The highest level of security available should be used for encryption and transmission of electronic votes to ensure the integrity of the process and the secrecy of the vote. The authorities should conduct a review of state-of-the-art cryptographic methods for internet voting with a view to addressing any potential security weaknesses in the systems.

Most cantons already use a tamper-evident overlay to shield the password assigned to each voter. Adoption of this approach by all cantons would enhance security, as well as the secrecy of the vote.

It is recommended that all cantons adhere to good practice when handling cryptographic material, which provide that the private key be generated at a public meeting and that the key be divided in separate parts and shared by at least two people who are unlikely to collude. Preferably, this key should be generated and stored using secure cryptographic media (such as a smartcard). Essential procedures, such as the decryption of internet votes, could also take place at public meetings.

In order to meet legal requirements and to ensure the integrity of internet voting systems, an independent body should be established to certify all systems, including through independent, third-party testing. Clear, written, and testable standards on certification should be developed and regularly reviewed and updated as the basis for the independent body’s work, covering such issues as security, transparency, reliability, ease of use, and protection of the secrecy of the vote.

To maintain the high public confidence in internet voting, further efforts should be made to exchange good practice amongst cantons, explain technical and operational elements, and ensure appropriate safeguards for transparency and accountability. The Federal Chancellery, possibly through the internet voting task force, could take a leading role in communicating information to political parties, civil society, and the general public.

Mandatory recounts for a random significant sample of polling stations where new voting technologies are used should be carried out, as allowed for by current legislation. Such a measure can contribute to further enhancing trust in such systems.

Either technical or procedural measures could be put into place to prevent poll workers from seeing the contents of ballots (for instance, through the use of privacy ballot covers) or votes being cast on touch screen machines (for instance, by using better privacy protection shields or proper voting booths) when helping voters.

The OSCE/ODIHR recommends that the NEC builds its own in-house IT expertise and
capabilities on Internet voting and retains detailed written records at all stages of the Internet voting process.

The OSCE/ODIHR recommends that the NEC adopts formal procedures for software
deployment and establishes a deadline for its updates.

It is recommended that a provision is introduced to provide clear criteria for determination of the validity of the votes cast via the Internet.

The OSCE/ODIHR recommends that the NEC forms an inclusive working group to consider the use of a verifiable Internet voting scheme or an equally reliable mechanism for the voter to check whether or not his/her vote was changed by malicious software.

The OSCE/ODIHR recommends delegating the responsibility for certification of the Internet voting system to an independent public body that would evaluate and then digitally sign the final version of the Internet voting software and publish a public evaluation report.

The OSCE/ODIHR recommends that an independent public body is appointed to perform a compliance audit of the whole Internet voting process with a consolidated operation manual.

Given the trend of ever greater use of Internet voting, with a significant proportion of the electorate voting before the end of the campaign period, consideration could be given to enabling voters who voted remotely via the Internet to change their vote with a paper ballot on election day.

The OSCE/ODIHR recommends that legal provisions with regards to all stages of internet voting are further detailed and consolidated in the law.

The OSCE/ODIHR recommends that the authorities consider the use of a verifiable internet voting scheme or an equally reliable mechanism for voters to check whether or not their votes were cast as intended.

It is recommended that a strategic voter education project is launched in order to enhance and promote citizen participation in the evaluation, organization, control, and adoption of new voting technologies.

It is recommended that the internet voting security requirements, as well as the methodology and results of security assessments, audit protocols, results of all audits performed, the analyzed source code, and minutes of all proceedings be made available to the general public to enhance confidence in the internet voting process.

The Press Council should be transformed into a self regulatory body for the print media and all compulsory restrictions to register newspapers and journalists removed in line with international standards.

The election administration should include more women and members of indigenous communities. It should adopt a proactive gender and multi-cultural policy and appoint a senior position responsible for its implementation, with an aim to increase participation of women and marginalised groups in the electoral processes and at all levels within the election administration.

Civil society organisations in close collaboration with the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and the National Commission of Human Rights should increase their efforts to enhance the participation of women in public life. Grass roots level campaigning and support for increased understanding of women as voters and candidates should also be implemented. This should also include increased awareness of the security services and a more transparent and inclusive security policy that is sensitive to the needs of marginalised groups and women.

A greater degree of coordination of domestic observers should be planned in future elections. Moreover, capacity building to facilitate more systematic and effective data collection as well as publication of observation findings should also be encouraged.

Efforts should be made to ensure that the complaints and appeals system is transparent and publicly accountable. Consolidated records of complaints, responses, decisions and outcomes should be made available by the Election Commission for public scrutiny. A revised election act should also provide specific and adequate time limits for the resolution of complaints and appeals.

A revision of the offences in the Election Offences and Punishment Act and associated provisions is necessary in order to further establish categories of offences including those currently contained in the Code of Conduct. The act should also specify how types of offences should be treated. The suspension of political rights should be limited to the most severe offences and to those established by law.

Greater certainty should be developed in the legal framework that clarifies jurisdiction of the respective courts dealing with petitions following election day.