This question was posed by an Election Commissioner that asked to remain anonymous.

Original Question:

The UK uses serial numbers on ballots, even with a connection to the voter's identity. Serial numbers in the form of bar codes, not linked to the voter's identity may also be present on ballots to facilitate the usage of ballot scanners.

Are there other examples of the usage of serial numbers on ballots? What are the justifications and the security measures in cases where serial numbers are used? Can such serial numbers be a meaningful way to prevent misuse of ballots, e.g. by using spare ballots from one polling station for ballot stuffing in another?

“The petitioner hopes to have individual votes excluded from or added to the count in order to change the result of the election. This scrutiny is not defined in the legislation, although its existence is recognized in several sections of the main piece of electoral legislation, the Representation of the People Act. This scrutiny procedure accompanies a polling system in which ballot papers are numbered and the polling number of the voter is recorded on a counterfoil to the ballot paper by the polling station staff, thus enabling the EDRB to identify and remove from the count ballot papers subsequently found to be ineligible. While this is broadly accepted in the UK, there are many countries in which such an approach would not command confidence because of secrecy of the ballot issues.” (Electoral Justice, International IDEA Handbook 2010, pp 172)

Introduction: Trade-off between secrecy and fraud

As hinted in the quote above, this question contains two basic principles of democratic elections, which at times can also be more or less contradictory. While secrecy of the voter’s identity is crucial to stimulate transparency and trust in the electoral process, it might in some circumstances have to be more or less compromised in order to prevent possible impersonation or other fraud which would enable incorrect electoral results. In this context, the advantages of using serial numbers, barcodes or other forms of registration on ballots can be considered. However, on a general level, ballot secrecy has been and still is the overriding principle in most of the electoral systems in the world (see ACE consolidated reply Secret ballots and vote buying).

In a secret ballot the voter is entitled to cast a vote independently in a way so that it remains unknown which voter has supported which candidate. Fair elections and integrity also imply that each eligible voter has the opportunity to cast one vote by him/herself. Secrecy of the vote is especially important in political contexts where citizens would have a reason to be afraid of political oppression and therefore vote for some other candidate than they personally would support.

In the cases of fraud, some individuals may try to vote several times during the elections or pretend to be another voter than they actually are. In such cases, the real voter whose identity has been abused may come to the polling station and face the fact that s/he is not entitled to vote anymore. This impersonation is impossible to correct if the ballot paper which has already ended up in the ballot box does not contain any information linking the voter to the vote. Serial numbers, barcodes or other security measures on ballots are usually used to solve this problem and they also help to keep track of the number of ballot papers given to actual voters and this way prevent ballot stuffing, a process in which electoral officers fill several votes and stuff them in the ballot box (see also ACE encyclopedia article on Legal provisions to prevent fraud).

Besides ballot secrecy and protection for fraud, there are finally also considerations on issues such as costs and credibility to be taken into account when designing a ballot system. For example, it may be worth putting more effort on security measures in places where there are high levels of distrust and security threats even if it would increase the costs of elections. Furthermore, technical measures to prevent ballot stuffing or impersonation can improve credibility if these cases have been detected before but can, in different circumstances, also work contrary and create rather than diffuse suspicions, if the voters feel their votes will be recorded or studied.

In the below text we try to outline different types of systems for ballot numbering and see how they are applied in some examples across the world. It is also discussed how fraud can be prevented by other means than ballot numbering in countries where serial numbers are not being used.

Summary of responses

The political situation of the country is an important variable when judging whether numbering of ballots will be effective or not. Magnus Ohman stresses that the perception of secrecy could sometimes actually be as important as the actual secrecy of the vote itself: “In some countries/situations it may be enough to spread rumours that serial numbers on ballots can/will be used to alter -- voting behaviour or make them (the voters) abstain completely.” Expert Horacio Boneo recalls a case from Zanzibar in 1995 where a vote tracing system was used to intimidate the opposition party. Boneo states that having a safeguard system for those rare cases where an individual might lose her/his vote is not worth it if it would mean risking the ballot secrecy.

Serial numbers are used in several countries but they are usually placed on the counterfoil, not on the actual ballot paper. With Ron Laufer we learn that this is also the case in Canada. “The ballot paper is divided into three detachable parts: the ballot itself, the counterfoil and the stub, which stays attached to the ballot book. The stub and counterfoil have a matching serial number printed on them.” The serial number is thus only a temporary control mechanism used to ensure that the ballot given to the voter is the same ballot that is given back to the election officer. The serial numbers are not registered anywhere with voters’ names linked to them. Magnus Ohman lines up with the counterfoil system by mentioning a case where it was possible to prove ballot box stuffing. Ballots with the counterfoil still attached to them had been placed in the ballot box and serial numbers on the counterfoil did not match the ballots issued to that polling station. Counterfoil system is also used in Pakistan according to Shahid Iqbal for whom maintaining serial number on the actual ballot would be considered as violation of secrecy.

Michael James Meadowcroft clarifies the background of the ballot system in the UK. Meadowcroft emphasizes that in order to maintain secrecy of the votes whilst having ballot numbering, the results are declared at the whole electoral area level, instead of at the individual polling stations level. However, if an individual would lost his or her vote through being impersonated, the numbering enables that he or she will be given a “tendered” ballot paper of different colour than the normal ones (for more information, see ACE article on Provisional or Tendered Votes). These ballots are not being counted unless the majority of the winning candidate is less than the number of tendered ballots. According to Meadowcroft the Parliament and the courts have initiated this process exceptionally rarely.

Example of a ballot paper in the UK

In addition to the UK, serial numbers are used on ballots also in Singapore, says Stina Larserud. The Electoral Management Body of Singapore justifies this system with avoiding ballot stuffing and impersonation. According to the EMB, secrecy of the vote is still safeguarded because of the strict rules surrounding examination of the ballots after the election. Peter Wolf points out that also Malaysia used serial numbers on ballot papers until this practice was abandoned in 2006, addressing concerns about the secrecy of the vote. Also the Federal Republic of Nigeria defines in its electoral act that the “ballot papers shall be bound in booklets and numbered serially with differentiating colours for each office being contested”.

In the times when India was still using ballot papers, they used to carry a number. According to Malaysian Centre for Commonwealth Studies, the ballot papers were sealed and signed at polling stations indicating the name of the polling station, total number of stations in that constituency and the signature of the Presiding officer. This system could prevent ballot papers snatched away from one polling station and being used in another polling station to cast bogus votes. The identity of the voters could thus not be compromised unless one had access to both the counterfoil and the ballot paper. These safeguards prevented malpractice at the polling stations as well as the printing of counterfeit ballot papers.

“In the Philippines, serial numbers are an additional security feature to track down releases of accountable forms such as ballots, election returns, certificate of canvass and statement of votes”, writes Beverly Hagerdon Thakur. Serial numbers are printed on upper and lower stubs of the ballot. According to Thakur, serial numbers are used to ensure that ballot papers are official to prevent the practice of bringing in other ballots from other precincts to consummate vote buying. In this type of fraud people will keep the originally issued ballot, bring out a spurious ballot and surrender the spurious filled up ballot to the polling station officer and give the unused original ballot to the vote buyer. Secrecy is maintained in the Philippine elections by the regulation that the upper and lower stub of the ballot are to be detached before the ballot is inserted in the compartment for valid ballots. In election dispute cases, lists of serial numbers are retrieved and stubs are examined and compared to voting records and thumbmarks on ballot papers to ensure that ballots being contested inside the ballot box are genuine.

Secrecy of the ballot is put before preventing possible impersonation in South Africa to unable party agents to record which ballot was issued to a voter. Serial numbers are used only on the stubs which remain attached to the ballot book after the ballot paper has been given to a voter. Michael Hendrickse from the Electoral Commission of South Africa stresses the importance of reconciliation of ballots used and votes cast. While acknowledging the fact that impersonation can be prevented by serial numbers, Hendrickse emphasizes that “The biggest danger of being able to trace a voter to a particular ballot is that voters could be subjected to intimidation because they are told that ‘we can find out how you voted’. Further, one must also be very wary of a voter being allowed to have a second bite at the cherry by alleging that the ballot was not cast by him”. According to Hendrickse, integrity can instead be ensured by recording the number of empty ballots at polling stations before voting starts and by similarly recording the number of unused ballot papers and casted ballots in the box at the end of the day. If a further reconciliation is required, it is possible to compare these figures. If it is shown that there is a discrepancy which affects the result, the election at that voting station can be declared void.

In conclusion it can thus be said that secrecy of the vote is still today seen as the primary principle of democratic elections in many countries. Serial numbers on ballots are thus being used in several countries and the justification for doing that is usually to prevent fraud. However, it must be noted that the common place for these kinds of security measures is on the counterfoil or on the ballot stub since in that case ballot secrecy will not be compromised. Recent developments in e-voting have also attempted to solve the conflict between secrecy and right to vote. In the future, when designing the suitable ballot system it could be useful to analyze the extent of impersonation and intimidation related to numbered ballots. Detecting and measuring voter fraud is however difficult as impersonation cannot be detected after the elections and intimidation is not always reported.

         Examples of ballot numbering practices

Related sources

Electoral Reform Society in the UK has published a report on Ballot Secrecy in 1997.

More information about India’s ballot papers can be found in: Park, Richard Leonard. 1952. India’s General Elections. Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 1-8.

See also related ACE material:

ACE Encyclopedia section Electoral Integrity. 

Consolidated reply Electoral management body independence.

International IDEA. 2010. Electoral Justice: The International IDEA Handbook.

This reply was written together with Maija Karjalainen 

Input received, with thanks, from:

Horacio Boneo

Needamangalam Gopalaswami

Michael Hendrickse

Stina Larserud

Ron Laufer

Michael James Meadowcroft

Peter Wolf

Malaysian Centre for Commonwealth Studies

Shahid Iqbal

Magnus Ohman

Beverly Hagerdon Thakur

Serial numbers are also used on ballots in Singapore. The justification is to avoid ballot stuffing and impersonation. The elections department argues that the secrecy of the vote is still safeguarded because of the strict rules surrounding examination of the ballots after the election. I have no idea how this has worked in reality.

From time to time there have been allegations that the counterfoil system undermines the secrecy of the ballot but, despite much anecdotal "evidence" as to instances of vote tracing, no single case has been proven in the 130 years since the introduction of the system.

It is the only means of safeguarding the individual against losing his or her vote through being impersonated, in that, despite the name being crossed off as having already voted, the actual voter can still vote through being given a "tendered" ballot paper of a different colour.

These ballots are only examined if the majority for the winning candidate is less than the number of tendered ballots, and only counted if, by including them, the result would be different. Parliament and the courts can thereafter initiate the process of determining the real result or of calling a fresh election. This is exceptionally rare.

It should be noted that, in the UK, partly because of the counterfoil system, the results are not declared at polling station level. After verification and before sorting, ballot papers are mixed from all the polling stations within the electoral area. Thus there may well be over a hundred concurrent runs of the same voting numbers and it is not feasible to spot and link up a polling number with a ballot paper number.

There has to be a balance between absolute secrecy and safeguarding the voter's right to vote. The counterfoil system achieves it.

There is an Electoral Reform Society (http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/) 1997 report on the subject: "Ballot Secrecy."

Michael Meadowcroft

Aparently Malaysia used serial numbers on ballot papers until this practise was abandonned in 2006, addressing concearns about the secrecy of the vote .

PN member Shahid Iqbal informed us in the related public poll and discussion that Pakistan is another country using serial numbers on ballots

Serial numbers have been used in several of the countries I have experience in. However, I believe in every instance the serial number is only on the counterfoil, not on the ballot.

In Canada, we also use serial numbers, but again the serial number is not on the ballot.  The ballot paper is divided into three detachable parts: the ballot itself, the counterfoil and the stub, which stays attached to the ballot book. The stub and counterfoil have a matching serial number printed on them. The serial number is only a temporary control mechanism used to ensure that the ballot given to the voter is the same ballot that is given back to the election officer. The serial number does not appear on the ballot itself, and it is not registered anywhere with the voter’s name.

Posted on behalf of Michael Hendrickse, Electoral Commission of South Africa

In South Africa, we do not use numbered ballot papers. What we have is a ballot book containing 100 ballots, and depending on the number of voters registered in the voting district, the voting station will supplied with sufficient ballot books with some back-up. The voting official will tear a ballot out of the book, leaving the stub behind in the book. On the stub will be a serial number. On the cover of the ballot book will be the range of ballot serial numbers of the ballot papers e.g. 1100 – 1200. 

 

The secrecy of the ballot is the driving force behind the measure, because it is possible for party agents to record which ballot was issued to a voter.  I know in certain countries, the allocation of a serial number to a voter is done so that in a later court case, if the fact that that voter was unlawfully allowed to voter is challenged, it is possible for the Court to order that ballot rejected. Our legislation makes it clear that if there is to be an objection against a voter being allowed to vote, then such objection must be made at the voting station by a party agent before the voter is issued a ballot paper. The biggest danger of being able to trace a voter to a particular ballot is that voters be subjected to intimidation because they are told that “we can find out how you voted”. Further, one must also be very wary of a voter being allowed to have a second bite at the cherry by alleging that the ballot was not cast by him, especially he /she is “prompted” because the result is very close.

 

What is important is the reconciliation of ballots used and votes cast. The Presiding Officer in charge of the voting station has an Election Diary in which all important tasks are reflected and which he/she completes as the voting day progresses. One of these tasks is, before the start of voting, to record the number of ballots received, together with the serial numbers of the ballot books in his/her possession. At the end of the day, he/she similarly records the number of unused ballots. Before the counting of votes starts, the Presiding Officer first has to count ( face down)  the total number of ballots removed from the ballot boxes and compare that to the number of ballots issued/ used as per his/her records. The number of issued/used ballots should then generally reconcile with the number of ballots in the ballot boxes. If a further reconciliation is required, it is then possible to compare the number of voters marked off on the voters roll vs. votes cast (including spoilt). If it is shown that there is a discrepancy which is material to the result, the election at that voting station can be declared null and void.

 

Personally, the reconciliation is far more crucial, because even if ballots are printed in the newspaper and a voter comes to the voting station with one of these, the important thing is to ensure that the number of ballots cast reconciles with the number of voters who have been marked off on the voters roll.  But this is an anathema to suspicious political parties.

 

 - Michael Hendrickse     
   Senior Manager: Electoral Matters
   Electoral Commission of SA

In earlier times, when India were using ballot papers, they used to carry a number. In the office of the retuning officer there used to be kept a record of the serial numbers of the ballot papers that went to each polling station. At the polling station, the Presiding officer was required to put a rubber seal to each ballot paper, stating the number of the polling station and the total number of polling stations of that constituency (ie the seal on ballots from the 5th polling station out of a total of 187 would state 5/187). The Presiding officer had to sign below the seal.

Any ballot paper not having the rubber seal and the signature was considered invalid. The Presiding officers were instructed to sign only 50 ballot papers at a time, to thwart any attempted snatching of signed ballots. The ballot papers used to prepared in loads of 50 and each ballot had a counterfoil where the voter would sign or leave a fingerprint and both the counterfoil and the ballot paper had the same number printed on it. In case of doubt this was available for verification but strictly under the orders of a court of law enquiring into an  election dispute.

Thus, the numbering of the ballot papers, the rubber seal and the signature of the Presiding Officer taken together could effectively prevent ballot papers snatched away from one polling station being used in another polling station to cast bogus votes. The identity of the voters would not be compromised unless you had access to both the counterfoil and the ballot paper. These safeguards prevented malpractice at the polling stations as well as the printing of counterfeit ballot papers.

In Pakistan, the format of ballot paper is prescribed under rule 11 of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Election) Rules, 1977, which shows serial number only on the counterfoil of the ballot paper and not on the ballot itself. Maintaining serial number on the ballot will be in violation of secrecy required for the purpose.

I fully agree with Meadowcroft that there has to be a "balance between absolute secrecy and safeguarding the voter's right to vote". Where this balance falls will be different for each country. 

We must also remember that the perception of the secrecy of the vote is as important as the actual secrecy. In some countries/situations it may be enough to spread rumours that serial numbers on ballots can/will be used to check how people voted to alter their voting behaviour or make them abstain completely. In such countries/situations serial number on the ballot paper is not suitable (few of these countries will use tendered ballots).

Several people have discussed using serial numbers on the counterfoil only. This is of course a good way of tracking the distribution of ballots and recovery of used "stubs".  In one case we were able to prove ballot box stuffing since ballots with the counterfoil still attached to them had been placed in the ballot box. The serial numbers on the counterfoil did not match the ballots issued to that polling station.

Posted on behalf of Beverly Hagerdon Thakur:

In the Philippines, serial numbers are an additional security feature to track down releases of accountable forms such as ballots, election returns, certificate of canvass, statement of votes etc. Accountable forms therefore have unique serial numbers pre-assigned by the EMB. They are duly noted by political party watchers and are listed in the Minutes of voting and counting report by the polling station officers.

In manual/write-in ballots, security numbers are printed on upper and lower stubs of the ballot. These numbers serve as an additional unique security feature which may be tracked down when sets of ballots are turned over the polling stations officer for every polling precinct. Serial numbers are used to ensure: 1) that ballots issued are official, genuine based on a centralized tracking list 2) “lansadera” or the illegal practice of bringing in other ballots from other precincts to consummate vote buying may be checked because serial numbers are listed down (people will keep the originally issued ballot, bring out a spurious ballot and surrender the spurious filled up ballot to the polling station officer and give the unused original ballot to the vote buyer) 3) that secrecy is still maintained. The serial numbers are printed on both the upper and lower stubs, are listed in the voting day record BUT are to be detached before the ballot is inserted in the compartment for valid ballots to ensure that any particular ballot cannot be traced to any voter.

During election protest cases, the list of serial numbers are retrieved, stubs are examined and matched to ensure that ballots being contested inside the ballot box are genuine.  The lower detachable coupon has a box portion for thumbmarking. These may also be matched with the voting record – to determine during technical or dactyloscopic examination that these are the same registered voters who accomplished the ballots and whose fingerprints appear in the voter’s list for such polling precinct.
 

If the number is included in both the stub and in the ballot, it would be possible to trace the vote.  It would be enough to make a note of the number before it is given to the voter and then check with the ballots inside the box.  While it cannot be made on large scale, it might be used to find out how personalities vote - in some cases it might be an interesting piece of news. 

While I fully agree with Michael Meadowcroft that its use in England or any other reputable country would cause no problem, I am not sure that the approach will be used to intimidate people in less fortunate cases.  I recall one case - I think it may have been Zanzibar 1995 - where the British practice was in place, and it was used to intimidate the opposition party.

The reason for having it - the safeguard of the vote of specific individuals in rare cases - does not seem to me to be enough of a reason.