Recommendation 37 (Detection and Mitigation of Fraud) Afghanistan 2009 —
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Recommendation 37 (Detection and Mitigation of Fraud) Afghanistan 2009

http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/asia/AF/afghanistan-final-report-presidential-and/at_download/file

Fraud detection measures should include the following considerations:
- Reconciliation forms and the lists of voters are good instruments for the mitigation of fraud as they can be used to detect excess numbers of ballots. Although both were available in the 2009 elections, there was no incentive for their appropriate completion as they were not subsequently used to cross-check the number of voters with the number of ballots cast. Cross-checking of reconciliation forms and lists of voters should be mandatory for future elections.
- Clear and binding procedures for auditing should be in place at the beginning of the electoral process, to avoid last-minute improvisations that are not generally understood by the public. Auditing is just a more precise and targeted way of counting and as such should be in the public domain and conducted in a manner which is transparent and understandable for voters.
- The final number and locations of polling centres and polling stations should be publicised at the beginning of the electoral process. Any kind of changes in numbers or locations should be fully justified and publicised immediately. This would safeguard against the risk of fraud though ballot stuffing, using electoral materials earmarked for polling stations which never opened to establish ghost polling stations.
- Clear and binding procedures should be in place to ensure efficient tracking of all unused electoral material. In order to prevent excess electoral materials being distributed to the provinces and used to commit fraud, only officially listed polling stations should receive electoral material.

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