Original question

This question was posed by an ACE user through the "Ask a question" function in Electoral Advice.

I am working with an African government which is interested in exploring the option to give its independent election commission the role of overseeing and administering internal political party elections. It believes that its present system is rampant with corruption and that this might be a possible way forward.

I undertook to approach you to see whether any members of your network has conducted any work in this area/s and whether they might be aware of any country that has already done this.

I (and the independent election commission) should be grateful for whatever help the ACE Network may be able to give.

Introduction

Quote from the ACE Encyclopaedia:

"Political parties perform many tasks both during election campaigns and between elections. Since much of the work of policy-making, ideological changes, and candidate selection take place within the parties rather than in the public domain, it is important to look at the internal functioning of political parties."

According to Antonio Spinelli, the logic applying to the democratic system of a given country would apply also to the internal affairs of the political parties themselves. The objective of democracy is to empower citizens with the right to choose and this choice is usually exercised through the holding of elections. Therefore, just as the citizens of a nation are entitled to cast ballots in elections, so the “citizens” of a political party (that is the party members or supporters) could be entitled to select (or to reject) candidates who are wishing to run for public office.

The internal affairs of political parties are often regulated in a country’s constitution/electoral law or in specific political parties' laws. Internal regulations among the parties themselves are also common. In some but not all countries there are provisions stating that political parties should elect their representatives or candidates democratically, but according to Spinelli such provisions are often vague and could be open to broad interpretation. One such example is in Germany where the Basic Law of 1949 states that “internal party organization shall conform to democratic principles”.

The ACE Encyclopaedia distinguishes between three main types of internal party elections:

•    In the Caucus (or Congress/Convention) election, selection of candidates are made at a party meeting (Caucus) where decisions are made internally behind closed doors. In some cases all party members are entiled to attend and vote in the meeting, while in other cases only party leaders or delegates from party sub-unites take part. Caucus elections are the most common way for political parties to select their candidates. 

•    Closed primary elections (or membership elections) are open to all members of the political party but not to other voters. This requirement implies that in order to be eligible, voters must openly declare their affiliation with a political party at the time of voter registration, which might be unfeasible in countries where political intimidation is high. Closed primary elections are used in many of the states in the US. 

•    Open primary elections (or open voters elections) are open to all registered voters in the constituency. Although avoiding the problem of voters having to openly state their party affiliation, the open primary system might risk being used by supporters of other parties to try to ensure that the candidate with least possibilities of winning the general election would win the primary. Open primary elections are rare, although used some US states.

Spinelli also mentions other cases of "de facto" primary elections between candidates from multi-party alliances, such as the one created by the Two-Round System used to elect a president in France.  Here, the first round allows rival candidates from within the same political sphere to compete against each other. The first ballot functions as a sort of national primary election in which a single champion will emerge from both left and right, and these champions will then participate in the second ballot. These contrast starkly with the cross-party nominating convention in Finland, where candidates seek support of members of other parties in order to win.

Summary of replies

The question of internal party election administration is relevant, since it can allow the EMB to contribute to an open and fair selection of party candidates (and therefore to their political legitimacy once they have been elected). However there are few cases where EMBs are involved in internal party elections, and the potential risks and dangers are numerous. 

Cases where EMBs are involved in internal party elections
Situations of EMBs being legally mandated to administer internal party elections are rare. Apart from the US, Magnus Öhman mentions Ghana as a case where the national EMB has taken on this role since the 2000 elections, offering to conduct the internal elections for parliamentary candidates on a voluntary basis. According to Öhman this opportunity has only been used by a limited number of parties, and many of these elections have been problematic according to EMB officials. Öhman also points out that the Ghanaian EMB is considered to be highly competent and independent by the general public, and that this is likely to be a crucial requirement for the successful administration of these internal elections. It is also worth noticing that the EMB only administers a limited part of the selection process, namely the actual election process at constituency level. The Kenyan EMB is also authorized to oversee internal party elections, but their level of involvement remains inconsistent. 

According to Simon Osborn the Kenyan Electoral Commission was given the mandate to conduct internal party elections as part of the Inter Party Parliamentary Group reforms of 1997, although the amendment came too late to be implemented prior to the 1997 elections. In 2002 the issue was revisited but the EMB was cautious to get involved as they felt the political parties did not have the capacity to conduct elections to the extent they required. It is worth noting that these talks came about due to the instances of violence, intimidation, and corruption previously present in Kenyan primary elections, as over 25 people were killed during the 2002 primary elections. 

Finally Spinelli concurs that cases of EMBs being legally mandated to organize internal party elections is rare, but cites examples of where it has occurred and the resulting implications. In the cases of Uruguay and Peru, the EMBs have a legal mandate to, to some extent, assist in the administration of internal party elections. This is also the case in Italy, but in 2006 one of the main political parties decided to conduct internal primary elections without the involvement of the EMB. Recent developments in Israel have also prompted modifications to the nomination system modeled after the United States design. Some countries (such as Indonesia and Nigeria) have adopted other provisions in order for the EMB to oversee internal party elections, where candidates are required by law to submit to the EMB the minutes of the meetings where they were selected as candidates for a particular election. Tanzania and Kenya have also debated the internal party processes in an effort to ensure fairness and efficiency. 

Managing internal party elections
Simon Osborn underlines the principal question of whether it is feasible that the state is involved in legislating and running the internal elections of political parties. As pointed out by Mark Stevens, EMB involvement might affect negatively on the integrity and independence of the political parties themselves as the EMB, as a state institution, might exert undue influence on them. However there are potential gains of such an involvement, such as responding to a demand for external scrutiny and the prevention of corruption and fraud. It is crucial that all parties, particularly the opposition, are in agreement of the need for such a process, lest the balance between political parties and the EMB be upset.  

Magnus Öhman points out that internal selection processes often are strongly connected to the central power structures of political parties, and that such structures are normally very hard to change. Reducing the role and power of political parties in this process is likely to have substantial effects on factors such as party cohesion. Öhman points out that such a system might not actually necessarily be the most democratic according to some scholars.

The task of monitoring internal party elections requires substantial demands on the capacity of the EMB. Staffan Darnolf points out that the EMB will need to be held in high regard by all electoral stakeholders and it must be able to offer the same kind of services to all political parties in order not to get involved in internal politics of the parties and jeopardize its overall mandate. Öhman argues that the conduct of such processes might also put strain on the EMB’s ability to carry out its main mandate as internal party elections are likely to take place during the pre-electoral period of the national elections. 

Osborn mentions the option of using an external agent to conduct the polls as an alternative method to introduce external scrutiny. External agents (such as EISA) have been used by parties in countries such as South Africa and the UK.

Image: Flickr/Alluringemail

Replies were received, with thanks, from:

Antonio Spinelli

Magnus Öhman

Staffan Darnolf

Mark Stevens

Simon Osborn

Relevant links

ACE Encyclopaedia:    Internal functioning of political parties

ACE Encyclopaedia:    Primary elections

ACE Encyclopaedia:    United States: Study on Primary Electons

Individual answers:

The question posed is indeed an interesting one, as it relates to issues of open and fair selection of party candidates (and therefore to their political legitimacy once they have been elected) and a possible role for an election management body (EMB) in overseeing and administering that selection process.

In the last years, I have been providing assistance to and worked with a number of electoral commissions worldwide and I must admit that cases in which an EMB is legally mandated for organizing and conducting internal party elections are indeed extremely rare. While this concept is intriguing and, due to its sensitivity, it certainly needs careful consideration, personally, I have never encountered a single instance of this kind.

Generally, political parties are required to run their internal affairs in accordance with procedures set out in relevant laws. There are instances of countries in which the legal framework (in this case, either the relevant electoral legislation or the political parties’ laws) establishes that political parties should "democratically" elect their candidates, but being this provision rather vague, the term "democratically" could be open to broad interpretation. Germany is a country where the value of internal party democracy is taken for granted in the Basic Law of 1949, which - specifically on the subject of political parties - mandates that “internal party organization shall conform to democratic principles”.

The main and strongest argument for “internal party democracy” is that the logic that applies to the democratic system of a given country (like the one of the country in your case, I hope) should apply also to the internal affairs of the political party organizations themselves. The objective of democracy is to empower citizens with the right to choose and this choice is usually exercised through the holding of elections. Therefore, just as the citizens of a nation are entitled to cast ballots in elections, so the “citizens” of a political party (that is the party members or supporters) should be entitled to select (or to reject) candidates who are wishing to run for public office.

There are different levels and sub-levels of internal elections. The main ones are:

• THE CAUCUS SYSTEM. The first level is the "Caucus" (or party meeting), a common internal mechanism to select party candidates, where the selection is generally made behind closed doors and by just party leaders or party members. They vote internally within the party organization to select the candidates who will then compete in an election. Problematic issues that arise from using a Caucus system include its often unrepresentative nature, the lack of a separation of powers within the party, the use of secret deals or exchanging favours to manipulate the nomination process by the Caucus, and the use of a "snap" caucus (by which small factions of a party control the nominating process by not notifying all eligible participants of the meeting), or other questionable behaviours. The Caucus can, however, produce compromise among different factions of a party. Being merely an internal procedure, the organization and conduct of a Caucus does not entail the involvement of an electoral management body. Moving to the regional context in which you are operating, in African countries political parties normally nominate their respective candidates and generally during party congresses.
• PRIMARY ELECTIONS. Being one of the primary purposes of a political party to select candidates and help them be elected, ideally, the selected candidate should be the candidate with the most popular support within the party. Unfortunately this is not always the case. Electing the nominees is one effective way to open up the selection of nominees and thus to ensure a fair selection of party candidates. Hence, the next level is when party supporters are involved in the so-called "primary" elections. The purpose of these elections is essentially a restrictive one, since they are meant to deny party leaders and office-holders the (often arbitrary) power to select the party's nominees as candidates for elective office. In the United States, for example, the influence of party leaders and factions was dramatically decreased through the introduction of the "primary" election system which opened up the nomination process and made nominee selection a more transparent, representative and democratic exercise.

Primary elections are "closed" when the nomination of candidates is restricted to party members. Hence, in a closed primary election, voters must declare their affiliation with a political party at the time of voter registration and voters who do not want to be officially affiliated with a political party may not vote in this type of elections (I don’t know if this is your case, but in countries with a high political intimidation, it may be unfeasible - or simply too dangerous - for voters to openly declare their political affiliation). Primary elections are "open" when all the registered voters (depending on the rules of the party and on the electoral system) are allowed to choose their nominees. A weak side of this system is that it could allow members of some political parties to interfere by selecting the nominees of another party - presumably selecting the weakest candidate, so that their own party candidate can win in the general elections.

Primary elections are generally organized and conducted by the EMB (like in the US), although this is not always the case. In Italy, after a long debate, in 2006 one of the main political parties has resorted to the use of primary elections within its internal party organization to achieve the nomination of candidates who indeed enjoy wide popular support. Being an internal matter and independent decision of a single political party, these open primary elections were conducted through the party national structure - both in Italy and abroad - without any type of involvement for the national EMB.

Finland and France illustrate the process concerning methods of negotiation between potentially allied parties in multi-party systems:

• In Finland, individual parties elect candidates to a cross-party nominating convention. There, bargaining takes place among the parties, and politicians who hope to win must seek the support of delegates of parties other than their own.
• In France, there is a two-ballot system of presidential elections. This allows rival candidates from within the political right, or the political left, to put themselves forward in the first ballot. The first ballot functions as a sort of national primary election in which a single champion will emerge from both left and right, and these champions will then participate in the second ballot.

Finally, browsing the web I ran into a few, isolated cases in which an national EMB has indeed some sort of responsibilities for internal party elections. Going through legislations of various countries, the few references that I could find to an involvement of EMBs in internal party elections were in Latin American countries, such as:

• Uruguay, Law Nº 17.063 (1998), Normas Relativas a las Elecciones Internas de los Partidos Politicos (procedures for internal elections of political parties);
• Peru, “Internal democracy” section, paragraphs 19 to 27 of the Political Parties Act of Peru.

Aside from the possible role that an EMB could play in internal party elections, you should be relieved to know that internal party democracy is not a challenge unique to the country where you operate, but it is an increasingly common problem for a number of countries, in both emerging and consolidated democracies.

Some examples are: Italy, as I mentioned before. Israel, where problems that characterized the Likud internal elections brought a wave of demands that party elections for the list of Knesset candidates be modeled on the US primary elections system. Tanzania and Kenya, where there is an intense debate on the need to assess internal party democracy, to identify the challenges parties face and address the reasons for failing to institutionalise internal party democracy and internal party organisational structures.

I agree that the participation of EMBs in the selection of candidates within political parties is rare, but it is not unheard of. The EMB in Ghana has taken on this role since the 2000 elections, offering to conduct the internal elections for parliamentary candidates on a voluntary basis (and conducting the selection of all presidential candidates). Only a few parties have availed themselves of this opportunity, and Ghanaian EMB officials have expressed how problematic these elections can be. I have observed such (EMB-conducted) elections for the major parties in Ghana, and it is always an interesting affair.

Relating to previous comments, I should point out that the Ghanaian EMB is unusually well considered in the country as being both capable and independent. If it was not, it would not be able or suitable for it to play this role. Also, it does not oversee the entire selection process, it only conducts the actual election process at constituency level, and this only if the parties wish them to do so.

I have been informed that the Kenyan EMB has the authority to play a similar role, but I do not know if they have ever done so in practice.

I should also warn that the selection process within political parties is very central to the power structures within these parties, and these are difficult to alter. Creating a decentralised system organised by the EMB is likely to move the actual selection process to the previous stage; when the names to be included in the internal elections are decided. A US-style selection process, where the parties have been largely removed from the selection process, would most likely have effects on party cohesion and other areas, and such effects need to be closely analysed. Many scholars of candidate selection systems within political parties challenge the idea that a decentralised system is necessarily the most democratic.

Regarding the EMB, this type of activity may not only jeopardise the integrity and reputation of an unprepared EMB, it should also be born in mind that the candidate selection process often happens at a time when the EMB will be fully occupied with organising the national election itself.

Responding to the comments of my illustrious colleagues I would have to concur with Staffan that in general terms this should be advised against. Whilst it is important to promote notions of internal democracy and transparency etc, the notion of the state (and the EMB is a state institution) in some way starting to involve itself in such a way in the machinations of a party and to regulate in such a fashion how a political party conducts itys afgairs can be a dangerous road to go down, as many states would be only too keen to do this to the detriment of the integrity and independence of the party. Ultimately it is up to voters to judge a political party. If the voters do not like how the party has behaved then they can vote for someone else (assuming they are given this choice!). As Magnus also says, this could also backfire on the EMB, as it gets embroiled in the internal political affairs of a party, which would be to the detriment of the electoral process. Whilst the example of Ghana flies in the face of this argument, as the EMB is extremely well regarded, as a general rule I think we have to be extremely cautious on this subject.

Magnus is quite right about the Kenyan Electoral Commission. Its functions were amended as part of the Inter Party Parliamentary Group reforms of 1997 to allow it to conduct party elections. However the amendment came to late for the 1997 elections and in 2002 the issue was revisited.

Kenyan party primaries have unfortunately been the focus of serious violence, intimidation and bribery. Indeed in 2002 over 25 people were killed during the party primaries as a result of intra party violence. The Kenya Domestic Observer Project partners report on the 2002 elections - When Kenyans Spoke - identified queue voting as a significant contributory factor in providing the opportunity for candidates to commit violence, intimidation and bribery. But this may not be the only factor. After all violence, intimidation and other offenses also occurred in some areas even when the parties attempted to hold elections by secret ballot.

The ECK however has been loathe to involve itself unduly in these elections because they doubt whether the parties can afford the cost of running "open" primaries using a secret ballot to a standard which they believe would be acceptable and the state has been unwilling to fund this.

By law the ECK can be called upon to conduct elections for the parties and more recently it has done so. But cost, the sheer administrative burden of conducting nationwide open party primaries and the potential to undermine the ECK's own fragile credibility have been three major reasons why they have not become more involved.

But there is obviously a larger issue here and Mark and Staffan are quite right to highlight it - should the state be involved in legislating for and running the internal elections of Political Parties? Particularly when this can be open to another type of abuse. If all parties, particularly the opposition, accept the need for external scrutiny or administration of their own internal polls and it can credibly deter would be offenders then it might be worth considering.

There is another option other than the EMB that should or could be considered - the party can hire a credible external agent. The ANC, for example, have in the past employed EISA for example to conduct the party's internal elections. In the UK the parties have employed outside agencies like the Electoral Reform Society to conduct their leadership and national executive elections but have fought shy of employing them to run their selection processes - it being far too expensive and by no means guarantees a poll free from manipulation!

This last pont is probably the most critical - would a truly independent electoral administrator, acceptable to all, acting under laws that are not unduly restrictive of the parties, be able to deter would be candidates from acts of bribery, intimidation or violence? After all the EMB is not the security services! They rarely have powers to investigate or prosecute offenders! My own experience is that candidates or their agents will only desist from commiting such offences if they know they have a fair chance of being caught and prosecuted.