The Question
This question is posted on behalf of Vasil Vashchanka, member of the ACE Practitioners' Network
 
I am looking for studies/research that would lend support to the argument that democratic consolidation is strengthened by the independence of EMBs. I would also be grateful for any research/analysis that seeks to distinguish between formal and actual (political) independence of EMBs.

Summary of responses
One expert stresses the need to make a clear distinction between EMBs that are formally independent – but may still be influenced by outside entities – and truly independent EMBs. Many EMBs in Africa, for example, purport to be independent, but are not.

On the matter of democratic consolidation and independence of EMBs, another reply is of the view that, “the involvement of political party representatives at the executive level of an EMB is not optimal for achieving public credibility, effective decision-making and administrative efficiency.”

A number of books, articles, handbooks and reports are cited as lending support to the argument that democratic consolidation is strengthened by the independence of EMBs (see below).

Examples of related ACE Articles and Resources
Encyclopaedia:
• Independent Model EMBs

External Resources
• Hartlyn, J., McCoy, J., & Mustillo, T. (2008). Electoral Governance Matters: Explaining the Quality of Elections in Contemporary Latin America. Comparative Political Studies, 41(1), 73.
• Pastor, Robert A.  The role of Electoral Administration in Democratic Transitions: Implications for Policy and Research
• International IDEA, The Electoral Management Design Handbook

• Gazibo, Mamoudou, The Forging of Institutional Autonomy: A Comparative Study of Electoral Management Commissions in Africa, Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, 39:3 (September/septembre 2006) 611–633
• Thiriot, C. 2004. “La consolidation des régimes post-transition en Afrique: le rôle des
commissions électorales nationales.” In Voter en Afrique: Comparaisons et différen-
tiations, ed. P. Quantin. Paris: L’Harmattan, 129–47.
• Election Commission of Bhutan

• The Neill Committee's Report on the Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom, published on 13th October 1998.

Names of contributors
1. Skye Christensen
2. Cristian-Alexandru Leahu
3. Carl Dundas
4. Harry Neufeld
5. Gabrielle Bardall
6. Kunzang Wangdi
7. Norbert Masson

Dear Vasil

One of the difficulties of studying the independence of electoral management is that many of the old democracies have governmental EMBs while the newer ones have EMBs which are structurally independent. 

One of my favourite studies in this is: Hartlyn, J., McCoy, J., & Mustillo, T. (2008). Electoral Governance Matters: Explaining the Quality of Elections in Contemporary Latin America. Comparative Political Studies, 41(1), 73. Hartlyn et al look within Latin America, which controls for the problem of old and new democracies to some extent. They used the appointment mechanism as the primary independent variable while the acceptance of the results was the dependent variable. 

They found that "a professional EMB is close to being sufficient condition for acceptable elections." 

I'm attaching the study, I hope this helps. 

Dear Vasil

I would suggest "The role of Electoral Administration in Democratic Transitions: Implications for Policy and Research" by Robert A. Pastor. It can be found in an offprint journal at http://www1.american.edu/ia/cdem/pdfs/roleelectoraladministration.pdf .

A clear distinction should be made between the formal classification of EMBs as independent model and those EMBs which operate as independent bodies, meaning that they do not function under the influence of any outside entity, particularly that of the ruling party or government in a given jurisdiction. A good illustration of this may be seen in the African Union Member States where thirty-three of the fifty-one EMBs are listed as belonging to the independent model of EMBs, but in fact the majority of those EMBs in practice are not considered by stakeholders, election observers or election researchers as independent. In order to earn the coveted label of a functioning independent EMB, at least three credible general elections should be conducted by the EMB and be so accepted by the majority of the stakeholders and independent election observers involved.

Challenging question, Vasil.

You may wish to look at the International IDEA handbook on 'Electoral Management Design' (http://www.idea.int/publications/emd/fr.cfm) and review their study of 214 countries and the three types of electoral management structures they identify (pp. 304 - 325).  Case studies of individual countries with 'independent' EMBs may provide information that supports the argument you are interested in developing. 

Most (55%) of the countries reported having an 'independent' commission in charge of electoral administration.  A majority (61%) of these were made up of 'expert' rather than political party representatives appointed as commissioners. 

In my view, the involvement of political party representatives at the executive level of an EMB is not optimal for achieving public credibility, effective decision-making and administrative efficiency.

However, an 'indpendent' commission made up of political party representatives on the Board of Directors might conceivably be better for a democratic consoldiation process than having a governmental EMB (e.g. elections run by the Ministry of Interior) or mixed-model (i.e. commission + government body) EMB.

Dear Vasil,

I would also suggest you look at "The Forging of Institutional Autonomy: A Comparative Study of Electoral Management Commissions in Africa" by Mamoudou Gazibo, Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, 39:3 (September/septembre 2006) 611–633. Gazibo broadly makes the link between EMB autonomy, electoral quality and, ultimately, democratic consolidation. His argument mostly focuses on paths of forging institutional autonomy.

Also see: Thiriot, C. 2004. “La consolidation des régimes post-transition en Afrique: le rôle des
commissions électorales nationales.” In Voter en Afrique: Comparaisons et différen-
tiations, ed. P. Quantin. Paris: L’Harmattan, 129–47.

This reply is posted on behalf of a member of the Malaysian Centre for Commonwealth Studies

I believe the answer to the second part of your question is best answered by the research conducted by international Idea which produced a hand book of various models of EMBs worldwide --Independent,Governmental and mixed model designs of EMBs . I found it very useful when doing my own research in this area

Dear Vasil,

Please visit WWW.election-bhutan.org.bt to see whether our laws are useful for your work. Thanks, Yours sincerely, Kunzang

Dear All,

Thank you very much for the responses and references.  They are extremely useful.  IDEA is developing a paper on electoral management in transition, which I hope to share with you in the coming weeks.

Best regards,

Vasil

Dear Vasil,

See :The Neill Committee's Report on the Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom which was published on 13th October 1998. The report dealt inter alia with the role and function of an electoral commission. Hear what the Neill Committee said in this regard "The functions of the Electoral commission are crucial to maintaining public confidence in our democratic institutions. It is vital therefore that the Commission is wholly independent of the government of the day, and is seen to be scrupulously impartial in its dealings with political parties. To ensure that this is the case, the Commission will not be a non-departmental body on normal lines but will be directly accountable to Parliament. "

You may wish to refer to:http://www.archive.official documents.co.uk/document/cm44/4413/4413-htm.it.htm

I shall be pleased to receive a copy of your study