This question was posed by Rindai Chipfunde Vava, National Director for the Zimbabwe Election Support Network and member of the Practitioners' Network.

Original Question:

Zimbabwe is advertising for Electoral Commissioners and the government has requested the ZESN (Zimbabwe Election Support Network) to come up with criteria for selection. What kind of selection criteria for Electoral Commissioners is used in your respective countries?

Introduction: Contextualizing Electoral Commissions

An Electoral Commission, or Election Commission, falls under the category of institutions today broadly regrouped under the term Electoral Management Body (EMB). An EMB is the body or bodies responsible for electoral management. The mix or choice of how to organize EMBs in a specific country thus refers to the Electoral Management Design (EMD) or Electoral Management Model (EMM) of that country. International IDEA and its partners generally discerns three categories of EMBs normally employed in the world today; i) the governmental EMB model – where the elections are organized and managed by the executive branch of government, usually through a ministry; ii) the mixed EMB model where usually two EMBs share the responsibility between on the one hand one governmental component which organizes the elections and one independent EMB structure that oversees and monitors them. The last model iii) is the Independent EMB model which uses an EMB structure with institutions that are independent and autonomous from the government to organize and manage elections. Under this last model, an EMB is not accountable to a government ministry or department but may be accountable to the legislature, the judiciary, or the head of state. The independent EMB should also be in charge of its own budget and financial resources to be able to exercise independence. However, as pointed out by Sara Staino in a previous consolidated reply here on ACE narrating the history and evolution of independent EMBs, it should also be noted that for achieving truly independent EMBs, a legislated structural independence with structurally autonomous EMBs might not suffice: In addition to being formally free to act, the EMB should also carry a culture of actually using the space for action, what Staino refers to as a dimension of “fearless independence”. In other words, to be free and independent, an EMB needs to have both structural and formal independence in terms of legislation, but also needs to posses a culture and attitude which promotes integrity and action. To learn more about the factors that influence EMB behaviour, click here.

As echoed by Rafael Lopez-Pintor in quote you can see to the right, current international experience and best practice have demonstrated that out of the three models described above, the independent electoral commissions are the preferred institutional model to facilitate democratic development and promote stability and governance today, and especially so for countries emerging from long-drawn conflicts. Most new electoral management models created today hence try to employ independent EMB models.

List of countries with a recent setting up of independent EMB structures

Summary of responses: What an EMB provides and how it is selected

As informed by Chris Hennemeyer, chapter four of the Handbook of International IDEA EMD is a great source of information to understand the various aspects of EMB composition and constitution. As informed therein, regardless of the EMM/EMD employed (governmental, mixed, or independent), an EMB’s activities generally require both the determination and capacity to formulate policy as well as skills to drive implementation of major administrative and logistics operations in order to carry out the actual elections on the ground. It is not an easy task. In this sense, the skills needed to compose an EMB consequently span a range of fields including management, integrity, professionalism and technical competence. It is therefore very important that each country carefully select their own specific mix of members keeping in mind their qualifications as well as depending on the circumstances at hand in the country in question.

Who can be a part of the electoral commission and on what basis are they chosen?

In most Independent EMMs, it is the electoral legislation that specifies the framework and criteria for EMB membership. In some countries, so called multi-party EMBs are used. In this system, the idea is that every political party shall hold representation and as such, the partisanship of one representative in the EMB is matched by that of the others. As a consequence, independence and neutrality can be achieved even though political affiliation is present. Since the base for nomination here comes from political affiliation, it is the political parties’ rules (hierarchy, membership in the party etc) that apply when deciding whom is to qualify for nomination.

On the other side of the spectrum, expert based EMBs, as the name indicate, are constituted on the basis of merits and professional standing of its members. Qualifications could include various criteria such as minimum age, citizenship, professional qualifications and renowned competence and university degrees in fields such as law and/or political science. In the Philippines for example, as pointed out by IFES Philippines , criteria for short listing candidates might also be more qualitative variables such as “proven track record of integrity and honesty in public and private life” as well as “loyalty to the duties and functions of the office, and not personal loyalties”. Expert based EMBs are quite common, found in countries such as Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Poland, Thailand and Ukraine.

Some countries also mix the model of political affiliation with that of solely expert based criteria. In Hungary for example, while the members of the EMB are elected by legislature based on expertise, each political party participating in the election at hand also appoint one member each.

Carl Dundas informs that many countries make a distinction between the chairperson, or head, of the EMB and the members therein. Normally, while the members of a commission are charged with formulating the policy and guide the direction of the EMB, the chairperson (“chief electoral commissioner” or similar) could hold a more executive position, providing hands-on management of the electoral process, representing the EMB toward other entities and be in control of staff for example. The chair might sometime be required to be a judge or former judge.

The actual process for appointing members to the EMB is often stipulated in the country’s electoral law. The recruitment and selection can be from nomination procedures or open advertising and may in the case of expert based EMB components include tests of competence, integrity and merit. Following the nomination, the formal appointment to the EMB can then be made by, inter alia, head of state, legislature or executive branch of government. An advantage of using open advertising for recruiting these posts may be that such a process creates transparency and good screening of merits of the candidates. It also opens up opportunities for candidates outside the normally favoured elites to apply. However, open advertising can be timely and costly and it could also discourage certain individuals whom do not wish to be publicly seen as applying (or failing to succeed) to be part of an EMB. Countries where open advertisement is common feature Iraq, Namibia, and South Africa.

In other countries the process is sequenced differently; for example in Kenya or Sierra Leone the nominations are initiated by the Head of State and then confirmed by the legislature. There are also systems featuring unilateral appointment. In Zambia, Malaysia and Senegal the Head of State unilaterally both nominate and confirm members to the EMB. Analysts have criticized this model arguing it could favour political bias toward the Head of State as a prerequisite for members’ nomination.

Ace Data

Looking at ACE’s comparative data on electoral management, found here, yields some basic features of how EMBs are generally set up across the world. It should be noted though that across the 214 countries used in the survey, the variation is big and the availability of data sometimes missing. Nonetheless, when studying EMBs on this aggregate level one can see that – apart from independent EMBs being more popular than governmental or mixed models throughout the world – the most normal set up of the EMB involves members (including chairs) that are appointed for a specific number of years (as opposed to for the election period only or for an indefinite time). In addition, the number of members in an EMB is often below 10 – the mean across all countries surveyed is 6 or so members, but with big variation. When EMBs include political party nominees for example, they can tend to have higher numbers of members in order to accommodate a credible range of interests. Out of the countries that do have a high number of EMB members, one can interestingly note several African countries, for example Cameroon (12), Central African Republic (30), Comoros (27) and Guinea Conakry (22). When choosing the members to the Commission, whom are usually appointed by either the Head of State or the Legislative Function of the country, expertise and competence is usually favoured over partisanship or political experience, even though a mix of these two dimensions are featured in many EMBs. An aggregate tableau conveying some normal characteristics from this ACE data is found below. In addition, as a comparsion and illustration to this more generic description,  two extracts from the selection of commissioners from the specific cases of South Africa and Sudan are also provided.

Common features in EMBs and their members

• Independent in structure;
• Members portrays expertise of the domain;
• On average features about 6-8 members but with high variation;
• Members commonly appointed by Head of State or Legislative;

(Source, ACE Comparative Data, Topic Electoral Management)

 Extracts from “real life” Electoral Commission Acts:

Replies and input received, with thanks, from:

Sara Staino

Fredrik Larsson

Carl Dundas

Chris Hennemeyer

Rushdie Nackerdien

IFES team in the Philippines

Mahmad Ally Dahoo

Debashis Sen

Hi Rindai,

There are several criteria for selecting electoral commissioners in Africa and elsewhere:

-Many countries make a distinction between the chairperson of the commission and the members there of. In such cases, the chairperson may be required to be of a stipulated age, and of a particular professional discipline, usually the legal profession, of a stipulated number of years, tens years or more. In some jurisdiction, the chairperson is required to be a member of the Judiciary of the Highest court in the country, or had been a member of that court, or is qualified to be appointed to that court.

In the case of members of an electoral commission, some constitutions or electoral legislative schemes require eligible persons to be of good standing in the community; to be members of stipulated professions or disciplines, including electoral administration; of a stipulated age; and with anticedent that has not been recently (past five to seven years) associated with active party politics. A prospective member of an electoral commission should not be likely to be in a position of conflict of interest with the work of the commission. 

My colleague Anne Salinas of IFES informs me that “Chapter 4 of the IDEA Handbook on EMB design gets into commissioner criteria, and there is a table on page 98 of selection criteria in Indonesia/Yemen/Mexico. I’ve attached this chapter.”

Chris Hennemeyer

I should add that, in my view, there are several desirable characteristics one might seek in a group of commissioners:

* minimal political partisanship, which might mean selecting commissioners not only from traditional political parties but also from civil society and faith-based groups

* ethnic, regional, gender and age diversity -- the more complex the mix, the less chance of creating an easily manipulated "mafia"

* while intimate familiarity with electoral work need not be required, a demonstrated commitment to democracy should be

On behalf of Mara Krier, representing the IFES team in the Philippines:

Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the Commission on Elections, also known as COMELEC, is one of the three constitutional commissions of the Philippines. It is the premier guardian of the ballot. Its principal role is to enforce all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, initiatives, referendums, and recalls.

The Commission Proper (En Banc) is the policy-making body of COMELEC composed of the Chairman and six Commissioners.

The minimum requirements of a candidate for the six COMELEC commissioners and Chairman are set out in Article IX (C) Sec. 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution:

1. One must be a natural born citizen of the Philippines;

2. At least 35 years of age at the time of his/her appointment;

3. Holder of a college degree;

4. Must not have been a candidate for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections, provided that the majority of the Commissioners including the Chairman must be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.

It has been observed that the selection process by the Office of the President for COMELEC commissioners was never transparent, and the selection criteria (except for the minimum requirements) were never made public. The President has the prerogative to freely appoint COMELEC commissioners. The appointment power of the President for COMELEC commissioners is “checked” through the congressional confirmation of the Commission on Appointments (composed of members from both Houses of Congress).

As early as 2007, a committee of electoral reform advocates from different Philippine civil society groups organized themselves and called for a very transparent selection process with regard to choosing and appointing the new set of commissioners.

The civil society search committee aimed to influence the selection process by coming up with their own list of candidates. The committee emailed its network of electoral reform advocates to ask for nominees who will replace three retiring commissioners (not to mention a seventh slot that was yet to be filled). It interviewed nominees and other people, including those from the provinces. They also shared the CVs and endorsers of their nominees with the media. The committee then submitted its recommendations to the President and the Palace search committee.

The criteria that the electoral reform advocates’ search committee used in determining their shortlist of candidates are indicated in the matrix found below:

Criteria for selection of Electoral Commissioners - MAURITIUS

            In Mauritius, there are two (or rather three) distinct bodies responsible for elections and which are guaranteed by the Constitution :

1.           Electoral Commissioner, who is responsible for the conduct of registration of electors and elections and for the compilation of registers of electors.

2.           Electoral Supervisory Commission, which is responsible for the supervision of registration of electors and elections.

3.           Electoral Boundaries Commission, which is responsible for the delimitation of electoral boundaries every ten years.

            Their selection criteria are set up in the Constitution under Sections 40 and 38 respectively, which are reproduced hereunder:-

40        Electoral Commissioner

(1)        There shall be an Electoral Commissioner, whose office shall  be a public office and who shall be appointed by the Judicial and Legal Service Commission.

(2)        No person shall be qualified to hold or act in the office of Electoral  Commissioner unless he is qualified to practise as a barrister in Mauritius.

(3)        Without prejudice to section 41, in the exercise of his functions under this Constitution, the Electoral Commissioner shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.

            38        Electoral Commissions

(1)        There shall be an Electoral Boundaries Commission which shall consist of a chairman and not less than two nor more than seven other members appointed by the President, acting after consultation with the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and such other persons as appear to the President, acting in his own deliberate judgement, to be leaders of parties in the Assembly.

(2)        There shall be an Electoral Supervisory Commission which shall consist of a chairman and not less than 2 nor more than seven other members appointed by the President, acting after consultation with the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and such other persons as appear to the President, acting in his own deliberate judgement, to be leaders of parties in the Assembly.

(3)        No person shall be qualified for appointment as a member of the Electoral Boundaries Commission or the Electoral Supervisory Commission if he is a member of, or a candidate for election to, the  Assembly or any local authority or a public officer or a local government officer.

(4)        Subject to this section, a member of the Electoral Boundaries Commission or the Electoral Supervisory Commission shall vacate his office –

(a)     at the expiration of 5 years from the                       date of his appointment; or

(b)     where any circumstances arise that, if he were not a member of the Commission, would cause him to be disqualified for appointment as such.

Best Regards.

M.A. DAHOO

Chief Electoral Officer

Mauritius

A panel should be made in consultation with the Speaker, Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition.