The Question
The Hong Kong government yesterday (May 17) announced a proposal to fill vacant seats in the Legislative Council arising from resignation or death of a serving legislator between general elections. Under the proposal (pls see the details from the following link http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201105/17/P201105170163.htm), the vacancies would be filled by the first unelected candidate on the list with the highest number of remainder votes in the previous election.

But it appears Hong Kong would be out of its own internationally under the latest proposal.

According to a study by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, if a seat becomes vacant between elections, list proportional representation systems in European countries often simply fill it with the next candidate on the list of the party of the former representatives.

I found that in eight countries which adopt proportional representation system, including Austria, Denmark, France and the Netherlands, vacant seats are allocated to the first non-elected candidate on the relevant list.

In Sweden, Ireland and Belgium, those vacancies are filled by substitutes named on the relevant lists.

The HK government argued that the number of votes obtained by a list of candidates to a significant extent hinged on the presence of individual well-known candidates.

“Thus, once a candidate has resigned, it is reasonable to assume that in the absence of that candidate, his list may not receive the same level of support,” the spokesman said.

I would be grateful if you or your colleagues could kindly answer the following questions regarding the Hong Kong government's proposal?

(1)  Is the HK government's proposal not in line with usual practice of countries adopting the list proportional representation to fill vacancies arising between general elections?
(2) Will the arrangement depart from the spirit of the list PR system?
(3) Will the proposal fail to reflect the preference of voters who backed the candidates who resigned prematurely? Is it fair to those voters?
(4) Would the representativeness of a candidate who was the first unelected candidates on the list with the highest number of votes in the previous election be called into question if they fill a vacancy arising midterm?
(5) Do you agree Hong Kong voters would be deprived of their rights to express their views in the event of vacancies arising between general elections?

Gary Cheung
Associate News Editor
South China Morning Post (Hong Kong)

Summary of responses
Whether Hong Kong voters would be deprived of their rights to express their views was noted as a potential flaw in a PR system of governance, as the contributors believe that elections are about choice, and not the actual implementation of policy. It was then mentioned that elections do not make policy, but that elections elect leaders to deliberate over policy on electorate’s behalf. Moreover, the true spirit of democracy was stated as demanding the election or filling of any vacant seat through the popular will of electorates, so that it gains legitimacy.

It was further pointed out that the old Hong Kong system of holding by-elections was incompatible with PR systems, and that it had a clear bias toward the larger political parties. If a smaller party lost a seat, it would have no chance against the larger parties in a by-election restricted to one seat. Also, the filling of vacancies with the first unelected candidate on the list with the highest number of remainder votes in the previous election would produce random results, as the size of the largest remainder is largely unrelated to the total number of votes obtained by a party. Given the large number of parties that have obtained representation in Hong Kong, the government’s argument has some validity. Of the 12 parties/individuals that obtained representation, seven got only one representative. However, it was concluded that the formulation consistent with the government’s argument would not be to assign the seat to the party with the largest remainder.  It would rather be to assign it to the party with the largest remainder among those who have not been allocated seats on account of the remainder.

Finally, a contributor noted that saying “once a candidate has resigned, it is reasonable to assume that in the absence of that candidate, his list may not receive the same level of support” appears contrary to what the literature would suggest. In Hong Kong’s five constituencies the average district magnitude any party list competes on is around five or six. Low district magnitude in open list PR decreases the incentive for a candidate to cultivate a personal vote, while in higher magnitude districts, the candidate preferences matters more. In a larger list, candidates have a stronger incentive to distinguish themselves from their fellow list members.

Examples of related ACE Articles and Resources
Encyclopaedia:

• Electoral Systems and By-elections

External Resources

• John M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart 

Names of contributors
1. Monte McMurchy
2. Horacio Boneo
3. Khalid Waheed
4. David Jandura

Question 5 represents for me the fundamental flaw in a Proportional Representative Electoral System of Governance as I believe elections are [only] about choice not the actual implementation of policy.

The many people that I know are constantly forming associations and they greatly value the freedom to associate as they please, with whomever, for all sorts of purposes.

Freedom of association is a central value, a fundamental requirement, of democratic practice and politics. Democracy is possible only if the citizens chose to vote or not, to join this or that political entity/movement, to form a caucus or oppositional faction, or to avoid political activity completely.

When we stand alone in the voting booth, democratic citizens are exercising power in the radically individualistic way that liberal theory is most comfortable with.

But there are many other moments in the democratic process when we are able only to exercise power along with other people and when the extent of power we exercise depends on those others.

I can identify four criteria for evaluating electoral systems—the degree to which they promote:

Political, governmental, and regime stability

Accountability of elected officials

High voter turnout

Thorough deliberation of public policy

Elections perform two primary tasks in constitutional democracies.

·      The first, long hallowed in liberal democratic theory, is to provide a means of popular control of government. John Locke, a political philosopher of individual rights and limited government (an approach known as “philosophical liberalism”), defined the legitimate powers of government in terms of popular consent:

“The constitution of the legislative [authority] is the first and fundamental act of society, whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union under the direction of persons and bonds of laws…by consent and appointment of the people, without which no one man, or number of men, amongst them can have authority of making laws that shall be binding on the rest.”  John Locke 1690

Locke’s formulation is now accepted throughout much of the world—governmental legitimacy depends on popular consent.

The second function of the electoral system is far less obvious.

Elections provide a means not only for the citizens to direct and control their government, but also for the government to direct and control the mass citizenry. By producing public acquiescence to the act of governing, elections empower governments to act. Elections also produce political order out of potential chaos.

Elections can be very worthwhile institutions. Elections stabilize and regularize popular participation in government, and can provide decisive results about which leaders will direct the government. Elections remain indispensable links between the public and government. An electoral system’s central objectives must be political order, high voting participation, liberty and accountability. Electoral systems have great consequences for the democratic qualities of any constitutional government.

First past the post offers the virtue of structural simplicity. In this system, elected officials individually win office in single-member districts by receiving more votes than do any rival candidates. It is a system with origins in Great Britain and is preferred in the English-speaking world and among former British colonies.

Single-member plurality systems produces simplicity and also contributes to accountability by making it clear to the public who is in charge and who can be blamed. Parliamentary systems with single-member plurality are more stable than those employing other electoral systems.

 Does single-member plurality systems facilitate governmental deliberation? On balance, probably not—

Single-member plurality makes candidate individualism possible, encourages a strong constituency orientation, and that, in combination with brief terms, encourages lawmakers to prefer a short-term responsiveness to local swing voters at the expense of long-term deliberation about the public good.

Electoral systems based on the principle of proportional representation (PR) produce governmental systems in which deliberation and bargaining are paramount. PR emphasizes inclusiveness and deliberation by representing minor parties in the legislature and often in the major decisions of government.

Advocates of PR systems emphasize the fairness of the proportional results and the responsiveness of the broader range of representation in government. PR encourages multipartyism by setting relatively low vote thresholds for parties (such as 5%) to win representation in legislatures. Parties that would have no governmental role in plurality and majoritarian systems can hold great power in PR systems.

This does generate more diverse viewpoints in government and more deliberation among a wider range of views, but at the cost of governmental stability and accountability. Governmental coalitions in PR systems can be complex and brittle—defection of a single party can cause a government to dissolve.

Holding elaborate coalitions accountable poses challenges for voters. In legislatures with three or more parties—often as many as eight or ten—it is frequently not clear on election night, which parties will coalesce to form a parliamentary majority that will govern the province.

 A PR electoral system probably would produce multipartyism and more bargaining and deliberation among the multiple parties in the legislature. It would accentuate our national diversity, producing longer governmental deliberations and perhaps less clear responsibility for policy outcomes. More diverse representation in the legislature might reduce political stability  by increasing conflict along racial, ethnic, and regional lines.

PR might stimulate higher voter participation because each vote is more likely to matter in electing parliamentary representatives under a scheme of proportional allocation. In addition, lower thresholds for representation may require candidates and parties to broaden their electoral targeting to win office by attracting new voters. The rewards for mobilizing new voters are greater when each additional vote counts more in winning representation.

What sort of democracy is implicit in the reforms being advocated? My approach begins with a sober realization of the limited knowledge and interest most citizens have in the political process and procedure. Responsiveness cannot be a useful goal for our electoral system because the public has limited issue knowledge that can serve as a basis for enforcing responsiveness. Given an uninterested and uninformed public frequently possessing inconsistent policy preferences, elections cannot really function as exercises in public issue deliberation. The shortcomings of the initiative reveal the folly of demanding too much time and attention from the electorate for such matters. Social choice theory exposes the futility of defining elections as “meaningful” expressions of the public’s policy preferences. 

Elections do not make policy; elections elect leaders to deliberate over policy on our behalf. An electoral system must provide voters an effective method for holding these leaders accountable. Our electoral system will function well if we become realistic about what it can accomplish.

I have been bemused by the current rhetoric expended over the problems and issues concerning the lack of voter participation in elections and how best to solve this problem of electoral apathy.

I would like to offer the following comments based on my years of extensive international electoral observation/participation missions.

Proportional Representation (PR) and the Single Transferable Vote (STV) models offer only descriptive methods in which to further alienate and further complicate active civic voter participation—what is required is a prescriptive model so as to enhance and encourage active citizen involvement in the political democratic process which at the best of times is extremely complex, inefficient and laboriously bifurcated in attempting to quickly resolve the intricate legislative/governmental process. 

The issue is not PR,  STV or any other hybrid model of electoral governance. These descriptive models would only in my measured opinion needlessly complicate and frustrate even further an already disengaged electorate. All existent electoral models are imperfect and have their respective flaws, but there exists a prescriptive device to encourage and even enhance civic voter participation.

Allow me to briefly digress; in Kosovo contesting the October 23/04 Assembly Election under a mathematically complex PR formula were 32 Political Entities thereby almost guaranteeing a brokered Assembly. Voter turnout in the past three elections in Kosovo since 2000 has been steadily decreasing with the voter turnout in the October 23/04 election being the absolute lowest since 2000. To be sure, many extenuating circumstances have assisted in this lack of active civic voter participation.

In August/04, I with my small entourage conducted an electoral road trip high in the mountains on the Macedonian frontier visiting the small village of Debalde. The village elders I spoke with lamented the lack of political connection to the politicians in Pristine who have no understanding or sympathy to their unique concerns. “Why vote—these politicians have never visited this community –why should they bother when they are on a party list and depending on the percentage of party support (will) be selected for the assembly”.

In a brokered Parliament there is no one single group or political entity to take responsibility; and the blame when events decay is usually on the other political entities in that they did not support or assist in these initiatives articulated by the party senior in the coalition.

For me, civic voter apathy is a result of a lack of political connection with and to the process. Democracy is an organic process requiring constant nurture vis a vis intellectual and pro-active articulation/participation. Civic electoral participation cannot and ought not to be legislated; rather, civic electoral participation is fostered through connection to the principals and norms of encouraging an active and informed citizenry.

Parents and families bear the greatest and most fundamental burden of fostering/developing civic electoral engagement. Educational resources/tools fostering civic appreciation should commence in Kindergarten and be considered an active component of the educational curriculum to the end of secondary school along that of social studies and history.

I remember from Kosovo, on election night 2004 speaking with my then nine-year-old son Elliott—his first question to me was—“dada, which party won and how many seats”. I tried to explain the complexity of this particular electoral model to him and before I could finish, his words to me —“ that is so silly not to have a winner”.

My then nine year old could name the Prime Minister of Canada, the Leader of the Opposition, the Premier of Ontario, the Mayor of Toronto, the President of the United States— he knew who the candidates were in St. Paul’s Riding seeking election to Parliament. His mother and I have instilled through action and deed, civic electoral responsibility—this then nine year old had/has been in countless voting booths and in his own personal unique way beginning to comprehend the sanctity and majesty of placing an X beside a name and observing how the electoral process unfolds and is looking forward when he turns 18 in casting his own electoral ballot representing his choice.

Elections are a sideshow, not a dispersal of power but a diversion from and a mystification of its actual coherence. Ordinary citizens passively accept their subordination, or they resist only at the margins, or they join mass movements that somehow fail. An educated citizenry is critical for a healthy and vibrant democracy. An educated citizen will be prone to be more active in the political process and would impose/create greater demands on the elected politicians who in turn must be able to articulate a response to an active citizenry.

Democratic values and principals cannot be templated/grafted directly and be expected to function—each society or moment is unique. The best that can be done is to promote a general ethos, prescriptively ascribing specific fundamental values and norms.

First Past the Post is not perfect—no system is. What is important is the promotion of civic electoral engagement. This cannot be done through an abstraction involving formulae and other minutia. Education and the constant promotion of a civic ethos are essential for a positive and flourishing democracy.

Children atavistically look to their parents for advice and how to conduct/deport themselves in life activities. Political elites have a responsibility to foster this advancement in civic education.

A critical citizen who actively participates in the political process can only be of benefit in ensuring the stability and continuance of democratic ethos/values. I have been witness to countless political/administrative electoral disasters abroad to be sanguine.

Monte McMurchy

Toronto

In this case, it is clear that the person who formulated the question knows the answer quite well, and probably just wants a confirmation of his argument by independent experts.  However, a few comments might be worthwhile.

First, the old Hong Kong system of holding by-elections was incompatible with PR, and had a clear bias toward the larger parties.  If the party losing the seat was one of the several small parties that exist in HK, it would have no chance against the larger parties in a by-election restricted to one seat. 

Second, the government proposal of filling vacancies with the first unelected candidate on the list with the highest number of remainder votes in the previous election would produce random results, as the size of the largest remainder is largely unrelated to the total number of votes obtained by a party.  In 2008 the Democratic Party received 312,962 votes and had a remainder of only 9,600 votes while the Democratic Alliance received 347,343 votes but a remainder of 44,300 votes (which resulted in one additional seat).  The only argument of general validity is that the parties that did not reach a Hare quota and obtained only one seat through the largest remainder are obvious candidates to obtain the seat if the government proposed system is used.

Third, it is undoubtedly true that most List PR systems fill vacancies with the next candidate on the list of the party of the former representative (or substitutes).  But the HK government argues that the number of votes obtained by a list of candidates is directly related to the participation in the list of individual well-known candidates.  “Thus, once a candidate has resigned, it is reasonable to assume that in the absence of that candidate, his list may not receive the same level of support.”  However, while this may be true, it could be also argued that his/her replacement might have brought in more votes than those lost by the absence of the previous candidate. 

Nevertheless, given the large number of parties that obtained representation, the government’s argument has some validity.  Of the 12 parties/individuals that obtained representation, 7 got only one representative.  In the case of some of the smaller parties like The Frontier or Civic Act-up, well-known personalities like Emily Lau or Cyd Ho Sau-lan had undoubtedly a major influence in the results.  Losing a few hundred votes would have resulted in no representation for those parties.  

But the formulation consistent with the government’s argument would not be to assign the seat to the party with the largest remainder.  It would rather be to assign it to the party with the largest remainder among those who have not been allocated seats on account of the remainder.  My argument may sound a little bit complicated, and if Mr. Cheung would like clarifications, he could send me a mail to [email protected] and I would be happy to answer.

Last, a reflection for the facilitators.  The information that can be obtained within ACE concerning the question (either in the Comparative Data or in Regions and Countries segments) is rather scanty and incomplete.  You may wish to compare it with the wealth of information found in Wikipedia on the same issues.  Perhaps links with relevant articles might be added.

Democracy is something wherein people have choice to elect their representatives according to their own constitutional requirements. In proportional representation there is always a set rule to fill the vacancy which best suits that country's legal traditions but the true spirit of democracy demands the election or filling of any vacant seat must have a popular will of electorates so that it could gain legitimacy.

“Thus, once a candidate has resigned, it is reasonable to assume that in the absence of that candidate, his list may not receive the same level of support.”  

the incentive for a candidate to cultivate a personal vote.  In contrast, it is in high magnitude, open list PR where candidate preference matters more.  This is because in a larger list, candidates have a stronger incentive to distinguish themselves from their fellow list members.