Political parties should receive periodic and timely information on voter register additions, corrections and deletions, and they should receive copies of the voter register well in advance of elections.

Modifications should be made to the system to make it easier to record a vote and to accommodate those with poor eyesight.

Inclusion of provisions that will permit competent individuals, academic institutions or civil society groups to comprehensively and independently test DRE voting equipment subject to reasonable limitations related only to patent or copyright law. However, such testing should not be perceived as a substitute for the establishment of inclusive and transparent certification procedures.

As the requirements of HAVA include that DRE systems produce a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity, serious consideration should also be given to ensuring a voter verified auditable paper trail (VVAPT).

During the implementation of HAVA, consideration should be given to enhance individual states’ efforts in training poll workers to manage new voting equipment, by releasing additional federal funding for training activities. Such measures have also the potential to further accelerate processing of voters on election day.

A paper-trail should be instituted in the e-voting system in order to increase public confidence and allow for manual recounts in case of election disputes. The usergenerated four-digit control code should be eliminated.

The voter interface should be modified in such a way that abstention is subject to the
same voter-verification options as selection of a candidate - i.e., a confirmation function
should be added.

Though the reasons are clear for the existing variable structure of regulation of the different methods of voting, it would appear to be useful to review and consolidate the legal provisions by amendments to primary legislation, whilst still allowing developing technologies to be regulated by secondary legislation.

Electronic voting systems should be monitored by an independent entity distinct from
the authorities responsible for conducting elections. Such an entity should have broad technical expertise, and should be also responsible both for formulating and
reviewing voting system standards.

In order to enhance public confidence in DRE voting machines, and to provide for
meaningful audits and recounts, legislation regulating use of such systems should
include provisions for a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPAT) or an equivalent
verification procedure. Software dependent vote recording mechanisms which do
not permit an independent check on their operation should be phased out.

Further transparency measures, such as access to software codes, independent testing, provision of voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) or multiple audit mechanisms would enhance public confidence in the integrity of the new voting technologies.

In order to enhance public confidence in DRE voting machines, and to provide for meaningful audits and recounts, legislation regulating use of such systems should include provisions for a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPAT) or an equivalent verification procedure.

Implementation of optical scanning equipment will benefit from thorough poll worker training and development of detailed guidelines.

The transparency of the certification process should be enhanced, including access by local authorities, political parties, observers, and relevant civil society groups to certification reports. The tests should cover all aspects of the system. A detailed comprehensive list of required criteria should be developed as the basis for testing.

In order to maintain public confidence in the e-voting system, more efforts should be made to clearly explain its technical and operational elements, and ensure appropriate safeguards for transparency and accountability. The Ministry of the Interior should play a crucial role in communicating this information to the public, political parties and NGOs.

When controlling the electronic tally, the re-calculation of the tabulation by the College of Experts should be extended to include a recount of magnetic cards at randomly selected polling stations. Finally, the electoral code should foresee that the reports of the College are published.

Ensure that public authorities in charge of the electoral process have adequate supervision and command of the e-voting system, and avoid excessive reliance on the vendors for running the system.

Reduce the number of people assuming responsibility for handling the floppy discs, ideally, only the Heads of Canton Main Offices and CPSs should handle floppy discs.

The involvement of first-time voters in administering elections is commendable, but in order to ensure consistent and efficient implementation of rules regarding opening and closure of voting procedures, consideration should be given to make training mandatory for poll workers ahead of election day.

In order to ensure that procedures are followed and verified accurately, the time for training of poll workers should be extended.

The system could be reviewed to introduce a voter verified paper trail, in order to increase transparency.

Consideration should be given to change closing procedures so that the members of the polling board cannot leave without attending the copying procedure of the ballot boxes' floppy discs and signing the envelopes when they are enclosed.

Consideration could be given to guarantee a hand over of the floppies from the Polling Station Chairperson to the Head of the Canton Main Office in person.

The law should require re-certification of the entire electronic voting system after
changes have been made. All standards and other requirements to which the electronic
voting system is certified should be made public.

To improve transparency, all electronic reports from PECs should be made public, so
as to allow parties and observers to verify election results.