South Africa: Voters vote for people and parties
Symposium on floor-crossing in South Africa. Centre for Policy Studies.
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<p class="style4" align="left">Synopsis</p>
<div align="left">
<p class="bodycopy"> <strong><font size="3">Voters vote for people and parties</font></strong></p>
<p class="bodycopy">‘Floor-crossing' legislation has been opposed on
the grounds that, in terms of the current electoral system, voters vote
for parties and not for candidates. Thabo Rapoo argues that, even in terms
of a party list system, the act of voting is not that simple</p>
<p class="bodycopy">Several opposition parties, notably the UDM and DA, argue
that, given South Africa's list system of proportional representation, floor-crossing
contradicts the `will of the voters' because the latter vote for a political
party rather than a particular politician.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">This argument is problematic for three reasons. Contrary
to popular perceptions, the party list (PL) system does entail the notion
of 'constituency'. In a simple plurality system based on single-member constituencies,
the entire country is carved up into a large number of geographic constituencies,
with roughly the same number of voters, in order to provide reasonably fair,
if not equal, representation. Political parties nominate single candidates
in each constituency to contest the elections against similar candidates
from other parties, and a single winner elected by a simple majority represents
the entire constituency.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">This is currently the case in the United Kingdom. However,
the PL system can also operate in larger, multi-member constituencies. In
fact, under the PL system, districts or even regions - and in some cases
entire countries - serve as multi-member constituencies.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">In South Africa, where the PL system currently operates
at the national and provincial levels, and partially at the local level,
the entire country is a multi-member constituency for the national assembly
elections. Provinces are multi-member constituencies for provincial legislatures,
and indirectly for the National Council of Provinces (ncop). At the local
government level where the PL system applies (ie where councillors are not
elected in wards), municipalities also serve as multi-member constituencies.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">Under the PL system, political parties release lists of
candidates for the elections in question. Some of them - in direct proportion
to the votes received by their parties - gain seats in parliament, provincial
legislatures, and municipal councils.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">One of the main arguments against allowing floor-crossing
under a PL system is that voters vote for parties rather than candidates.
This is a simplistic and mechanistic understanding of the meaning of voting
for a party. A vote cast for a party in terms of the PL system should not
be regarded as a vote for the party alone, but also for the the candidates
on that party's list. The same is true in respect of simple plurality systems
in single-member constituencies; when a voter votes for a candidate, he/she
is also expressing a preference for their party; in fact, in such systems,
party affiliation is typically far more important than the personalities
of particular candidates. Therefore, in both systems, votes are an expression
of preference for parties as well as candidates.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">Secondly, the argument that voters vote only for parties
seems based on a curious conception of 'political parties' - as if they
are inanimate and alien entities that exist over and above the individuals
who constitute them. Political parties are associations of individuals who,
in principle at least, share and subscribe to a set of common beliefs, values,
and goals, as well as a desire to win control or become part of government.
In addition, while the actual ballot papers (especially in PL systemns)
may not display the names of party candidates, as would be the case in a
single-member constituency system, in South Africa parties do have to publish
the names of their candidates. Therefore, seats won by a party will be occupied
by some of the individuals who constitute that party.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">Citizens are able to study these lists before casting
their votes. The fact that voters currently vote for parties rather than
candidates is not an essential characteristic of PL systems; it is a technicality
that could be rectified by encouraging political parties to publicise these
names more effectively and disseminate them more widely to citizens. Incidentally,
it is customary in this country, as elsewhere, for candidates to campaign
on behalf of their parties. This often involves canvassing individuals as
well as groups of citizens, providing vital opportunities for citizens to
realise that they will not merely be casting their votes for inanimate,
faceless, and unidentifiable entities.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">Therefore, voters under a PL system typically do have
some knowledge about their party's members who will occupy seats in representative
institutions of government. It can be argued that citizens choose their
parties with some knowledge of individual candidates or even leading figures
who appeal to them because of the ideas, values, and policies they represent.
Also, the individual or collective traits of party candidates such as charisma,
bravery, intelligence, and manners, as well as characteristics such as age,
gender, race, religion, class, and so on do play a significant role in individual
voters' choice of a party. We can therefore safely conclude that expression
of preference for a particular political party in a PL system also serves
to some extent as an expression of choice for that party's candidates. After
all, without their members and candidates - individually or collectively
- political parties may not exist, let alone secure support from citizens.</p>
<p class="bodycopy"><strong><font size="2">Grave implications</font></strong></p>
<p class="bodycopy">Thirdly, the argument against floor-crossing on these
grounds may have grave theoretical and practical implications. It may privilege
the status quo, and therefore reinforce or even justify the current tendency
in our political system to place too much power and authority in the hands
of party leaders who often see themselves as 'the party', at the expense
of ordinary party members and citizens.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">One of the current criticisms of our electoral system
is that it turns public representatives into 'party animals' who are loyal
to their party bosses rather than the electorate. This is a valid criticism,
and one that can be addressed effectively by ensuring that public representatives
are as accountable to ordinary citizens as possible, whether in a PL system
or not. That is why the view that, in a PL system, votes are indications
of preference for a party alone may help to reinforce and therefore justify
authoritarian tendencies among party bosses in South Africa. Such a view
may strengthen their perceptions that they are entitled to demand and expect
complete loyalty from party representatives at the expense of accountability
to citizens.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">In sum, the fact that, in South Africa, voters place their
crosses against the names of parties rather than those of individual candidates
is insufficient reason to argue that they are only voting for those parties
and not for their candidates. Therefore, this cannot be advanced as the
sole reason why floor-crossing in a PL system violates the 'will of the
voters'.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">Thabo Rapoo is a senior CPS researcher.</p>
<p class="bodycopy"><br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</p>
<p class="bodycopy"><strong><font size="3">THE ANC AND KWAZULU-NATAL</font></strong></p>
<p class="bodycopy"><strong><font size="2">Winner doesn't have to take all</font></strong></p>
<p class="bodycopy">If floor-crossing is legalised, the ANC could gain control
of KwaZulu-Natal. But would this be prudent? Kenny Hlela and Thabo Rapoo
argue that, should it wish to gain outright control of this heavily politicised
province, it might be better for the ANC to win an election</p>
<p class="bodycopy">There is a saying that 'power corrupts', and ‘absolute
power corrupts absolutely'. The current debate on floor-crossing legislation
seems to validate this statement. Both the ruling party and opposition parties
seem obsessed with executive control, and invariably equate influence with
being in power. However, parties can wield political influence without necessarily
being in power.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">These considerations have become relevant because of the
situation surrounding the governance of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). Earlier this
year, anticipating the original floor-crossing legislation, five MPLS from
the DA, IFP and UDM crossed the floor to the ANC. When the constitutional
court blocked the legislation, the five were expelled by their previous
caucuses and replaced by others, thus effectiely losing their seats. However,
the constitutional amendments currently being prepared by the department
of justice to allow floor-crossing in all spheres of government will probably
be retroactive. This means that the five members will be restored to their
seats and allowed to defect to the ANC, which will make the latter the largest
single party in the provincial legislature - and thus allow it to take over
the provincial government.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">Constitutionally, and in terms of democratic conventions,
a party that gains a majority in a legislature, whether through elections
or by other means, can form a government. Having failed to win control of
the province in the two previous elections, the ANC now seems determined
to do so by means of floor-crossing. But would this be desirable? This article
suggests that it may not be. Moreover, it also suggests that the ANC does
not necessarily have to gain full executive control in order to wield significant
political influence in the province.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">Symbolism plays a critical role in politics throughout
the country, but especially in KZN. This province has a history of violent
conflict between the two major parties that are currently governing it.
The fact that the IFP is in power, and has been for the past eight years,
has an important symbolic significance, and plays a stabilising role. Should
it be removed from power in a way that fails to respect this symbolism,
it might destabilise the province to the detriment of the whole country.
This is precisely what may happen should floor-crossing at the provincial
level be allowed.</p>
<p class="bodycopy"><strong><font size="2">Allure of power</font></strong></p>
<p class="bodycopy">The ANC's overwhelming desire to assume control of the
province is based on two considerations. The first is that KZN is one of
only two provinces in which it has never won an election, thus enabling
it to rule on its own. There is an irresistible drive within every political
party to win elections and form governments. For the ANC in KZN, this is
even more tempting; the allure of gaining power in the province for the
first time is overwhelming.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">The second imperative is based on the notion not only
within the ANC but also within other political parties that the only way
to exercise real influence in matters of governance is by being directly
in power - hence the desire of the ANC to wrest control of the province
from the IFP. The premiership of the province has become the prize to be
won, and the ANC may believe that not winning it is tantamount to having
no meaningful influence at all. However, for the ANC, which already governs
seven other provinces, and forms part of a coalition government in the Western
Cape, power at all costs in KZN may not necessarily be politically prudent.
It risks projecting an image of a party that is concerned with public positions
rather than serving the electorate.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">While this may not be clear to the party at this stage,
gaining control of KZN by means of floor-crossing creates the risk that
it may appear to be too politically greedy and merely concerned with its
short-term interests, rather than the long-term interest of the province
as a whole. KZN does not need another potentially explosive conflict between
the ANC and IFP which might result from perceptions that the latter is being
outmanoeuvred and humiliated. Moreover, if the IFP is unseated as a reuslt
of floor-crossing rather than losing an election, it may gain renewed sympathy
among voters.</p>
<p class="bodycopy"><strong><font color="#333333" size="2">Meaningful influence</font></strong></p>
<p class="bodycopy">Therefore, if the ANC does eventually manage to have the
floor-crossing legislation accepted as constitutional, and gains a majority
in the KZN legislature as a result, it is not necessary for the party to
take control of government, and especially the premiership. It could exercise
far more meaningful political influence by maintaining the status quo (i.e.
remaining a junior partner in the coalition government in the province).
It could allow the IFP to retain symbolic political power by retaining the
premiership and more seats within the KZN executive committee.As long as
the ANC has a majority in the provincial legislature, it could ensure that
the premier and his cabinet are closely scrutinised and effectively held
accountable to the legislature.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">The ANC would have far more effective power over the business
of the provincial legislature, including its many portfolio committees,
especially the all-important standing committee on public accounts. In addition,
given its majority in the legislature, the ANC would be able to control
the policy agenda of the provincial government, ensuring that the IFP-controlled
provincial executive does not do anything that the legislature has not agreed
to. The ANC could also appoint its members to influential positions within
the legislature, such as speaker, deputy speaker, and leader of the house.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">This will be a more meaningful way of exercising power
than taking over the provincial executive and premiership. Therefore, sacrificing
these two arenas of power and influence for reasons of political symbolism
would not necessarily mean a great loss of real political influence for
the ANC in KZN. In fact, exercising power through the premiership and the
provincial executive without the necessary majority in the house might be
extremely difficult for the IFP. The constant threat of losing a vote of
confidence might induce moderation within the IFP in its dealings with the
ANC. On the other hand, not being in charge of the provincial premiership
and the executive might be a price the ANC should pay for exercising real
influence and political power in the province. The advantage for the ANC
would be that, while it would exercise real power and influence behind the
scenes, it would be absolved from blame should policies fail. Symbolically,
the party in charge of the premiership and the provincial executive will
have to assume responsibility for a failure to deliver services to citizens.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">Therefore, while it might be legally and constitutionally
acceptable for the ANC to assume control of KZN through floor-crossing,
it may not be politically prudent. While this may run counter to democratic
conventions and constitutional theory, in practice there is nothing that
prevents a party with a majority of members to remain in opposition. This
is necessary, at least in KZN, to prevent potential political instability
resulting from 'floor-crossing'. </p>
<p class="bodycopy"><strong><font size="2">Elections</font></strong></p>
<p class="bodycopy">Should floor-crossing eventually be declared constitutional,
the ANC may need to resist the temptation to take control of the province,
despite its majority in the legislature, There are other ways of exercising
power and influence without necessarily taking over the premiership and
provincial executive committee. Should the ANC really want to gain control
of the KZN government, it may be more prudent for it to do so by winning
the 2004 elections.</p>
<p class="bodycopy"> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------</p>
<p class="bodycopy"><strong><font size="3">OPPOSITION AND FLOOR-CROSSING</font></strong></p>
<p class="bodycopy"><strong><font size="2">Even democracy is not perfect</font></strong></p>
<p class="bodycopy">Will the floor-crossing legislation 'undermine democracy',
as opposition parties have stridently alleged? Instead of protesting so
loudly, argues Kenny Hlela, those opposition parties should work to strengthen
their internal structures and their links with voters</p>
<p class="bodycopy">The debate on the merits or otherwise of the floor-crossing
legislation has exposed some of the hypocricies underlying South African
politics. Except for the NNP, all opposition parties have described its
introduction by the ruling party as a subversion of democracy; however,
a closer analysis reveals that this charge may contain a good dose of opportunism.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">The German political philosopher Jürgen Habermas
argued that if formal processes of law-making in modern societies were to
remain legitimate, they had to take account of the concerns of ordinary
citizens.1 It would be difficult to gauge how much support the proposed
legislation has on the ground without some kind of referendum. However,
it is easier to assess the general feeling among members of the country's
elite, because they have access to the media. Throughout our history, certain
sections within this group have claimed to speak on behalf of those who
do not have access to the public debate, and have often presented their
views as the views of the populace.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">The floor-crossing legislation might not be of great concern
to the ordinary voter, but has been presented as such. Is describing the
proposed legislation as a 'subversion of democracy' an overstatement? If
it allowed a one-way defection to the ruling party only, it would obviously
be unacceptable. But, as it stands, no political party is immune, and if
most of the defections flow in that direction, this cannot be blamed on
the ruling party. The legislation has shown that even public representatives
elected as members of opposition parties are susceptible to changing their
allegiances. Whether they are motivated by patronage is beside the point.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">The issue of the constitutionality of the legislation
has clouded the debate, as have the selective appeals to democratic principles.
The question should have been: how do we find a workable alternative to
a 'one-party dominant' system? The view that such systems are not good for
democracy, particularly in a 'deeply divided' society such as South Africa,
influenced the constitutional negotiations prior to the 1994 election, and
is heavily influencing opposition parties in the current debate as well.
I believe it is difficult to come to that conclusion in South Africa, because
our democracy has not been sufficiently tested; but that is another issue.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">The DA appears to be satisfied with describing the current
trends as an attempt by the ruling party to undermine democracy. However,
while the IFP has also described the legislation as 'immoral, vile and despicable',2
it has acknowledged that it needs to reform itself internally by ensuring
that its office-bearers and public representatives are more concerned about
their supporters, and are properly grounded in their communities.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">This is the route other opposition parties should contemplate
as well, instead of engaging in debates that are unlikely to help their
cause. If there is one thing the proposed legislation has achieved, it has
been to expose the weaknesses of our opposition parties.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">The IFP appears to have learnt something from voting trends
in the country. In the national and provincial elections of 1999, it lost
almost 10 per cent of its support in its 'core' province of KZN; it received
41,90 per cent of the vote compared to the ANC's 39,38 per cent - far less
than its overwhelming majority in the first democratic election.3 This was
one of the factors that forced the IFP to form a coalition government with
the ANC. The current debate lacks an analysis of these trends at the grass
roots.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">It has been argued that the floor-crossing legislation
will do voters a disservice because it will allow a movement of public represenatives
towards the ruling party that is not reflected among voters at the grass
roots. This implies that party-political support at the grass roots has
remained static. But a comparison of the past two national elections - especially
in KZN and the Western Cape - paints a different picture.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">The recent political history in KZN has been one of intense
rivalry between the IFP and the ANC, often leading to violent conflict.
So-called IFP or ANC 'strongholds' still exist in some areas. The ANC is
aware that, if it wants to gain control of the province, it has to make
inroads into the IFP's mainly rural power base. Recent trends in national
and provincial elections show that the ANC has partly achieved that goal.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">For example, in the general election of June 1999 most
voting districts in the peri-urban area of Sweetwaters near Pietermaritzburg
were won by the IFP, but the ANC did quite well, winning two of nine voting
districts. The IFP has more support among older people, while the ANC has
more support among youths and the educated elite. This is particularly true
in areas such as Sweetwaters that are still administered by 'traditional
authorities'.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">The ANC did not canvass in these areas before the elections,
as they were regarded as IFP strongholds and therefore impenetrable by the
ANC. But these results show that rural communities such as those in Sweetwaters
have other means of accessing infromation, such as television, and that
many of their members work in urban areas.4</p>
<p class="bodycopy">In the Indlovu Regional Council elections the ANC won
41,57 per cent of the vote, and the IFP 49,23 per cent. This close contest
also demonstrates that the power of traditional leaders to control their
'subjects' is limited; the ANC performed well despite the fact that 90 per
cent of traditional leaders in this region support the IFP.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">The closer competition between the two political parties
therefore shows that the environment in rural KZN has changed, and that
the authority of traditional leaders may be declining. Apartheid laws restricting
the free movement of people worked to the advantage of traditional chiefs.
Following the transition to democracy, peasants and other members of rural
populations have more freedom to move as around as they please; people are
'subjects' or 'citizens' as and when it suits them.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">To conclude, the notion that the floor-crossing which
the legislation may trigger off will be unsupported by shifts in party-political
support at the grass roots might need to be rethought. Also, to assume that
patterns of support among voters are static may misrepresent what is actually
happening. Instead of displaying mass hysteria about the possible effects
of the new legislation, opposition parties should rather strengthen their
structures in order to minimise its impact.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">Another argument being used against the legislation is
that it will give the ruling party an asymmetric ability to attract elected
representatives of other parties, because of its ability to dispense patronage
in the form of government positions. However, parties in power always have
this advantage, whether at the local or national level, and their voter
support only fails in case of a sustained failure to deliver. Opposition
parties will do well to recognise this built-in bias, and to work as hard
as possible to minimise its effects.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">I have tried to show that these issues are more complex
than most people are prepared to acknowledge, and also that we need to live
with the fact that democracy is not a perfect system.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">Kenny Hlela is a CPS researcher.</p>
<p class="bodycopy"><strong><font size="2">Endnotes </font></strong></p>
</div>
<ul>
<li>
<div class="bodycopy" align="left">Jürgen Habermas, Between facts and
norms: contributions to the discourse of law and democracy, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1997. </div>
</li>
<li>
<div class="bodycopy" align="left">Business Day, 12 September 2002 </div>
</li>
<li>
<div class="bodycopy" align="left">The ANC received 1 185 669 votes in 1994,
but 1 176 926 votes in 1999. The IFP received 1 622 385 votes in 1994
and 1 196 955 in 1999. More people voted in 1994 than in 1999: 3 750 606
against 2 958 963. There was no voters'roll in 1994 - hence the decrease
in numbers for 1999, other than apathy. Also, some irregularities probably
took place in 1994. There were allegations to this effect, and the results
were to a certain extent a compromise agreed on by pollitical actors.
</div>
</li>
<li>
<div class="bodycopy" align="left">Most of the people of Sweetwaters work
in Pietermaritzburg. </div>
</li>
</ul>
<div align="left">
<p class="bodycopy"><br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</p>
<p class="bodycopy"><strong><font size="3">VOTERS' MANDATES</font></strong></p>
<p class="bodycopy"><strong><font size="2">Representatives are more than voters'
mouthpieces</font></strong></p>
<p class="bodycopy">The debate on floor-crossing touches on the important
notions of 'representation' and 'mandate'. Thabo Rapoo points out that,
in the South African political tradition, political representatives are
trustees rather than delegates</p>
<p class="bodycopy">The issue of floor-crossing has provoked arguments that
touch on some of the most important concepts involved in representative
democracy. Among them is the argument that floor-crossing would violate
the mandates voters confer upon political parties, especially in our electoral
system based on party lists and the principle of proportional representation.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">This view is based on a problematic understanding of the
concepts of 'representation' and 'mandate'. Rethinking them may help to
move the debate on this issue in a more fruitful direction, with floor-crossing
becoming a less emotive issue among politicians and commentators alike.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">South Africa's democratic political system is based on
the idea of indirect popular government based on the principle of 'representation'
rather than direct popular self-government. Citizens do not govern themselves
directly, but indirectly through elected public representatives. Therefore,
institutions of political representation and others derived from them are
based on the notion that our public representatives are 'trustees' rather
than 'delegates'. The concept of 'delegation' essentially denotes that authority
is transferred from one individual or group to another, and that the latter
is meant to serve as a channel for that delegated authority, or as an agent
of the delegating individual or group in decision-mking. What this implies
is that, in a system based on the concept of 'delegative representation',
public representatives are authorised only to convey accurately, truthfully,
and faithfully the specific views or instructions of their followers without
imposing their own opinions or interpretations.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">In that sense, public representatives or even political
parties serve as mere 'mouthpieces' or 'conveyor belts' for their constituents
or followers, with limited scope to interpret or alter these instructions
without seeking their constituents' approval. Therefore, the mandates conferred
upon political parties or candidates need to be construed as virtually inviolable
instructions, to be faithfully obeyed by political parties or public representatives.
Every time public representatives are faced with decisions that could potentially
violate these mandates, they are obliged to seek fresh mandates from their
constituents. To ensure that delegative representatives faithfully reflect
the views of their followers in decision-making processes, they are usually
subject to instant recall or immediate removal by their constituents.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">By contrast, in terms of the notion of representation
as 'trusteeship', public representatives have considerable freedom to exercise
their judgement in pursuing the 'interest' of their followers. This does
not necessarily mean that, in exercising this freedom of judgement, public
representatives will always accurately reflect the interests of their followers.
Moreover, this 'interest' may not even always be clear, or easy to ascertain.
And even if the interest of followers were clear at certain times, such
as elections, this may not always be so at other times. The notion of 'trusteeship'
is central to modern liberal democracies around the world, including South
Africa. It provides public representatives or political parties with a measure
of freedom to govern and make decisions in the name of their constituents
without having to constantly seek approval for fear of instant recall or
sanction.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">In addition, such a system does provide safeguards in
that regular opportunities exist - in our case once every five years - for
citizens to pass judgement on the way in which public representatives or
political parties have exercised their judgement. If, in the process, public
representatives or political parties erred and offended their followers
or violated their mandates, then the followers may exercise their own judgement
by withdrawing their current mandates or refusing to grant a new one.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">South Africa's system of democratic government is essentially
elitist, based on the notion of representative trusteeship. This means that
public representatives have considerable discretion and freedom to exercise
their judgement in decision-making without constantly having to seek the
approval of their followers. In principle, this applies to all decisions
politicians make, whether or not on behalf of their constituents, including
a decision to cross the floor. If the followers take a dim view of floor-crossing
by their public representatives, an opportunity exists in our system for
them to impose sanctions by withdrawing the mandate they had conferred upon
their preferred political parties and candidates at the time of their election.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">The view that floor-crossing violates voters' mandates
appears to be premised on the idea of 'delegative representation' in terms
of which political mandates are immutable commands, to be faithfully conveyed
or obeyed by political parties or public representatives under all circumstances
and at all costs. This understanding of representation unnecessarily portrays
public representatives and political parties as unthinking conveyor belts
for instructions from electors. Equally, such a view also appears to construct
electors as a group with unity of purpose, clearly defined interests, and
an unambiguous mandate to be implemented as is by their political parties.</p>
<p class="bodycopy">However, understanding representation as 'representative
trusteeship' allows us to see the voters' mandate not as a set of inviolable
instructions but as set of expectations, programmes, policies, or even promises
to be realised by political parties exercising freedom and independence
of judgement or discretion. This freedom applies to decisions that political
parties and their members may routinely make in the process of fulfilling
their functions.</p>
<p><span class="bodycopy">Thus, a decision by a member of a political party
to cross the floor should be understood in this context as an inevitable
and integral aspect of the system. This will allow us to move beyond the
conceptual hurdles in current debates on floor-crossing imposed by our understanding
of representation as 'delegative representation', and 'mandate' as a set
of inviolable instructions from citizens. This does not imply that decisions
to cross the floor are and will always be taken on the basis of ethically,
politically, and morally acceptable considerations. It merely suggests that,
within a system like ours, based on the notion that public representatives
are trustees, the decisions of public representatives to change membership
of parties should not be seen as undemocratic. They are an inevitable aspect
of our system, and entirely consistent with the notion of 'representative
trusteeship'. </span></p>
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