoral activities and urged for their desired action. IIEC also managed a short-code Short Message Service (SMS) number for voters to confirm and authenticate their personal voter registration details.

vii) Social media

IIEC tapped into social sites such as Facebook and Twitter to propagate voter education messages. IIEC ran specific Facebook and Twitter accounts dedicated to voter education

viii) Accreditation of Observers

The EMB accredited, on request, independent observer groups and individuals to witness various electoral episodes. Observers are required to submit reports to IIEC based on their mission which, in turn, studies them for recommendations and where applicable, for appropriate reactions. This willingness to subject itself to scrutiny from independent outsiders helped secure public confidence in the EMB and the electoral process.

Results

The 2010 referendum results reflected a voter turnout of 72.18% compared to the referendum of 2005 that registered a voter turnout of 52.36%. Apart from the remarkable voter turnout the electioneering process was peaceful. The contestants in the referendum accepted the results. The Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) finished its tenure and was succeed by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) of Kenya in November 2011. The author was privileged to serve as the chairperson of IIEC. He is the current chairperson of the IEBC of Kenya

Improved voter registration procedures must have led to the significant increase in numbers of registered voters between the general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2002, 2006 and 2010 respectively. This happened in a socio-political environment, which is not exactly conducive for active citizens’ participation. Turnout in percentages remained stable, possibly due also to active voter education / public information efforts undertaken by CSOs before the 2010 polls.

It is practically impossible to attribute the above increases in VR figures to population changes. It is actually about positive changes in legislation and procedures. The EMB is in charge for the voters lists, in coordination with other state agencies, while voters have access to permanent VR centers in each municipality.

Aside from that, a network of 30 local NGOs undertook a wide-scale “Civil society campaign – 2010 elections”. It was mostly run through the media, but some organizations conducted education for first time voters, candidate debates and analyzed parties’ commitments from the previous elections. Synergies and extensive media coverage were achieved through the coordination efforts of the Center for Civic Initiatives (CCI) - a BiH NGO active in the sector for some 10-12 years, which also allocated grants to the implementing partners. A certain number of youth NGOs targeted young voters and I personally find some of their internet activities particularly innovative and possibly successful in motivating this audience.

These NGOs reported an increase in turnout among young voters from 46.9% in 2006 to 52,3% in 2010. Generally, the program managers say that the 56.5 % turnout in 2010 represents 10 % or roughly a quarter of million voters more than what public opinion polls had predicted.

While it is difficult to statistically verify these claims and relate voters’ behavior to this particular voter education effort, it appears to me that the campaign might have effectively neutralized the growing over the years frustrations among BiH citizens with harsh socio-economic realities and with the poor performance of their elected representatives. In any case, I can’t think of any other factors such, as successful new political players, new agendas or an improved quality of the political debate. Nothing like that, unfortunately.

Prior to the 2006 parliamentary elections in Sweden, the government provided a small grant (60 000 euro) to the 12 municipalities that had the lowest turnout in the most recent election (2002). The municipalities were free to spend the money on any activity relating to increased participation, although 50% of the funding was earmarked for civil society support. 

Compared to 2002, turnout increased in 11 of 12 municipalities. This was however true for the national average as well. Some municipalities did really well, turnout increasing more than twice as much as the national average. Success factors included an engaged municipality board, strong contacts between civil servants and civil society and a strong social capital in the municipality in general. 

More information is available from my research paper from 2007.