What type of majority is best suited to approve constitutional referendums?
Referendums are polls that give citizens the opportunity to directly accept or reject specific legislative issues proposed by government via a general vote. In many countries, referendums are mandatory in a range of explicitly predetermined circumstances. This is most often the case when the particular policy proposals being considered are of major national significance – in the event of constitutional amendments, for instance, many countries require that a referendum be held to poll the general population. Given the range and importance of polls of this nature, a number of points of debate arise regarding the political, administrative and logistical structure of constitutional referendums. A critical issue among these relates to the type of majority thought appropriate to decide the outcome of the vote. Some experts argue that the standard simple majority, meaning a vote of 50% +1, helps give both the government and the greater part of the population the most flexibility to institute needed social and political change. Others argue that a simple majority does not sufficiently mandate the government to amend the constitution, as the latter is typically thought of as a foundational legal document that should be rather difficult to change relative to other types of legislation. Some experts claim that double majorities – in which a majority according to more than one criterion is required – better protect minority groups from being marginalized by the majority. Switzerland, for example, requires that a majority of its voters as well as a majority of its cantons vote in favor of the referendum if a constitutional amendment is to pass. Others argue that a supermajority, where the proposition passes if a predetermined number well above 50% vote in favor of the proposed change, gives sufficient mandate to the government to amend the constitution without adding the constraints usually associated with double majorities.
When using referendums to approve or reject suggested changes to a constitution, what kind of majority do you think is most suitable as a threshold for approval? |

Constitutional amendments by popular vote
A good bad example of constitutions that can be reformed via popular amendment is California. Its constitution is one of the longest in the world, bloated by persistent amendment. Thanks to the ballot initiative, any group which collects signatures of 8% of the electorate can place a constitutional amendment on the state ballot. A majority of voters can approve the amendment in a single election. In 1978, California passed Proposition 13 by popular vote. Prop 13 amended the California Constitution to limit increases on property tax bills to 2% annually, regardless of property values, unless the property changes ownership. Additionally, Prop 13 requires a two-thirds majority of both houses of the California legislature to increase state taxes. The end result: a fiscal nightmare. Real and lasting change must come through democratic means. But true constitutional democracy means public deliberation. Popular constitutional amendments adopted by majority vote in a single election (whether it is a simple, special or double majority) are not reasoned and informed democracy; they are can became government by mobs mobilized by special interests.