Plurality systems where a majority coalition can't override the election leader
Plurality systems where majority coalition can't override election leader
Russell Bloom, November 06. 2018This question is posted by ACE on behalf of Desmond Thomas.
Original Question:
I am looking for examples of and/or data on countries with plurality systems in which a coalition of parties, making up a majority, cannot override the plurality leader after the election in order to form the government. Does anyone have this information or know of good sources to find it? Any examples and sources are welcome.
Summary of Replies:
There was a limited discussion on this question regarding examples and data of countries with plurality systems where a majority coalition cannot override the plurality leader after the election. Guyana was presented as an example where post-election coalitions are not allowed, and the example of the 2015 election was given, demonstrating the successful attempt where two parties formed a pre-election coalition, resulting in a majority and replacing the previous plurality leader. The same contributor made the valid point that the party in power may not have control to approve projects and programmes as a result of a minority in parliament.
In some countries the rejection of the government budget, or other important bills, is equivalent to a vote of no-confidence, which results in a new election. This is the case in Australia, Canada, India, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and other countries using the Westminster system. The majority of countries, if not all, seem to fit into the criteria of the question, where a coalition cannot override the plurality leader post-election, except with what was already mentioned in regards to votes of confidence.
Another possible example for consideration was during the 2008-2009 Canadian parliamentary dispute where two political parties agreed to form a coalition government if the plurality leader (holding a minority government) was defeated in a confidence vote. The discussions to form a coalition was instigated by a fiscal update six weeks after the election in which the plurality leader was elected, but the only way this would have been successful was if a confidence vote, such as the budget, was rejected. This would have led to another election. The plurality leader, and his party, negotiated the budget to avoid this outcome. Additional sources and databases that may prove useful are:
The Electoral System Design Database <www.idea.int/data-tools/data/electoral-system-design>.
The Global Elections Database <www.globalelectionsdatabase.com>.
Armstrong, David A. and Raymond M. Duch. “Why can Voters Anticipate Post-Election Coalition Formation Likelihoods?” Electoral Studies 29, no. 3 (2010): 308-315.
Contributing members:
Re: Plurality systems where majority coalition can't override election leader
Vishnu Persaud, November 08. 2018In Guyana, the contesting political parties that receives the largest number of votes wins the Presidency and gets to form the government. Legislation in Guyana does not allow for post election coalition. Any Parties wishing to form a coalition would have to so do prior to the submission of the combined List of Candidates to contest the elections. This is precisely what took place with respect to Guyana's 2015 General & Regional Elections resulting in the then incumbent government being removed from office.
It is essential to note that, in a situation where the party that forms the government may not necessarily have the majority in parliament. Hence, governance in itself gets affected because of the government's inability to get approval for expenditure approved by parliament for specific projects/programmes.