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"Focus On..." Series
The "Focus on..." series aims to explore in greater detail cross-cutting issues referenced in the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. A subject matter specialist introduces each topic, highlights issues and sample materials in ACE and identifies additional online resources for users to research more information.
by André Blais and Agnieszka Dobrzynska by Domenico Tuccinardi, Paul Guerin, Fabio Bargiacchi, Linda Maguire by Sean Dunne
Electoral Laws: A Macroscopic Perspective
IntroductionThis Focus on provides a global overview of electoral laws and regulations around the world. It focuses on nine aspects: legal framework, electoral management,
boundary delimitation, voter registration, political parties and candidates,
media, voting operations, vote counting and voter education. By employing a global comparative perspective the authors strive to identify common legal practices as well as the underlying causes of these practices. Authors: André Blais and Agnieszka Dobrzynska
The present report examines the laws that govern the conduct of elections around the world. The purpose is to indicate what kind of regulations are most and least frequent and to point out some factors that seem to be related to the adoption or non adoption of these rules. Electoral laws matter. They define what parties, citizens, groups, and the media are allowed or not allowed to do or not to do, during the election campaign (or, sometime, even before) and on Election Day, and they provide strategic incentives for the actors to behave in certain ways (“Establishing the Rules of the Game: Election Laws in Democracies”, Massicotte, Blais and Yoshinaka 2004; “Making Votes Count”, Cox 1997). It is impossible to make sense of how electoral democracy functions if we do not know or understand the rules of the game. Few people would challenge the idea that democracy requires free elections. There is much less consensus, however, when it comes to explicating what “free elections” really mean, and even more debate when it comes to specifying which rules should be enacted to ensure that an election be really “free”. This is so in good part because there are many conceptions of democracy, each of which having distinct implications about what kind of legislation should be adopted (“Democracy and Elections”, Katz 1997).
Click here for the next chapter "Objectives".
Objectives
The first objective of this study is thus to document the amazing variety of electoral laws that have been adopted in the world, while pointing out, whenever appropriate, the most popular practices that can be observed. The second objective is to explore some of the factors that seem to be associated with the presence or absence of various rules. We examine four such factors: region, economic development, degree of democracy, and colonial heritage. We determine the extent to which the presence or absence of a given electoral rule is associated with the region (continent) the country belongs to, its relative wealth, the strength of political rights, and its colonial heritage. We hope that this study will contribute to a better understanding of the rules that govern the counduct of elections around the world and will provide useful information to organizations involved in the process of reviewing the legal framework under which the electoral game is being played in a given country.
Click here for the next chapter "Methodology"
Methodology
In all our analyses, the dependent variable is the presence or absence of a given electoral law and the independent variables are region, economic development, degree of democracy, and cultural heritage.
Our universe consists of the 237 countries and territories listed in the Comparative Data set that provides a systematic collection of how countries manage their elections (being accessed on the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network). It covers the field of electoral administration around the world including older election administrations (Europe and Latin America), newer (Eastern Europe, Pacific, some places in Africa, Middle East) and those who start from scratch (as Afghanistan or Iraq). Related territories are included in that collection; it should be noted however that there is a lot of missing data about them. We provide information about the rules according to which elections take place in both tiny and huge territories, poor and rich, free and unfree environments.
We have selected nine aspects of electoral legislation which seemed to be interesting and important and about which sufficient information was available. The nine factors are : 1. Legal Framework 2. Electroal Management 3. Boundary Delimitation 4. Voter Registration 5. Parties and Candidates 6. Media and Elections 7. Voting Operations 8. Vote Counting 9. Voter Education
We start with the legal framework which defines the parameters of electoral legislation; we then turn to the issue of the electoral management body, the boundary delimitation, the voter registration process, the rules concerning the parties, the candidates, and the media, the casting and the counting of the votes. And we end with the question of voter education. In each domain we identify three or four specific issues, and we examine the laws that have been adopted to deal with these issues.
On each dimension, we first document the variety of electoral laws while identifying the most popular practices. We then determine whether the propensity to adopt or not to adopt a given rule depends on the region, the country’s wealth, its degree of democracy, and its colonial heritage.
Our starting point is geography. We have retained the six regions according to the classification used by the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network: Africa, Americas, Asia, Middle East, Pacific, and Europe. We determine whether some rules appear to be more popular in some regions than in others. When such differences occur, and they do occur rather frequently, we are not in a position to specify why it is so. This could be because of cultural, economic or political differences between these regions. Deeper analysis would be required to flesh out the meaning of these regional variations.
Regional differences are inherently interesting, and this is why we systematically start with a simple description of patterns across the continents. As noted above, the exact meaning of these differences is ambiguous, and this is why we analyze them separately from the other factors. To the extent, however, that these regional variations do not seem to be related to the economic or political factors that are also considered, we are inclined to suppose that they reflect the impact of the culture and/or the social networks that link the political elites within a given region. We offer these conjectures, but they should be treated cautiously. Finally, we should point out that the number of observations for the Middle East (14 at the maximum, often less than 10 because of missing data) is quite small, and that generalizations concerning that region should be taken with extra caution.
After an examination of geographical variations, we look at the potential role of three factors that could affect the nature of electoral laws: the level of economic development, the degree of democracy, and colonial heritage.
The first factor is the economy. The indicator is GDP per capita in 2002 US dollar power purchasing party. The source is the cross-national comparative data The Quality of Government Dataset (version 2008) by Jan Teorell, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein. We have data on 174 countries; the range is from 520 to 61,190, with a mean of 9087 and a standard deviation of 9925. Since Seymour Martin Lipset, a leading scholar of democracy, who wrote in 1959 a pioneer work on Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, a vast literature has established that economic development is a strong antecedent of democratization, and it is thus “natural” to verify whether electoral laws are systematically different in rich and poor countries.
The second factor is the degree of democracy. We use the political rights scores given each year by Freedom House. These scores range from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). We use the mean score obtained between 2001 and 2006. These scores have been standardized so that the minimum equals 0 for those 13 countries that got the worst score of 7 every year and 1 for those 55 countries which were given the best score of 1 every year. Strong democracies constitute 29% of the cases for which we have information. Our objective is to determine whether democracies conduct elections differently from non democratic or authoritarian countries.
One may wonder whether it is the degree of democracy that leads to the adoption of a given electoral law or the reverse. It must be acknowledged that causation may run both ways. On the one hand, a country that has become “democratic” would be inclined to modify its electoral laws in some direction. On the other hand, a country that has adopted a given set of rules would be more likely to be construed as “democratic” by the international experts who rate political rights across the world. While both causal directions are possible, we believe that casuality runs mainly from degree of democracy to the adoption of specific laws. Our belief is based on the assumption that experts evaluate the extent of political rights first and foremost on the basis of concrete indicators of freedom of speech and the observed degree of competition than on the text of the laws.
The third factor to be considered is colonial heritage. We distinguish former French (27 countries), Spanish (19 countries), and British (66 countries) colonies. In their analysis of election laws in 63 contemporary democracies (“Establishing the Rules of the Game: Election Laws in Democracies” 2004), Massicotte, Blais and Yoshinaka found that former colonies tend to adopt the same electoral rules as their earlier mother country, and we wish to establish whether this pattern holds more generally.
Given the exploratory nature of this research the statistical analyses have been kept as simple as possible. We have dichotomized the dependent variables, and so we have simply distinguished those countries that did or did not adopt a given rule. For each rule, we provide two pieces of information. We first show the bivariate correlation between regions and the existence or absence of a rule. We then indicate in a summary table whether the presence or absence of a rule is significantly related or not to level of economic development, degree of democracy, and colonial heritage. We have performed multivariate analyses including these three factors and the summary tables tell whether there is a statistically significant correlation.
We should mention at the outset that the correlations between our independent variables are generally modest. The strongest correlation (.66) reflects the fact that an overwhelming majority of former Spanish colonies are located on the American continent, and as a consequence it is sometime difficult to distinguish the effects of these two factors. All other correlations are under .5, except that between Europe and GDP per capita, which is exactly .50.
The findings we report and the interpretations that we suggest are necessarily tentative. We are conscious of the fact that some of the information is incomplete and in some cases (we hope only seldom) perhaps even inaccurate, given the time span from the last validation of the data (for some countries the data has been confirmed only in 2001, for others it has been validated more recently). We examine a limited number of factors that may “explain” why certain rules are adopted in some countries and not in others and we test basic models. Our work is merely suggestive, and our hope is that it will trigger further and more elaborate analyses.
Despite all these limitations, we believe that it is fruitful to get some sense of different electoral laws that prevail in the world, to take stock of the amazing variation that exists, and to point out the factors that seem to be related to these variations.
Click here for the next chapter "Legal Framework" Legal FrameworkIn this section we examine the broad legal framework under which electoral laws function. The first issue is whether election laws are part of the constitution or not. The argument for having them in the constitution is that they are given higher status, as symbols of the contract that ties members of the community towards each other and between the people and their representatives. The argument for not putting them into the constitution is to obtain greater flexibility, as it is easier to amend simple laws than the constitution itself. It turns out that most of the time, that is, in 60% of the countries about which information is available elections laws, or at least some of them, are incorporated into the constitution. There are substantial regional variations, as they are part of the constitution in 80% of the countries in Europe and the Pacific, but only in a minority of the cases in the Americas and the Middle East. The propensity to include electoral laws into the constitution is not related to the degree of democracy or level of development. We do observe, however, that former French and Spanish colonies are less prone to incorporate election laws into the constitution. The second question is whether the national electoral law covers only national elections (and referenda) or applies to regional or local elections as well. In two thirds of the countries (65%), the electoral law has a broader reach and is not confined to national elections. This is particularly so in Africa, which is the most “centralized” continent. In contrast, a majority of the countries in the Middle East and Pacific have electoral laws that apply exclusively to the central level. The only factor (other than region) that seems to be correlated with degree of centralization is colonial legacy; former British colonies tend to have more decentralized legislation. The third aspect to be considered here is whether voting at the national level is voluntary or compulsory. Voting is compulsory in 25 countries, representing 12% of the total countries. The region where compulsory voting is most popular is clearly the Americas, where one quarter of the countries (26%) has adopted such legislation. In contrast it is in Africa that governments have been the most reluctant to force their electorates to go to the polls (only two countries, Central African Republic and Rwanda, have compulsory voting). The propensity to adopt compulsory voting appears to be unrelated to any obvious characteristic, except being a former Spanish colony, which is of course strongly correlated with being in the Americas. The final issue concerns the interpretation of the electoral law, and the question here is whether the ordinary courts are entirely responsible for (first level) electoral disputes or whether the electoral management body or some special electoral tribunal can also be involved. Two thirds of the countries (69%) have found it useful to grant at least some authority to specialized agencies or tribunals. In this case, regional variations tend to be muted but we observe that former French and British colonies are more likely to have bestowed some power to special tribunals or quasi-tribunals. Former French colonies appear to have followed the practice established in the “mother” country but the same explanation does not hold in the case of former British colonies since Britain does not have special tribunals. In this section we observed that:
The impact of degree of democracy, colonial heritage and economic development on legal framework
Electoral Management We start with the financial autonomy of the electoral management body, more specifically whether the legislature determines its budget and/or control its expenditures. It could be argued that electoral management bodies need financial autonomy from legislatures in order to maintain their full independence from the parties and government.
As a matter of fact, the legislature votes the budget to be allocated to these agencies in two thirds (69%) of the cases but it actually scrutinizes their spending in only one third (34%) of all the countries. There is thus more autonomy in the concrete operational side than at the planning stage. Surprisingly it is in Europe that financial autonomy is weakest; the budget of the electoral management body is voted by the legislature in 36 (84%) of the 43 European countries where information is available, and expenditures are controlled by legislators in 20 countries (54%). There is only a weak relationship between the level of democracy and the degree of financial autonomy, and it applies only with respect to the control of expenditures. Many democratic countries do not find it necessary to bestow electoral agencies with full fiscal independence. But at the same time, legislatures in former French and British colonies are less prone to oversee the revenues and expenditures of electoral management bodies. There may be a tension between two “democratic” principles. On the one hand, all public organizations should be scrutinized by the representatives of the people; on the other hand, politicians should have no leverage on the organization that may determine their future.
A second issue concerns the term of the members of the electoral management body. In most cases (51%) the members are nominated for a fixed term, sometimes (25%) the period is left unspecified, and there are 26 countries (14%) where they last only for one election (there are in addition 20 (11%) “other”, meaning until retirement, permanency, a minimum term defined, but also cases where the information is not detailed enough).
We are particularly interested in those 26 countries where the members are nominated for only one election. The concern here is that the members may feel that they have to please the eventual winner in order to be renominated for the next election. There is the possibility that the members of such bodies will not feel completely independent. Indeed, the two regions where such rules prevail are precisely those where democracy is weaker, that is, Africa and the Middle East. And indeed there is a significant negative correlation between the degree of democracy and the presence of agencies in which the members are nominated for one single election (we also find a positive correlation with French colony).
A final question is whether the national electoral body is in charge of all the elections that take place under the territory. This is the case most of the time. There are only 41 countries (23%) where the national agency takes care of only national elections, and leaves other institutions with the task of administering regional or provincial elections. Such specialization is particularly rare in Africa and more generally in poorer countries and is more popular among former British colonies. It is neither more nor less frequent in more democratic countries.
It is striking to observe that:
The impact of degree of democracy, colonial heritage and economic development on electoral management rules
Click here for the next chapter "Boundary Delimitation"
Boundary Delimitation
In most countries, elections are contested first and foremost in districts. One thorny issue is how these districts should be defined and by whom. We address three specific questions related to the boundary delimitation.
The first question is whether the districts are designed specifically for election purposes or whether existing regional/provincial/administrative boundaries are used. It seems that it is the former in an overwhelming majority of cases; only 28% of the countries appear to utilize existing regions as the basis for the boundary delimitation. There is little geographical variation across the globe, and more democratic countries do not appear to be more or less inclined to rely on existing boundaries. Again colonial heritage seems to matter. Former British colonies seem to be more prone to design specific electoral districts while former French colonies tend to rely on existing boundaries.
The second question concerns the criteria for drawing the boundaries. A plethora of criteria is utilized, such as respecting natural barriers or cultural communities, the compactness of constituencies, and conformity with local jurisdictions, as well as equality of population. We focus here on the importance attached to equality. For 25 (18%) out of 141 countries for which we have information, equality of population appears to be the sole consideration. These countries are spread across the continents and do not form any coherent pattern, and so we have little to say about the factors that may induce decision-makers to put more or less emphasis on equality of population as a principle
The last issue is whether a neutral independent agency is responsible for the boundary delimitation. This would seem to be an important requirement in order to prevent the parties, and most especially the governing parties, to draw the electoral map to their own advantage.
We find that in only 47% of the countries where information is available the authority to draw the boundaries is delegated to an independent body. Paradoxically, independent authorities are particularly infrequent in the continent where democracy is the most strongly established, that is, Europe. There is strikingly no relationship between the degree of democracy and the presence of an independent body in charge for drawing electoral boundaries. Finally, former British colonies are more prone to creating independent agencies.
This section allows us to conclude that:
The impact of degree of democracy, colonial heritage and economic development on boundary delimitation
Click here for the next chapter "Voter Registration" Voter RegistrationIn almost all cases, the citizen who wishes to vote must first make sure he/she is registered as an eligible voter. But what does it take to be registered?
The most common eligibility criterion is age. The great majority (86%) of countries have selected 18 as the voting age. Five countries (3%) have even gone for a voting age of 16 (Austria, Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua, Somalia), and in four additional cases (2%) it is 17 (Indonesia, North Korea, Sudan, Timor-Leste). We are more interested here in countries that have chosen a higher threshold, that is, 20 (8 countries or 4%: Cameroon, Japan, Liechtenstein, Nauru, Morocco, South Korea, Taiwan, Tunisia) or 21 (11 countries or 6%: Bahrain, Fiji, Gabon, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan, Samoa, Singapore, Tonga). These are countries that have resisted the trend towards a lowering of the voting age.
There are some striking regional variations in the voting age. Almost all countries in Africa, America, and Europe now have a voting age of 18 or less (for a sake of simplicity, we combined those two categories in our analysis, but it should be noted that there is a large agreement that the voting age should be 18 and not below). In contrast, exceptions are more frequent in Asia (7 countries out of 27 have 20 or 21) and the Middle East (three countries out of nine). Former French and British colonies, as well as richer and less democratic countries, are more prone to be among the less “liberal” exceptions.
The other qualifications that are often necessary to get registered are citizenship (or naturalization), citizenship of parents, and residence. We focus on those cases where citizenship (or naturalization) is the sole requirement. Those countries represent almost half of total cases (44%). This practice is widespread in Europe (77% of the cases), but is quite rare in Americas, Middle East and the Pacific, as well as among former French, Spanish, and British colonies. This suggests that culture and history inherent to this region play an important role in the definition of what is deemed to be necessary (besides age) in order to have the right to vote.
There is then the issue of who is responsible for the registration of voters. Perhaps the most logical solution is to endow the electoral management body with this task. This is indeed the most popular option, chosen in 57% of the countries (the second most frequent is local authorities and the third a central government department). There is a huge exception; in Europe only 18% of the countries have gone with the electoral management body. Furthermore, the electoral board approach is most often utilized in more democratic but poorer countries as well as in former Spanish and British colonies. The reasons for these patterns are not altogether clear. But these findings suggest that these apparently technical matters are dealt with quite differently in different regions and cultures.
The last question to be considered is whether registration is voluntary or compulsory. It is compulsory in two thirds (64%) of the countries. Regional variations are not as huge in this case but there remain some substantial differences. Less than half of African countries and very few British colonies have compulsory registration, but more than four fifths (84%) of European countries do require their citizens to register.
Voter registration rules vary immensely from one country to the other, and as a consequence there is no dominant pattern:
”Registration is compulsory in 24% of the countries undertaken in this study.” ”Culture and history inherent play an important role in the definition of what is deemed to be necessary (besides age) in order to have the right to vote”
Parties and Candidates An important set of measures which are part of the electoral legislation are specifically targeted at the parties and candidates.
One question has to do with what is required for the parties running for national elections to be officially registered. In 40% of the countries one such requirement consists in a monetary deposit. This practice does not vary significantly across the continents; it is unrelated to the degree of democracy or economic development. The measure is somewhat more popular in former French colonies.
A second aspect concerns the legal qualifications to become a candidate at legislative elections. A residence requirement is mandated in 40% of the cases and a literacy or education threshold is imposed in 17% of the countries. The residence qualification is found most often in the Americas while literacy tests are to be found mostly in Africa and the Middle East, and more generally in former British colonies. More democratic countries are less prone to screen out candidates on the basis of their “competence”, perhaps an indication that the democratic credo rejects explicitly excluding people on the basis of socio-demographic characteristics.
A third set of issues concerns parties’ eligibility to receive public (direct or indirect) or private funding. The dominant pattern is clearly to allow both: public funding is permitted in 74% of the countries and private donations are legal in 85% of them. Public funding is almost universal in Europe (only one exception, Belarus), but relatively infrequent in the Middle East and Pacific. Bans on private funding seem to take place almost exclusively in less democratic countries while public funding tends to be exceptional in former British colonies.
We finally examined whether independent candidates are allowed to compete in legislative elections. The answer is “Yes” in 80% of the countries. Such is the dominant pattern in all regions of the world and knows of only few exceptions in former British colonies (Guyana, Israel, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria and South Africa).
There seem to be a certain number of norms that are respected in most countries with respect to the regulation of parties and candidates:
In 80% of the countries independent candidates are allowed to compete in legislative elections.
The impact of degree of democracy, colonial heritage and economic
development on rules for parties and candidates
Media and Election In this section, we examine four aspects to the election law that pertain to the role of the media in elections.
The first dimension concerns the criteria for allocating free broadcast time and/or free advertisement space to political parties. Many different criteria are utilized, such as the number of candidates put forward in the election, the outcome of the previous election, and the size of the legislative caucus. In a few cases a special committee is charged with the task. But the most frequent approach, used in 64 countries, is to give each party equal time. This is found in 55% of the cases for which we have information.
Variations across regions in the propensity to choose the equality principle are minimal. Interestingly, the equality clause is not more popular in more democratic countries. It is, however, somewhat less frequent in former French and British colonies.
The second aspect has to do with paid advertising. In only 24 (18%) of the 133 countries about which information is available (it should be kept in mind that in many countries paid advertising is not allowed) there is a limit on advertising. The only region where limits are frequent is the Americas, where it exists in almost half of the cases. None of the former British colonies has implemented specific limits on advertising (note that there can be limits on total spending, which indirectly affect the amount of money that can be spent on advertising). Again, there is no correlation between imposing limits on advertising and the degree of democracy. Finally, limits on advertising are more frequent in Spanish colonies.
The only region where limits for paid advertising are frequent is the Americas.
The third item concerns the presence or absence of televised debates in legislative elections. Among the 131 cases for which there is information, 55% do hold such debates (note that in 18 countries televised debates are organized only for presidential elections). They are clearly the norm in Europe, where four fifths (80%) of the countries have them, and are particularly infrequent in the Americas (with only four countries out of 16: Canada, French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique; note, however, that in many cases there are debates for presidential elections). We find debates to be held more frequently in countries with high scores on the Freedom House Political Rights scale.
The last aspect to be examined is the presence or absence of a blackout period during which the results of pre-election polls may not be released to the public. Such blackout prevails in 58 (45%) of the 130 countries about which information is available. In 30 cases (23%), this is a short ban, of three days or less, but in another 17 countries 13%), the ban applies to a period of more than one week. Blackouts are more frequent in Europe and the Americas and rarer in Africa and the Middle East. Former British and French colonies seem more reluctant to implement such legislation, but more democratic countries do not appear more inclined to have blackouts.
With respect to the regulation of the media in election campaigns, there appears to be no clear norm about what should be and should not be done:
The impact of degree of democracy, colonial heritage and economic development on rules for the media in elections
Click here for the next chapter "Voting Operations"
Voting Operations We have previously looked at the rules that govern how people can get on the voter register. There are also rules that determine how registered voters can actually vote. We consider two specific aspects, first where voters can actually vote, and second if and how registered voters who are outside the country are allowed to vote.
The first issue is where (and how) people vote. The most frequent option is at a specified polling station in the locality where they are registered but in many countries there is also the possibility to vote at other polling stations, by mail, by phone, or by proxy. We simply distinguish here those countries where the sole option available is a polling station in one’s locality from those where other options are also available. It turns out that there is a perfect split between the two groups. There are substantial regional differences, but the underlying logic is not clear. Sticking to the local polling stations is more frequent in the Middle East and Americas while offering more options is more popular in the Pacific, Europe and Asia. Contrary to what we might have expected, more economically developed and more democratic countries are not more prone to make it possible to vote in different places or ways. Finally, former Spanish colonies are more likely to rely entirely on local polling stations.
The second question is whether people can vote from outside the country. In one third of the cases (37%), voting from outside the country is simply not permitted. This is the situation in a majority of countries in the Americas. At the other end of the scale, we find that three fourths of European (78%) and African (73%) countries explicitly allow some people to vote from the outside under some conditions. Again there is no correlation between being more “liberal” on this and the degree of democracy and/or economic development. The only pattern that we observe is that former British colonies tend to be more “conservative” and not to allow voting from outside the country.
When voting from outside the country is allowed, it is most often made available to citizens residing abroad. Such a measure prevails in almost half the countries (47%). Here regional variations are quite modest, and the only significant pattern is that former British colonies are less prone to adopt such rules.
Finally, voting from outside the country, when allowed, can be made more or less easy. In a small majority of cases (56%), voting takes place exclusively at embassies, consulates, or special polling stations. In other countries, it is also possible to vote by mail or proxy. The most “liberal” regions are the Pacific and Europe and the most “conservative” is Africa. The most liberal countries are the most democratic and wealthiest, while former British colonies tend to be more “conservative”.
As in many other domains, there is an amazing variety of voting operations across the planet, there is really no dominant approach, and for the most part there is no cleavage between more and less democratic countries:
The impact of degree of democracy, colonial heritage and economic development on voting operation practices
Click here for the next chapter "Vote Counting" Vote CountingThe penultimate aspect of the electoral law that we examine concerns the counting of the votes. Two questions are addressed: First, where are the votes counted? Second, under what conditions are the votes recounted?
The first question is whether votes are first sorted and counted at the local polling station or more centrally. The advantage of the former is that the count can be completed more quickly and that there is less risk that ‘something’ happens between the polling station and the place where the count takes place. The counterargument is that it may be easier to ensure a fair count when the process is more centralized, as it is easier for all the parties and international observers to watch. Almost 80% of the countries have chosen to have the first count directly in the polling stations. This is the majority pattern in all regions, though there are relatively more exceptions in the Middle East and Pacific. There is no relationship with level of economic development or degree of democracy. Former British colonies tend to follow the example of the UK and to opt for centralized counting.
The second issue is about recounts. There are basically three approaches. In some places (11 countries or 7%) ballots are never recounted, in others (14 countries or 8%) they are always recounted, and in the great majority they may be recounted under certain conditions, or by request or by court order. Countries with no recount (Angola, Costa Rica, Croatia, Israel, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, Panama, Paraguay, Romania, and Venezuela) are clearly the exception but perhaps surprisingly they do not tend to be less democratic overall than those with recounts.
There are clear dominant practices regarding the counting of the votes:
The impact of degree of democracy, colonial heritage and economic development on vote counting practices
Click here for the next chapter "Voter Education" Voter Education
Given the recent decline in turnout observed in most democracies, there has been renewed interest in the issue of voter education. Perhaps some citizens do not vote simply because they do not know the basic facts about how, where, and when to register and vote. Or perhaps some are baffled by the apparent complexity of political institutions and do not see the utility of voting, and would need civic education programs to inform them about how Parliament, the government, and parties function.
The first issue concerns basic information about what it takes to register and vote, how/when/where people can cast (or perhaps mail) their ballot. It would seem normal for electoral management bodies to conduct information campaigns to improve citizens’ knowledge and understanding of how one gets registered and then votes. Indeed, an overwhelming majority of these organizations (84%) do wage such campaigns. Interestingly, it is in Africa, in Asia, and more generally in the poorest countries that these information campaigns are the most frequently conducted by EMBs. It is only in the more developed countries that the need for providing such information may not be obvious, and even in these countries the recent turnout decline has brought home the message that one should not assume that everybody perfectly understands how one votes.
A related question is whether such information campaigns should be conducted at the time of the election or continuously. The dominant pattern is to do the former. Only 28% of the electoral management bodies appear to run a permanent campaign to inform citizens. Interestingly, permanent campaigns are most frequent in the Americas and particularly rare in the Middle East, the Pacific, and Europe.
The other approach, of course, is to ensure that citizens understand not only the mechanics of registering and voting, but more generally the functioning of political institutions and political life. This is the goal of national civic education campaigns. Such programs seem to prevail in 69% of the countries. Perhaps not surprisingly it is in Europe and generally in wealthier countries that civics education programs appear to be less popular. As in the case of voter information programs, it appears that the need to educate people about politics is most obvious in poorest areas of the world. It is also interesting to note that civic education or information programs are neither more nor less popular in more democratic countries.
The dominant pattern is thus to run campaigns to provide citizens with basic information about elections and the political system:
The impact of degree of democracy, colonial heritage and economic development on voter education practices
Click here for the next chapter "Summary"
Summary
We have examined the electoral laws that are in place in the countries of the world with respect to nine different domains. What is most striking when we look at them in some detail is the amazing variety of rules that prevail in the world. It is very rare that a given rule would prevail even in a mere majority of countries. Differences clearly trump similarities.
There a few exceptions and these are interesting in themselves. The most dominant pattern is the voting age. There is a nearly consensus (86%) that voting age should be 18. This is a paradoxical consensus, as there seems to be no obvious reason why people should have the right to vote at 18 rather than at 15 or 20 or 25. Why almost all countries have converged towards the same rule, while they have not in most other matters, is a mystery which hopefully will be solved in the future.
There are other exceptions. Compulsory voting at the national level does not occur frequently. Few (17%) countries impose education or literacy conditions for candidates and the great majority allows independent candidates as well as public and private funding. Vote counting usually takes place at the local polling stations and vote recount is possible under some conditions.
Still, in the great majority of cases there is just no dominant pattern. We have looked at the nature and source of these variations. We have first determined if there are geographical patterns. The verdict is pretty clear. In most domains, regional variations are quite substantial. This observation raises further questions, about the reasons for these regional variations. We have not been able to address this question in this exploratory study but we hope that future research will delve more systematically into the sources of these regional variations. We suspect that this reflects the impact of networks and culture but more detailed analyses are required to test our intuition and to untangle the relative importance of these two factors.
We have also checked whether the various electoral rules seem to be correlated to the level of economic development, the degree of democracy, and colonial heritage. In the great majority of cases we have shown evidence that colonial heritage matters. Our findings confirm those obtained by Massicote, Blais and Yoshinaka (“Establishing the Rules of the Game: Election Laws in Democracies” 2004) whose study was confined to electoral democracies. But again much more work needs to be done to specify how the influence of the mother country concretely operates, which former colonies are most and least likely to follow the “example” and why.
Conclusion
The data that we have reported suggest that electoral rules are seldom correlated with economic development and degree of democracy. We are not surprised by the nil finding concerning the economy. The economy may be a strong prerequisite in the democratization process but it may have little to do in the precise forms of democracy that a country chooses.
But the general absence of a relationship between the degree of democracy and the nature of electoral rules is more perplexing. In our view, coming to an understanding of why it is so should be a top priority on the research agenda. This suggests the lack of consensus on even the minimal conditions under which elections should be contested in a democracy. Why is it that almost everyone appears to agree that voting age should be 18 while there seems to be no agreement that the election should be conducted by a completely free and independent agency?
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About The Authors
André Blais is professor in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal. He is a holder of the Canada Research Chair in Electoral Studies, a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, and a research fellow with the Centre for the Study of Democratic Citizenship, the Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative (CIREQ), and the Center for Interuniversity Research Analysis on Organizations (CIRANO). He is past president of the Canadian Political Science Association.
Agnieszka Dobrzynska (Ph.D., Political Science) in 2008 joined the Office of Institutional Research at the University of Montreal where she is a Research and Planning Analyst. A former postdoctoral fellow with the Canada Research Chair in Electoral Studies at the University of Montreal, she was also a consultant for Elections Canada. Her most recent publications are on the topics of elections and voting behaviour, public opinion, media coverage of politics, electoral systems and research methodology. Focus On Effective Electoral AssistanceAuthors: Domenico Tuccinardi, Paul Guerin, Fabio Bargiacchi, Linda Maguire
This “Focus On…” argues that the work that still needs to be done is essentially capacity building, both at the development agency and partner country level. The initiatives implemented over the last three years in the field of electoral assistance by the European Commission, the United Nations Development Programme and International IDEA, and the recent establishment of the EC-UNDP “Joint Task Force on Effective Electoral Assistance” are analysed in this context. This represents a first assessment of the way in which electoral assistance is delivered on the ground, and the effect that these new ideas are having in shaping other development agencies’ priorities in this field. Cost-effective knowledge services and capacity building tools like the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network and BRIDGE are playing an increasingly decisive role in making electoral assistance more effective. This "Focus On ... Effective Electoral Assistance" is structured as follows:
IntroductionElectoral assistance can be defined today as the legal, technical and logistic support provided to electoral laws, processes and institutions. It spans a broad spectrum - from the establishment of the legal framework for the administration of elections, to inclusive electoral systems and voter registration processes, support to the institutions called to administer and adjudicate upon electoral processes, through the provision of financial resources, materials, equipment and expert advice, as well as technical and financial support to civil society engaged in civic and voter education, election observation and media monitoring, including technical assistance to political parties. The provision of this type of assistance implies as well the handling of a very complex and delicate set of interactions among Electoral Management Bodies, assistance providers, multilateral and bilateral development agencies, partner country governments, CSOs, political parties and vendors. The appreciation of the sensitiveness of this delicate set of relationships requires the development of specific skills that go well beyond the pure technical advice. In this context, by “Effective Electoral Assistance” we mean all the initiatives and activities that are intended to improve the quality and impact of electoral assistance to partner country electoral institutions. In this sense, electoral assistance is part of the wider democratic development of the partner country, in accordance with the five key principles of “ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability” that inform the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Electoral assistance as defined above is still a discipline in its infancy, despite the fact that election assistance activities have been part of the external relations’ agenda of several established democracies since the end of World War II. Only very recently has electoral assistance been recognised as a branch of democracy development assistance (“Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of Governance”, Lopez-Pintor 1999 and “International Electoral Assistance: A Review of Donor Activities and It was only after the end of the Cold War that the importance of supporting the establishment of functioning and transparent governance institutions was widely acknowledged as a priority for the creation of more stable, peaceful and economically sustainable democracies. This arose during a period of formation of new countries established after the break up of authoritarian regimes and in countries transitioning from military regimes, and support for the institutions and processes related to elections was very much a part of this development. Since then, states at the bilateral level and, more often multilaterally, have been keen to provide significant financial support to elections in several countries, with important progress being made in the process. However, after the initial enthusiasm caused by the so-called “Third Wave” of democratisation which began in the mid-1970s but advanced apace in the 1990s, problems began to emerge. In studying transitions in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, a striking dichotomy emerged in many cases between the provision of apparently successful election assistance and the concomitant failure of recipient states to make progress in the overall democratisation process. In many cases, the transition from electoral democracies to parliamentary democracies was never fully accomplished. This “Focus On” highlights how the lack of progress in this area may be attributed to the failure of all development partners to fully understand the integral relationship The resulting recognition that concepts such as ‘effectiveness’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘capacity building’ were the way forward in electoral assistance was made by several development agencies around the turn of the Millennium[1], but very often the officials involved struggled to identify effective methods that could turn the above mentioned concepts into effective implementation policies. Many development agency officials dealing with electoral assistance expressed frustration over the pressures created by short pre-election time frames, in combination with large expenditures and with the sudden drop-off of interest for the partner countries’ institutional development in the post electoral period. Long-term institution building programs in the electoral area were at first simply not considered, as the focus was usually on the election as an event. International support was typically not available for sustained activities in this sector and longer-term assistance was deemed difficult to measure and more easily influenced by external factors or unforeseen events. In contrast, short-term, ad hoc support to specific election events remained extremely attractive, as it provided easily identifiable and measurable (though much more modest) outcomes, provided high visibility at a political level and had proven to be easily justifiable to domestic and international constituencies.
This paper will describe some of the new activities and initiatives undertaken by the above mentioned institutions in an attempt to make electoral assistance effective, as well as the related efforts to conceptualise the linkages between electoral assistance, democracy development and the necessary development of more inclusive political frameworks and democratic culture. This description will follow a brief overview of almost two decades of electoral assistance and an analysis of the challenges and constraints which emerged towards the end of the 90s. The main aim is to demonstrate with concrete examples that the building of strong and transparent electoral administration capacity is a primary and invaluable form of investment for the long-term democratic development of the partner countries and that ad hoc contributions to election events, whilst still needed and politically attractive, yield positive results only if embedded within a larger and more complex framework of democratic assistance initiatives. Next: Brief History of Electoral Assistance - Three leading actors [1] See especially UNDP Practice Notes on Electoral Assistance and Processes of 2001 and 2004 and EC communication 191/2000 on Electoral Assistance and Observation. Brief History of Electoral Assistance – Three leading actors
Article 21 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides the legal and moral justification for electoral assistance. Since the Declaration’s adoption and proclamation in 1948, the notion of international electoral assistance has undergone various transformations and been interpreted in various different ways. Nevertheless, it has always been firmly rooted within the wider domain of “democracy assistance” efforts. Almost all established democracies had, by the 1960s, included election assistance in the framework of their democracy assistance initiatives in favour of developing countries; as such assistance had been identified as an important stabilising factor, a facilitator for economic development and a useful foreign policy instrument. At the same time, election assistance has also been used to justify interventions and even interference in countries of specific strategic interest. An early form of electoral assistance was that lent to political parties in the 1960s and 1970s in many countries of Southern Europe and Latin America by the US government or by other agencies such as the German or British political party foundations (see “Aiding Democracy Abroad, the Learning Curve” Carothers, 1999). Subsequently, established democracies began providing support for constitutional referenda and transitional elections through their respective development cooperation agencies or more often, through specific contributions to multilateral institutions. Apart from the ‘Balkan Parenthesis’, where for a very specific set of circumstances the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was entrusted with the organisation of elections by the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and by the Rambouillet Accords for Kosovo, one can clearly single out three actors that shaped the way electoral assistance has been justified and delivered since the 1960s: the United Nations, the United States and, from the mid-90s, the European Commission. The UN’s involvement with electoral activities began in earnest in the 1960s and 1970s,[1] when the Trusteeship Council assisted with the observation or supervision of some 30 plebiscites, referenda or elections in various regions of the world. By the late 1980s, UNDP had financed several small-sized projects that provided some form of assistance on specific technical aspects of electoral processes and on the establishment of the related infrastructure necessary to conduct elections. Also at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, the UN had begun to engage in major electoral missions of three kinds – the organisation and conduct of elections (such as through the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia through UNTAC in 1993); the supervision and control of elections (such as in Namibia through UNTAG in 1989); and the verification of electoral processes (such as in El Salvador through ONUSAL in 1994). These
activities, along with rising demand from Member States for technical
assistance by the UN, led to the introduction in December 1991 of a General
Assembly (GA) Resolution 46/137 on
“Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine
Elections”. Since then, the Secretary-General has reported biannually to
the GA on “appropriate ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the
principle of periodic and genuine elections, in the context of full respect of
the sovereignty of Member States.” GA
resolution 46/137 also called for
The GA resolution also recommended that an office be created to support the Focal Point in these functions, and since 1992, the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD) has filled this role. All UN electoral assistance must follow a request made by a recognised national authority and most assistance delivered in cooperation with national actors in non-crisis situations has relied heavily on UNDP’s financial and personnel resources. Also important, however, are the major activities that have been implemented through the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the context of peacekeeping missions and, increasingly, in an integrated “one UN” manner that draws on the mandates and expertise of different agencies of the UN family in a given country.
UNDP’s field presence and traditional custodianship of the UN Resident Coordinator system proved important facilitating factors for the implementation of the UN electoral assistance: UNDP resident officials provided established relationships with government, bilateral development agencies, non-governmental organisations and political parties, as well as logistical infrastructure, country knowledge and financial resources for the mobilisation of assistance. The support provided from the late 1980s through the late-1990s, however, did not benefit from long-term planning, but was often directed at obtaining the maximum results in the shortest possible timeframe.
The EC has been active for a decade an a half in the field of electoral assistance, and its activities have always been firmly established within the larger domain of democracy promotion, as set forth in Article 6 of the European Union Treaty. Over this period, the forms through which this support has been provided have evolved considerably and become much more substantive then mere financial contributions to projects designed and managed by other international institutions and agencies. The EC began funding electoral support missions in 1993 with the observation of the first multi-party elections in Russia, and in 1994 with the first multiracial elections in South Africa. In 1994 the EC also provided significant financial and technical support to an electoral event of specific relevance to its foreign policy - the Legislative and Presidential Elections in Mozambique, the first elections in the country after the end of the civil war and the related Peace Agreement. Since then, EC electoral support activities have grown considerably in their number and scope: the Palestine Authority Presidential Elections in 1996 were supported both in terms of technical assistance and observation. Since then, electoral assistance projects were mainly supported through the development cooperation funds, but continued to be programmed on an ad hoc basis without any standardised and strategic approach for a number of years. In this context, EC Regulation 976 of 1999 and the EC Communication 191 of April 2000 on “Electoral Assistance and Observation” marked a significant step towards the conceptualisation of electoral assistance and observation as complementary activities and towards the harmonisation of the interventions. After a period where electoral assistance activities remained somewhat uncoordinated and not very visible at the global level, the EC is now a leading global actor in providing electoral support, both in terms of electoral assistance and electoral observation. The creation of a quality support unit within the main implementation arm of the EC, Europe Aid, steered the steep increase of funding designated to electoral assistance operations (from 2004 to 2006, about 320m EUROs), with senior level attention increasingly focused on the specific challenges of supporting elections in post-conflict scenarios. In parallel the EU Election Observation programme has built on its initial achievements and consolidated a reliable methodology that can be applied consistently anywhere in the world. Since 2000, the EU has deployed some 50 observation missions in 35 different countries, which have contributed greatly to the mitigation of conflict and the deterrence of election fraud.
Next: The hard lessons of the 1990s
[1] The first UN involvement in electoral processes dates back to the end of 1940s with the observation of the first elections in the Korean peninsula. The hard lessons of the 1990sSince the first large UN-led electoral missions at the end of the 1980s, electoral assistance has played a significant, sometimes fundamental role in the democratisation processes of many countries undergoing political transitions. However, the period of regime changes that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union was characterised by enthusiastic and often unconditional support for electoral processes in Eastern Europe and in many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Asia. This enthusiasm for elections spread despite the fact that international assistance was very often uncoordinated, promoted inappropriate or unsustainable electoral systems and procedural models and indeed sometimes served to recycle former warlords as legitimately elected leaders. Development agencies often provided conspicuous financial contributions
for particular electoral events (generally requested by the partner countries).
The support for rushed and costly election processes, using temporary
institutions and massive deployment of international expertise was based on the
belief that fast elections could be the panacea for transitional countries’
structural and economic problems and set a sort of democratic virtuous circle
in motion in the partner country. Instead In the conduct of the so-called ‘second generation’ of elections after a regime transition, a two-fold pattern developed: a) on one end of the spectrum, some countries were left to their own devices by the international community in a crucial but overlooked phase of their democratic transition, having been prematurely identified as being firmly on the ‘democratic path’ or no longer considered a political priority; b) at the opposite end of the spectrum, development agencies and assistance providers stayed the course in certain countries, but started from scratch every time there was an electoral event and a request for electoral assistance. In doing so, development agencies also tended to make their own identification of the needs that should be addressed, although this did not always match with the priorities perceived by the partner countries. In both situations, development agencies were forced to rethink their
approach. However, the almost complete absence of proper coordination between
different bilateral and/or multilateral development agencies systematically
impacted on the lack of effectiveness and sustainability of the electoral
assistance efforts. Even if the partner country’s Electoral Management Body
(EMB) had defined its needs clearly, the interest expressed by different development
agencies to ‘flag’ their support to a highly visible and attractive event often
led to overlaps and gaps in With the end of the 1990s, the initial wave of enthusiasm for supporting electoral processes gave way to a more reasoned and realistic approach. In many cases, international electoral assistance was crucial to prevent undemocratic forces from performing mass manipulation of the results, to strengthen the legitimacy of emerging democratic groups and parties and to persuade ex-combatants to accept the rules of the democratic game. Nevertheless, serious disappointments were also recorded in terms of the expected democratic developments in countries were elections had been made possible with international funding and expertise. This led major electoral assistance providers to acknowledge that a positive evaluation of elections had to be based on a larger scale of parameters, of which the peaceful conduct of polling and the sound logistic organisation of the electoral event was one very visible factor, but certainly not the most fundamental one. These hard lessons convinced assistance providers that “a successful electoral process is built upon the legitimacy of the institutional frameworks”[1] and that these frameworks are made of a number of crucial and interlinked components. Persuading development agencies’ decision-makers proved to be a tougher task. Next: The Wake-Up Call of the New Millennium [1] Andrew Ellis, “From Optimism to Realism: Ten Years of Electoral Development”, in International IDEA, “Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide”, IDEA 10th Anniversary Publication, May 2005, page 100. The Wake-Up Call of the New MillenniumAt the turn of the Millennium, electoral assistance providers began to engage more consistently with donors to analyse, in greater depth, the impact of their support to elections in post conflict, transitional and emerging democracies in terms of their long term democratic and economic development. UNDP, in particular, undertook a review of a decade of its experience in electoral assistance, from 1990 to 2000, which can be considered the first comprehensive evaluation made in the field of electoral assistance. The result of this review revealed that elections were too often supported as isolated events. Electoral support was not linked to other aspects of democratic governance such as constitution building, as well as political and electoral system design, despite the fact that electoral assistance often offered an ideal entry point for assisting partner countries on other democratic governance efforts. The UNDP’s review presented the clear conclusion that the relationship between electoral systems and political party systems, and the need to involve stakeholders through dialogue, were often insufficiently understood or not fully considered in planning electoral assistance support, pointing for the first time to the responsibilities of the international community. UNDP followed up its 10 year review with more specific studies, while a number of other development cooperation agencies like the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) undertook similar critical reviews of ad hoc support to electoral processes and the need to place electoral assistance more clearly within larger democracy and governance efforts. Despite the gradual widespread acknowledgement of the need to move away from the event-driven support approach, the hard reality of foreign policy proved to be a difficult obstacle to overcome in planning longer term electoral assistance projects. At times, support to sudden elections or referenda after an unexpected regime change or a breakthrough in a long-drawn conflict was not necessarily compatible with efficient and effective planning, not even with the execution of an inclusive and transparent electoral process, unless massive international presence was deployed. In many other cases, a fundamental dichotomy persisted in the approach of many development agencies (and in the consequent formulation of assistance programmes) between the desirability of investing in capacity development and the political imperatives to achieve the best results within the shortest possible timeframe. The assumption made by many development agencies was that “democratization tends to
unfold in a set sequence of stages”[1] , and
that the institutional design that had been previously put in place with
international technical assistance might eventually be found by the new rulers
of the partner countries as not respondent to their needs. Many developing
countries in between elections moved away from the initially established
democracy trajectory and reformed their political and electoral systems. These
changes were sometimes the result of a genuine democratic development process
within the partner countries; at other times these changes were imposed by the
new rulers in the attempt to consolidate their hold on power. The consequence
in both cases was often a severe underestimation of the technical and financial In the face of growing consciousness of its limited effectiveness, this type of assistance was repeated again and again, and the event-driven approach often frustrated the efforts of those development agency officials who had been advocating a different strategic course. Electoral reforms therefore became a double-edged sword: on the one hand they were advocated for and encouraged to enable the partner country to follow its own democratic development; on the other hand, they were also very much feared as often requiring an unforeseen amount of technical and financial assistance and increasing concerns about the sustainability of electoral processes. Independent international observation missions played an important role in shifting the mindset of electoral assistance providers from the event-driven approach to a more cyclical one. Evaluations and reports produced by election observation missions represented a valuable tool for better assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the electoral process in a given country and of their reform processes. Electoral observation in the New Millennium had in fact already considerably evolved from the so called rubber-stamping missions of early 1990s to become a rather sophisticated and complex undertaking, especially due to the initiative of the European Union, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE (OSCE-ODIHR) and independent foundations like the Carter Center. Observation missions organized by the above mentioned actors are now deployed after timely needs assessment missions and apply a tested and precise methodology as well as an internally agreed code of conduct modelled on the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation. Non-partisan election observation by international and domestic observer organisations can greatly contribute to enhancing the integrity of election processes by deterring irregularities and fraud, by promoting public confidence in the electoral process, by mitigating potential for election-related conflicts in the pre-electoral period, and most importantly, can provide grounded recommendations for improving the democratic reform process. Today there is a growing tendency for international and domestic observer organisations to monitor second and subsequent legislative and presidential elections. Furthermore, missions are deployed to observe local elections and referenda, with the aim of promoting genuine, cost effective and transparent elections. This includes the strengthening of democratic institutions and respect for human rights and the rule of law, which also benefit from development cooperation programmes. However, although observation missions produce detailed reports highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the electoral processes, such reports have rarely been used for defining and structuring future electoral support programmes. This is often due to a limited understanding by election observation missions of development cooperation mechanisms and its implications for the complexities of electoral administration structures in partner countries. Next: Facing Electoral Realities: Too Much Assistance, Too Late [1] Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, N.1, January 2002. Facing Electoral Realities: Too Much Assistance, Too LateThe lessons that several development agencies learned through the various evaluation processes described above, balanced with the constraints faced by assistance providers in applying these conclusions in practice, have been the subject of further detailed initiatives and studies promoted mainly by International IDEA, the EC and UNDP, with the aim of making electoral assistance effective beyond the technical delivery of the electoral event. The aim of these initiatives has been to clearly state the issue to those stakeholders and development agenciess still not facing the reality that they are providing too much assistance too late, when their contributions only serve as “quick fixes” and do not address structural problems. In this respect, the Ottawa Conference organised by International IDEA and CIDA in May 2006 represented a defining moment in the establishment of a new approach to make electoral assistance effective and meaningful for the overall democratic development of partner countries. It was formally acknowledged that even though concepts such as ‘effectiveness’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘capacity building’ had been recognised as the way forward, turning the concepts into reality in implementation had proven difficult. Support for institution building is by its very nature a longer-term exercise, and therefore less visible or perhaps less politically attractive in the event that elections may be some years in the future. Furthermore, progress in institution building is difficult to measure, easily influenced by external factors and unforeseen events, and not always fully informed by or linked to wider governance programmes. The potential consequence of neglecting the strengthening of institutions between electoral events is that “open and democratic” elections can take place in semi-authoritarian states in which the opposition is given space only during that brief period while the world is watching. Similarly, institution-building activities must be supported by corresponding improvements in pluralism and the rule of law, if they are to generate real changes. Such practices might also have led in some cases to the misuse and abuse
of development agencies support. For example, development agencies’ officials
could be pressured to apply available assistance funds To move towards sustainability - an important and often underestimated step - is to engage stakeholders in defining what needs to be done after and between electoral events. There should be full consultation and as much consensus as possible among all stakeholders (including governments, political parties, the media, civil society organisations dealing with democratic governance, academics and think-tanks) with regard to political frameworks, legal frameworks and electoral systems and related activities. This will encourage commitment and compliance by political and electoral stakeholders at all levels both during an electoral event and after it. To this end, development agencies have the responsibility to ensure that the objectives of electoral assistance programmes support the longer-term objectives of a democratisation strategy in the partner countries. In turn, democracy and good governance programmes need to be in line with the priorities and plans as articulated in national programmes of development assistance (poverty reduction/poverty eradication programmes) and should be an integral part of the development agencies–partner government dialogue. Next: The Electoral Cycle Approach
The Electoral Cycle Approach
Together, development agencies and partner counties should plan and implement electoral assistance within a framework of democratic governance by thinking ahead 10 years, rather than reacting to each electoral event as it occurs. In order to achieve this, it is crucial to acknowledge at both the political and operational levels that every time a decision to support an electoral process is made, such a decision entails involvement and commitment to the democratic evolution of the concerned country far beyond the immediate event to be supported. Any decision to keep offering ad hoc electoral support, while this might still be acceptable at the contingent political level, must be accompanied by the consideration that it will not solve the democracy gap in any partner country, but will instead trigger a more staggered process of development cooperation. Indeed, the core mistake of past electoral assistance projects did not rest in the provision of ad hoc short term support, but in the belief that such support would suffice to ensure the sustainability of the following electoral processes, the independence and transparency of the EMB concerned and the consequent democratic development of the partner country.
These considerations, together with the recognition that obstacles to the implementation of long-term assistance remained, led International IDEA and the EC to the development of a visual planning and training tool that could help development agencies, electoral assistance providers and electoral officials in partner countries to understand the cyclical nature of the various challenges faced in electoral processes: this tool has become known as the electoral cycle approach.
The cyclical approach to electoral processes and electoral assistance was designed by EC and International IDEA electoral specialists working on the first pilot module for training development agencies officials dealing with electoral assistance projects. The concept rapidly gained consensus among practitioners and development agencies agencies. Its conceptualisation was completed with the publication of the EC Methodological Guide on Electoral Assistance, the International IDEA Handbook on Electoral Management Design and the UNDP Electoral Assistance Implementation Guide. This approach has been officially endorsed by the EC and UNDP for every common electoral assistance project through the signing of the “Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of Electoral Assistance” in April 2006. The document recognises that “electoral assistance has to take stock of all the steps of the electoral cycle and that inter-election periods are as crucial as the build up to the elections themselves, thus requiring regular inter-institutional contact and support activities before, during and after election periods, for the sake of lessons learned and inter-institutional memory aiming at improved electoral processes in beneficiary countries”. These guidelines are already acting as a catalyst in aligning other development agencies with the strategy and features of UNDP-managed electoral assistance projects.
The aim of this “Focus On…” is not to describe the notions underpinning the electoral cycle approach, but rather to describe how it has rapidly become a cornerstone of the efforts to make electoral assistance more effective. Since its first conceptualisation in 2005, there have been several electoral assistance projects which were successfully implemented or designed (Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Togo, Sierra Leone) in accordance with the principles set forth in the Operational Guidelines and informed by the electoral cycle approach. It has also become a model for both planning electoral assistance projects, for developing capacity within national EMBs and for raising awareness among stakeholders.
An adequate understanding of the various components, stages and entry points of an ideal electoral cycle should also be used to better plan and respond to any sudden call for urgent electoral support and clarify from the outset what is achievable and needed in the short-term, as well as identifying what must be the objectives of different, longer-term initiatives. The recognition of the different needs and deliverables related to each stage of the electoral cycle is essential for appropriate programme identification, formulation and implementation, as well as development agencies and stakeholder coordination. The establishment of joint monitoring and quality support mechanisms at top levels between the EC and UNDP for the improvement of the implementation of field operations (through the establishment of the EC-UNDP Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance, JTF) is a further step towards the consolidation of the principles for making electoral assistance more effective. The focus of the JTF is on identification, formulation, implementation, support and monitoring of all EC-UNDP electoral assistance projects, whenever needed and demanded by EC Delegations and/or UNDP Country Offices. The lessons learned are consolidated and codified so that they can be effectively applied to the implementation of new electoral assistance projects, joint EC-UNDP training activities, and the ACE project in the Practitioners’ Network.
The electoral cycle approach has also proved to be a formidable learning tool for electoral officials. Effective electoral assistance requires adequate transfer of know-how, through long-term capacity building that enables electoral administrators to become more professional and to better understand, plan for and implement their core tasks (see paragraph on institutional strengthening and professional development). The electoral cycle approach is a key instrument to facilitate understanding of the interdependence of different electoral activities, helping EMB officials to plan and allocate resources for specific activities in a more timely fashion than in the past. In particular, it places an important emphasis on the post-electoral period as a significant moment of institutional growth, and not just as a vacuum between elections.
Lastly, elections do provide an important and secure entry-point for wider interventions to support democratic governance development, such as the strengthening of civil society, the promotion of human rights (including issues of gender, minorities and indigenous peoples), support to parliaments, media and political party development, reinforcement of the rule of law and justice, and more opportunities for political dialogue and conflict mitigation. Electoral assistance programmes should thus be designed to be broader than the traditional concept of an electoral assistance plan. The electoral cycle approach is valuable in engaging other stakeholders in the process and providing them with tools to improve their assessment of times and roles for their action. Consequently, financial support should be linked to a longer-term and integrated strategy, which should include the electoral period as one phase of a longer-term democratisation process.
Next:Setting Up an Effective Electoral Assistance Project: From Identification to Evaluation Setting Up an Effective Electoral Assistance Project: From Identification to EvaluationOf the various stages in an electoral
assistance project’s life, the planning, identification and formulation stages
are perhaps most critical to effective electoral assistance. Despite the wide
acceptance of this axiom, automatic coordination in identification and
formulation among the various development agencies involved is often not a
given. The electoral cycle approach provides
development agencies with a basic understanding of
what the entry points in a given electoral process are. They should come
together at the beginning of every new cycle and dispatch coordinated electoral
needs assessment missions: ideally, this should even happen at the end of the
previous cycle. Development agencies often need to be reminded by both assistance
providers and national partners that targeted assistance must be determined and
made available at an early stage: this is when the clarification of the different
timelines for the various electoral activities within the electoral cycle
becomes crucial. UNEAD has increasingly been conducting electoral needs assessment
missions jointly with UNDP to inform the project identification and formulation
stage, ensuring that the political and electoral assessment is Needs assessment visits should include discussions with all relevant stakeholders, and provision of feedback on why their identified requirements have or have not been included in assistance programmes. The work of the needs assessment team becomes fundamental for good planning of electoral assistance projects, and not merely for the identification of technical assistance needs but also for providing adequate consideration to management and environmental constraints that are country specific (e.g. conflict prevention). Lessons learnt, conclusions from post-election reviews and recommendations from observers’ final reports should all be properly considered in developing needs assessments for the following electoral cycle. In addition to early planning, proactive rather than reactive programming, including the formulation by development agencies of contingency plans to meet late or emergency requests for assistance, is more cost-effective and has more impact. Lastly, the importance of sharing the needs assessment conclusions and adopting a common terminology among development agencies and electoral assistance providers can greatly enhance cooperation in the formulation of the respective assistance programmes. Planning and identification activities would benefit enormously from the development of standard situation tool kits for electoral needs assessments missions that take into account all aspects mentioned above, and should be utilised in conjunction with stakeholders such as EMBs, civil society organisations (CSOs) and observers. Such tool kits would include a menu of options for assistance during each stage of the electoral cycle, linked to risk assessments and identification of the costs and benefits of implementing or not implementing items on the menu. As for the content development activities of electoral assistance
projects, national stakeholders should be encouraged to take the lead in
determining priorities and linking them to national development goals using
international advice where appropriate and within the context of
It is important that electoral assistance, with its diverse components, provide support which is well balanced between that provided to institutions managing the electoral process and other institutions such as the media and grass-roots CSOs. Successful assistance programmes generally encourage the formation of NGO umbrella groups for voter/civic education activities and technical assistance to domestic observation to balance the support provide to the national EMB. Support to electoral dispute resolution mechanisms and training for the media on the electoral cycle is often omitted from such programmes, but is vital in building trust in the electoral process and in promoting understanding of the continuous publicity needs of EMBs and other electoral actors. The specification of the objectives of electoral assistance projects should then be aligned with the wider democracy and good governance programmes that the development agencies have commonly agreed with the partner country in consideration of the national programmes of poverty reduction/eradication, and should be inserted in the political dialogue with the recipient government.
The implementation of programmes is obviously central to their effectiveness, but it is important to set clear objectives from the outset. In this respect, the recruitment of electoral experts requires better coordination between the various actors involved and greater attention to identifying the most appropriate professional profiles, if quality and effectiveness are to be ensured. Overall, the mechanism that has shown the best results is the multi-level assistance coordination system that covers political, managerial and technical levels. In addition, participation of the partner country institutions in the technical coordination mechanisms is essential, but needs to be planned before the implementation starts. The typical cash-flow crisis in the middle of the implementation period can be avoided by linking the disbursements to specific benchmarks and deadlines in the electoral cycle. Stakeholders’ interest must also be stimulated and sustained by requiring multi-stakeholder participation in information sharing, for example through EMB/political party/CSO liaison mechanisms. The most neglected component of electoral assistance programmes remains monitoring and evaluation. This is partly due to the objective difficulty of evaluating progress in the partner country’s democratisation process in the short-term. Even so, the electoral cycle approach offers a platform to development agencies to remain engaged in a continuous manner throughout this delicate process, where important breakthroughs can be achieved in improving the quality of the ensuing phase of assistance. Operational auditing, external and internal peer reviews, results-based monitoring and evaluation tools and independent or multi-stakeholder post-election reviews all help to make electoral assistance programmes more effective and promote and assist in their evaluation. Assistance programmes should adopt the results-based management approach, with indicators agreed by development agencies, implementers and recipients. International IDEA, UNDP and the EC are at the forefront of this activity and are committed to developing a new evaluation methodology for electoral assistance in line with the 12 principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 2005. Next: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Development Institutional Strengthening and Capacity DevelopmentIt is now widely understood by all those involved that electoral assistance has to take stock of all the steps of the electoral cycle: this approach, however, presents challenges of its own that are still to be fully appreciated. Chief among these are the problems caused by post-electoral fatigue among electoral officials, institutions and development agencies’ decision makers alike; and political indifference in the post-electoral period towards any type of electoral, political and administrative reform that impacts election administration. A recurrent problem is the underestimation at the political level of the financial and administrative consequences that accompany decisions labelled as purely technical (for example, the decision to go ahead with a crucial electoral administrative reform like the transition from an ad hoc voter register to an integrated permanent civil registration). Analysis of the various challenges facing attempts to improve the effectiveness of electoral Changes in electoral procedures and increasing sophistication of the processes are such that even the most experienced staff cannot rely on experience alone in order to adequately perform their tasks. Furthermore, EMBs must cope with the typical “brain drain” that often leads the most qualified staff to move to better paid positions in the private sector or with international organisations, and the consequent loss of institutional memory. However, the benefits of training and professional development activities are not immediately tangible and offer little visibility for development agencies, unlike ballot boxes or voter education and information materials. EMBs in partner countries generally have a difficult time persuading governments to approve budgets that contain sufficient funds for these activities. It is a typical area where external assistance is requested, sometimes at a very late stage in an electoral cycle, when electoral officials are already too absorbed by operational duties related to the upcoming electoral event. Furthermore, a lack of qualified personnel in other sectors of the partner country’s structure can be an additional factor preventing the sharing of other partner countries’ resources in electoral processes. Effective electoral assistance in this sector should mean greater awareness of the professional development and institutional capacity needs of recipient EMBs rather than focusing solely on training needs for procedures related to a given electoral event. Organisational and staff development (OSD) for the EMB’s long-term staff should address their capacity-building and skills requirements, and also take into account staff career development. OSD aims to unify the EMB’s strategic objectives and The tendency for electoral assistance providers and development agencies to focus too much on national elections, envisioning top–down democratisation, also requires careful reconsideration. Local elections can be as important as national ones for the democratic development of a partner country and also require targeted capacity building programmes. One of the key issues for effective assistance is the promotion of legislative reforms that provide the EMB’s highest officials with the means to protect institutional memory and continuity. This can be achieved by introducing staggered terms for EMB members or a clear delineation of responsibilities between the Electoral Commission (or Board of Commissioners) and the EMB Secretariat. It is crucial to help the EMB develop a coherent vision for its role between elections – which may form part of long-term electoral reform proposals. The possibility of enhancing the career development of EMB staff should be identified and supported, including if possible international secondment. Next: Existing Knowledge and Capacity Building Services Existing Knowledge and Capacity Building ServicesEMB activities directed at building internal capacity and strengthening the institution (as well as electoral assistance projects which use advisers and consultants with experience in other countries), need to be structured to ensure skills transfer and capacity building - in order that the project’s achievements do not depart with the advisers. In this context, each EMB’s capacity development plan must take advantage of the instruments and mechanisms that are already available for sharing and disseminating knowledge and capacity building services at very affordable costs, and development agencies should pay attention to the constant development of such instruments. Effective electoral assistance passes through regular inter-institutional contact and knowledge networks comprising electoral experts, electoral officials and electoral assistance providers. To meet all of the challenges posed by the changing needs and increasing sophistication of the administration of elections and in order to make electoral assistance more effective, the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network has considerably expanded its range of activities in the past two years. From the original concept of an on-line repository of electoral knowledge, it has evolved into a much more dynamic endeavour that contains an informative section called “Elections Today” with articles that cover recent electoral events or a theme in election management, an enlarged, updated and more comprehensive “ACE Encyclopedia” on almost all relevant aspect of the electoral process with more than 10,000 pages of documentation and a continued emphasis on sustainability, professionalism and trust in the electoral process. Other key features of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network are the “Comparative Data” section and “Electoral Materials”, where users can find comparative information and examples of how electoral activities and processes are managed elsewhere. The most dynamic features of ACE are concentrated in the sections “Electoral Advice”, where around 200 electoral experts provide on-demand advice to fellow practitioners, academics and electoral officials from all over the world, and “Regions and Countries”, containing updated electoral information on almost all countries by affiliated resource centres. Both sections are managed by International IDEA with funding from the EC and the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF). Even though still in its pilot phase, the advice provided by the ACE
Electoral Knowledge Network to electoral planners through this network of
experts has had an impact on how a number of recent electoral assistance
projects have been formulated and are being implemented. The sharing of
successes and failures of electoral support initiatives in different legal and
institutional frameworks avoids the repetition of mistakes made elsewhere and
the typical “re-invention of the electoral wheel” that has plagued so many
electoral assistance projects in the past. The establishment of the ACE Regional Centres
in geographically strategic locations worldwide has enlarged the global
dimension of ACE by adding specific regional-focused activities and
perspectives on various facets of the electoral process well beyond the mere
collection of information at the country and regional level. The
ACE Regional Centres Also part of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network is the creation of a Capacity Development Facility intended to promote partnerships between EMBs for the purpose of sharing lessons and building capacities jointly. The Capacity Development Facility is being undertaken as a pilot in Southern Africa by EISA with the support of UNDEF. Initially, it will focus on the creation of capacity development tools and methodologies based on ACE knowledge services, such as the encyclopaedia and comparative data, and will provide technical support to EMBs and facilitate participation by EMB staff in training programmes and peer exchanges for improved electoral administration.
The other significant instrument already in use for quickly and cost-effectively building EMB internal capacity is the BRIDGE project. BRIDGE stands for Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections, and it is the most comprehensive professional development course available in the field of election administration, already utilised in 25 countries for more than 3,000 election officials. It offers an excellent platform for the timely delivery of a capacity building program. Non-prescriptive and participatory, BRIDGE has recently been expanded and updated by 50 experts from all regions, adding diversity of practical experiences and underpinned by the latest publications on specific topics (including IDEA’s Handbook series, UN/UNDP’s series of Handbooks, and the body of content generated through the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network). The BRIDGE curriculum framework has two Foundation Modules and 21 other modules divided into three thematic areas: Electoral Architecture, Dealing with Stakeholders and Electoral Operations. While the primary BRIDGE target remains EMB officials, its modules and methodology are easily adjusted and tailored to the needs of other categories of stakeholders such as parliamentarians, media, civil society, universities and security forces. It can also be tailored for specific reorientation and professional development courses for electoral assistance providers and development agencies. Particularly following post-electoral review, BRIDGE could play a prominent role in effective assistance programming by institutionalising best practices and including recommendations of observers and stakeholders in strategic planning and institutional reform. Next: Embracing technology Embracing technologyAny effort to make electoral assistance more effective must tackle the issue of the increasing use of technology in electoral processes. The accelerating development of Information & Communications Technology (ICT) applications available for electoral purposes and the appeal that such applications have for the partner countries’ EMB are factors to be reckoned with by all development agencies, electoral assistance providers and practitioners. ICT has already dramatically changed the way elections are conducted in many developed countries, and it must be accepted that this process will go on and affect more and more emerging democracies, including post-conflict countries, regardless of their level of preparedness to
However, there are other factors that influence the decision making process in choosing to implement a new ICT solution, and they are not always sound ones. Sometimes undue influence in favour of one solution or another is exerted by interested vendors, or even by development agencies who wish to introduce a technology similar to the one in use in their own country. At other times, it might be political groups in power that view the use of technology as the ultimate and the most effective method to control the electoral process. Advances in technology are not to be feared as the major factor for change, although such developments have created new opportunities for political and economic interest groups. In this framework, development agencies, practitioners, academics and electoral assistance providers have an important role to play in influencing the technological choices to be adopted in a given electoral process. Technology can build credibility by improving the speed and efficiency of the electoral process. How its application relates to the EMBs’ key obligations – legality, neutrality, transparency, accuracy, and service-orientation – is less certain. Too much attention to technology applications may also divert the EMBs from other important matters, and may drain development agencies’ or EMB budgets. Costs associated with system defects, poor design or testing may leave development agencies captive to increasing costs in order to save what they have already invested in. There is a need to "skill up" staff to implement sustainable From an implementation perspective, best practices on when and how to introduce and implement technological upgrades in a given electoral process, and on how to avoid falling into vendor-driven traps, can be found in the ACE Encyclopedia under the Elections and Technology topic area and in Chapter 3.7 of the EC Methodological Guide on Electoral Assistance, as well as in Chapters 3 and 6 of the UNDP Electoral Assistance Implementation Guide. The latter also offers a wider perspective for development agencies on what technological changes are sensible to support in a partner country. A good understanding of the electoral cycle helps to identify the best circumstances in which a partner country’s EMB can embark on a technological upgrade. An important consideration is that these circumstances may not be in line with the typical development agencies’s planned financial commitment shortly before an election. Effective technology upgrades cannot be introduced without an honest evaluation of the degree of IT literacy and infrastructure that already exists in the partner country. However, long-debated issues like feasibility and technical and financial sustainability in the long-term can be properly addressed through transparent and open tendering procedures (inclusive of pilot and validation tests), and through serious training and capacity building measures to be required as part of the service. Nevertheless, a fascinating debate remains open on whether it is appropriate to introduce a level technology that is aligned with the existing capacity of the partner country or whether such capacity should be increased for the purposes of introducing a technological upgrade that can serve the partner country beyond the immediate needs of the electoral event. This debate is particularly heated over crucial aspects of the electoral process, such as voter registration, voting operations, vote tabulation and results aggregation. There are also much less controversial areas, such as communications and logistics, voter and civic education, and even training, where technology can be introduced more smoothly as a tool to improve effectiveness and product delivery and without involving the legislative power. All the above considerations about the correct and adequate use of technology apply specifically to an area of rapidly growing interest which has significant financial implications: the introduction of biometric features in specific segments of the electoral process: voter registration and voting operations. More specifically, the notion of Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) is used to refer to software applications capable of establishing the identity of an individual through fingerprints by the use of biometric functions. AFIS requirements have been recently included in several voter registration processes, and in some cases these requirements have been included in the legal provisions governing voter registration. AFIS systems are in fact increasingly considered to be the definitive solution to voter impersonation and multiple voting practices. They are especially popular in post-conflict countries and emerging democracies with either very limited or non-existent forms of civil registry identification, such as DRC, Togo, Guinea Conakry, Angola, Nigeria, Mozambique and Pakistan, and are under consideration in a very large number of developing countries. The one aspect of introducing technology applications in electoral processes that has been strongly neglected to date is the socio-cultural dimension. Often the heavy investments in technology are not supported by adequate attention to confidence building activities aimed at explaining to the stakeholders and the electorate the purpose and the functions, as well as the security control mechanisms, associated with every technology upgrade. The generation of new distrust can sometimes be the most difficult problem to overcome in transitioning to a new system and might lead to a dangerous loss of credibility for the electoral institution. Too much may be expected all at once from technology upgrades – improved security, transparency and efficiency – and public expectations may be unrealistic. The UNDP Electoral Assistance Implementation Guide will address the issues highlighted above and offer practical recommendations on how electoral assistance providers and electoral officials can engage vendors and stakeholders in a debate leading to the selection of the most appropriate products and the eventual establishment of synergies with civil registration and census activities at the best price - through transparent procurement procedures, resisting the hard sell and not being forced to resort to “least worst options” by time constraints. Next: The Way Forward The Way ForwardThe electoral cycle approach has gained almost unconditional support as identification and planning instrument both among electoral assistance providers and EMB officials from all over the world. Nevertheless, it presents a number of challenges and requires delicate advocacy and sensitisation work with the development agencies community. This work is directed at firmly shifting the emphasis from generic endorsement for long-term assistance policies to concrete commitments, especially for capacity development and institutional strengthening programmes that make the outcomes more sustainable and are aligned with the overall development objectives of the partner country. The response to the current challenges calls for the refinement of the current assessment, identification, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation tools. The objectives are to identify the electoral reality with respect to any proposed initiative or requested support, including the time necessary to adequately deliver results, required resources, security and logistic constraints and financial implications. The appreciation of the constant impact that electoral assistance exerts on the democratic development of any country should be borne in mind when a new multi-year strategy of assistance is planned by the relevant development agencies, in coordination with partner country institutions. In this context it is crucial to give adequate consideration to the available entry points for assistance in the medium and long term. Programming interventions for the purpose of electoral assistance should be based on a clear recognition of what phase of the electoral cycle the partner country is in, and what is required to promote democratic development and good governance. There is now more attention paid to the complementary aspects of electoral assistance and election observation - as two separate but interdependent pillars for electoral and democracy support, and to promote the establishment of the necessary synergies between the two activities. These synergies would ensure that election observation missions benefit from the experience gained through electoral assistance projects, and that the recommendations of election observation missions be duly taken into account for future electoral assistance interventions. Much of the attention of leading actors in electoral assistance such as UNEAD, UNDP, EC and International IDEA is focused on the development of new assessment methodologies that take into account these complementarities – in order to better identify, plan and implement beneficiary-driven assistance programmes and missions. The Ottawa Conference, while drawing on expertise and conclusions provided at previous events (such as the UNDP Practice Meeting on Electoral Assistance of November 2004 and the EU Conference on Election support of September 2005), was instrumental in identifying the necessary tools to make the shift from long-term electoral support rhetoric to concrete commitments. The key to making this a reality is the enhancement of development agencies capacity to identify, plan and advocate with their own governments for more targeted and diversified support to electoral institutions. In consequence, the major recommendation was the call for the production, globalisation, adaptation and dissemination of resource material for developing awareness and understanding of the principles and practical implications of effective electoral assistance, including the production of a set of resource material and guides on the various topics. In the past two years, several activities have been designed and implemented by the EC, UNDP and International IDEA targeting a more effective and timelier formulation, implementation and evaluation of electoral assistance projects, in line with the concepts of enhanced development agencies coordination of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In the second half of 2006, International IDEA, UNDP and EC experts developed a training course and a related manual that is designed to raise EC and UNDP officials’ awareness of the complexities of electoral processes and the specific issues underpinning electoral assistance. In this context, three major joint training events for EC and UNDP officials took place to date ( Brussels September 2006, Dar Es Salaam November 2006 and Brussels October 2007) in cooperation with International IDEA. The content used for developing the training modules is based on the ACE Encyclopedia, and the three fresh publications in this field - the International IDEA Handbook on Electoral Management Design, the EC Methodological Guide on Electoral Assistance and the UNDP Electoral Assistance Implementation Guide. The methodology is a customisation of the BRIDGE methodology tailored for EC and UNDP policy and implementation officers working on electoral assistance.
The methodology employed for the joint training courses on effective electoral assistance has now been modified to cater for larger audiences and can be applied to wider initiatives in the domain of democratic governance and public administration reform. The Global Training Platform builds on the material codified and produced within the Practitioners’ Network component of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network for content development and knowledge generation. The training methodology will draw upon the unique experience that UNDP and IDEA gained with BRIDGE and the insight gained by UNDP Learning Resource Center. The training programme is comprised of a five day “face to face” course, alongside longer and more flexible e-learning and blended versions. The courses will also provide a mechanism for evaluation and immediate feedback for further improvement and encourage participants to contribute at a later stage with their own direct experience. The above described initiatives are now inscribed in a more official inter-institutional framework of the EC-UNDP Joint Task Force and the “Effective Democracy Assistance Conference” to be organised in 2008 under the auspices of International IDEA. The conference will draw together development agencies, practitioners and experts from each region to debate and build consensus on a comprehensive set of policy recommendations and how best to implement them. The event should culminate with the drafting of a universal declaration on ‘Global Effective Electoral Assistance Principles and Parameters’ to be adopted and ratified either on that occasion or at a subsequent event. Next: Conclusions ConclusionsThere is still a long way to go before electoral assistance can be declared completely effective. Mistakes will continue to be made, especially in presence of high political pressure to deliver elections as early as possible. It is still relatively early days in the field of electoral assistance, and the way forward will be a constant learning experience. Nevertheless, it is encouraging that key electoral assistance providers and development agencies have engaged in recent initiatives designed to facilitate the achievement of democratic development objectives through electoral assistance projects. In particular, the gap between “learning the lessons” to “applying the lessons learnt” is now closing. Effective electoral assistance primarily means long term institutional strengthening and capacity development. Twenty years of electoral assistance have demonstrated that there is no short-term method to support a democratic transition. The international community must be ready to stay the course if the democratic development of a partner country does not follow the originally envisaged path. Short-term election assistance projects are unlikely to disappear from the foreign policy agenda of established democracies, and indeed, they should not be entirely discouraged. The solution is to frame them within a wider assistance context, with a clear understanding from the outset of their real deliverables and limited impact on the democratic development of the partner country.
Knowledge and capacity development services such as ACE and BRIDGE are cost-effective and readily available tools for professional development and the dissemination of regional based knowledge. . Each new electoral assistance project and electoral mission should make more use of these services, from the moment of programme design and deployment. EMBs should be made aware that these services are available at relatively low costs and require limited implementing capacity. These instruments should be included as key components in every electoral assistance project, to be utilised independently of the more operational component of the assistance project, including making them available in several languages other than English. Capacity development is a matter that concerns development agencies, in some cases, even more than partner countries. The Global Training Platform is developing training courses modeled after the Joint EC-UNDP-IDEA training events that can be easily customised to the specific needs of the agency or institutution requiring the training services. Planning an effective electoral assistance project is an extremely complex undertaking, best achieved at the multilateral level. In this respect, development agencies coordination of aid and initiatives requires much more than simply identifying the technical needs. There remains insufficient capacity to identify and plan a well-coordinated and targeted electoral assistance programme. Anticipating requests for assistance in a sustained long-term support process rather than reacting to periodical requests - this is the crucial Gordian knot to be cut. Next: Links Relevant to Effective Electoral Assistance Links Relevant to Effective Electoral Assistance
I. ELECTORAL ASSISTANCEIDEA
UN/UNDP
EC
AusAID
CIDA
DFID
Sida USAID
NED
World Bank
Research Articles
II. DEMOCRACY SUPPORT AND ELECTORAL PROCESSESCivic Education
Cost of Electoral Processes
Democracy Building and Conflict Management
Disability and Elections
Domestic Observation
Electoral Management and Institution Building
Electoral Standards
Electoral Systems
External / Out-of-Country Voting
Gender and Elections
Governance and Democratisation
Legal Framework
Media Development/Media Monitoring
Parliamentary Development
Political Parties
Procurement UNDP-IAPSO Procurement Guide
Professional Development The BRIDGE Project
Regional Focus: International Organisations
Technology
Focus on Elections and Security
The views expressed in this article are solely the personal views of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the position of the United Nations or imply the Organization's endorsement Introduction An election is a contest for legitimate power that can be described as a non-violent competition, fought within a political forum. It is important in this context to recognise that elections do not avoid confrontation, but rather, focus on its management and containment within accepted boundaries. In practice, the assurance of equitable security during an electoral process is essential to retaining the participants’ confidence and commitment to an election. Consequently, security is both integral to the goal of an election and an inseparable part of the electoral process. There is no single model of elections or democracy that is universally applicable to all countries. An election is unique – defined not only by the electoral rules, but also shaped by the social values, politics, religions, history and culture of the people. In the same way, the security of an election is unique to the circumstances in which it is conducted. The stakes of any given election are different – even if it is held periodically in the same country – due to the changing forces that shape the national interest and corresponding political agenda. Similar to a sporting event, the rivalry between opposing teams entails competition within an accepted set of rules, but does not allow for the use of violence to seek victory. Extending on this comparison, if violence does occur, it can lead to the disqualification of players (candidates), teams (political parties), an amendment of the results or the abandonment of the competition altogether. As such, the emergence of electoral violence is not a result of the process being followed, but signals a critical departure from the accepted rules that govern the process.
Next:
Principles of Elections and SecurityThe organisation and conduct of credible elections demand adherence to principles and rights, which in practice, impose significant challenges for ensuring effective security, including:
To operate effectively within these electoral requirements, security forces need to be guided by their own principles, including: Equitable and rights-based Participants in an election must be treated in an equitable manner by both security forces and electoral officials. Reasonable and proportionate responses to actions must be consistent, which cannot be influenced by arbitrary factors, such as, political affiliation. An election is a mechanism by which people are able to exercise their political, civil and human rights. Security protocols must consider and acknowledge these rights, as well as the heightened sensitivity and scrutiny to the respect for these rights that occur during an election period. National ownership Elections are a sovereign process. However, in some circumstances such as, post-conflict or transitional elections, national security forces may need to be strengthened by international forces. To the degree permitted, the security of an election should fall within the ownership and control of a national authority to reflect sovereignty and avoid allegations of international interference. Advantageously, indigenous security forces are the most sensitive to their cultural practices and may therefore be best positioned to interpret and respond to emerging threats. Strategic Elections are normally planned 18 to 24 months before polling day and occur as a widely dispersed exercise requiring significant planning and preparatory activities. Security forces (police and/or military) rarely possess sufficient standing resources to secure an election, and simultaneously carry-out their regular duties. Integrated strategic planning by the electoral and security institutions is essential to prioritise, allocate and coordinate necessary resources. Non-partisan and impartial To be effective, security forces must avoid allegations of partisan bias. If security forces are found to behave in a partisan way, rather than defusing tensions they may heighten them and undermine their own function in the process. During the election period (especially during the campaign period) normal security actions may become the subject of analysis which evokes political dimensions. In politics in general, and in elections in particular, perception is as important as reality. As such, senior security managers must actively consider these political dimensions to preserve not only the reality, but the perception of impartiality. Flexible and efficient Electoral processes can face late-stage amendments to accommodate emerging legal, operational or political conditions that arise. In the first instance, security planning should include a range of contingency plans and resources to ensure flexibility. Alternatively, clearly defined constraints on security capabilities and resources based on efficient planning should be available to inform decision makers on the range of options that are feasible to accommodate. The efficiency of these operations, both in delivering substantive security services and adjusting to changes, is an important indicator for the confidence of the electoral participants. Transparent and accountable In security operations there is always a tension between operational security policies of ‘need to know’ and the public interest. In an election period, disclosure policies are normally best weighted towards the public interest, recognising the importance and value of transparency. In cases where it is necessary to protect information, extra accountability measures may be necessary to ensure post-event justifications. Transparency in this context also refers to enhancing consultative mechanisms with political groups, civil society and other organisations to ensure the role and functions of security forces are well understood in the process. A favourite saying of this author is: ‘The best operational solution is rarely politically feasible’. In many cases, the political dimensions of an election can create obstacles to otherwise seemingly simple security decisions. This feature of the electoral process highlights the potential frustrations that can arise between security and electoral officials. Ultimately, an operational solution cannot be considered desirable if it does not address the necessary political conditions. This discord emphasizes the need for strong communication and coordination between security forces and electoral institutions. NEXT: Election Security Threats and Analysis
Election Security Threats and AnalysisThe nature of an election makes it vulnerable to a range of security threats against participants, infrastructure, information and materials. Effective election security analysis must draw on information and expertise from multiple arenas. A high-level of communication and coordination among the agencies responsible for the administration and security of an election is a significant advantage. Neither can security analysis and planning be effective when it occurs only in a period shortly before the electoral process starts, nor depend solely on reactive strategies. Anticipating and pre-empting security risks, mitigating their impact or probability of occurrence, is a strategic endeavour of both the electoral authorities and their security partners. An electoral process is constituted from a complex series of interdependent sub-processes, generically including: boundary delimitation, civic education, voter education, voter registration, party registration, candidate nomination, the campaign period, polling operations, tallying and counting, dispute resolution and the official announcement of results. With the exception of boundary delimitation (which often occurs following a decennial census exercise) these sub-processes occur in some form during each election cycle. Each of these sub-processes can be characterised by different types of threats, influenced by: the particular approach adopted, cross-influence between sub-processes and the individual circumstances of the election. Further, the circumstantial conditions of an election can alter quickly, requiring the rapid reprioritisation or invalidation of initial security assumptions. Accordingly, the analysis of threats and risks is a continuous task throughout the electoral process, and is not simply event driven. The types of security threats likely to arise in a particular election are influenced by both structural and circumstantial aspects of the election process. The structural design of the electoral process such as the choice of electoral system may foster or deter certain threats. For instance, an electoral system that uses a single national district (the national borders form a single electoral constituency) and allows voters to cast their vote at any polling station, will offer no direct incentive to forcibly move voters within the territory – since irrespective of where the vote is cast, it will be counted in the final tally. On the other hand, this arrangement may promote efforts to forcibly migrate eligible voters across national borders, so they cannot participate. In security terms, this scenario reflects a heightened structural risk for border control operations during the voter registration and polling phases of an election. Circumstances will dictate in each election, and at each stage of the electoral process, the level and priority of risk posed by different threats. For example, when an election is a presidential run-off (the final two candidates competing), the danger of political assassination represents a significantly higher risk than an election of several hundred parliamentarians to an assembly. Similarly, if an election is being conducted as part of a post-conflict peace agreement, it has a very different risk profile to an election held in a country with an unbroken history of democratic elections. One methodology to map an election’s risk profile is by the identification of mission critical assets (people, infrastructure, information and materials), without which, the election cannot reasonably proceed. In combination, the unique structural and circumstantial aspects of an election will dictate at what phase of the process an asset is critical, and notably, if this may change between sub-processes. Some electoral processes by their nature are better able to adapt to certain types of attack. For instance, the destruction of ballot boxes at a polling station after polling has been completed may or may not cripple the ability of the electoral authorities to produce a result from the election. The impact of such an attack will vary significantly depending on a range of both structural and circumstantial factors. Separating ‘mission critical’ from ‘recoverable’ threats is a key step in building the election risk profile and determining priorities. Against the backdrop of these regular security challenges, several new threat trends have emerged in the past few years. These include international terrorism and organised crime: International terrorism As a well-recognised ritual of democracy, elections can attract threats from diverse groups, whose motivations may have no connection to the national stakes of an election. As recent events have demonstrated, international terrorists have the capacity and motivation to conduct “spectacular attacks” geared towards fulfilling their own propaganda agendas. The intensity of media coverage during an election is a highly visible period, affording an attractive opportunity for such attacks to occur. Organised Crime The political tensions that arise during an election offer organised crime groups an appealing opportunity – at a time when the authorities’ ability to differentiate between politically motivated violence and criminally motivated violence can be extremely difficult. Paradoxically, a group committing politically motivated offences may try to have their actions interpreted as purely criminal, whereas criminally motivated groups may wish to obscure their actions behind a political façade. Of further concern, these interests have become convergent in some post-conflict settings, where organised criminal groups have been known to kidnap individuals and sell the hostages to political groups for propaganda value. It is necessary in any section on electoral threats and analysis to highlight a cautious approach in carrying out this function. As noted in the principles above, non-partisanship and impartiality as well as transparency and accountability are important guides for electoral security. The choice of methods and subjects of information collection, during an election period, must be sensitive to the possibility of interpretation as a political intent and possible backlash. As such, extra emphasis on procedures that adopt checks and balances, are an important safeguard of the analytical process during elections.
Security ActorsIn broad strokes, security arrangements can be divided into three main types: static (e.g. protection of warehouses, polling stations and offices), mobile (e.g. protection of voter registration teams or campaign rally sites) and reserve (e.g. contingency forces to support either static or mobile forces as required). Within these three broad categories, the types of security tasks involved vary widely and depend upon significantly different capacities (skills and numbers) and lawful authorities. In many cases, the assignment of these tasks will be dictated by ‘best fit’ to function (involving a division of labour among several security institutions or contractors), but can be constrained by legal, financial and political conditions.
In some countries, the involvement of the military forces is outright prohibited and uniformed personnel are required to stay in barracks on polling day. In other countries, the military is integrally involved, but may do so under special arrangements, such as the head of the electoral management body temporarily assuming the mantle of Commander-in-Chief of military forces. Elsewhere, police forces may be able to utilise military personnel and equipment through regular legal provisions (such as secondment arrangements). The financial arrangements for security services can become a controversial issue between security and electoral institutions. This controversy (if it arises) principally stems from the high costs associated with such large scale operations, additional costs incurred by late amendments, and whether the costs should be borne as part of the electoral process (and therefore by the electoral management body) or as a function of the security forces (and therefore by the budget of the security forces). The resolution of this problem will depend on the formal arrangements of government in a particular country, but is also influenced by the electoral and security institutions ability to identify the problem early in the strategic planning phase, and find a mutually satisfactory solution. Political constraints may also affect the assignment of security forces to particular tasks in the electoral period. If a security actor has been the subject of controversies relating to partisan bias, the use of these forces in some aspects of the electoral process may be counter-productive to gaining the trust of the participants. For example, in a post-conflict environment, the involvement of the State security forces in the conflict may have created a level of distrust that can necessitate alternative arrangements. In this post-conflict scenario in particular – especially if military and police forces are undergoing major reforms in parallel to the election process – the deployment of these forces can be detrimental not only to the election, but to the reforming institutions. Neither are security actors in an election process limited to formal security institutions. Political parties, civil society groups, non-governmental organisations (NGO’s), the media and election observer groups can all have an influence on the security environment through various mechanisms. Political parties may enter into a mutually agreed Code of Conduct that guides the behaviour of their supporters and candidates. Civil society and NGO’s (national and international) may undertake information campaigns, public debates or use other strategies to assist in defusing political tensions. Media outlets may also follow a Code of Conduct that deters speculative reporting that could unnecessarily heighten political tensions. And, electoral observers may also mitigate intimidation and other threats to the process, by virtue of their presence and scrutiny of the process. NEXT: Electoral Special Security Measures Electoral Special Security MeasuresSeveral measures have evolved in different countries to enhance security during an election. The applicability of these measures varies given the unique circumstances. Listed below is a non-exhaustive list of special measures or arrangements that might be considered by election and security officials: Joint Operations Centre (JOC) The establishment of a Joint Operations Centre (JOC) has become a common feature of efforts to coordinate security and electoral operations. Normally established some months before an election, the JOC contains representatives from a range of institutions and acts as a nexus for information sharing, planning, briefing and monitoring the electoral process. Dedicated Training on Security The development and delivery of a training package for security officials involved in an election. Normally this step is reinforced by the distribution of ‘Election Cards’ to security force personnel – outlining key points about the process, their expected behaviour and lawful authorities. Similarly, the training delivered to electoral staff should include a component that outlines the role and integration of security personnel into their activities. Weapon Exclusion Zones During registration, campaigning, polling and counting exercises, special legal provisions may come into force that create a ‘weapon exclusion zone’ around these sites. Normally, the only persons legally bearing arms within these zones are appropriately authorised security personnel. Coordination of Campaign Rallies
Campaign ‘Cooling-Off’ Period Several countries impose a “cooling off” period between the end of the campaigning period and polling day. This cooling off is intended to reduce the amount of political rhetoric and tension between opposing parties, as their respective supporters go to vote together at polling stations. Security Media Component (Proactive and Reactive) In the course of an election, security forces may become the subject of disinformation campaigns. Disinformation campaigns may seek to misinform voters about the role, behaviour or credibility of security forces. In the first instance, a proactive information campaign seeks to explain the role of security forces in the process, which can deter disinformation efforts. In reactive circumstances, security forces should have the capacity to respond quickly and effectively in the media to journalist enquiries or disinformation. Enhanced Communications Network An effective communications system is well recognised as a ‘force multiplier’ for operational activities. For an election, ensuring that both election and security officials have appropriate communications equipment and interoperability at key levels – significantly enhances responsiveness and efficiency, as well as avoiding misunderstandings. Security Consultative Meetings and Liaison In certain circumstances, it may be necessary for security officials to pursue liaison and consultation with local communities to explain their role in an election. Offering an opportunity to exchange expectations, these meetings can be highly productive in alleviating concerns. If follow-up is necessary, a reliable security focal point (or team) may be appointed as a dedicated channel for election related security issues. It is strongly recommended that if this type of engagement is initiated, representatives of the electoral authorities are directly involved to avoid inconsistent messages. Rules of Engagement or Use of Force Policies Security forces often outline a policy framework termed a ‘Rules of Engagement’ (RoE) or ‘Use of Force Policy’ (UoF) to guide the actions of their personnel in certain circumstances. Usually, these policies guide security forces on what action is considered to be a reasonable and proportionate response to certain types of threats. During an election these policies may need to be reviewed with an emphasis towards ensuring that security forces are not ‘baited’ into actions that may later be politicised. In the case that security providers are contracted by an electoral institution, a use of force model should be clearly outlined in the contracting arrangements. Code of Conduct As has been mentioned earlier, several different groups, such as political parties and the media may enter into a Code of Conduct to guide their behaviour during an election. Security forces may also enter into a Code of Conduct to administer the behaviour of their personnel during an election. Investigation Taskforce Irrespective of the forum to which an electoral dispute is brought, the ability to rapidly and competently investigate the asserted facts is essential to defusing uncertainty. The awareness that any allegation will be thoroughly and competently investigated, can in itself, deter frivolous or malicious disputes from arising. Assembling a credible, impartial and competent investigation taskforce, solely for electoral matters may therefore pre-emptively defuse unnecessary disputes. The measures outlined above offer a sample of the range of security solutions that might be considered during an election process. The desirability and suitability of certain measures, or their combination, should stem from the threat analysis and strategic planning stages. Conclusion
Elections are a potent tool to defuse conflict and create a means of finding negotiated resolutions. As these peaceful means seek to resolve inter alia social, political, ethnic, religious and economic divisions, an election is a period of heightened tensions. Security is pervasive in this process and can affect both the actual, and perceived, legitimacy of the electoral outcomes. An equitably secure environment for electoral participants is fundamental to their engagement in the process, and by extension, the goal of an election itself. Whether or not an election lifts a conflict out of violence, or generates conflict, is strongly influenced by the integration of effective security policies and practices, into the electoral process. Next: Contributors to this Focus On
ContributorsContributors to the "Elections and Security" Focus OnThis Focus On was written by Sean Dunne in December 2006. Sean Dunne holds a Bachelor’s degree in information technology from the University of Central Queensland, Australia, and a Master’s degree in politics from New York University, USA. Mr. Dunne has a military and law enforcement background, and since 1999 has been a Political Affairs Officer of the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division. He has been involved in elections in more than 20 countries around the world, many of them occurring in the context of post-conflict or transitional circumstances. Focus on Cost of Registration and Elections
The following information covers:
The CORE Project uses two analytical tools to examine election costs: case studies and survey research. The case studies provide dynamic analysis of election finances, while the survey results report baselines and quantification; both types of report also share some common features. For example, both the surveys and case studies examined internal budget and financial procedures; addressed issues related to election technology; recommended the development of new cost constructs and analytical indicators; and concluded that it is possible for election budgets to be reduced. Next: Working definitions of election costs
Working definitions of election costs in a core-costing modelAccording to the current standard theory and practice of elections, the main expenses are incurred for the following activities: voter registration, boundary delimitation, the voting operation, counting and transmission of results, dispute adjudication, voter education and information, campaigning by political parties and candidates, and vigilance or oversight by party representatives and domestic or international observers (Goodwin-Gill 1994; López-Pintor 2000; OSCE 2001; EU 2002; IDEA 2002). Consequently, electoral costs include all the costs incurred in undertaking such activities, regardless of the kind of agency involved, whether national or local, public or private.
Types of electoral costsVoter registration, boundary delimitation, the voting operation, counting and transmission of results and dispute adjudication are almost invariably conducted by various forms of EMBs (i.e., the executive branch of government, officials under the supervision of an electoral commission or an independent electoral commission). Providing voter education and information, may be shared by electoral authorities, political parties and civil society organizations, while the seventh (campaign activities) is exclusively conducted by political parties and candidates. The main variable for cost analysis may therefore be directly related to the specific organization or entity in charge of a given electoral activity—one or several organizations within the national government, local governments, judiciaries, private firms (e.g., quasi-public postal service and telecommunications), NGOs and political parties. The electoral budget during an election year may cover one or several elections, and in the latter case one should consider whether elections are held simultaneously or separately on different dates. These factors heavily influence the overall budget figures as well as their distribution by budget line item. Number and time sequence of elections are variables that make it difficult to compare electoral costs among different countries. It is not always easy to split budgets and assign costs to different elections. A distinction between personnel costs and operational costs is generally used as the main structuring criteria in an electoral budget. Over time, there are fixed costs for the ordinary functioning of an electoral administration; these costs are incurred independently of the occurrence of elections in a given year. Variable costs, meanwhile, are those related to the actual conduct of elections. Almost the entire budget for a specific election consists of variable costs. With the term funding source, three main distinctions can be made. One is between a) a separate electoral budget that is part of the consolidated budget of the nation and b) election-tied funds that form part of the budget of public agencies whose main responsibilities have little or nothing to do with elections (i.e. civil registries, police and postal services). Another distinction, between national and international funding of electoral budgets, is of utmost relevance in the case of post-conflict elections and even second-generation elections in emerging democracies. A third distinction, between public and private funding, is applicable primarily in regards to the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns. Electoral-budget costs that can be readily identified on a budget document are called direct costs. There are also diffuse costs—those that may prove difficult or impossible to accurately assess even if properly identified. This category can be further divided by degrees of diffusiveness; for example, some costs for activities can be clearly identified, yet still cannot be disentangled from within the general budget of the agency involved (i.e. the contribution of civil registries in providing information to EMBs for the production of voter lists; or the production of voter lists by the national agency in charge of censuses and statistics). Obtaining specific information about such costs is frequently impossible because activity-focused cost audit are not often practiced by organizations responsible for a multiplicity of programs, such as those mentioned above. As noted above in the funding source category, other diffuse costs may include actual costs hiding beneath the ordinary operations of agencies that lend various forms of support to the electoral process (i.e., police force, postal services, school systems, local governments and public TV). While these are real costs, they are neither included in the electoral budget nor are they easy to assess in many cases. An additional and very important distinction is between integrity costs and core costs. This distinction may be essential for an adequate understanding of the funding of elections, most notably in emerging and post-conflict democracies. It has much to do with conditions ensuring a safe, politically neutral environment and a level playing field. The integrity of the voting operation is mainly a function of voter security and ballot security. Voter security includes ensuring the safety of individual voters and of voting and counting facilities; removing threats and intimidation factors; and guaranteeing accessibility to polling stations. Security of the ballot implies arranging the voting and counting in such a way that the voter lists, ballot papers, tallies and other result records are tamper-proof. The main objectives are to preserve secrecy of the vote (disposition of the voting booth), to avoid double voting (a safe ballot box, use of indelible ink), and to eliminate undue manipulation of voting materials (printing control, storage and transport). The presence of party representatives and electoral observers—both domestic and international—may be required at the voting and counting locations. In summary, integrity costs generally concern security arrangements for registration and polling places. They may include funding for international personnel serving as part of the electoral administration; tamper-resistant electoral materials necessitated by a low level of trust among contenders; long-term electoral observer missions; intensive voter education campaigns and election publicity; and assistance to political parties at national and local levels as part of a broader approach to capacity building. Those costs routinely associated with carrying out elections are designated as core costs. They are incurred independently of the degree of uncertainty and security of the political environment and have to do with voter lists, voting materials, competence among polling officials, voter information, and organizational and logistical arrangements. Core costs are assumed to be fixed rather than variable; integrity costs are incurred when special and often unexpected expenses are required to ensure that the process works efficiently. The relative proportion of overall election costs that can be attributed to integrity or core costs generally depends on how far removed the politics of a given country are from conflict and lack of security. In a recent assessment of post-conflict elections, the following dummy exercise offered a useful indication of how costs may be structured.
Developing a methodology for electoral cost assessmentThe classification of electoral costs are defined in Types of Electoral Costs serve as the basis for developing cost-assessment methodologies. The following steps are required:
Table 1 (below) shows the frequency and intensity with which different costs are incurred, depending on the democracy environment. Three trends are apparent when comparing electoral scenarios in stable, transitional and post-conflict democracies. First, integrity costs are relatively higher in transitional than in stable democracies, and still higher in post-conflict situations. This is primarily, although not exclusively, due to the requirement of police and military to handle security at every stage of the electoral process, frequently with the presence of an international force. Second, diffuse core costs are particularly extensive in stable democracies where a large part of the actual electoral expense is covered by budgets from different state administrations; in such environments, it is not always easy or feasible to quantify which part of their budgets are devoted to electoral activities. On the other hand, diffuse integrity costs are greater in transitional and post-conflict environments because of the need for funding from a peacekeeping budget, which are difficult to quantify. Diffuse costs attributable to political party finance are substantial and difficult to quantify in both stable and other democracies. Third, the existence and amount of vigilance costs could be reduced to some core costs for party agents in stable democracies, but would expand to domestic and international observers in the other democracy environments, especially in post-conflict situations.
Next: Election budgets and revenue sources for funding the administration of elections Election budgets and revenue sources for funding the administration of electionsThe Cost of Registration and Elections (CORE) Project evaluates budgets of Electoral Management Bodies (EMB’s) in order to identify budgeting practices and techniques that influence cost control and transparency and identifies the revenue sources for funding the administration of election processes. For more information covered in this section, see:
Election funding: legal framework and practice; election budget processes and cyclesAs a rule, electoral budgets tend to be part of the consolidated budget of the nation on an annual cycle. In a non-election year, the budget for the electoral authority— whatever shape it takes—is usually a line item of the national budget or is included within the budget of the larger agency of which the electoral administration is part (e.g., the Ministry of Interior). In an election year, the corresponding budget is funded from the national budget by following ordinary or extraordinary procedures, depending on whether the elections could be anticipated or were called unexpectedly. Flexibility is particularly necessary in parliamentary systems in which governments may collapse unexpectedly or a prime minister may call an election at any time within a given term of office1. Almost invariably, electoral budgets are prepared by the electoral authority and processed through the finance ministries for approval in the legislature. Most finance ministries do not have the authority, at least formally, to curtail or amend an electoral budget prepared by electoral authorities. Some exchange and bargaining between a ministry and electoral officials may nonetheless ensue. In Australia, for example, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) receives the major part of its funding through government appropriations, which are acts of Parliament that authorize expenditures and appropriate money from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to provide agreed levels of budget funds to government agencies. Budget levels are agreed for the budget year and three succeeding years, according to the stages of the election cycle. Adjustments to funding to cover changes in operational and legislative requirements occur through a formal process of New Policy Proposals involving ministers and the Expenditure Review Committee made up of senior cabinet ministers. Appropriations are made on an outcomes basis, and annual reporting is made in accordance with the outcomes and outputs framework, including performance indicators and targets against which performance can be assessed. Appropriations and all reporting occur on an accrual base, so non-cash expenses (such as depreciation) form part of annual funding levels. Improved information technology (IT) platforms have helped limit increases in the costs of registration and elections in Australia over the past five years—operational costs in a non-election year have increased by approximately 0.8 percent, and in an election year by 1.3 percent. The Government and the Parliament place constant pressure on the AEC (along with other publicly funded agencies) to continually review its operational performance and to contain costs. The AEC will upgrade its IT capabilities in the next three years to take advantage of the scanning and optical character recognition technologies that can further enhance its roll management systems and its management of elections. Such a budgetary practice is better established in countries where the state administration has achieved a certain degree of organizational maturity and the legal system is stable. More frequently than not, standard budgetary practices are formally followed at all levels of government (after influencing international financial and monetary agencies as a requirement for aid and trade agreements). Otherwise, the electoral budget for a fresh election after civil conflict, or elections in the midst of unstable times, is usually made on an ad hoc basis and defined with participation of international agencies (e.g., Haiti, Afghanistan). A kind of transitional situation might be that of Cambodia, where elections are funded through a special account at the National Treasury called the Trust Fund Account for Elections. Practically all contributions for elections—private and public, national and international—are deposited in this fund. Guatemala offers an interesting case where a fixed percentage of the national budget (0.5 percent) is allocated by law for the ordinary functioning of the electoral commission. In an election year, the commission follows standard budgetary procedures in defining and requesting the necessary funds for the election. Afghanistan presents a recent example of how elections are organized in a post-conflict scenario. The October 2004 presidential poll bore many similarities to other electoral processes where the international community has been heavily involved in both the political process and the practicalities of organizing elections. Those processes are inclined to choose high-tech solutions, rather than low-tech alternatives, and a large central election administrative bureaucracy with a distinct international component— which together contribute to a staggering price tag for the electoral process. A unique feature of the Afghanistan election was how early and suddenly the responsibility for planning and implementing the election was handed to the government itself, at least on paper. This marked the first time that a national election authority with no previous experience in organizing elections was charged with implementing its first election—even though the United Nations had a staff of more than 100 people on the ground tasked to work on the electoral process and had the explicit mandate to conduct voter registration prior to polling. The early transfer of responsibility for organizing the elections from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to the national government became known as the ‘Afghanization’ of the electoral process. Notes: 1A notable exception is Switzerland, where the electoral budget stays the same in election and non-election years. This is due to the fact that there are almost always three to four referenda at the national level in a non-election year and two to three referenda in an election year.
Next: Resource-sharing arrangements with other public agencies Resource-sharing arrangements with other public agenciesA particularly common situation in stable democracies with highly developed state apparatuses at the national and sub-national levels is that a number of electoral costs are shared among the electoral administration and other public agencies. This is the case with the making and updating of voter lists and district boundary delimitation, voter information, the conduct of external and proxy voting, early transmission of results, dispute adjudication, and security of the polling operation. Sometimes such costs are easily identifiable within an electoral budget of the national EMB or of another public agency. Frequently, however, there are diffuse costs within the state and local administrations that cannot be sorted out as electoral costs since they are part of standard costs of functioning state apparatuses (i.e., local governments, police) or of private organizations (i.e., private schools functioning as polling centers at no cost). Such costs cannot be properly assessed unless program-focused cost accounting is made by the implementing agency, which is not usually the case in most governmental agencies dealing with a variety of activities (e.g., local governments, census and statistical authorities or civil registries). A typical agency budget is normally structured by separating personnel and non-personnel services (materials and procurements), but it generally difficult to determine how much of each is devoted to a given election-related activity (i.e. security, arranging for polling stations, supplying information for voter lists) as part of the larger cost of operations of the entire organization. For example, in Spain and Sweden, voter lists are compiled in a national office of statistics. Although the electoral authorities pay a fee for the lists, this does not cover the full cost of the operation simply because there are hidden costs that could only be ascertained by program-focused cost accounting. There are other hidden costs in both countries, as in many others, related to the conduct of the polling operation by provincial and local municipal administrations, the postal services, police and embassies abroad. Such a wide range of hidden costs is less likely in countries with small state infrastructures, where almost any electoral cost incurred at any level of government can be easily spotted and referred to a general electoral budget for provision or refund by whatever authority implemented a given election-related activity. For example, in Cambodia and Guatemala, a local employee at the municipal level is exclusively in charge of helping with civil registry and voter lists. Although the municipality provides certain office support, both the main office and salary costs are covered in the national electoral budget. A number of templates of electoral budgets are included as illustrative examples of budget structures in different democracy environments.
Next: How much do elections cost? How much do elections cost?One major finding regarding the overall cost of elections is the importance of the type of democracy environment (i.e. stable, transitional and post-conflict) in determining both the kind and amount of electoral expenses. The conclusions from previous research, have been validated in the current study and are described according to the two categories below: Previous experience with multi-party electionsA very significant factor in explaining cost variations is duration of previous experience with multi-party elections. Significant cost differences exist between routine elections in stable democracies, elections in transitional democracies, and elections during special peacekeeping operations. In countries with longer multi-party democratic experience, elections are consistently less costly than in countries where such elections constitute a new undertaking. This trend cuts across regions, levels of economic development, and even interruptions of electoral practice by military breakdowns. Low electoral costs, approximately $1 to $3 per elector, tend to manifest in countries with longer electoral experience: the United States and most Western European countries; Chile ($1.2), Costa Rica ($1.8), and Brazil ($2.3) in Latin America; Benin ($1.6), Botswana ($2.7), Ghana ($0.7), and Senegal ($1.2) in Africa; India ($1) and Pakistan ($0.5) in Asia; and Australia ($3.2). In most countries that have less multi-party electoral experience, costs tend to be higher, even taking into consideration elections that have taken place as part of peacekeeping operations, where the cost per elector is highest: Mexico ($5.9), El Salvador ($4.1) and Paraguay ($3.7) can be mentioned in Latin America; Lesotho ($6.9), Liberia ($6.1) and Uganda ($3.7) in Africa; and Russia ($7.5) in Eastern Europe. Thus, duration of electoral practice is in itself a cost-reducing mechanism, perhaps the most important during the stage of democratic consolidation. Since a longer-term perspective is by definition difficult when assessing election costs in new democracies, the above findings offer strong support for the claim that efforts at capacity building in electoral administrations are probably cost-effective in the longer term. These findings also support the idea that establishing and consolidating a permanent electoral administration as the repository for managerial capacity development with regard to elections—within both the political and the administrative systems—is a cost-effective practice. As might well be expected, elections held as part of broader and longer-lasting peacekeeping operations are the costliest of all. Nicaragua in 1990 ($11.8 per elector), Angola in 1992 ($22), Cambodia in 1993 ($45.5), Mozambique in 1994 ($10.2), Palestinian Territories in 1996 ($9), and Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Dayton Accords ($8) are cases in point. This is not to say that a cost-effective approach cannot or should not be used for special operations, but that it would function to a much more limited extent than in simple transitional electoral politics or, indeed, in routine periodic elections. In the Cambodian case, in which donors subsidized both elections, it would be hard to demonstrate that the high-cost elections in 1993 (at $45 per elector) were better organized or produced a more positive political outcome than did those of 1998, which were run at costs closer to the standard of the politics of democratization ($5). Somewhat less dramatically, both Nicaragua and El Salvador also demonstrate that second elections after peacekeeping operations can be run significantly less expensively: costs dropped from $11.8 in 1990 to $7.5 in 1996 in Nicaragua, and from $4.1 in 1994 to $3.1 in 1997 in El Salvador. Consequently, elections as part of special peace-making and peacekeeping operations should be considered separately for both analytical and strategic policy purposes. (López-Pintor, 2000, 76-77). According to the research conducted for the CORE Project, elections cost more than $20 per elector in Afghanistan (2004), $5 in Guatemala (2004), $2 in Cambodia (2003), $4 in Spain (2004), and $2 in Sweden (2004). The projected per-elector cost for the 2005 election in Haiti is $11. Costs in Guatemala and Cambodia are similar to those in Spain and Sweden, respectively, but these similarities should be considered in light of the fact that the former two countries are among the poorest in the world in terms of per capita income, while the latter two are among the richest. Thus the elections in Cambodia and Guatemala can be viewed as being much more costly. A corollary to these findings is that the integrity costs of elections are reduced by efforts and investments to improve peace, security and national reconstruction, such as disarmament, demobilization, integration to civilian life, inter-ethnic reconciliation, and infrastructure development. Other electoral costs may remain constant or even increase (e.g., personnel, high technology), but integrity costs will certainly decline with democratic progress. Within the realm of core costs, progress in building state apparatuses would normally imply that certain electoral costs may be reduced or shared within the ordinary budget of other public agencies different from the electoral administration (e.g., civil registries, postal services and police). As national security, transport and communication infrastructures are of paramount importance in determining integrity costs, so is state building with regard to core electoral costs.
Democratic consolidationCore costs as a whole—especially in the areas of personnel and advanced technology—tend to increase rather than decrease independently according to the degree of democratic consolidation. One main cause of this in emerging democracies is the sheer institutionalization of a permanent professional electoral administration, which in most countries is a bureaucratic organization in the form of an electoral commission independent of the executive branch. A second set of causes stems from the complexities of the political and party systems in countries with federal, state and regionalized electorates, all of which may run different types of elections under separate schedules; when high demands for voter information persist (i.e., use of different languages); and when elections require special voter assistance (i.e. external voting, proxy voting). A third cause is the increasing use of new technologies, which may include computerization of office work, establishment and update of permanent computerized voter lists, quick electronic transmission of results on election evening, and introduction of electronic voting. All of these activities are expensive. In the specific scenario of emerging democracies, once peace is achieved and reconciliation fares well, dramatic cost decreases may be expected—though not under all circumstances (e.g., Ecuador, Kosovo and Nicaragua). The case of Cambodia illustrates the decreasing cost trend and the fact that after a given point, no further decrease can be expected. The substantial reduction of costs achieved by the National Election Committee (NEC) from 1998 to 2003 can be explained by a series of factors that are not all technical in nature. At the policy level and as a matter of pride, the Government of Cambodia does not want to rely heavily on international assistance for future elections. Eventually, the greater part of electoral costs will come from the government’s coffers. This, in itself, is a strong incentive to reduce costs. Electoral assistance dropped substantially, from almost $19 million in 1998 to $10 million in 2002 to $6 million in 2003. The 2002 reform of the legal framework in Cambodia was undertaken with the double objective of improving and reducing the costs of the electoral machinery. For instance, a permanent voter registry was introduced, and voter registration was delegated to local administrations. In addition, expensive procedures were abandoned or replaced with cheaper alternatives. For example, the practice of issuing a new voter identity card (with photograph) for each election was replaced by the use of other identification documents, such as a new national identity card. The NEC was forced to rationalize its internal practices and reduce the number of departments. The chairman of the NEC has said he believes that electoral costs in Cambodia should not vary widely in future elections; if anything, he said, the cost of materiing factors to larger electoral budgets in the future may include capital expenditures to replace aging vehicles, computers and other electoral items, and the necessity to provide for an ever-increasing voter population. In Guatemala, an assessment of election budgeting, funding and cost management in recent years found that election costs have consistently increased overall and in almost every single area. First, the 2003 election budget was more than twice that of previous elections after including foreign aid, but still around the average for Latin America. A similar pattern observed in Guatemala at the time of these elections had been seen previously in elections in Nicaragua in 2001 and Ecuador in 2002. In all three cases these were third-generation elections which took place after acute social conflicts, and each poll turned out to be more expensive and more poorly organized than the previous national election. Given that a substantial part of Guatemala’s electoral budget was funded through foreign aid, this finding should be taken as a warning to the international community to closely monitor election spending. Second, the most expensive items in Guatemala were salaries and per diem given to temporarily hired staff and polling station workers, although this cost has remained relatively constant over the last five years at 125 quetzals ($15) for polling station officers— an amount that many poll workers did not consider equitable. This expenditure was followed closely by the cost for voter list updates, although it should be noted that updating of voter lists and rearrangement of the polling stations accordingly was basically covered by external aid. Cost increases in the official national electoral budget basically involved larger expenses for voter education and an increase in the number of polling stations to 8,885. Over a five-year period, voter information and education had the largest real growth in costs, most of which stemmed from an effort to reach rural and indigenous populations in their own languages (half of the Guatemalan population is of Mayan descent and does not speak Spanish). There is no single item for which a cost decrease has been recorded.
Next: Electoral budget histories in 1990s
last modified September 08, 2006 11:18 Electoral Budget histories in the 1990sElectoral costs do not tend to decrease overall once civil conflict and severe political turmoil have been overcome, although some line items of expense may prove to be more sensitive than others to cost-cutting measures. In other words, stability is much less expensive than civil conflict, but it cannot be taken for granted that electoral costs will decrease once democracy is stabilized and a state administration continues to develop. There are no grounds to expect that such massive processes as voter registration and voting would not be subject to the same challenges and expectations as other undertakings by a modern state administration (i.e., tax collection, educational services, postal services and communications). There are more countries where electoral costs have increased during the last five years than those where costs have decreased. In about half of the countries, the budget was merely inflation-dependent and did not change in substance. The case of Switzerland, with a constant electoral budget over the last five years, illustrated this situation. In contrast, Canada, Spain and Sweden experienced high budget increases due largely to automation of voter lists and early transmission of results, expansion of postal voting, and intensive voter-information activities. Although second- and third-generation elections following civil conflict tend to cost less than the first post-conflict elections, there are cases showing the opposite trend. In three Latin American countries (Nicaragua, 2001; Ecuador, 2002; Guatemala, 2003) later elections were more expensive than earlier ones. Electoral expenses showing the largest growth tend to be for personnel and professional services. Sometimes this occurs following the establishment of an increasingly consolidated electoral administration, as in Cambodia and Guatemala; at other times, it stems from outsourced professional expertise in computer and telecommunication fields, as in Australia, Spain and Sweden. Voter information and postal voting are other expenses experiencing growth, especially in well-established democracies where sophisticated voter-information efforts offer individualized notification of date and place of the polling. For example, in Switzerland, voter information accounts for as much as 50 percent of the entire electoral budget. According to the survey response from the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), the areas of operation experiencing the greatest increase in costs related to upgrading the AEC Web site (developing the ’virtual tally room’), administering a 40 percent increase in the volume of postal voting, and also administering the increased volume of overseas voting together with attendant security issues. Postal voting within country and abroad is becoming increasingly popular, yet is quite expensive. In Spain, for example, the cost per registered voter grew from $2.1 in 1996 to $4.1 in 2004. While reporting and accounting factors may explain a large part of the growth, there is still considerable room for actual cost increases, which can be explained by significant changes in the management of the electoral process. In any case, cost increases have been much larger than the 10 percent increase in the number of eligible voters from 31.4 million in 1996 to 34.5 million in 2004. Some of the discrepancy is related to the change in Spain’s currency from the peseta to the euro as well as the fall in the US dollar’s value against the euro over the past couple of years. These external factors are responsible for the estimate that at least 25 percent of the current cost per registered voter should be considered ‘inflated’ by mere accounting factors; taking this into consideration, the actual 2004 cost is $3 per registered voter. Other factors are also responsible for the higher costs in 2004 compared with 1996. The major significant changes in the management of elections in Spain over those eight years included:
In Sweden, the cost of technology and Web communications is fairly high due to the large investments that have been made. In addition, most of this work is done by consultants instead of permanent staff—yet another reason for the high cost. Voter-information efforts are mainly focused on the production of a magazine in 14 different languages (in addition to Swedish); placing information on the official Web site; producing brochures; and advertising on television and radio. Brochures and films in sign language and Braille are also produced. The cost for voter information is around 18 million kroner ($2.3 million) for each general election; this number increased by 60 percent between 1998 and 2002. Before the election to the European Parliament in June 2004, the central EMB participated in the government’s Democracy Campaign by organizing information seminars for representatives from municipalities, organizations, government agencies and schools. The authority focusing on schools included information brochures in its general dissemination plan. The central EMB is prepared to develop its information activities further before the general election in 2006; among the suggestions additions are the preparation of special information packages for schools and immigrants. Special investments in new technology and Web-based communication have been made in recent years in Sweden. To fund them, a relatively high annual budget has been granted to the central EMB. The cost of IT support and technology in 2002, more than 20 million kroner, was almost double its usual cost. The new technology is mainly used to produce a voter register, assist in accurate boundary delimitation and in managing election results. In addition, election results are published electronically immediately after the close of polls on Election Day. Some countries show dramatic reductions in electoral budgets. The case of Cambodia looks spectacular because the first elections were held as part of peacekeeping operation in 1993 and had an exceptionally high cost—nearly $46 per registered voter. Subsequently, the cost dropped to $5 in 1998 and to $2 in 2003. Expense-line items undergoing the greatest reductions in recent years include staff savings (Canada), voter education (Australia) and voter registration after establishing a permanent registry (Cambodia). In other countries such as Spain, however, no significant cost reduction was noted from one election to the next—although in the longer term a number of cost-reducing measures have been singled out. Spain’s electoral authorities have gained experience over the past 20 years with a number of cost-effective measures:
The expenses that remain constant vary greatly among countries. Examples include fees to registration and polling officials in Canada or Guatemala; training in Australia; general voter-information campaign by the EMB (Spain); voter education (Cambodia); and every single budget line item (Switzerland). Next: Public funding of political parties Public funding of political partiesThe source of funds for political parties varies around the world based on culture, precedent and legal standards. In most countries in continental Europe, political parties are at least partially funded from the national budget in the form of various types of allowances, including those for regular party operation, functioning of parliamentary groups of party representatives, and for campaign expenses in an election year1. In the United Kingdom and the United States, private financing of parties represents the largest portion of campaign expenses. In emerging democracies, there are examples of the different legal models as well as of compliance in actual practice. A mixed model with public and private financing is frequently established with an obligation for disclosure by political parties and controlling authority held by the EMB. More often than not, a legal vacuum exists regarding sanctions for non-compliance or other enforcement mechanisms at the disposal of the implementing authorities. In Australia, political parties and independent candidates receive public funding for campaigning, as per the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (the Act). Under the Act, candidates or Senate groups are eligible for election funding if they receive a minimum of 4 percent of the formal first preference vote in the division (House of Representatives) or the state or territory (Senate) in which they stand for election. The amount payable is calculated by multiplying the number of eligible votes by the current election-funding rate, which is indexed to increases in the consumer price index every six months and was set at $1.972 per vote for the 2004 election. The total amount payable that election was $42 million. Following an election, key participants in the electoral process are required to lodge with the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) various returns disclosing certain campaign transactions. These transactions include donations received and electoral expenditures by candidates and Senate groups; details of electoral expenditures, donations received; donations made to candidates and others by third parties; electoral advertising by broadcasters; and published electoral advertisements. Regarding political party financing, the disclosure provisions of the Act are intended to improve the integrity of the electoral process by allowing the electorate to be well informed about the major donors to political parties, groups and candidates as well as the levels of some kinds of expenditures by those involved in the electoral process. The AEC receives and processes the various returns required under the Act, makes them publicly available for inspection (on the AEC Web site), and conducts a program of compliance reviews of disclosures made by the political parties and associated entities. Even as the AEC’s workload in administering these requirements and activities continues to grow, it is frequently criticized by parties and members of Parliament who are often interested in exposing the financial arrangements of their political opponents while seeking at the same time to limit the transparency of their own arrangements. During the 2003–2004 period, some 184 annual returns were processed; 1,190 donor returns were processed; and 102 compliance reviews were conducted. According to the AEC Portfolio Budget Statements, the cost associated with funding and disclosure activities during 2004-2005 was estimated to be $2.8 million. In Spain, a mixed model applies, with public funding provided to political parties for ongoing and electoral operations. Public funding for campaigning is not directly a part of the electoral budget, and parties can also receive funds from private sources. Campaign subsidies are calculated in proportion to the number of votes and seats obtained. Political parties also receive funds from their membership, private donors, their own investment revenues, and bank loans. Access to state radio and television is free of charge and is managed by a special commission supervised by the electoral committees. Sweden has a rather peculiar mixed model that is based largely on informal agreements among political parties. For one thing, any political party, candidate or organization can conduct an election campaign. Organizations other than political parties were involved in campaigning prior to the referendum in 2003 on replacing the Swedish currency, the kroner, with the euro. Any business was able to fund campaign organizations prior to this vote, and many did so3. Regarding the financing of political parties, there is no system of regulation, although there is one law containing rules and moral guidelines for political parties. There are no provisions for disclosure of contributions to political parties; however, the political parties represented in parliament reached a mutual agreement in the 1960s to share information about sources of contributions with each other, but not with the general public. Political parties are also obligated to produce an annual report, which is also not made public. There are four main sources of funding for Swedish political parties: direct public funding, indirect public funding, income from party membership, and lotteries conducted by parties or their affiliated organizations. The main source is direct public funding given to political parties during election periods and between elections, with the amount based on performance in the previous election and current representation in the legislature. Indirect party funding is typically provided through the party-affiliated press, which is publicly subsidized. Although membership in political parties has declined, income from membership still remains important, representing between 5-10 percent of the total budget of the two main parties in the early 1990s. Some political parties or their affiliated organizations receive income from lotteries; the Social Democrats are particularly successful in this respect. Although no law prohibits political parties from receiving funds from private businesses, party leaders agreed in the 1970s to refuse such contributions. In Guatemala, public financing of political parties is established by the law. Parties are entitled to free postal and telecomunnications services from the calling of an election until one month after its conclusion. Moreover, political parties receive public funding in proportion to the number of votes obtained in the first round of the presidential election, at a rate of 2 quetzals per vote, if and only if a party receives at least 4 percent of total valid votes. Disbursement is made under the control of the national electoral commission, Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), in four annual installments between elections. Political parties may use public funds for either ordinary operations or campaign expenses. The TSE has the responsibility for audit and control of party finances and expenses. Before each annual disbursement, parties must submit a detailed report of expenses. In the event that a political party does not abide by its accounting and reporting obligations, the TSE may bring the party before the courts in an effort to force compliance. Private financing is neither contemplated nor prohibited, and no limit on campaign expenses is established in the law. It follows that it would be extremely difficult to estimate campaign expenses except for the public subsidies component, even if all parties complied with the obligation for disclosure after elections. In Cambodia, the Law on Political Parties states that parties should be funded through their members’ contributions, from income generated by lawful business activities, from donations of private enterprises or individuals, and from the political party’s own assets. Contributions from foreign firms, public or government institutions, and NGOs are forbidden. Regardless of their participation in the electoral process, all political parties are required to report annually to the Ministry of Interior their income and expenditures, balance sheets, statements of bank accounts, and assets. These documents are not available to the public. Regarding campaigns, the same law establishes that the State shall provide funding for campaigning to political parties on an equal basis; to date, however, this provision has never been applied. Existing laws also require parties to report campaign expenditures and maintain a special account registry showing their sources of income and expenditures. The registry must remain available to the election commission for examination, if requested. The only actual government contribution to campaigns of political parties comes under the provision of free airtime on state radio and TV. The electoral authorities arrange free equal access to airtime for political party campaign messages during the 30-day campaign period. This, however, does not apply to local commune elections. In Haiti, few provisions or policies had been determined regarding political party campaign activities by the time the electoral budget was drafted and international assistance was pledged for the 2005 elections. This oversight illustrates the uncertainties and challenges that are typical of post-conflict environments. In Afghanistan, the picture is also rather bleak even though laws regarding political party contributions have been passed. The political entities registered to take part in an election must have a dedicated bank account where all campaign contributions are deposited, as stipulated in the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) Regulation on Political Campaign Finances. Each Afghan citizen or organization may contribute up to 2 million Afghani ($47,000) to a candidate per campaign period. Any contribution greater than 1,000 Afghani must be recorded and reported to the JEMB. The only kind of campaign contribution from a public source that can be accepted is in the form of security services. Thus, current circumstances hold that no public money is available to political parties, its candidates, or independent candidates running for office. Even though political entities are not allowed to accept funding from abroad, international NGOs have been offering courses and advice on how to organize a political party, develop a political program, and how best to run an election campaign in a democratic environment. Notes: 1Private funding in most of these countries is allowed, but it tends to be secondary in importance. 2All references to Australian electoral costs are in Australian dollars. 3The vast majority of businesses supported replacing the kroner with the euro, thus greatly tilting the balance of funding in favor of the “yes” vote. Some analysts attribute voters’ rejection of the euro at least in part to a backlash against the huge amount of money spent by euro supporters. Next: Electoral Assistance from the international community Electoral Assistance from the international communityIn emerging democracies, the funding of an electoral budget by the international community, totally or in part, is an important component of democracy assistance. The amount varies from practically funding an entire election in a post-conflict scenario to more limited support of a specific phase of the electoral process, such as voter registration, civic education, and the provision of some materials like ballot papers and indelible ink. The following are illustrative country examples. In Afghanistan, as in Kosovo since 2000, elections in 2004 were financed completely by foreign donors, with an overall cost per registered voter of more than $20. An additional peculiarity was the financial management of the election. Even though the JEMB was responsible for the election, it did not have complete authority over finances; that authority rested with UNDP and its Voter Registration and Elections Project. According to a conservative estimate by the unit responsible for the election budget, more than $190 million was spent to obtain 8,128,940 ballots, resulting in a cost of $23 per vote. This figure excluded all costs related to the security operations conducted by 18,000 US troops and 8,000 ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) soldiers. Other costs not included were related to expansive civic education activities and logistic assistance provided by international NGOs but paid by individual donor countries; the total amount of such assistance may have amounted to more than $30 million. More than 2,000 domestic electoral monitors were separately funded by USAID. Special election support teams from the European Union ($2 million) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were also separately funded by their respective organizations. The estimated total cost for the direct polling operation inside the country was $55 million. In addition, UNAMA spent almost $21 million, and support to the Ministry of Interior for security cost a further $10 million. The latter funds were primarily spent on salaries, new vehicles fitted with communication equipment, and other equipment (except weapons and ammunition) necessary for the national police to perform its duties. Not included in these totals was the $23 million contract to Global Risk Strategies (GRS) to field 96 international staff to conduct security coordination and perform logistical planning for the EMB in the field. In fact, to a very large extent, GRS became the JEMB’s field structure. There was also the issue of funding external voting processes for Afghan citizens living elsewhere, particularly refugees in neighboring Iran and Pakistan. Significant resources were needed to set up and run, in fewer than 80 days, a registration and voting operation in those two countries for more than one million potential voters,. In Pakistan an in-person registration exercise was conducted prior to Election Day (this was not feasible in Iran). On Election Day, both Pakistan and Iran offered in-person voting at a limited number of polling centers, primarily near locations with large Afghan refugee populations. The cost, excluding resources spent by host countries (in particular, for security arrangements), amounted to nearly $30 million. This exercise resulted in 818,189 votes being cast. It is not surprising that the 2004 elections in Afghanistan were so complicated to arrange and proved quite costly. The election authority charged with organizing the 2004 presidential poll was faced with an electorate that had not experienced an attempt to hold democratic elections in four decades. Instead, more than 25 years of violence had dominated the political landscape and colored the political climate of the country. A significant amount of money was therefore needed to recreate the election authorities’ infrastructure, as well as on civic and voter education to facilitate the electorate’s understanding of a democratic electoral process. The electoral administration had a huge pool of internationals teaching Afghans how to run elections via on-thejob- training, which affected the cost of the election. Security concerns also played a significant role. Preparing and organizing elections is more costly in a post-conflict society, as much of a country’s physical infrastructure has been destroyed and large segments of the population have moved internally or become part of a diaspora. The late decision to allow eligible Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran to take part in the poll further increased the costs. In Haiti, it is likely that a three-election event in November 2005 will be almost entirely financed internationally. As in Afghanistan and Iraq, the electoral budget in Haiti is illustrative of the exceptional electoral setting in post-conflict societies. First, there is the overall cost of approximately $10.5 per registered voter, not including political party funding and international and domestic observer missions. The voter registration operation alone will cost around $2.10 per registered voter. Typical of post-conflict situations, infrastructure and technical equipment costs (i.e. transport, office space rental, communications and computer facilities) will require approximately $2.30 per registered voter. It should be noted that the electoral cost per registered voter in 2005 will be higher than it was ten years ago in 1995, when it reached $4 (López-Pintor 2000, p. 74). The total resource requirement for the period October 2004 to December 2005 amounts to $48,893,180, which is expected to cover personnel and operational costs for municipal, congressional and presidential elections. The Haitian government will finance the cost of 82 headquarters electoral staff and also contribute $2.9 million to the extraordinary electoral budget, to which three main international donors (Canada, the European Union and the United States) have committed $41 million. International financial resources for operational items have been linked to objectives of quantitative output through a result-based framework created by the electoral commission. Of the $41 million committed by donors, which will be administered by UNDP, $9 million has been allocated for voter registration to be conducted by the Organization of American States (OAS). The international community has pledged additional funding for security services and civic education and election observation programs, including political party activities. The following countries and regional organizations have pledged or are considering technical assistance opportunities prior to the 2005 elections in Haiti: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Japan, Mexico, Spain, Venezuela, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Organization of French Speaking Countries (OIF). The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is also preparing to establish a Trust Fund aimed at mobilizing additional resources for the elections as may be required. The substantial contribution of the international community is the only hope to sustain the entire electoral operation, as the national contribution amounts to less than 10 percent of the total budget. International financial assistance for Cambodia has consistently decreased every election since 1993. In 1998, international assistance funded almost 80 percent of the total cost of the election, but this percentage declined to around 60 percent for the 2002 commune elections and to less than 50 percent for the 2003 national election. The estimated cost per registered voter was $45.50 in 1993, but dropped dramatically to $4.40 in 1998, and continued to decrease to $2.30 in 2002 and $1.70 in 2003. For the 2003 national election, the budget was funded at 24,344,723,000 riels ($5.68 million) from a Trust Fund for Elections in the National Treasury and 24,931,681,000 riels from the international community. Seven billion riels were provided to the National Election Committee (NEC) from UNDP; six billion riels was provided by one donor country to the NEC through the Ministry of Finance; and only 536 million riels went from donors directly to the NEC. The donors’ money covered, for the most part, the non-salary, non-contingency budget costs. UNDP signed funding agreements with 12 donor countries and coordinated the earmarked funding to cover all the various phases of the process in agreement with each country. The Cambodian government’s money was used almost exclusively for salaries. The NEC accredited over 1,000 international observers, with two most important observation missions being conducted by the Asia Foundation (305 observers) and the European Union (some 120 observers). The approximate cost was $1.5 million for the EU Election Observation Mission and $240,000 for the Asia Foundation observation effort. These costs offer proof that international funding of civil society activities in election monitoring sometimes comes in relatively massive amounts. For example, in the 2003 Cambodian general election, external funding amounted to almost as much as the entire electoral budget of the NEC. In Guatemala, the electoral budget was generously funded by international assistance up to $9 million (not including international observation missions), with assistance provided mainly by Canada, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. Of the $9 million, $3.5 million flowed through the Organization of American States (OAS) for technical assistance on voter lists, and the remaining $5.5 million was provided directly to the national electoral agency. The distribution of this aid by item was approximately as follows: voter registration, $2.5 million; voter education, $2.5 million; purchasing of equipment, $2 million; and training for poll workers, $2 million. To a lesser extent, external aid was provided to civil society organizations monitoring the elections. All in all, electoral expenditures amounted to around $23 million, which is equivalent to $4.6 per register voter. There were also several large international observer missions, including particularly extensive ones from OAS and EU, with an average cost of around $1 million each. Voter registration costsThe main issues regarding voter registration costs have to do with the type of registration system (permanent versus ad hoc, automatic versus show-up update); institutional locus responsible for voter registration (the EMB or a separate agency); and degree of resilience in cost assessment (easily identifiable versus diffuse costs). The following conceptual considerations, which are likely to be relevant to a correct assessment of voter registration costs, are excerpted from a UNDP assessment mission in Cambodia in August 2004. For more information covered in this section, see:
General considerations on the purpose of voter lists in comparison with other registries of peopleVoter lists are meant for the exclusive purpose of recording the enfranchisement of voters and facilitating the voting operation by which the citizens eligible to vote (with given age and legal conditions) exercise their right to suffrage on a periodic basis. Voter lists are the tangible proof of enfranchisement, and the quality of such lists is to be judged according to their capacity to serve that specific purpose. Other registries of people exist and are meant to achieve different purposes: civil registries, lists of residents, and different personal identification documents (i.e., identity cards, passports and driver licenses). The number of registries and the institutional locations of each registry vary from country to country, depending on historical and legal traditions. Civil registries, which are usually based at local government levels, serve the purpose of recording and certifying births, deaths and marital status. Certification by civil registry is the main proof of citizenship, which in turn is generally based on nationality. Civil registries also offer proof of age—and both citizenship and age are the fundamental requirements for voter enfranchisement. Other lists are compiled Voter lists should not be considered per se as registries of citizens or of residents. Voter lists are intended neither to help with the identification of citizens, nor (even less so) to serve as a resource for the quantification of the population of a given country. Voter lists essentially exist for the purpose of allowing individual voters to vote only within a given constituency and at a given polling station. In the production and maintenance of voter lists, the kind of links to be expected between voter lists and other types of registries basically depends upon two factors. One is the legal administrative tradition of a given country. The other refers to the special circumstances under which voter registration is organized, most frequently in the case of emerging democracies and post-conflict situations. In the latter case, problems stemming from a deficit of population statistics, civil registries and citizen identification, as well as significant displaced populations, may strongly influence the procedures whereby voters are registered. In general, the main link between voter lists and civil registries is the requirement of a birth certificate as proof of citizenship (which is normally defined by nationality) and, at least in the first instance, a proof of residency (which would normally be required for the allocation of individual voters to constituencies, polling centers, and polling stations). Voter lists and personal identification documents are linked by the necessity for the voter to be identified at the ballot box. Finally, the link of voter lists with population censuses can be found in the facilitating role of census data for the organization of early voter registration, and the disaggregating of voter lists into constituencies. Also, population statistics may be crosschecked with voter lists to assess the size or age of segments of the population that will be eligible for enfranchisement at the present time or in the future. Or provide citizens or residents in a country with certain personal documents, such as national identity cards, passports or driver licenses. These activities are frequently undertaken by some branch of the security administration, normally the national police, and these documents exist for the purpose of personal individual identification. A third type of registry is a list of residents, which may be compiled, maintained and updated by local authorities in the districts of large cities, townships, communes or villages. These lists may serve different purposes normally related to the delivery of public services at the local level, and to provide information to higher levels of government for their respective action (i.e., correcting or updating other lists of citizens on which residence information is required, like the voter lists). Finally, another kind of documentary record is the population census, which is usually compiled every 10 years for the production of aggregate statistics of the population at different territorial levels of a country. Aggregate census information (but not data on individual persons) has many different uses, including the definition of electoral constituencies, which may be based on population, and the allocation of parliamentary or local council seats to constituencies according to population. Next: Voter registration systems in a global perspective Voter registration systems in a global perspectiveVoter registration can be conducted on an ad hoc basis only for a specific election or organized on a permanent basis either with periodic updating or with updating as a more continuous process. Ad hoc registration occurs least frequently, with the exception of post-conflict elections, which are often conducted with an ad hoc registry of voters. Nevertheless, there are exceptional cases even in well-established democracies where a permanent voter registry was instituted only recently (i.e., Canada in 1997). In addition, voter registration may be compulsory or voluntary for citizens. A global survey of 124 countries by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) found that compulsory voter registration is quite common in Western Europe as well as in Central and Eastern Europe. In those nations, it is organized on a continuous basis whereby the voter is automatically registered on a voter list after turning 18 years of age, with no requirement to appear before any public authority. This system is based on individual citizenship and age information, provided from either civil registry records or residents’ rolls compiled at local government levels. Compulsory registration is not widely practiced in Africa or North America. In South America, the two practices are evenly distributed. Again, much depends on the way civil registries and residence records are organized. Permanent voter registers are updated either on a continuous basis or at specific time intervals, normally during the period immediately preceding an election. Continuous registration requires an appropriate infrastructure to maintain the register either at the electoral administration or at the civil register. This involves adding the names and other relevant information for those who satisfy eligibility requirements (attaining citizenship, satisfying residency requirements, and attaining voting age) and deleting the names of those who no longer meet the eligibility requirements (usually because of death and change of residency). Continuous registers are used more often than periodic registers in all regions of the world, despite the complex machinery and high cost incurred. It is important to note, however that voter registration through a periodic voter register is ultimately a more expensive operation than maintaining a continuous register (IDEA, 2002, p. 30). Next: Quality standards of voter lists Quality standards of voter listsDemocracy means rule by the people, and the purpose of a voter list is to register the people who are eligible to exercise the right to vote. The following standards of democratic quality are particularly relevant:
There are also standards of technical efficacy such as the following:
Since the achievement of absolute perfection in almost any ongoing population record is unlikely, the main guiding principle for voter rolls, according to IDEA, is that enrollment procedures:
Next: Managing the cost of voter/civil registries: Country Experiences Managing the cost of voter/civil registries: Country ExperiencesIn Australia, voter lists are automatically updated with civil registry information. The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) divisional staff continually process enrollment information and enter it into the computerized Roll Management System (RMANS) in order to ensure an accurate and up-to-date electoral roll. This includes information about newly eligible persons, electors changing addresses, and deletions of electors who have left their enrolled addresses or died. The staff also process information received from Continuous Roll Update (CRU) activities and elections. Data matching programs undertaken in conjunction with other Commonwealth, state and territory authorities have also assisted the AEC in confirming enrollment details for approximately 43 percent of occupied addresses that can be enrolled without the need for direct contact with residents. The AEC also provides roll products for joint roll partners (state and territory electoral bodies), senators and members of Parliament, registered political parties, medical researchers, government agencies and authorities, and the public. The costs associated with the roll administration activities in 2003–2004 amounted to $58 million (a period leading up to the national election), and the estimate for the 2004–2005 financial year was $46 million. In Sweden, the voter register is compiled on the basis of the civil register, which is continuously updated by the National Tax Agency, the organization that since 1971 has been responsible for keeping a correct civil register. Before every election, the central EMB acquires from the agency a complete voter register, which is extracted from the database containing the civil register. The central EMB pays the agency a fee for this information; the amount for the euro referendum in 2003 totaled 500,000 kroner ($64,000). The amount is calculated on the basis of the number of persons in the register, with the per-name being 2-5 öre (1 kroner = 100 öre). The central EMB receives the voter register in an electronic format and produces printed registers for each polling station. This is done with the use of statistics and maps provided by the Land Survey. The cost of dividing and printing the register by polling station is equivalent to 300,000 kroner. Additional costs (almost 13.5 million kroner) involve the printing and dissemination of voting cards to all eligible voters. In Spain, lists of voters have a permanent automatic character. They are substantially produced and updated with information based on civil registries and lists of residents provided at the municipal level. Voter lists are handed to the provincial office of the Office of the Voter Registry and then compiled at a national level. Lists were updated on a yearly basis until 1998, when monthly updates were established. Lists of voters are distributed to the municipalities for a five-day revision period before every election. Following revision, the Office of the Voter Registry distributes voter lists organized by booth to each polling station. Also, voter lists are distributed to political parties, but not to the Ministry of Interior, which receives only aggregate figures of voters at different levels of government. Costs related to the routine production and monthly update of voter lists are part of the ordinary budget of the National Institute of Statistics, which totaled 200 million euros in 2004. The costs are not officially quantified separately in the organization of the Institute’s budget, but could be more than 15 percent. In its turn, the Ministry of Interior includes all costs related to the use of voter lists at election times (13 million euros in 2004). These costs cover reproducing the lists to be handed out to political parties; postal communication to voters informing them of the reviewing period before every election and of their specific polling locations; and the management of external voting. This extensive outreach effort explains why voter registration-related expenses have shown the largest actual growth over the last five years. The Ministry must reimburse the Office of the Voter Registry for these costs. Spain allows external voting by mail, both within the national territory and abroad (the 2004 voter list consisted of 34,557,370 individuals, of whom 1.1 million were voters living abroad). Voters from abroad are included in a separate list of absentee voters that is produced by the Office of the Voter Registry with information provided by Spanish consular offices. At election time, consular offices share management of the ballot abroad with the Office of the Voter Registry. Voters first apply for external voting at the consular office; then most of the ballots are mailed directly to the corresponding local electoral commission, and a smaller amount is handled directly by the consular office for remittance in Spain. All external ballots—including those from within the country—are supposed to be deposited at local electoral commissions within three days following Election Day since the official vote counting must take place on the third day. External voting operations have recently involved more than 600,000 people living in the country and 295,000 from abroad, amounting to 1.8 percent and 0.8 percent of the entire electorate, respectively. Voting abroad has continued to increase over time, while in-country mail voting tends to remain unchanged (Ramos Vadillo, 2003; Brugarolas Masllorens, 2003). In Guatemala, voter registration costs amounted to 20 percent of the total electoral budget in 2003. The rising cost was due to a particularly complicated method of updating voter lists by which the voter lists and polling stations were split into two sections: updated and non-updated. The process of updating the voter register by allowing people to vote closer to their residence resulted in a split register—nonupdated voters and updated voters. This made the entire operation not only costly, but also created much confusion among the electorate. A technical problem while processing updated voter information produced an unknown number of legally registered voters who could not be found on the updated register but were still on the non-updated list; the problem stemmed from the fact that the electoral law states that citizens must vote in the municipality where they are registered. The assessment by the European Union Observer Mission concluded that a main liability of the electoral process was the failure of organizing voter lists when allocating voters to polling stations in accordance with the identification records previously given to the almost two million voters who had updated their registration or registered for the first time. This shortcoming was recognized as a major issue a few weeks prior to Election Day, but the problem could not be properly addressed by the national election commission. As a consequence, many voters were unable to exercise their right to vote even after the commission decided to allow for a tendered ballot in the first round for those duly registered voters whose names did not appear on the voter list of the corresponding polling station (EU EOM Report, February 2004). Despite recent efforts to improve the rate of voter registration, accounts continue to be received of actual, if not legal, disenfranchisement of certain populations (primarily rural residents and indigenous people). (López-Pintor and Gratschew, 2002, 37). In Cambodia, voter registration costs in 2002 were part of the commune election budget and were close to $1.00 per registered voter. In 2003, the update of the list was also part of the electoral budget and amounted to $0.50 per registered voter; the update of a permanent registry in 2004 was estimated at $0.14. Therefore, this is a case where registration costs were lowered in comparison to the overall cost of elections, largely due to the establishment of permanent, automatically updated registries. The cost of voter registration operations for the commune elections included the production of photographic identity cards for each voter. The total voter registration operation amounted to 20 billion riels ($4.9 million), which was included in the electoral budget of the commune elections. In 2003, Cambodia created a permanent voter registry based on the voter list used in 2002 for the commune elections. Registration operations were delegated to the commune administrations but were closely supervised by the National Election Committee (NEC). The operation was an update of the previous voter list: voters already on the list did not need to re-register. Only those who had reached voting age or who had moved from one commune to another were required to register. Under this new system, no voter card was issued. As a result, the total cost of voter registration amounted to 12 billion riels ($2.9 million) and was incorporated in the 2003 electoral budget. In 2004, as required by the Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly (LEMNA), updating of the permanent registry entailed an annual voter registration and revision of the list even if there were no upcoming elections. Voter registration and list revision are conducted between October 1 and December 31 of each year. Therefore, a new valid voter registry is generated each year. For these operations in 2004, the NEC prepared a budget of 3.7 billion riels that was approved and provided entirely by the government. This amount was not part of any electoral budget. In future, this recurrent expenditure may either be granted on an ad hoc basis as happened in 2004 or eventually be integrated in the annual functioning budget of the NEC. The cost of voter registration will likely continue to decline as the procedure becomes part of usual commune administration operations. In 2004, savings had already been realized on training and direct assistance to commune clerks. Since registration operations are no longer conducted directly by the NEC, part of the cost is now indirectly absorbed by the commune councils, which provide the personnel. Although the financial burden of voter registration seemed to be ‘passed on’ to the commune councils, the NEC is bound to provide “appropriate training, capacity building, facility, supplies and materials and budget to the commune and clerk to enable the implementation of these responsibilities.” Regardless, these costs are already lower than those of a periodic registration. The NEC also provides salary supplement incentives to commune clerks for the additional administrative burden during the annual update period. In Haiti, as in Guatemala recently, the voter registration operation for 2005 will be conducted with technical assistance from the Organization of American States (OAS). Of a total electoral budget of nearly $49 million, some $9 million will be allocated to the task of voter registration, which ideally will include the possibility of creating the basis for a civil register, still non-existent in the country. The overall voter registration process will be automated, and no manual registration will be made. All voters will receive a digital card that will gradually replace the national identification card. The OAS is planning to establish 615 offices for registration activities (400 registration centers, 185 automated registration offices, and 30 automated registration mobile units). The registration centers will be located in rural areas; the automated offices in urban areas; and the mobile units in the semi-urban areas. The number of automated centers will be adjusted as required to reach a larger number of potential voters. It is estimated that the registration process will take four months (March–June 2005). The concept of operations also provides for the establishment of approximately 3,200 polling centers. All automated registration offices will also be considered as polling centers, and voters will be advised where to vote during the registration process. Haiti’s provisional electoral council and the international donors have approved this project, and the OAS is already implementing it. The government will directly fund operating costs for approximately 82 staff at the electoral council’s central headquarters. Provision of $2,017,167 under this heading reflects the need to hire voter registration officers. According to the electoral law of 1999, each voter registration office should comprise a staff of five: a president, vice president, secretary, and two voter registration officials. The monthly salary of voter registration officers is approximately $111, while voter registration officials receive $97 for a two-month period. Voter registration in Afghanistan prior to the 2004 election was particularly complicated and even hazardous. The actual size of the electorate was unknown, and identity card ownership was very limited among the population. Therefore, a nationwide registration exercise was implemented, resulting in what was regarded as a largely successful registration drive. Due to the security situation, all registration centers were required to have communications (satellite phones in most cases) and to be well protected and mobile. Much money was spent on acquiring thousands of vehicles, in addition to setting up the entire registration organization to run a computerized register. With a $74 million budget, the voter registration exercise was the single most expensive component of the entire electoral process. An additional $7.4 million was spent on registering refugees in Pakistan the week before the poll. Unfortunately, the voter register was never used in the polling stations on Election Day because voters were allowed to cast their ballots in any polling station in the country. The EMB has yet to decide how to turn the current voter register into a continuous voter registration process.
Electoral cost management practicesA few general considerations are pertinent in a discussion of cost management. First, expense processing and cost management are handled in very different ways in elections that are fully managed by international organizations (i.e., Cambodia in 1993, Kosovo from 2000 to 2002, and Afghanistan in 2004); elections administered by national authorities with substantial financial support from the international community (i.e., Angola in 1992, Guatemala in 2003, and Mozambique from 1994 to 2004); and elections fully handled by national electoral authorities (i.e., well-established democracies). In the first scenario, expense processing is handled directly by the international agency in charge of election finances—the OSCE in the Balkans and UNDP in other regions of the world. Budgeting, procurement and auditing procedures are followed in accordance with the rules of the relevant international organization. In financially sustainable, well-established democracies, expense management is conducted by the relevant department within the electoral administration in accordance with domestic public management regulations, some of which might pertain specifically to election expense management. Finally, in situations where national electoral authorities are only partly subsidized by the international community, management of expenses charged to external funds tends to be totally or partly in the hands of international implementing agencies like UNDP and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), or a regional organization like the OAS. Another issue concerns the management of political party and campaign finance by public agencies—an important and sensitive issue in both stable and emerging democracies. Significant variations exist among countries in terms of public versus private funding, legal limits on campaign expenses, obligation for disclosure by political parties, and enforcement responsibilities of electoral authorities. Total or partial public financing of political parties is already common in most democracies, and in some countries such financing represents the fastest-growing electoral public expense over the last five years (i.e., Canada). A correct assessment of campaign costs and financing is of utmost relevance for reaching some sound conclusions about whether the playing field is level for all parties and participants. The fact that political finance reporting and control is methodologically complex and politically sensitive should not keep it from the forefront in both election management analysis and democratic quality assessment. Regarding specific management practices, the following issues deserve attention: procurement procedures, inventory control, cash transactions, cost overruns, budget audit, high-technology investment and cost-effective measures. Each is described in detail below. Electoral Procurement proceduresProcurement procedures for equipment, services and supplies are generally prescribed by government guidelines and practices, often complemented by EMB regulations and practices. The guidelines have become increasingly standardized around the world since the 1960s in response to regulations and pressure from international assistance and finance agencies like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and UNDP. An interesting case of adapting general governmental prescriptions to the specificity of election expenses is that of Spain. The state administration’s general procedures for expense management are applied with some modifications: a given expenditure requires financial clearance by the general expense-controlling agency within the executive branch of government. This is to ensure that expenses are handled according to budgetary and public contractual provisions. Until the mid-1980s, electoral expenses followed standard clearance procedures, which made management burdensome and dysfunctional due to the short timeline typical of the electoral process. (Making funds available for an after-expense justification was the procedure actually followed to make elections possible). Further legal reform introduced the modality of permanent financial control; in this system, prior clearance for every expense is not necessary, yet the controlling authority retains the right to examine electoral expenses at any given time in the process. Moreover, the Ministry of Interior must submit a detailed report on expenses to Parliament after the election. As for expense management by the different agencies involved in the process, each agency may spend the anticipated allowance in the budget from its own funds, with the understanding that it will be reimbursed by the Ministry of Interior. Such expenditures might cover voter registration expenses other than the current maintenance of the voter list to external voting—and certainly polling operations at lower levels, which are managed by local authorities. The situation in Cambodia, an entirely different political-administrative environment, illustrates the difficulties in obtaining disbursements of the budget. In practice, the difficulties concerning electoral funding stem from the Ministry of Finance’s procedural and administrative practices, which are not geared for quick response in the context of election preparations. The standard finance procedures applicable to an ordinary government department are not capable of responding to the National Election Committee’s exceptional time constraints in terms of procuring election-related materials and ensuring unavoidable cash-flow disbursements during the organization of elections. In addition, direct funding from international donors or through UNDP tends to be disbursed quite late in the process, sometimes even after the election, thus creating additional cash-flow problems. In some cases, excessive earmarking may hamper the timely utilization of funds and may require last-minute changes to funding agreements to fit the actual operational expenditures more flexibly. Inventory control of unused electoral supplies
As in the case of procurement, inventory of unused supplies is conducted according to general government regulations and varies substantially among countries. For example, in Spain an inventory of both used and unused supplies is made following an election. Local municipal authorities are in charge of making an inventory and storing electoral materials. They pass on this information to the national government’s provincial and regional delegates who, in turn, consolidate the inventories at the provincial level and report to the Ministry of Interior. No special or unanticipated costs are incurred in this activity other than current operational costs of the different administrations involved. Supplies that can be reused are stored on municipal premises. Unused supplies, mostly paper products, are discarded or recycled at the local level. Inventory control in Australia requires that arrangements for the storage of unused supplies be included in the contract when ballot paper is purchased. This is treated as Australian Electoral Commission inventory and is carried on the balance sheet at cost. It is all processed electronically. In Canada, electoral supplies and materials are tracked using the Supply Management System, which is an application developed in-house that uses a weighted monthly average cost to estimate the value of unused supplies. In Sweden, an inventory of unused supplies takes place after each election; unused material without text, such as voting envelopes, can be used in future elections. The central EMB always keeps in stock a certain amount of voting envelopes and paper used for printing ballots. This stock is regarded as a reserve. The local EMBs store materials used in polling stations, such as ballot boxes and polling booths. These are normally made of strong, long-lasting material and do not need to be replaced often, which is why they constitute a very low and rare cost in the budget of the EMB. In Guatemala, sub-national electoral commissions conduct an inventory of used and unused supplies, focusing particularly on long-lasting materials such as screens and ballot boxes, which are stored for the next election. The national electoral authorities keep a record of all inventories. In Cambodia, all unused supplies are inventoried and stored in a central warehouse. Each year, a committee for inventory is established and performs its task for all departments of the National Election Committee. In addition, the department of operations receives monthly reports on the movement of supplies and materials in and out of the warehouse. Developments in Afghanistan in 2004 illustrated some of the uncertainties and complications that can arise from the electoral system itself. The electoral formula for the presidency requires a run-off between the two top candidates if no single candidate receives 50 percent plus one vote in the first round. In planning for this possibility (which ultimately was not necessary because Hamid Karzai won more than 50 percent in the first round), the electoral Secretariat had to purchase significant quantities of polling day commodities such as tamper-evident bags, seals and indelible ink. These unused materials are now stored in a borrowed UNICEF warehouse in Kabul. Currently, the Joint Election Management Body (JEMB) and its Secretariat are trying to decide where and how to store ballot boxes and other polling material. The JEMB is fully reliant on the UN’s inventory system and has not yet developed its own policies and procedures.
Cash transactions for electoral-related goods and servicesRegarding payroll procedures and cash transactions, the rule is that salaries are seldom paid in cash1. In general, cash transactions are limited to minor purchases and petty cash. In Australia, for example, the election commission handles very few cash transactions, and these are restricted to the use of petty cash (limited to $100 per transaction) for which there are established controls and accounting procedures within the organization. Likewise, deposits for the nomination of candidates and fees for party registration can be paid in cash. In Spain, small allowances such as per diem for poll workers are paid with checks and bank transfers, although there have been cases when cash payment has been facilitated by local authorities. Special allowances for security services provided by the National Police are included with salaries in the corresponding monthly payroll. (Per diem assigned to polling and security officers was most recently established at rates of about S$60 and $98, respectively). In Sweden, the EMB handles no cash transaction except for small purchases of certain office supplies. Note: 1There are some exceptions, including Cambodia. In that country, salaries are paid in cash but all other transactions are made through bank transfer or by check. Electoral Cost overrunsIn general, the Cost of Registration and Elections (CORE) Project survey indicated that election managers tend to keep expenses within limits anticipated under budgetary premises. Covering cost overruns does not seem to be a major problem regardless of the kind of democracy setting: stable, transitional or post-conflict. In the rare case of unanticipated expenses, electoral authorities have requested and obtained from the government some extra funds whose potential necessity was anticipated in electoral legislation (e.g., Canada, Guatemala, Spain), or the expenses were netted against surpluses within the agency’s approved budget (most often in Canada). Electoral budget auditAccounting procedures and audit practices in the surveyed countries generally follow widely shared international standards, at least formally. Electoral expenses are normally subject to some internal audit at the EMB, plus an external audit by the national accounting control agency. An annual audit cycle is the norm. Accounting generally applies to income and expenses organized by broad chapters or budget lines (i.e., personnel, procurement services) encompassing the entire electoral operation. Program focused accounting is not usually applied (i.e., the overall cost of voter registration as part of activities by the different agencies involved). Some specific country examples and their variations are detailed below. In Australia, the electoral budget requires approval by the Department of Finance on an annual audit cycle. In Canada, the Office of the Auditor General may decide to perform an audit or evaluation at any time. In Spain, all electoral expenses are audited by the national audit agency on an annual basis. This agency also audits the finances and expenses of political parties. An internal audit by the Finance Ministry’s auditor general can be made at any time during the process. In Switzerland, the budget is audited by the Finance Committee and the Finance Delegation of the national parliament. In Guatemala, there is an internal audit at the election commission and an external audit by the National Controller General on an annual cycle. In Cambodia, the budget is internally audited by the Ministry of Economics and Finance on a yearly basis; donor funds, however, are audited by external agencies. A national accounting audit agency remains to be established in Cambodia. Investing in High-technology Electoral SolutionsNew technology is not only considered a pressing necessity for electoral modernization, but it has also become a status symbol for many organizations and countries. The question is not whether to employ new technology, but how much to use and at what cost. Examples below from countries at different levels of socioeconomic development examine this feature of electoral systems. In Australia, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) has proposed to upgrade its Roll Management System (RMANS) and the supporting IT capacity. This will be undertaken over a four-year period and will enable the MANS to integrate with other Web-based systems, exploit image and optical character-recognition technologies, meet e-government standards, and more easily adapt to new technologies as they emerge. Pilot programs have been undertaken to test the use of optical scanning and character recognition to process applications for enrollment and other forms. An automated postal voting system is also envisaged. The trials have successfully collected Continuous Roll Update (CRU) enrollment application data and transmitted the information to a RMANS test database. The results of these tests will be reported to government by June 2005. Over the next two to three years, the AEC will further enhance the security of its IT network with the rollout of additional network attached storage (NAS) servers to each division. In Sweden, investments have been made in new technology and Web-based communication during the past few years. The cost of IT support and technology almost doubled in 2002, when it was a little more than 20 million kroner ($2.6 million). In 1994, the Swedish central EMB was first in the world to publish preliminary and later final election results in real time on the Internet. Results for the parliamentary elections of that year were reported through a reporting receiver to the central EMB (then located at the National Tax Agency) directly from the polling stations. In the parliamentary elections of 1998, the final election results were reported in this way also. The central EMB was established as an independent authority in 2001, and one reason for the structural change was to facilitate the installation of new technology. In Canada, all aspects of the administration of federal elections, except voting, have been computerized since the 1990s, and the systems are upgraded constantly. The National Register of Elections was established in 1997 as a permanent voter list to replace a door-to-door enumeration system, and this has resulted in considerable savings. Elections Canada also developed REVISE, a system used for the revision of the preliminary lists of electors during an election and to oversee the integration of changes into the Register. In 2003, Elections Canada developed REVISE-2, which allows changes of address across all electoral districts. Also, a Web site has been developed on which a range of training materials, handbooks, forms, election returns, election results and maps are made available. In Spain, permanent voter lists are computerized and updated on a monthly basis. Early transmission of results is facilitated by high-tech communication. The electoral unit at the Ministry of Interior has developed a Web site with electoral information and results. The use of electronic voting is being tried on a pilot scale. At the national level, a branch of the National Police—a civil guard composed of 70,000 individuals— voted by Internet for its Staff Advisory Committee in 2002 and 2004. On a much smaller scale, a rehearsal with Internet and cellular telephone voting took place in four small municipalities during general elections in May 2004. Prime Minister Zapatero announced in August 2004 that electronic voting might be used in the referendum on the European Constitution early in 2005. Apparently, electronic voting is seen more as a way to encourage voter turnout than to reduce costs. In other countries like Guatemala, office management and the voter registries are computerized. Furthermore, quick vote counting and transmission of preliminary results are subcontracted with a private firm. Nevertheless, there are no plans to introduce other new technologies like electronic voting. In Cambodia, the electoral list is compiled in a centralized database. For the past three elections, lists for each polling station have been generated by computer. (A new computer system costing $220,000 was offered to Cambodia in 2001.) Efforts are ongoing to improve technical aspects related to the sorting of voter names and the cleansing of double registrations; the budget for this is around $20,000. There are plans to change the software platform to one that is less expensive to maintain and to provide computer equipment to all provincial offices, including networking capacity; the prospective budget for these operations is $103,000. Such initiatives are bound to improve the technical quality of the list while reducing the costs of technical maintenance. The production of the list on CD-ROM will enhance its accessibility and considerably reduce the cost for political parties to buy the list for their own use. Cost-effectiveness in electionsSome final considerations regarding cost effectiveness in elections include the following:
Country Case Studies on Electoral CostsThis section of the Cost of Registration and Elections (CORE) Project contains the main findings and conclusions drawn from case studies on electoral costs in 10 countries. The countries were selected as illustrative of election management within different democracy environments—from stable to transitional to post-conflict, because they were also examined in a previous UNDP study published in 2000 and other countries, meanwhile, were added based on geographic location and size of the electorate. Stable Democracies: Large- and medium-sized electorates Stable Democracies: Small-sized electorate Transitional Democracies: Large- and medium-sized electorates Transitional Democracies: Small-sized electorate Conflict Environment: Large- and medium-sized electorates Conflict Environment: Small-sized electorate A standard case study methodology was followed. A panel of authors and election specialists was selected on-site1. Panel members were guided by a checklist template as well as documentary sources and individual informants for consultation. The case studies were researched in the field and written between September 2003 and January 2005. The case study reports generally include an outline of the current structure of each nation’s EMB, including appointment procedures, terms of office and scope of responsibility, followed by a description of the legal framework for elections—primarily concerning budgeting and funding provisions (i.e., reference to voter registration, polling operations, campaign expenses by political parties and candidates and financing of media access). The reports assess how the legal provisions regarding election funding are actually followed in practice. They also consider the main obstacles— political, financial, administrative or technical—to the application of the law in the proper management of the electoral budget. The case studies describe the electoral budgets and procedures of EMBs in both non-election and election years. Voter registration costs, especially new registration operations in conflict environments, are considered separately. The cost of polling operations in the most recent general election is scrutinized by disaggregating budget figures by main items and comparing them to previous elections to discover the main reasons for change, if any. The cost of external voting operations is analyzed when it can be separated from the aggregate electoral budget. International funding of electoral budgets is categorized by area of application, i.e. whether awarded to the EMB or to other election-related actors, such as domestic and international observer missions. A number of cutting-edge issues are examined whenever information is available. Among the questions directly addressed are the following:
Finally, the case studies offer an overall assessment of current and most recent practices in election budgeting, funding and cost handling, by describing election items that have proved either more susceptible or more resilient to cost-saving measures. Documentary resources most often consulted in the preparation of the case studies included constitutions, electoral laws, laws on political parties, organization charts of the electoral authorities, election bylaws and electoral budget documents. Professional literature and Web sites were also consulted. And finally, informal and semi-structured personal interviews were conducted with electoral authorities and specially qualified informants, academics and practitioners. Note: 1The authors are academics and practitioners with long experience in the field, most of them related to electoral authorities as senior staff or international consultants. Iraq: Cost of Registration and ElectionsIntroduction This case study concerns the first post-war elections in Iraq, held on 30 January 2005. The figures in this paper are based on budget estimates and on partial expenditure reports collected during the implementation of the 30 January 2005 elections. As of the time of the final revisions to the study (March 2006), final expenditure figures are not yet available, both because the IECI has remained busy with a referendum and general election in 2005 and so has not completed its 2005 audits and because so many agencies contributed to the 2005 costs. The budget estimates are, however, reasonably accurate estimates of the incurred costs. I. Background on the electoral process The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (Transitional Administrative Law, TAL) called for five elections during the transitional period (defined as beginning with the formation of a fully sovereign Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004 and ending with the formation of an elected government under the terms of a permanent constitution, as of the final revisions to this paper, the assembly elected on 15 December 2005 has not yet formed a government). All of the required elections were held according to the schedule set in the TAL, which was in itself a notable achievement:
Through a consultative process facilitated by the United Nations, Iraqi political leaders decided to empower an independent electoral management body to conduct the elections during the transitional period. The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) was created by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order no. 92, which describes the IECI as the “exclusive electoral authority throughout Iraq during the Transitional Period. II. Structure of the EMB The IECI is an “independent and autonomous, non-partisan, neutral and professional government office” empowered “to organize, oversee, conduct, and implement all elections set forth in the TAL.” (CPA 92) The IECI has two major components: the Board of Commissioners regulates the electoral process and has ultimate responsibility for the planning and implementation of the elections; the Electoral Administration, headed by the Chief Electoral Officer (also a non-voting member of the Board), is responsible for carrying out the electoral process. The members of the Board of Commissioners were selected in June 2004 after an extensive process of public nominations; a panel of respected international election officials appointed by the United Nations (UN) proposed a slate of commissioners to the then-Governing Council, which accepted the panel’s recommendations. The Electoral Administration is divided into a National Electoral Office, 18 Governorate Electoral Offices, and 542 District Electoral Offices/Voter Registration Centres. In addition, there is a Kurdistan Regional Office and two sub-governorate offices in Baghdad, the largest governorate. Each District Electoral Office is responsible for, on average, 10 polling centres with up to 3,000 voters each. The national office has divisions for Finance, Administration, Public Outreach (including services for electoral contestants and observers), Capacity Building, and Operations. In addition, a small planning and reporting cell assists the Chief Electoral Officer. After the first elections on 30 January 2005, legal and audit units were established in the national office reporting directly to the Board of Commissioners. The national office has a staff of approximately 220 persons, the governorates a staff of 22 each, and the districts a staff of 10 each; most of these positions have been filled. In the governorates of al-Anbar and Ninewah, the security situation has precluded the regular operation of the District Electoral Offices/Voter Registration Centres. III. Legal framework CPA Order no. 92 grants the IECI broad authority over its finances:
The IECI presented a budget for the 30 January 2005 elections to the Interim Government’s Ministry of Finance in September 2004. While the budget did include some approximate costs for FY2005 to aid the government’s financial planning, these figures were of course very general given the uncertainty surrounding the election calendar for 2005. The 30 January 2005 budget also contained several important unknowns which, in the end, proved to be substantial cost. One of these was secure logistics – the delivery and retrieval of 3.3 million kilograms of election material to more than 5,000 polling centres in the midst of severe ongoing conflict. These costs were eventually borne by UNOPS. In addition, the original budget did not provide for out-of-country voting. The IECI decided to conduct out-of-country voting in October, and contracted the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as its implementing partner. The costs for this operation (US$92 million, of which some portion was unspent and returned) were provided by the Government of Iraq. The IECI operates under the procurement, human resources, and accounting rules of the Government of Iraq. IV. Electoral costs a) Establishment of the IECI As a new institution, the IECI required facilities, office furniture and equipment, communications and information technology, and other capital investments. These costs amounted to approximately $28 million, of which approximately $12.5 million was provided by the United Nations for office furniture and equipment and communications and information technology and $3.5 million was provided from Iraqi budget funds by the CPA for the renovation of a headquarters facility. b) Voter registration The voter register for the 30 January 2005 elections was based on the existing Public Distribution System (PDS) database, used by the Ministry of Trade to manage a monthly rations program. To be used as a voter register, the database required a substantial period for corrections and additions. The costs of this period amount to approximately $83 million. These costs were mainly for staff, printing, data entry, and secure logistics. The bulk of these costs was borne by the IECI through Iraqi budget funds, but the UN funded the data entry project, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded printing of registration forms, procurement of other registration material, and public information. c) Polling Polling costs were approximately $180 million. The largest line items were for polling staff, material procurement (including polling kits, ballots, and voters lists), and secure logistics. Again, the majority of costs were funded by the Iraqi budget, but the UN funded a large section of the secure logistics costs (approximately $50 million) by contracting with a global logistics firm, which in turn, sub-contracted with security firms working in Iraq. USAID made several donations in kind, as did the Governments of Denmark and the Peoples’ Republic of China. Other support has been provided by the Italian and Japanese governments for training of the election staff. d) External voting The IECI concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for the implementation of an external registration and voting program in 14 countries. This program was implemented on very rigorous timelines, and the Memorandum allowed for costs as high as $92 million. This total was reached by estimating up to $50 per potential voter, based on recent external voting projects. In addition, $3 million was budgeted for each country in security costs based on IECI experience with an external data entry centre. IOM returned $20 to the IECI, so the final cost of the external registration and voting operation was $72. e) International assistance The IECI received international technical assistance under the leadership of the UN. In addition to the UN, IFES, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the European Commission provided staff to the international assistance team. f) Security costs The security environment in Iraq imposed a number of security costs. These included personal protection for the Board of Commissioners and international technical advisors, but also markedly higher than normal costs for the storage and transportation of election materials, which required a reliance on air movements and private security contractors. In addition, a number of projects, including data entry, took place abroad and at higher cost due to domestic security concerns. g) Support from the Iraqi government In addition to direct budget support, the Iraqi government provided office and warehouse space, especially through the Ministry of Trade, and support from the security services. The Ministry of Education provided most of the polling locations. About the author
Jarrett Blanc has been the Chief-of-Party for IFES’ Center for Transitional and Post-Conflict Governance in Iraq and in the Palestinian Authority. He advised the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council on the establishment of the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq and on the establishment of the electoral calendar and legal framework. He was a senior advisor to the IECI in the planning and implementation of the 30 January 2005 elections. In the Palestinian Authority, he advised the Central Elections Commission, Palestinian Legislative Council, and diplomatic community and coordinated IFES’ technical assistance program. Blanc also has field experience in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Lebanon, and Nepal. Haiti: Cost of Registration and ElectionsAcknowledgement This case study is based on information from various publications and reports of international bodies, including the Organization of American States (OAS), UNDP and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), on the May 2000 elections in Haiti. Additional information was obtained through personal interviews with members of the Provisional Electoral Council, (Conseil Electoral Provisoire). The author would like to extend special recognition to the Chief of the Electoral Mission of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and his staff, who provided the most accurate financial information for the elections to be held in 2005. This study was revised in March 2006 by Pierre-André Guillaume, electoral consultant of UNDP for MINUSTAH /Electoral Assistance Section. STRUCTURE OF THE EMB The Conseil Electoral Permanent, Haiti’s permanent electoral authority, was established in the 1987 Constitution (articles 191 to 199). It was conceived as an independent council tasked with developing a voter register, organizing elections and serving as the tribunal for electoral disputes. However, although it was created by law, this permanent council has not been formed yet, because the Constitution calls for a full election cycle as prerequisite for establishing the council—a situation that has not occurred since the creation legal creation of the council. Therefore, since 1988 all elections have been organized by a provisional electoral authority (Conseil Electoral Provisoire, to be referred to henceforth in this section by the acronym ‘CEP’). Since 30 April 2004, the CEP has been composed of a board of nine members: one appointed by the private sector; three by the Catholic, Episcopal and Lutheran churches; one by human rights organizations; one by the Supreme Court; and three by political parties. The composition of the board was agreed following a political settlement in June 2002 and incorporated into the Resolution 822 of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) in September 2002. This board began to function after taking oath at the Supreme Court in May 2004, and it will continue functioning until the permanent electoral authority is set up under the constitutional procedures scheduled to begin after the newly elected president of Haiti takes office (article 134:1 Constitution). After the resignation in December 2004 of the president of the CEP, the council continued working under the leadership of an interim president who will be confirmed as president of the council in August 2005. A Comité d’Appui to help the executive functions of the CEP was appointed as indicated in internal by-laws. STRUCTURE OF THE CEP OF 2005 The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) is a hierarchical structure, with the nine board members acting as the highest level. The CEP has an electoral structure composed of departmental electoral offices at the provincial level (the Bureaux Electoraux Departementaux - BED); communal electoral offices at the district level (the Bureaux Electoraux Communaux -BEC); and voting centres (CV), formed of voting bureaus (BV) at the polling station level on Election Day. The CEP has 11 department electoral offices (BEDs), which follow the geographical division of Haiti in departments: Ouest, Sud-Est, Nord, Nord-Est, Artibonite, Centre, Sud, Grande-Anse, Nord-Ouest and Nippes. Each department has one BED, with the only exception of the department of Ouest—the largest one— which has two: BED Ouest I and BED Ouest II. In the departments, the BEDs are divided into Bureaux Electoraux Communaux (BECs). The number of BECs within each department varies by the number of the communes. Although Haiti has 140 communes, the CEP has 142 BECs, because Port-au-Prince, the capital, has three BECs. Each BEC has several voting centres (CV). For the elections of 2006, the CEP will establish 803 voting centres around the country, which in turn will have several voting bureaus (BVs). For the 2006 elections, the CEP has planned to establish 9,214 BVs throughout the country. THE BEDs and BECs The role of the BEDs and the BECs, is to organize, manage and monitor the electoral process and to solve procedural challenges presented by political parties in a timely manner in the administrative territories under their jurisdiction. Each office is headed by a president, vice president and secretary appointed by the CEP. These three officials are assisted by two legal advisors charged with resolving electoral disputes at the local level. The departmental electoral offices are present in the following cities: North (Cap Haitien), Nord-West (Port-de-Paix), Nord-East (Fort Liberte), Artibonite (Gonaives), Grande-Anse (Jeremie), Nippes (Miragoane) and South-East (Jacmel), Plateau Central (Hinche), South (Les Cayes), West I and West II (Port-au-Prince). The role of the voting bureaus is to manage election day operations at the polling stations during the 2006 elections. THE VOTING CENTERS Voting centres are accessible to the people living in the area and are designed to be easily accessed. They are situated by preference in schools, government buildings or other public facilities. Each voting centre has between 1 and 50 voting bureaus. Each voting bureau can receive a maximum 400 voters. The geographical identification of the voting centres and their physical description, the distance and travelling time from the BEC, accessibility, risk, etc., was conducted by MINUSTAH. All voting centres were approved by the CEP. A total of 9,214 voting centres have been established for 2006 elections. THE NEW STRUCTURE OF CEP In October 2005, the CEP will be transformed into a Conseil d’administration and will have a new mission, namely: to plan, organize and realize elections and take strategic decisions. In the meantime, a new Director General is in charge of all executive and operational aspects of the process. The general direction is divided into other components: electoral operations, administrative, legal, communication, security, etc. THE REGISTRATION PROCESS The voter registration operation for 2005 will be conducted with technical assistance from the Organization of American States (OAS). Of a total electoral budget of nearly $49 million, some $9 million will be allocated to the task of voter registration, which ideally will include the possibility of creating the basis for a civil register, still non-existent in the country. The overall voter registration process will be automated, instead of the current manual registration. Registration period, originally scheduled to take place from 9 August to 25 April, has been extended until 9 October 2005 in order to reach all the country. Presidential and legislative elections will take place on 7 February 2006 for the first round and on 21 April 2006 for the second round. Local elections are scheduled to take place on 18 June 2006. All voters will receive a digital card that will gradually replace the national identification card. The OAS has established 615 offices for registration activities (400 registration centres, 185 automated registration offices, and 30 automated registration mobile units). The registration centres have been located in rural areas; the automated offices in urban areas; and the mobile units in the semi-urban areas. The number of automated centres will be adjusted as required to reach a larger number of potential voters. The registration process will take six months (April-October 2005). As part of the operations, 3,200 polling centres will be established.. All automated registration offices will also be considered as polling centres. Voters will be advised about their voting locations during the registration process. The CEP and the international donors have approved this project to be implemented by the OAS. Some 3,535,025 identification cards are expected to be distributed by OAS to voters around all the country. ELECTIONS CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK From 1801 to 1987, Haiti had a total of three Fundamental Acts, 22 Constitutions (two of which were imperial), 14 amendments, and one accord. Regarding electoral provisions, there have been 25 electoral acts. The current electoral law, the 3 July 2005 Electoral Act, is regulated by the 29 March 1987 Constitution as well as by the Electoral Acts of August 1990 and February 1995. There is also the Political Party Functional Law, dated 31 July 1986. The president is elected for a five-year term (consecutive terms are forbidden, although one can hold the office a second time after a five-year hiatus). Since the reintroduction of a bicameral Parliament in 1987, deputies are elected for a four-year term and senators for a six-year term. One third of Senate seats are up for election every two years. Under regulations for the 2006 elections, which will fill every elected seat in the country, the Senate will be composed as follow: winners by majority in the first round of the election will be elected for a six-year term. The second round will oppose the candidates who have the same quantity of votes for a four-year or a two-year term (articles 76 to 78 of the electoral decree). The main elements of the electoral system are presidential elections (articles 86 to 90), elections to Senate (articles 80 to 85), elections for Deputies (articles 74 to 79) and local elections (articles 91 to 111). Winners at local elections are elected for a four-year term (articles 98, 102,108). Local elections will take place after the second round. They are very important, because they will permit the establishment of the Conseil Electoral Permanent called for by the current Constitution of 1987. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS After the introduction of the direct presidential election, a plurality system was established for the 1950 and 1957 elections. However, only one candidate campaigned in the 1950 election (Paul Eugene Magloire); in 1957 there were two candidates (Francois Duvalier and Louis Déjoie), so the system of decision was actually the majority system. No presidential elections were held during the two Duvalier governments (1957-1986). After the fall of the Duvaliers, there have been four presidential elections: 1988 (Leslie Manigat elected), 1990 (Jean-Bertrand Aristide elected), 1995 (Rene Preval elected), and 2000 (Aristide elected again). The president is elected via absolute majority. If no candidate achieves this majority in the first electoral round, a second round is held between the two candidates with the highest number of votes. ELECTIONS TO THE SENATE
ELECTIONS TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
LOCAL ELECTIONS
AMENDEMENTS TO THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM The new electoral decree of February 2005 was modified many times. Appeal was made at the Cour de Cassation of the contentious decisions: requirement for candidates to the Senate, rules of majority for president, requirement process for financing parties and candidates. Various decrees are expected to be enacted by the government in the second half of 2005 about various aspects of the electoral process like the electoral lists, financing of political parties, nationality of candidates, and identification card. ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE SECTION SUPPORT The Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) joined MINUSTAH on 18 August 2004. This was the official starting point of Electoral Assistance Section (EAS) within MINUSTAH. The mission carried out many important tasks. It assisted the CEP in revising the electoral law by preparing working papers on the main issues involved in the drafting of the new legislation and internal by-laws. It also provided support to the CEP in formulating a chronogram of activities with sets of options. The main areas of support are: training sessions for members of CEP, political parties, civil society, voter registration plan proposal, assisting CEP staff, registration process, communication systems, budget management, establishing civic education programs, tabulation centre, electoral calendar, logistics plan, security system, procurement guidelines, procedures for the elections, establishing voting centres, legal aspects, and regional coordination. One of the critical phases of electoral processes are the procedures around voting and counting, complaints and appeals processing, tabulation and announcement of the final results. The greatest challenges were for the EAS to plan, work with a CEP, sometimes divided, execute complex electoral operations, solve budget problems, and participate in creating good environment to attain the objective of successful, peaceful, nationally and internationally accepted elections. OAS ELECTORAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE The Organization of American States (OAS) voters plan provides for the establishment of approximately 615 offices for registration activities (400 registration centres, 185 automated registration mobile units). The registration will be located in the rural areas, the fixed automated in the urban area and the mobile in the semi-urban areas. The overall voters’ registration will be automated and voters will all receive a digital card (Carte d’identification nationale) that will gradually replace the “numéro d’identification fiscal” (NIF). OAS provided support to the CEP in creating a reliable electoral registry for the elections, issuing a secure and adequate identification card to the voters, providing the operational framework for a plan of strengthening and modernizing the civil registry and contributing to the training of electoral technicians. A high-tech registration system has been conceived. The electoral partial list (LEP) and electoral general list (LEG) have been prepared and are available at the time of the writing of this document. The registration system is fundamental for the success of the vote and the future of a strong civil register. STRUCTURE AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS The concept of operations provides for establishment and operations of the BEDs and BECs, elaborate technical strategy for registration, staffing BEDs, logistical support, purchase and deployment of transport vehicles, communication facilities, security and coordination between the MINUSTAH Electoral Unit and other institutions. MINUSTAH UNVs Many UNVs participate in supervision of electoral process in assigned regions. They assist CEP technicians for registration of voters, identify sites for registration and voting centres, plan training sessions, and provide logistical support to BEDs and BECs. Each BED is headed by a District Coordinator who reports directly to the Chief Electoral Officer. The district coordinator supervises the electoral process down to the communal levels. CIVIC EDUCATION Only $1,263,167 has been provided for civic education, despite the importance of this component of the electoral process. Under this heading comes the cost of consultants that the CEP plans to hire to conduct civic education programs over 13 months. The consultants are expected to conduct civic education programs prior to the registration process and through election day. Additional funds have been requested from donors for this line item of the budget. An intensive campaign is expected during the registration process, followed by a massive campaign to promote voter participation after political parties and candidates are registered. So far, there is nothing planned to support political party activities by either civic education NGOs or domestic monitoring groups. As the voter registration process, public information on the electoral decree and the national identification card began in April 2005. Approximately 200,000 radio spots and 1,500 television spots have been launched. Civic education materials have been produced and distributed nationwide (500,000 posters, 1,000,000 pamphlets and 1,000 banners). In June 2005, two important national registration days were conducted: one for women and another for civil society. It should be noted that women represent 52% of the Haitian population and this national day has significantly boosted the registration process. TRAINING SESSIONS In August 2005, a training of trainers’ course will be conducted for 60 participants, who then in turn will have to train 550 civic education agents who are expected to then train up 3,500 civic education promoters from departmental level down to the communes. According to the year 2003 census, 4.2 million Haitian citizens will have the right to vote in the 2006 elections. The municipal elections are expected to be held in June 2006, and the first round of the legislative and presidential elections scheduled to take place in February 2006. The second round for these elections will follow on 21 April 2006. In compliance with the Constitution, an elected legislative power will be installed in May after the second round, and the president will be sworn-in in May 2006. The total resource requirement for the CEP, the provisional electoral council, for the period from 1 October 2004 to 31 December 2005 is planned to amount nearly $49 million, covering personnel and operational costs. The Haitian government will cover the regular costs of the CEP’s approximately 82 headquarters staff. It will also contribute $2.9 million for the extraordinary electoral budget. Three main international donors (Canada, the European Union, and the United States) have committed to provide $41 million. The financial resources for operational items have been linked to quantitative outputs. This budget covers all elections (at least two, but possibly three) in 2006. Since the CEP is not a permanent institution and there are no other activities between election years such as updating the voting list or issuing IDs as do most permanent EMBs, there is no ordinary budget. The substantial financial contribution of the international community, as described below, underpins the entire electoral operation in Haiti. Because of financial constraints, the national contribution is less than 10 percent of the total budget. Table 1 shows the structure of the required funds. Table 1. Budget projection from electoral division of MINUSTAH
Note: This budget is a work-in-progress and may very well change as donor negotiations precede. Some of the main issues and trends regarding election cost structures are detailed below. a) Transportation Given the precarious conditions for communications in Haiti, transport represents a major issue. Thus, the CEP will purchase approximately 200 vehicles and have three block coordinators based in Port-au-Prince to provide direct support to the electoral departmental offices in their area of responsibility. The three blocks coordinators are going to be divided in the following way: 1) South, comprising Jacmel, Les Cayes, Jeremie and Miragoane; 2) North, comprising Artibonite and Plateau Central; and 3) West, comprising Port-au-Prince. Each block coordinator will have one vehicle. The departments will be provided with three vehicles each while the communal office will receive one vehicle each. This will bring the total fleet to 191 vehicles; additional vehicles for transport of electoral equipment from seaports to storage facilities and communal sections can be rented locally. There are also ground fuel station companies that can be contracted locally. Air transport is also available in almost every commune for landing helicopters. Several seaports are available and provide facilities for unloading equipment, but storage facilities are rare. In most departments and communes, telephone facilities exist, both fixed lines and mobile services (except in Jeremie, which has no cellular phone service). There are community radio services and TV channels. Radio communication services will be placed in each department and commune to facilitate direct communication with Port-au-Prince and other departments. b) Staffing and logistics Local staff and logistical facilities will be provided. Office space will be provided by the government where possible, otherwise offices will be rented when it is not possible to secure government-owned premises. There will be requirements for the refurbishment of all office spaces and small construction services to ensure that the electoral infrastructures are viable. For local and temporary personnel, Table 2 outlines what is planned for electoral staff costs. Table 2. Planning for electoral staff costs
* To be funded by Haitian government National staff salaries are estimated to cost $4,027,939. Cost estimates are based on the phased recruitment and deployment of 165 staff for the departmental electoral offices and 1,395 staff for the communal electoral offices to be hired for 15 months. The cost estimate for salaries is based on $3,526,250 for departmental electoral offices and $501,689 for communal electoral offices, rates that are derived from the national salary scale rates for public servants. CEP central headquarters operating costs for approximately 82 staff will be directly funded by the government. Voter registration officers’ salaries are estimated to cost $2,017,167. According to the electoral law of 1999, each voter registration office should comprise a staff of five: a president, vice president, secretary, and two voter registration officials. The monthly salary of voter registration officers is approximately $111, while voter registration officials receive $97 for a two-month period. A total of $10,080,000 is provided for salaries of 56,000 polling officers for each of the three types of elections: municipal, legislative and presidential (first and second round). The cost estimate for polling officers’ salaries is based on $60 per officer for 56,000 officers covering approximately 14,000 polling stations (300 voters per station on average). In accordance with Haiti’s electoral law, polling stations will be open from 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. $501,689 for communal electoral offices, rates that are derived from the national salary scale rates for public servants. CEP central headquarters operating costs for approximately 82 staff will be directly funded by the government. Voter registration officers’ salaries are estimated to cost $2,017,167. According to the electoral law of 1999, each voter registration office should comprise a staff of five: a president, vice president, secretary, and two voter registration officials. The monthly salary of voter registration officers is approximately $111, while voter registration officials receive $97 for a two-month period. A total of $10,080,000 is provided for salaries of 56,000 polling officers for each of the three types of elections: municipal, legislative and presidential (first and second round). The cost estimate for polling officers’ salaries is based on $60 per officer for 56,000 officers covering approximately 14,000 polling stations (300 voters per station on average). In accordance with Haiti’s electoral law, polling stations will be open from 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. c) International financial assistance UN Security Council resolution 1542 (2004) gave MINUSTAH the mandate "To assist the Transitional Government of Haiti in its efforts to organize, monitor and carry out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections…through the provision of technical, logistical and administrative assistance…" OAS General Assembly resolution 2058 of June 8, 2004 calls on the OAS special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti "To assist the country’s Provisional Electoral Council in preparing, organizing and overseeing the elections and the proclamation of the results, in cooperation with MINUSTAH." Pursuant to these provisions, the OAS and MINUSTAH approved a Memorandum of Understanding to foster cooperation and outline and assign tasks to coordinate their efforts to achieve their stated objectives. The OAS is to be responsible for the registration of voters in the electoral process, which will create a civil register system, while MINUSTAH electoral mission will provide technical assistance to the CEP over the entire electoral process in all areas. Of the $41 million committed by donors, $9 million has been allocated to the OAS through UNDP. The following countries and regional organizations have pledged or are considering technical assistance: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Japan, Mexico, Spain, Venezuela, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Organization of French Speaking Countries (OIF). The international community has pledged additional funding for civic education and election observation programs, including political party activities. MINUSTAH is also preparing to establish a Trust Fund aimed at mobilizing additional resources for the elections as may be required. MINUSTAH is assisting CEP to build internal capacity and to make efficient use of international resources. At the same time, several key organizational issues that may affect CEP staffing, including inter alia, operational planning, technical assistance and logistical support, are currently being discussed at the CEP. This extraordinary budget provides for hiring and training of 57,642 nationals: 165 departmental electoral office staff, 1,395 communal electoral office staff and 56,000 polling station officers. The total resource requirements for 2004–2005 elections have been linked to CEP objectives through a result-based framework. About the author Dr. Félix Ulloa is NDI's senior resident director in Haiti, managing the Institute's programs there since 2000. Prior to joining NDI, Dr. Ulloa served as magistrate of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in his native El Salvador from 1994 to 1999. He has taught at several universities of El Salvador, and has been invited to the Language School of Middlebury College in the United States. He also served as president of the Institute of Law of El Salvador, and has participated in elections programs for the United Nations, OAS, the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), the Center for Elections Assistance (CAPEL), and NDI, providing oversight for electoral bodies, political parties, and civic organizations. Dr. Ulloa has published books, essays and articles in several countries, on topics such as democracy, elections and political parties. He earned a law degree from la Universidad Complutense, Madrid, and from la Universidad de El Salvador. He has also completed other post-graduate studies at the Institut International d'Administration Publique in Paris and at the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota in the United States. Cost of Registration and Elections Survey Research
ContributorsContributors to Focus on Cost of Registration and ElectionsThe material in this ACE Focus On comes from the Cost of Registration and Elections (CORE) Project initiated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Center for Transitional and Post-Conflict Governance at IFES; written and produced by Jeff Fischer and Dr. Rafael López-Pintor. The primary goal of CORE is to assist governments and independent organizations in their efforts to identify and examine all forms of election-related costs and funding sources. The Center is grateful for the support provided by Linda Maguire of the UNDP and would also like to acknowledge research and editing assistance provided by members of the Center’s staff, including Will Covey, Jamie Crowley, Joanne Faulkner, Maya Serban and Rakesh Sharma. To download a PDF copy of this publication in English, please click here
Focus on Direct DemocracyPlacing Power in the Hands of Voters
The common characteristic of these mechanisms is that they all place more power directly in the hands of voters, as opposed to elected representatives. Direct democracy is therefore often seen as conflicting with representative democracy, in which voters elect representatives to make decisions on their behalf. In contrast, under direct democracy, voters can themselves make decisions about specific policies or issues. Broad arguments are advanced in favour of and against direct democracy. Proponents argue that direct democracy can help to reduce the "democratic deficit", in which voters are losing confidence and interest in traditional models of representative democracy. They claim that by putting power back in the hands of the people, people will take a greater interest and role in issues of governance, thereby increasing the legitimacy of the democratic systems. In contrast, critics argue that it undermines and weakens representative government, and that placing power in the hands of the people can threaten the rights of minorities in society. It is also argued that many voters do not have sufficient understanding to make informed decisions about referendum issues, especially in the case of complex constitutional issues. Voter education and campaign information are therefore significant issues in relation to direct democracy. This "Focus On ..." section looks at the three different forms of direct democracy, looking at how direct democracy mechanisms are designed, how they are administered, and outlining the advantages and disadvantages of each:
Selected Websites - Direct Democracy
Initiative and Referendum Institute: C2D - Research and Documentation Centre on Direct Democracy: Ballot Initiative Strategy Centre: Canadian referendum law and analysis:
Democracy International, the organisation campaigning for a referendum on the new EU constitution: Enitiatives - an online internet tool to facilitate and promote popular initiatives in Switzerland and Canada Referendums
"Referendum" is the term given to a direct vote on a specific issue, in contrast with votes cast at elections, which are made in relation to parties or individual candidates and generally reflect voters' preferences over a range of different issues. Referendums may be held in relation to particular circumstances (e.g., to amend a country's constitution) or in relation to particular political issues (e.g., whether or not to join an international organisation) but are in general held in relation to issues of major political significance. The terms used to define referendums may differ in different countries; the following are the most common types of referendums held in countries across the world.
Types of referendumReferendums fall into one of two main categories: the mandatory referendum or the optional referendum. Mandatory referendum A mandatory referendum is a referendum that must be held in certain circumstances, or in relation to certain issues. The outcome of a mandatory referendum is usually binding. Mandatory referendums may be required in relation to pre-determined issues. Typically, these are issues of major national significance, for example joining a supra-national organisation (as in Switzerland). In addition, in many countries, proposed amendments to the constitution must be affirmed by a referendum. Alternatively, mandatory referendums may be required in pre-determined situations. One example is in a Presidential system, where in the case of disagreement between the President and Legislature, a referendum may be required to resolve the dispute. The requirement for mandatory referendums is usually specified in a country's constitution or other law. Optional referendum The second category of referendum is the optional referendum. These are referendums which do not by law have to be held, but can be initiated by the government, and in some cases by other parties. Optional referendums may or may not be binding. A government can decide to initiate a referendum on a major political issue. It might do so because public pressure for a referendum forces it to hold one, or it might choose to hold a referendum because it is divided on the issue at hand. Optional referendums initiated by the government have been held frequently in Europe on the issue of European Union integration (although in some cases, such referendums have been mandatory because they involve an amendment to a country's constitution). These referendums may not be legally binding, although it may be politically difficult for a government to ignore the outcome. In addition, in some countries, Parliament or a Parliamentary minority may also be able to call a referendum. A further type of optional referendum is the abrogative referendum. Abrogative referendums are held when citizens force a vote on a piece of new law passed by the legislature, usually by collecting a certain number of signatures in support of a vote, see citizen initiatives. In some countries, abrogative referendums can also be used in relation to existing legislation. If the law is defeated in a vote on the issue, it may be required to be repealed or amended.
Design featuresThere are therefore key design features that help to define different types of referendums. The first and perhaps most important is how the referendum fits within a country's overall legal system; are referendums mandatory under a country's constitution or other laws? Is a referendum required to be held, or has it been initiated by the government, legislature, or citizens? A second key feature is the issues in relation to which referendums can be held. If the circumstances in which referendums can be held are clearly specified in a country's legal framework, the issues on which referendums will be held will be known. Typically, these will relate to issues of major constitutional or political significance, such as a country's constitution, sovereignty, or international relations. A large proportion of referendums held in Europe, for example, have been connected to the issue of European integration. However, where referendums are optional, the subject matter on which they are held may vary. Without restrictions, abrogative referendums could relate to any issue that is the subject of legislation. Some countries that provide for holding referendums therefore place restrictions on the issues that can be the subject of referendums. In Uruguay, for example, referendums cannot be held in relation to fiscal policy or laws relating to the executive, whilst in Colombia, political amnesty is barred from being the subject of a referendum.
IssuesA number of issues arise in regard to the politics, administration and logistics of holding a referendum. Combination of polls When a referendum is held, it must be decided whether or not it is to be combined with another poll (e.g., an ordinary general election), or whether the referendum is to be held separately. It is sometimes argued that combining polls can increase the risk that voters will confuse separate issues (e.g., the performance of the incumbent government can be confused with the issue on which the referendum is being held). However, from an administrative point of view, it may be more cost effective to hold a referendum at the same time as an election. The referendum question A second important issue relates to the wording of the referendum question. Studies suggest that the wording of the question can have an important effect on the outcome of a referendum; who determines the exact question that appears on the ballot is therefore significant. Is the government responsible for framing the question, even in cases when the government initiates the referendum and therefore has an interest in designing the question to increase the chances of achieving its own desired outcome? Does the Electoral Management Body have oversight of the question? Whoever designs the question, it is important that the question put to voters must be clear and straightforward. For information on the UK Electoral Commission's approach to referendums questions, click here.
Campaign regulationsIn relation to the referendum campaign, campaign regulations may be implemented to try to ensure that there is a level playing field between organisations campaigning for and against the referendum. These might include limits on campaign expenditure although in some countries, these may be deemed unconstitutional; see United States) and/or controls on the acceptance of campaign contributions. Alternatively, public funds may be allocated to campaign groups to ensure a minimum level of campaign spending on each outcome. The role of the government and provision of information The role of the government in a referendum campaign can also be important. Is the government allowed to campaign for the outcome it supports (in Ireland, the government is not allowed to campaign); does it distribute its own promotional material or run government broadcasts outlining its views? Similarly, is there a neutral source of information, separate to the government and referendum campaigners, and/or are there requirements providing for the dissemination of non-partisan information about the issue to voters? Does the Electoral Management Body have a role in providing information to voters? If information is provided through a neutral channel, who can put information into this channel? Voters may be more inclined to trust information from sources other than campaigners, and a source of information that is perceived to be neutral will be important to many voters. For an example information booklet from Ireland, please click on the link below: The Referendum on Irish Citizenship
Turnout/majority requirementsFinally, a critical issue is when a referendum is judged to have passed. In some countries, a referendum will pass if a simple majority of voters vote "yes." In others, a referendum vote is only binding if a specified turnout threshold is reached: a recent referendum in Taiwan was defeated because turnout did not reach the minimum threshold required. Finally, some countries require a double or super majority to pass (e.g., when a referendum must achieve an overall majority and a majority in a number of states for it to pass, or when the yes vote must achieve a certain percentage of the overall vote), or an overall majority of registered electors (rather than voters who actually turnout to vote). Clearly, the requirements for a successful referendum have an impact on the likelihood of whether a referendum passes or not. For information on the requirements for Australian referendums to pass and details of successful Australian referendums, click on the link below: 1999 Referendum Reports and Statistics
Arguments for and against referendumsSeveral arguments are advanced in support of and in opposition to referendums. Supporters of the use of referendums argue that, in the context of increasing voter apathy and disenchantment with traditional forms of democracy, direct democracy can help to re-engage voters with politics and democracy. Another argument advanced in favour of referendums is that they can be used to resolve political problems, particularly for incumbent governments; where a governing party is divided over an issue, for example, holding a referendum can help reach a solution on the issue without splitting the party (one example of this is the 1975 UK referendum on whether the UK should remain in the EC, over which the ruling Labour government was deeply divided). There are also a number of arguments made against the use of referendums. One is that it weakens representative government by undermining the role and importance of elected representatives. Another is that voters do not always have the capacity or information to make informed decisions about the issue at stake, and instead may make ill-informed decisions based on partial knowledge or on the basis or unrelated factors such as the economy or support for the government. This trend may be exacerbated in the case of referendums on complex issues such as constitutional change or international treaties, with which voters are likely to be unfamiliar. Opponents of referendums also argue that, if the executive has the power to determine when referendums are held, they can be used as a political tool to suit the needs of the governing party rather than in the interests of democracy. They also claim that, since in many countries turnout at referendums is lower than at national elections, the argument that referendums increase the legitimacy of political decisions does not stand up. However, experts in Switzerland (where a number of direct democracy votes take place each year) believe that, although turnout at referendums is around 45%, more than 45% of electors participate in direct democracy, since different voters participate in the different votes that interest them. Next: Citizen Initiatives
Citizen Initiatives
Citizen initiatives provide for the inclusion of constitutional or statutory proposals on the ballot at an election if enough signatures are collected in support of the proposal. The number of signatures required to place an initiative on the ballot varies, but is usually a proportion of the number of voters who voted at the most recent election, or a fixed number of registered voters. Depending on the design of the initiative process, if the ballot measure is passed by voters, it may become part of the state or country's law. The initiative process therefore provides citizens with an opportunity to directly frame the laws and/or constitution under which they live. Use of the initiative process varies substantially across different countries and in different regions within them. The following are examples of common types of citizen initiative and the design features that distinguish them.
Types of citizen initiativeConstitutional Constitutional initiatives can be used to propose amendments to a country or stateÕs constitution. The number of signatures required to place a constitutional measure on the ballot is usually higher than the number required to place other types of measure on the ballot. Statutory Using a statutory initiative, citizens can propose statutory measures to be placed on the ballot. A lower signature threshold is usually required for this type of initiative. Direct If an initiative is a direct initiative, then the measure that is circulated in petition or placed on the ballot automatically becomes law if it is approved by voters, without any involvement by the legislature. Indirect In contrast, indirect initiatives allow for the involvement of the legislature in framing the laws that arise from the initiative process. This involvement might take a number of different forms. In some countries or states, when a petition has met the required threshold, the legislature is able to formulate its own proposal to go on the ballot as well, to offer voters an alternative between the citizen initiative and the legislature's response. Alternatively, the legislature may have a role after a measure has passed, e.g. if a ballot is approved by voters, the legislature may have some scope to amend the measure. Abrogative referendums/recall There are two other types of direct democracy mechanisms which are commonly labelled as initiatives, because they are invoked when citizens collect enough signatures in support of a measure. These are the abrogative referendum and the recall. Details about these mechanisms can be found in the sections on referendums and recall.
IssuesIn order to start an initiative, proponents of the measure are required to collect the signatures of a small, specified number of supporters of the initiative and file it with the relevant government office (in some countries and states, the requirement is as low as 25 signatures). Once an initiative has been filed, its proponents must begin the process of collecting the relevant number of signatures required to get the initiative on the ballot. If and when the relevant number of signatures are collected, the initiative is normally included on the ballot of the next election in the appropriate jurisdiction. A number of important issues arise in relation to process of preparing, circulating and approving a citizen initiative. The significance of each of these issues varies, however, according to the relevant constitutional and political context. Ballot title Once a proposition is filed, the first key issue is the wording of the ballot title to be circulated in petition and which will appear on the ballot. Typically, the ballot title will be a short summary of the proposed measure. The proposed measure will normally have been drafted by the individual or group proposing it, or by a legal team engaged by them, whilst the ballot title will normally be drafted by the office responsible for overseeing the administration of the initiative process. Agreeing the ballot title can be a long process, since whilst administrators aim to ensure that the ballot title clearly and accurately reflects the measure being proposed, proponents seek to put forward a title that maximises the chances of it being passed. Well funded initiative campaigns may file various versions of the same proposition then conduct opinion polls to assess the relative popularity of each, in order to ensure the proposition that is taken forward stands the highest chance of success. Signature collection and verification After an initiative has been filed and the ballot title agreed, the proponents of an initiative are required to gather a specified number of valid signatures within a specified time period from the date on which the initiative was filed. The number of signatures required varies; clearly, the lower the signature threshold or the longer the time allowed for signature collection, the more likely it is that the initiative will qualify for the ballot. Signatures must normally be collected from registered voters; usually, a proportion of signatures collected will be found to be invalid, so proponents must collect a number of signatures in excess of the actual threshold. Signature verification is undertaken by the department responsible for administering direct democracy and will normally be undertaken on a random sampling basis. The signature collection and verification process does not always run smoothly (see the recall section). A sample of petition forms from the US state of Oregon can be found at the links below:
Campaigning and the provision of information During the petition circulation stage and in particular once an initiative has qualified for the ballot, proponents and opponents of initiatives will run campaigns for and against the measure. As with a referendum campaign, in some places, campaigning is regulated; contributions or expenditure may be capped. In others, however, there may be difficulties in implementing campaign controls because of the constitution; in many US states, for example, courts have ruled that expenditure limits are unconstitutional, because campaign expenditure has been equated with freedom of speech, which cannot be restricted. This has become a contentious issue because of concern in the US over the role of money and the initiative industry (see below). In addition to campaigns run by organisations campaigning for or against the initiative, the administration responsible for overseeing the initiative process will often publish an information pamphlet providing voters with information about the proposal. Typically, this might include a statement from the pro- and anti- campaigners, as well as a non-partisan analysis of the measure produced by the government. It might also include statements from other individuals and organisations who support or oppose the measure. Details of how campaigners can arrange to place a statement in an information booklet in Oregon, and an example of a Californian voter information guide, can be found on the links below: http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/forms/sel405.pdf http://voterguide.ss.ca.gov/propositions/prop_summary.html Number of initiatives on the ballot Because there are not normally any limits on the number of initiatives that can be included on a ballot, it may be the case that there are multiple initiatives on any given ballot. The number of initiatives on a ballot normally depends simply on the number of initiatives that have qualified for the ballot in the relevant period before the election (some initiative proponents will deliberately time petition circulation in order to ensure that the initiative appears on the ballot for one particular election rather than another) In the US state of Oregon, there were 26 different initiatives on the ballot at the 2000 Presidential election. The link below provides an up to date record of the initiatives that have qualified for the Californian state ballot at the 2004 US Presidential election: http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_j.htm#2004General The initiative industry In a number of US states in particular, concern has been expressed that the use of citizen initiatives is increasingly professionalized, and that the "initiative industry," rather than citizens, determine which measures make it onto the ballot. Professional firms can assist with virtually all aspects of the initiative process, including: initial drafting of the initiative; opinion polling and focus group research; negotiation over the ballot title; securing endorsements to be used in campaigning; petition circulation; proposing counter-initiatives; and campaigning for the initiative once it has qualified. One area of concern to some observers has been the use of paid signature collectors to circulate the initiative in an effort to qualify the measure for the ballot. This is perhaps because the use of companies acting for profit to collect signatures arguably seems most at odds with the concept of citizen backed initiatives which are promoted by volunteers who believe in a measure. It is almost accepted in some countries that, without the assistance of professional signature collectors, it will be virtually impossible to get an initiative on the ballot, meaning that only well-financed campaigners are able to get initiatives to the ballot. Some US states have tried to legislate against this by banning the use of paid signature collectors, or requiring professional firms to pay collectors by the hour rather than per signature. This has been ruled unconstitutional in some states, however. Counter-initiatives In some places where citizen initiatives are proposed frequently, one trend is for opponents to propose a counter-initiative as a means of opposing the original initiative measure. This tactic can be successful in that the existence of two related but opposing initiatives increases voter uncertainty and confusion about an issue, increasing the likelihood that voters will simply oppose both measures. Use of this tactic may be effective for opponents of specific initiatives, but it also increases the number of initiatives in circulation and potentially on the ballot. Role of the legislature, government officials and courts The role of the legislature, government officials and courts in relation to citizen initiatives tends to be strictly defined and rather limited. As outlined above, there is a role for the legislature in relation to indirect initiatives, where there may be an opportunity for it to amend initiative measures, or propose their own alternatives. However, in cases where the design of the initiative process does not provide for the involvement of the legislature, the only reviews that are permitted by the state in relation to initiative proposals is whether or not they comply with the administrative requirements imposed, i.e., are there enough proponents, have enough valid signatures been gathered? A further administrative task is to draft and agree the summary of the ballot title. In some places, where there are strict controls on the number of issues that an initiative can deal with, administrators might also be responsible for checking that the initiative proposal deals only with one issue. In systems where initiatives need to be translated into more than one language, administrators might also be responsible for confirming whether the translation of the initiative proposal means the same in all the relevant languages. However, other than these legally defined administrative tasks, there is often no role for officials or the courts in reviewing the constitutionality of initiative proposals, for example, the compatibility of the proposal with human rights measures. In some US states, this has led to a situation in which a significant proportion of initiative measures are struck down by the courts after they have been passed by voters.
Advantages/disadvantagesIn addition to the general advantages and disadvantages of direct democracy (i.e. reducing the democratic deficit versus undermining representative government, see referendums) there are a number of perceived advantages and disadvantages specific to citizen initiatives. Advantages It is argued that the simple existence of the initiative mechanism acts as a check on the activities of the legislature. This is because legislators are more likely to introduce certain reforms and measures if the initiative mechanism exists, because it is likely that if they do not, an initiative on the issue will be launched. One example is that US researchers have shown that US states that use the initiative process are more likely than those that do not, to have introduced governance reform policies (e.g., term limits, campaign finance controls). Another indication of this is the number of initiatives that are introduced but subsequently withdrawn in Switzerland, because the introduction of the initiative has in itself forced the legislature to address the issue. It is therefore claimed that the initiative process makes legislatures more responsive. Disadvantages One often cited disadvantage of citizen initiatives is that they result in badly drafted law, since (except in the case of indirect initiatives) the wording of the measure as initially proposed ends up as statute if the measure is passed. It is argued that the failure to use the expertise provided by government lawyers and officials who are familiar with the drafting process leads to laws that can be meaningless or ineffective, or have to be re-drafted, because the individuals or lawyers who draft the measures are not experienced in legislative drafting. Additionally, in some cases, statute created by the initiative process is found to be unconstitutional. A further disadvantage is the sheer number and complexity of issues that voters are expected to vote on. It is argued that it is impossible for voters to make informed decisions when they there are a substantial number of initiatives on the ballot, and that the likelihood of simple A frequent criticism of citizen initiatives is that they are only really accessible to well-resourced organisations and interests, and that the process is therefore hijacked by special interest groups promoting their own interests. Empirical evidence about the success of well-financed interest groups is mixed: some research has suggested that money does not in fact have a major effect on the outcome of citizen initiatives, whilst other studies have highlighted the role of money, in particular in defeating initiatives. However, there can be no doubting the importance of professional firms in the initial stage of the initiative process, in particular in terms of signature collection. A common criticism of citizen initiatives (and other forms of direct democracy) is that they enable the "tyranny of the majority." This term refers to the electoral power of majority groups in society being used to restrict of hinder the rights of unpopular minority groups. Critics argue that without the moderating influence of the legislature, legislation may be passed which actively targets the rights of groups within society which are unpopular. However, research undertaken in the US has produced different conclusions about whether initiatives do actually restrict the rights of minorities or not.
Possible reformsIn places where it exists, the citizen initiative process is generally an accepted feature of the political system. However, many people familiar with the initiative process have outlined possible reforms to refine the initiative process. Most possible reforms of the citizen initiative process focus on reducing the importance of money in the process and/or ensuring that voters are best able to make informed decisions about initiatives. Reducing the importance of money Various reforms could be enacted to limit the role of money in the initiative process. In relation to signature collection, banning the use of paid signature collectors and/or payments per signature, or requiring signature collectors to identify whether or not they are paid collectors or volunteers, might reduce the importance of professional firms in the process. Another alternative is to require a fixed proportion of signatures to be collected by volunteers, although this might be hard to regulate. In terms of the campaign, imposing campaign or contribution limits reduce the significance of campaign funding, although in some places these may be constitutionally difficult to introduce. Subsidies for less well-funded campaigns might be one way of trying to ensure that well-financed campaigns are not able to completely outspent less well-financed opposition campaigns. Minimising complexity of issues To ensure that voters are able to make better informed decisions about ballot initiatives, it has been proposed that the number of initiatives on the ballot is limited, the argument being that it is impossible for voters to make informed decisions about complex issues when they are faced with several initiatives on the same ballot. Other proposals include limiting the reading-age level of the ballot title, or restricting the number of words in the title, to ensure that initiatives are presented in as clear and straightforward terms as possible. Ensuring a role for the legislature and court It has been argued that statutory provisions arising from initiatives could be improved by involving the legislature and/or court in the initiative process. On one level, this could simply mean providing assistance with the drafting of initiatives, which would mean that they are better written. Another improvement to the process would be to allow courts to screen initiatives to judge whether or not they are constitutional. This would prevent initiatives being struck down by the courts as unconstitutional after they have been passed by voters. Alternatively, it would also be possible to give the legislature a more significant role in the initiative process, effectively turning it into an indirect process. As indicated above, such reforms could include allowing the legislature to draft its own proposals in response to initiatives and allowing the legislature to make minor amendments to initiative statutes. Next: Recall
RecallRecall is the name given to a mechanism by which voters can end an elected official's period of office before the next scheduled election for the office. Combining elements of the initiative process and a normal candidate election, a recall initiative is launched when a recall motion is filed with the relevant administration. Proponents are then required to gather a specified number of signatures in support of the recall measure. Typically, the number of signatures required will be a proportion of the votes cast for the officer who is the subject of the recall at the last ordinary election to that office. If and when the recall petition acquires enough valid signatures, the issue is put to voters at a ballot to determine firstly, whether or not the officer in question should be recalled and secondly, who should replace the officer if the recall measure is successful. The recall mechanism is the least common of the three direct democracy mechanisms. Although many US states include provision for the recall in their constitutions, the mechanism is not used at national level. Provision for the recall mechanism outside the US and at national level is rare, even in countries where direct democracy is widely used (e.g., Switzerland).
Design issuesRestrictions on which officers the mechanism applies to Where a country or state's constitution provides for use of the recall mechanism, relevant legal provisions will need to specify which elected officials the mechanism can be applied to. Only in Venezuela does the recall mechanism apply to a country's elected head of state. However, in most US states, the recall mechanism can be used to recall all elected state officials, from local and county officials up to the office of Governor. Judges may also be the subject of recall campaigns. In some states, some on-elected officials such as administrative officers can also be recalled. Restrictions on applying the recall mechanism In some places that have adopted the recall mechanism, officers can only be recalled if it can be demonstrated that they have acted improperly (e.g. the US state of Minnesota, where the grounds for recall of an elected official are serious malfeasance or nonfeasance during the term of office). In others, there are no requirements for officials to have acted improperly or incompetently, and the simple fact of enough signatures being collected is enough to force a recall vote. Number of signatures required to force a ballot The number of signatures required in order to hold a recall ballot clearly has a significant effect on the likelihood of being able to do so; the fewer the number of signatures required, the more likely it is that a vote on whether an officer should be recalled will take place. At the 2003 California recall, recall proponents were required to gather signatures of 12% of the vote for Governor at the last election in a period of 160 days. Many other US states require 25% of voters to support a recall; California's threshold of 12% is the lowest in the States. Verification of signatures As with the citizen initiative mechanism, the requirement to produce a specified number of signatures in order to hold a ballot creates the need to collect and verify signatures. Signatures are normally only valid if they are collected from individuals who are registered to vote in the jurisdiction of the officer who is the subject of the recall. Verification of signatures is undertaken by the office administering the recall initiative. The importance of the signature collection and the verification process is demonstrated by the high profile Chavez recall initiative in Venezuela, where the National Electoral Council initially ruled that a large number of signatures collected by recall proponents were ineligible. For news stories in English about the Chavez case, please click on the links below: http://www.eluniversal.com/2004/05/06/06A457503.shtml Combining the votes on the recall and a successor One feature of the recall mechanism which varies in different places is whether, once a recall petition has collected enough valid signatures, the recall ballot is combined with the vote for a replacement officer if the recall be successful. In some places, the votes are combined, meaning that voters have to vote on two issues: firstly, whether or not the officer in question, and secondly, who should replace the officer if the recall is successful. In such cases, if the recall vote is defeated, the vote on a successor is irrelevant and is ignored. However, if the recall vote passes, the candidate who achieves the most support on the second vote is elected as a successor to the recalled officer. Alternatively, an initial ballot on whether or not to recall the officer is held, and only if the recall vote is passed is a second vote on a successor held. There are arguments for and against each of these alternatives. One argument against combining the votes is that the combination might confuse voters about the process, and that it prevents voters from focusing solely on the recall issue. Arguably, when voters make a decision about whether to support the recall, they should be able to focus on the issue at hand and the performance of the incumbent, without the distraction of possible successors. On the other hand, combining the two votes leads to cost savings and increases administrative efficiency. A further issue is that combining the recall and successor vote could mean that the vote for (i.e. to retain) an incumbent who is successfully recalled is actually higher than the plurality vote in favour of the successor, which could give a legitimacy problem. This scenario might be avoided by using voting systems such as the Alternative Vote or Supplementary Vote. However, this would mean that a combined vote would become increasingly complicated for voters. The recall in a party based electoral system More generally, there is a question of compatibility of recall with the electoral system. If the electoral system is candidate-based, there is no problem. If however it is party based, should the voters have the right to recall a specific representative nominated by a party? Would there be a difference between representatives chosen by the voters under open list proportional representation? In general, in list systems, does the party or the voters fill the vacancy caused by a successful recall?
Advantages and disadvantages of the recall mechanismProponents of the recall mechanism argue that it acts as a discipline on elected officials, in that elected representatives will be less likely to make unpopular decisions if it may make them more likely to be the subject of a recall campaign. However, the same argument is also used against the recall: opponents argue that the recall mechanism completely undermines representative government by making elected officials afraid to make unpopular but necessary decisions. A further argument in favour of direct democracy is that it provides voters with the continued opportunity to make a democratic decision about who governs them, since they do not have only one opportunity every three to five years to elect the people who will represent them, but retain a degree of control over the decision for the duration of the office. However, it is claimed by opponents of the recall that the mechanism could be used irresponsibly, and that it could be used by political parties as a political weapon against rival incumbents. The claim that the recall mechanism was being used as a political tool was made by many Democrats against Republican party activists in relation to the 2003 California Recall. Next: Total Recall - the election of Schwarzenegger in California Total Recall - the election of Schwarzenegger in California
Gray Davis was re-elected Governor of California in November 2002. However, within less than a year he had been ousted from his post and replaced by a man previously more famous for his acting and his muscles. So how did it come to be hasta la vista for Governor Davis in such a short space of time?
The recall mechanism in CaliforniaHistory Like many other US states, Californian democracy provides for the use of the recall mechanism. Adopted into the Californian constitution in 1911, the recall mechanism is a process by which the electorate can seek the removal of elected public officials before the end of their terms of office. Prior to 2003, the recall mechanism had been used in California on numerous occasions. Several local government officials have been recalled, and four state legislators have been recalled, in 1913, 1914 and 1995 (twice). However, whilst previous state Governors have faced some level of recall attempt in the last 30 years, Governor Davis was the first Governor to face a recall election. Launching a recall initiative To launch a recall initiative, proponents are required to file a notice of intention with the California Secretary of State's Office. The notice must include a statement explaining in no more than 200 words why the proponents are seeking a recall, and must give the names, signatures and addresses of either a minimum of 10 people or the number of people required to have signed the nomination of the officer who is subject to the recall, whichever is the greatest. Proponents of the recall must be registered voters within the electoral jurisdiction of the officer they seek to recall. Within a week of the notice being filed, the officer in question is given the opportunity to make a 200 word statement in response to the initiative. Circulating the petition Once the notice has been certified by the Secretary of State, proponents are required to collect a number of signatures equivalent to 12% of the votes cast for the officer the last time the office was on the ballot. Signatures must be collected within 160 days, and the petition must be circulated in at least five Californian counties. In the 2003 recall, the recall petition was certified for circulation on 25 March 2003, giving proponents until 2 September 2003 to collect 897,158 signatures. Signatures are only deemed to be valid if they are from voters registered in the electoral jurisdiction of the officer who is the subject of the recall; similarly, only such registered voters are qualified to circulate the recall petition. Reporting and verifying petition signatures Proponents of the recall are required to file the petition with the election official in each county in which the petition is circulated. Whilst the petition is being circulated, county election officials are required to report to the Secretary of State on the progress of the petition; the first report must be submitted within 30 days of the recall being initiated, and every 30 days thereafter. The report must advise on the number of signatures collected in the most recent 30 day period, the total cumulative number of signatures collected, and the total number of valid signatures collected. County election officials are not required to begin verifying signatures for validity until 10% of the total number of signatures required have been collected. Once the verification process begins, a random sample of signatures must be checked. Where more than 500 signatures are reported at any one time, either 3% of signatures submitted or 500 signatures must be checked, whichever is the smallest. The recall election
In California, the recall and the vote for a successor to replace the officer should the recall succeed are included on the same ballot. The officer facing recall is not entitled to stand as a candidate for re-election. Therefore, if in the first vote the incumbent officer receives the support of more than 50% of the electorate, the recall is defeated and the second vote is irrelevant. However, if a majority vote to recall the officer, the candidate who receives most votes is elected. At the 2003 recall election, there were also two state wide initiatives on the ballot. This differs from other US states and other countries, where once a petition has qualified, a separate yes/no vote on whether or not to recall the officer will be held before a vote on a successor is held. Critics of the Californian process argue that this causes confusion for voters. In addition, it also raises the possibility that if an officer is recalled, his successor could be elected with a less legitimate democratic mandate: for example, if an officer is narrowly recalled on a vote of 51% in favour, 49% against, but the winning candidate on the second vote receives the support of 37% of voters, the new Governor arguably has the support of 12% fewer voters.
The 2003 recall campaignThe case against Gray The campaign against Gray Davis was initially launched by an organisation called the People's Advocate, an anti-tax organisation headed by Ted Costa, the official proponent of the recall effort. The main charge against Gray was that he had mismanaged the Californian economy, creating a budget deficit of over USD 30 billion and the need for large tax increases. The efforts of the People's Advocate were supported by a number of Republican Party activists and by other California political parties such as the Libertarian Party and the American Independent Party. In May, the recall campaign was boosted when Republican Congressman Darrel Issa launched his own recall effort, Rescue California, backed by significant funding and the expertise of political strategists. Rescue California was instrumental in collecting signatures for the recall petition, organising its efforts on a professional basis and claiming to have collected around 70% of the valid signatures submitted. Opponents of the recall included labour leaders and public sector employees, and were led by an organisation called Taxpayers Against the Recall. They argued that using the initiative would set an expensive precedent, and that recall should only be used in the case of abuse of office or corruption. The announcement of the election The recall petition was certified for petition on 25 March 2003. By the middle of July, recall proponents claimed to have gathered 1.6 million signatures, well in excess of the 897,158 needed to secure the recall ballot. On July 23, Secretary of State Kevin Shelley verified that 1,356,408 of the signatures were valid. The following day, Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamante announced that the recall ballot would be held on October 7. Candidates for the election One notable feature of the 2003 recall election was the large number of candidates who stood for election. Nomination procedures for a recall election are required by the constitution to be virtually the same as for a normal election to the office of Governor (except that papers have to be filed no less than 59 days before the date of the recall election). Candidates at the 2003 recall were therefore required to collect 65 nomination signatures and pay a USD 3,500 fee (or submit USD 10,000 in lieu of the fee). The low threshold for nominations meant that 135 individuals stood as replacement candidates, thus ensuring an extremely long ballot for voters to consider. The Republican and Democrat parties The most prominent of the candidates was undoubtedly Arnold Schwarzenegger, film actor and husband of a member of America's most famous political dynasty, Maria Shriver, niece of assassinated President John F Kennedy and Bobby Kennedy. Following considerable speculation about whether he would join the race to succeed Gray Davis, Schwarzenegger, a Republican, used an appearance on the Tonight Show on 6 August to announce his candidacy. His entry into the race prompted other high-profile Republican candidates to drop out of the race to be Gray's successor. The Democrats faced a more difficult position in choosing whether or not to stand a replacement candidate. On the one hand, their main aim was to win the recall ballot and defeat the recall proposition. It was argued that achieving this result would be helped by the presentation of a united front, with no Democratic candidates for successor. However, an alternative argument was formulated along the lines that, should the recall succeed, it was necessary to have a Democratic candidate on the ballot as a potential successor. The debate was settled when, on August 7, Cruz Bustamante entered the race to offer a prominent Democratic candidacy. The campaign controls Different controls applied to the recall element of the campaign, and the campaign to promote replacement candidates. The issue of recall is treated by campaign finance law in California as equivalent to a ballot measure, whilst the question of a successor is treated in accordance with controls on normal candidate elections. In practice, this meant that whilst Governor Davis was not subject to any contribution limits on the amount of money he could accept in trying to defeat the recall measure, replacement candidates were subject to contribution limits of USD 21,200 and an expenditure limit of USD 10,624,000. The outcome of the recall process At the election on October 7, the measure to recall the Governor was passed by a vote of 55.4% against a no vote of 44.6%. Of the replacement candidates, Arnold Schwarzenegger achieved 48.6% of the vote (more than had supported Davis), his nearest rival Crus Bustamante achieving 31.5%. Governor Gray Davis was duly recalled, and Governor-elect Schwarzenegger sworn in on 17 November. The total cost of running the recall election, including providing voters with a state voter information guide, was estimated to be just under USD 70 million.
Useful linksState information and voter guide
Campaign sites Independent websites
Next: Swiss Direct Democracy Swiss Direct Democracy
When it comes to direct democracy, Switzerland is usually cited as the country that is the closest to having a directly democratic system of
History and backgroundDirect democracy has a long standing tradition in some of the Swiss cantons, going back as far as the fourteenth century. When Switzerland became a federal state in 1848, direct democracy instruments were introduced at the national level as well. The federal constitution introduced the principle of holding a mandatory referendum in order to change the constitution, as well as the popular initiative for a total revision of the constitution. Further rights of referendums were introduced in 1874, and the popular initiative for a partial revision of the constitution in 1891. Between 1848 and February 2004, 517 referendums were held, whilst between 1892 and May 2004, 244 initiatives were proposed.
Forms of direct democracy - federal levelNumerous different direct democracy mechanisms can be used at federal level in Switzerland. The mechanisms fall into two broad categories: referendums and initiatives - there is no provision for use of the recall in Switzerland. Each mechanism can be used to achieve different results, and has different design features. Referendums Unlike in other countries, in Switzerland it is not the government that decides if a referendum is held on an issue; the circumstances under which referendums are used are clearly prescribed within the country's constitution. The first type of direct democracy mechanism is the mandatory referendum, i.e., a referendum that the government must call in relation to certain important political issues. These are:
The first three kinds of mandatory referendums require a double majority to pass; that is, they must achieve a popular majority (a majority of the votes cast at the referendum) whilst at the same time achieving a majority vote in a majority of the cantons. The latter three, which take place as part of the initiative process, only need a popular majority. Optional referendums can be held in relation to new or amended federal acts and/or international treaties. The optional legislative referendum is held in relation to all federal laws and urgent federal laws which are due to be valid for more than a year. The optional referendum on international treaties is held in relation to international treaties that are of unlimited duration and may not be terminated, and international treaties that provide for membership of international organisations or contain legislative provisions that have to be implemented by enacting federal laws Optional referendums are called if 50,000 signatures are collected in support of a referendum within 100 days, or if eight cantons request a referendum, and pass with a popular majority. Until 2004, an optional referendum has never been successfully requested by a group of cantons; the first referendum initiated by the cantons was held on 16 May 2004. Initiatives Initiatives can be used to propose changes to the federal constitution. In addition, in 2003 Switzerland adopted a new form of initiative, to be used in relation to more general statutory provisions. Once an initiative is filed, a specified number of valid signatures (i.e. signatures of registered voters) are required in order to force the Federal Council and Parliament to consider the initiative and to hold a referendum on the initiative proposal. Amendments to the constitution can be proposed using two different initiative mechanisms. The popular initiative for a partial revision of the constitution provides voters with the opportunity to propose a draft revision to part of the federal constitution. 100,000 voters must sign an initiative in order for a referendum to be held on the proposal. The popular initiative for a total revision of the constitution also requires the support of 100,000 voters in an initiative. In both cases, the signatures must be collected within 18 months of the initiative being filed. From late 2006, the general popular initiative will be available to Swiss voters. This mechanism can be used to force a referendum on the adoption of a general proposal that will be incorporated on a constitutional and/or legislative level, providing that 100,000 signatures are collected in support of the initiative. Until 2006, initiatives in Switzerland can be submitted as a general proposition or in the text that would be adopted if the initiative measure is successful. However, after the implementation of the general popular initiative, the popular initiative for a partial revision of the constitution will only be accepted in the form of a written text proposition (general propositions in relation to the constitution should be made using the general popular initiative). In response to initiatives which meet the required signature threshold, the Swiss Parliament advises the people on whether to adopt or reject the proposal. In addition, the government is also able to formulate a counter-proposal that is included on the ballot. The "double-yes" vote allows voters to approve both the original initiative and the government's response to it, and indicate which of the two measures they prefer. The measure which receives the most support is passed.
Forms of direct democracy - cantonal levelUse of direct democracy is even more extensive in Switzerland's 26 cantons (i.e., state authorities). However, use of direct democracy varies between the cantons; between 1970-2003 Zurich held 457, whilst Ticino held just 53 (the canton of Jura held just 45 referendums, but was only formally established (by referendum) in 1979). In addition to the referendum and initiative mechanisms used at federal level, the following mechanisms are also used in some or all of the Swiss cantons. Unlike at federal level, the legislative initiative has for some time provided voters in all cantons with the opportunity to propose additions to laws. In some cantons, the administrative initiative can be used to demand that certain work is undertaken in public administration (e.g., building a new school or a new road). In addition, some cantons provide for the initiative to launch a canton initiative, an initiative to force the canton to table a motion to the Federal Assembly. All the Swiss cantons provide for legislative referendums on legislation passed by the cantonal parliament; however, in different cantons, these may be mandatory or optional. Administrative referendums may be held on major public projects that will incur high levels of public expenditure (and may lead to increases in taxes); these are sometime called fiscal referendums. Lastly, administrative referendums may be held on the non-fiscal issues of public administration listed above.
Characteristics of the use of direct democracy in SwitzerlandTurnout Swiss voters are given the opportunity to vote in federal referendums on average four times a year. Typically, voters will also vote on a number of cantonal and local issues on the day of a federal ballot. Over the second part of the twentieth century, turnout at federal referendums fell from around 50-70% to an average of around 40%; this mirrored a similar decline in turnout at federal elections from 80% to around 45%. One suggestion is that this comparatively low turnout is due to the sheer number of votes that the Swiss are able to vote in; however, it is argued by many that a far higher proportion of the population is politically active than appears so from the figure of 40%, since it is not always the same 40-45% of voters who vote at each opportunity. Issues Given the numerous opportunities for using direct democracy in Switzerland, it is perhaps not surprising that the variety of issues on which referendums are held is extremely wide. Since 1990, referendums have been held on such diverse issues as:
Impact of direct democracy Undoubtedly, direct democracy has played a key role in shaping the modern Swiss political system. Yet it is important to question the actual impact of direct democracy on the legislative issues that, in other countries, are the responsibility of elected representatives. On one reading, it could be argued that the impact has been limited: in the first century of using the initiative (1891-2004), just 14 initiatives were passed in Switzerland. Yet to consider this statistic alone ignores the considerable, indirect impact of direct democracy. Although the majority of initiatives fail, the fact that there has been an initiative, and therefore a campaign, increases publicity surrounding the issue in question and public knowledge of it. This may well increase pressure on the government to introduce measures dealing with the issue, even if it is not required to by virtue of a successful referendum. An initiative might therefore be successful in achieving some of its proponents' aims, even if it is not successful in the sense of having passed. This trend explains why many initiatives are filed but subsequently withdrawn; because sometimes a government chooses to act before an initiative reaches the referendum stage. A further impact of the direct democracy mechanisms within Switzerland is that the government is forced to seek a wider consensus about the statutory (and constitutional) measures that it seeks to introduce than is the case in a purely representative system. In a representative system, the party of government may, in the absence of a large majority, have to develop cross-party consensus on an issue in order to ensure that the measure is approved. In the Swiss system, the possibility of an optional referendum forces the government to ensure consensus with groups outside of Parliament so as to prevent the possibility of such groups seeking to overturn the new legislation. Conversely, the significance of direct democracy in the Swiss system is often cited as the reason for the weakness of Swiss political parties and the relatively low significance attached to normal elections. This is because, given the prominence of direct democracy, political parties are not solely responsible for controlling the federal agenda. In addition, direct democracy often raises cross-cutting issues on which members of political parties might not be in agreement.
Useful links and sourcesSwiss federal chancellery and information DVD
Next: Contributors ContributorsContributors to Focus on Direct DemocracyFocus on direct democracy was produced by Ellie Greenwood, whilst on secondment to International IDEA from the UK Electoral Commission. The work was undertaken as part of IDEA's project on the global use of direct democracy. The project is considering how the use of direct democracy can enhance democratic systems, and aims to produce a series of tools outlining options for the design of direct democracy institutions. Focus on Elections and DisabilityExtending the Franchise to Citizens with Disabilities
These are the absolutes of election rights, and are among the phrases which motivate, even inspire, election workers, who in many nations face daunting challenges as they strive to carry out free and fair elections. Yet in many elections, these best of intentions rarely extend to or enfranchise citizens with disabilities. Over the past five years, however, as part of its Global Initiative to Enfranchise Citizens with Disabilities, IFES learned that the electoral rights of disabled citizens can be recognized and championed, even in the most difficult of electoral environments. With funding primarily from the governments of Finland and Sweden, IFES has worked with grassroots disability organizations, national election commissions, and with international and multilateral democracy organizations to advance the electoral rights of citizens with physical, sensory, mental, and psychiatric disabilities. This work is chronicled in this inaugural edition of ACE's "Focus On" Series. In the paragraphs which follow we will:
Discrimination by Law and Mental DisabilityThe election laws of most nations establish a criteria that limits the right to vote for people with psychiatric disorders. This criterion varies widely among nations. In some, those determined by court order to be insane cannot vote. In others, the right to vote is lost when a court appoints a legal guardian. In other nations still, the franchise is lost when someone is institutionalized, or even when someone is "known to be insane." No standards govern these laws, which seem subject to stereotypical and outdated views of mental disability. In consultation with global experts in the fields of disability, election law and practice, and international human rights standards, IFES and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) have developed a "bill of electoral rights for people with disabilities," which argues that election law cannot discriminate against individuals with intellectual or psychiatric disabilities. Further, this "bill of electoral rights" has determined that a test of competency cannot be used to deprive any single individual or group of individuals of the right to vote, unless that same test of competency is applied to each and every citizens. For additional information on this important topic, see: www.electionaccess.org/rs/Discussion_Paper.htm Discrimination by Law and the Secret Ballot:The right to vote in secret is a cornerstone of democracy, and is recognized as such by nearly all nations through their ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The secret ballot is a feature of possibly every election law in the world. However, the practice of elections in nearly every nation results in the blind citizen being dependent on another to cast his or her ballot. And logic tells us that a secret between two people is no secret. If all citizens are to have equal access to the election process, then the election process must include procedures to enable blind citizens to cast a secret ballot. It is surprisingly easy to do so. In nations which use a paper ballot for voting, numerous jurisdictions have developed a ballot guide to help a blind voter independently mark the ballot. In most instances, this guide is a folder in which the regular ballot is inserted. The folder contains holes which correspond to the boxes on the ballot paper. On the folder are markers - sometimes Braille, sometimes raised bumps or lines - that help the voter navigate up and down the folder. Some election management bodies use a cassette tape as supplementary guide to the folder. For examples of ballot guides from Canada, Ghana, Sierra Leone and the US State of Rhode Island, see: www.electionaccess.org/Bp/Ballot_Templates.htm In jurisdictions using electronic voting systems, markings in Braille may be used (Brazil) or a combination of Braille and synthesized voice. These approaches are becoming must more common in the United States, where federal law now requires all voting systems to be accessible to blind and disabled voters by no later than 2006. Removing Barriers for Voters with Mobility LimitationsElection authorities wouldn't dream of placing a polling station at the top of a rugged mountain, miles from the nearest village. Yet, for a wheelchair user or an elderly voter who uses a walker, a second floor polling station is just as inaccessible as that mountain. As more and more disabled citizens seek to take their place in society, and as society's age, public agencies need to put into place strategies that are inclusive and that promote full and equal participation. In selecting polling stations, election authorities should envision having level access from the curbside outside of the polling station all the way inside the building to the polling booth itself. And that polling booth should be at table height, reachable by someone using a wheelchair. At an absolute minimum, all polling stations should be on the ground floor and election authorities should consult with their local disability organizations to develop standards for selecting polling stations. Many industrialized nations have established guidelines for polling station design, and it is common to see election sites with temporary and/or permanent ramps to ensure easy access. It is also becoming increasingly common to see polling sites in homes for the elderly, at hospitals, and in other settings where elderly or disabled people gather. A few developing nations have begun to address the issue of polling place accessibility. The best of these efforts begins with a commitment to have ground floor voting only, and working toward having ramped entrances to all polling stations. Election Monitoring By Citizens with DisabilitiesSince 2000, IFES has worked with disability organizations in eleven nations to train over 1,300 people with disabilities to serve as election monitors. This exercise contributes to election reform, as disabled citizens become knowledgeable of the election process, and become informed partners to election management bodies. In countries as diverse as Albania, El Salvador, and Ghana, disability groups have developed collaborative relationships and formal agreements with election commissions, resulting in specific reforms to the election process. For example, as a direct result of election monitoring exercises in Albania and El Salvador, election authorities have agreed to ground floor voting. In Ghana, the election authorities agreed to develop and pilot test a ballot guide for blind voters. Election monitoring by disabled citizens can also lead to a change in public attitude about the rights and abilities of people with disabilities, and about their ability to play a positive role in shaping a democratic society. For reports on election monitoring activities in Zambia, see: www.electionaccess.org/Bp/Zambia.htm and in Albania, see: www.electionaccess.org/Bp/Albania_local_election.htm Emerging International StandardsThe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) establishes clear benchmarks for the world's election laws and practices. Over the past two years, the ICCPR, IFES and the International IDEA - two of ACE's project partners - have launched an effort to develop international standards of electoral access for citizens with disabilities. Central to this effort is the involvement of representatives of global and national disability organizations, regional and national electoral bodies, and multilateral agencies that promote democracy and human rights. Much of this important work has been funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. In September 2002, IFES and IDEA convened a four-day meeting in Sigtuna, Sweden, at which approximately 45 representatives of disability organizations, election agencies, parliaments, and international democracy agencies met to draft and approve a "bill of electoral rights for persons with disabilities," and accompanying guidelines for election agencies. The "bill of electoral rights" is available, in multiple languages, including English, French, Spanish, Bosnian, Macedonian, Serbian, Albanian, and Bahasa Indonesian, at: www.electionaccess.org/subpages/Rights_Standards.htm Guidelines for election commissions developed at this same workshop are available at: www.electionaccess.org/rs/Discussion_Paper.htm These guidelines address a number of key issues, including election rights and competency; election standards for assisted voting, and election standards for mobile and off-site voting. IFES, IDEA, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and disability and election experts are currently at work on phase two of this effort to develop model election law provisions to ensure full electoral participation by disabled citizens. A draft version of these provisions can be received by contacting IFES' human rights advisor, Jerry Mindes, at jmindes@ifes.org. Comments are most welcome. Links to Disability OrganizationsToo many election laws are written by people who assume they know what is best for voters with disabilities. All too often, this results in election law provisions which perpetuate stereotypes about disability, and treat disabled voters as second class citizens. To put an end to these shortcomings, election management bodies are encouraged to consult regularly and openly with organizations of people with disabilities, and to seek their input in the design of outreach programs, in the design of ballots, and in the establishment of criteria to select polling stations. The following global disability organizations have affiliates in most nations:
Additional Resources - Elections and Disability:
Electoral Insight, published by Elections Canada, has a special issue (Vol. 6 No.1 April 2004) on Persons with Disabilities and Elections (PDF file) ContributorsContributors to Focus on Elections and DisabilityFrom 2001-2006, Jerry Mindes led IFES' global initiative to enfranchise people with disabilities and also guided IFES' work in the broader field of human rights and elections. Mr. Mindes is a recognized expert on issues affecting the political, social and economic advancement of people with disabilities in developing nations. Focus on E-VotingThere is an on going discussion in many countries about e-voting with particular emphasis on voting via Internet or electronic distance voting. While some kind of e-voting is already widely used by society, organizations and private industry voting needs as well as non professional/non-official polling, the situation is quite different when it comes to national elections and referendums. Several countries are considering the introduction of e-voting and are running a variety of pilot projects. Because of security concerns there is, in some countries, a strong opposition to any kind of e-voting, but specially when it comes to the use of the Internet for voting at national elections or referendums. While the ACE Project does not recommend any particular type of e-voting including the Internet to be used for national elections and referendums, the sections that follow outline some basic requirements for additional consideration when introducing e-voting to the electoral process and opportunities, risks and challenges that face e-voting today. This “Focus On” ends with a brief overview of countries considering e-voting applications. Next: What is "e-voting"?
What is "e-voting"?
E-voting is short for ‘electronic voting’ and refers to the option of using electronic means to vote in referendums and elections. There are systems such as DRE (Direct electronic recording) voting machines that record the vote without that vote being transmitted over the Internet or another network. The interface of a DRE machine can be a touch screen or a scanner that scans the ballot paper where the voter marked the vote. There are a wide variety of e-voting set ups, ranging from the casting of the vote with the aid of an electronic device (voting machines) inside a polling station to casting a vote anywhere outside the polling station at a PC and transmitting the vote via the Internet. E-voting might also refer to the use of electronic means for the vote counting process, but this will not be addressed here. In this "Focus On" “Polling place e-voting” will be used in reference to systems where a voter casts his or her vote inside a polling station or similar premises controlled by electoral staff. "Remote e-voting" will be used to reference the system where a voter casts his or her vote at any place outside the polling station. The two systems face similar challenges. However, remote e-voting is, in some aspects, more challenging than polling place e-voting. The fact that the casting of the vote is not done inside a controllable area of a polling place and that the vote has to be transmitted in some way to the polling or counting place, poses additional challenges. Next: Requirements for e-voting
Requirements for e-votingTraditional voting systems have been developed to ensure that the principles required for democratic elections and referendums are met, namely the guarantee of the freedom to vote, the secrecy of the vote, the non modification of the expressed intention of the vote and lack of intimidation during the vote operation. It is essential that these principles are not undermined by the introduction of new voting methods and, accordingly, e-voting systems must be so designed and operated as to ensure the reliability and security of the voting process. In sum: E-voting has to be as free, secret, reliable and secure as voting systems that do not involve the use of electronic means. An e-voting system therefore should consider the following minimum requirements:
Next: Auditing of e-voting systems Auditing of e-voting systemsJust as is the case with manual voting systems, e-voting systems have to able to be audited, i.e. it must be possible to examine the processes used to collect and count the votes and to re-count the votes in order to confirm the accuracy of the results. The greatest danger to e-voting systems is if external interference on systems is possible and can go undetected affecting the results of the voting. This is why independent and extensive security monitoring, auditing, cross-checking and reporting need to be a critical part of e-voting systems. There are different mechanisms to audit an e-voting system. Some systems include a so-called ‘voter verified audit trail’ (VVAT), also known as ‘voter verified paper ballots’. These systems include paper records of the vote, which have been verified by the voter at the time of casting the vote and can be used for a recount at a later date. VVAT can only be used in non-remote e-voting systems (polling place e-voting), since the voter has to be physically present at the place where his/her vote is actually recorded and printed for control. Other e-voting systems include a ‘voter verifiable audit trail’. The difference between the first systems and the latter is that in the first case, it is mandatory that the voters check their vote before they cast it. In the second case, voters may check their vote but they don’t have to. In some systems, the ballots are printed only after they have been cast and are stored in a closed area. These ballots can also be used for a recount. But it has to be noted that the voters did not verify these printed ballots. Other systems include the disclosure of the source code and/or documentation on the e-voting system, so that voters or / and representatives of political parties and civil society organizations have the opportunity to examine its accuracy. Whichever approach to auditing is chosen, it is crucial that the e-voting system has audit facilities for each of the main steps of the voting operation (voting, counting). The audit system should also provide the ability for independent observers to monitor the election or referendum (without revealing the potential final count/result). The audit system has to be able to detect voter fraud and provide proof that all counted votes are authentic. Audit systems by their very nature gather a lot of information. However, if too much information is kept, the secrecy of the vote may be compromised. A voting audit system should maintain voter anonymity and secrecy at all times. In all cases the information gathered by the audit system has to be protected against unauthorized access. Next: Opportunities, risks and challenges of e-voting Opportunities, risks and challenges of e-votingBoth supporters and opponents of e-voting offer arguments justifying which method is better suited for the electoral process. On the one hand, e-voting technology:
Potential risks in e-voting
Challenges of remote e-votingIn the context of remote e-voting, special attention should be given to the process guaranteeing a free and secret vote. Only entitled voters are allowed to cast a vote and this requires that every voter be authenticated (e.g. by using a PIN -Personal Identification Number or TAN -Transaction Number or by the use of digital signature) and their right to vote verified. In order to prevent multiple votes being cast or other misuse, a record must be made and checked in order to establish whether he or she has already cast a vote. With a remote electronic voting system, there must be an electronic separation between the vote and the identification of the voter. Next: Countries with e-voting Countries with e-voting projects
AUSTRALIA (polling place e-voting)The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Electoral Commission recommended to the ACT Government, to permit electronic voting for the ACT Legislative Assembly elections. The ACT’s Electoral Act 1992 was amended accordingly in December 2000 and electronic voting was allowed for the first time at an Australian parliamentary election in October 2001. In that election, 16,559 voters (8.3% of all votes counted) cast their votes electronically at polling stations in four places. Electronic votes could be cast 2 weeks before election day for those unable to vote on that day. On election day, 8 polling places were equipped with electronic voting machines. Remote e-voting is not likely to be introduced in Australia for the next Parliamentary elections. The ACT Electoral Commission recommends in its report to the ACT Legislative Assembly (PDF file) on electronic voting at the 2001 election that electronic voting should continue to be provided only at polling places using secure local area networks. At this time the Internet is not considered a sufficiently secure way of conducting a parliamentary election. For the 2004 election, due to be held on 16 October 2004, the electronic voting machines of the same type as in the previous elections will be used at the same number of locations as in 2001. AUSTRIA (remote e-voting)In Austria, e-voting is not a first priority of the government. Nevertheless, the Austrian Federal Council of Ministers approved an e-government strategy (PDF file) in May 2003, in which an e-voting project is listed in the Annex. In spring 2004, the Federal Ministry of Interior established a working group on e-voting in order to study and establish a report, on various aspects of e-voting. A first (legally non-binding) test of remote e-voting was undertaken in parallel to the Student Union election at the WU Vienna (Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration), in May 2003. A prototype developed at the WU Vienna by Prof. Prosser and his research group e-Voting.at was used (www.e-voting.at). The system implements a remote voting procedure which is based on the Austrian electronic National ID Card (Bürgerkarte ): Before Election Day the voter applies for the issuing of an electronic voting token, that is saved on the electronic National ID Card. On Election Day the voter to prove his right to cast a vote supplies only this electronic voting token. As a follow-up to this first test, the same project team conducted a second (legally non-binding) test of its system in parallel to the Austrian presidential elections of April 25, 2004. This time, 1.786 students out of a possible electorate of 20,000 students of WU Vienna voted electronically in addition to voting with their traditional paper ballot. The political result was very similar to that of all Austrian voters (see www.e-voting.at ) BELGIUM (polling place e-voting)The first trials using e-voting machines in polling places were made in 1991. In 1994, the legal framework for e-voting entered into force and e-voting has been widely used in the general and municipal elections in 1999, 2000 and 2003. During regional and European elections on 13 June 2004, 3.2 million voters (20% of voters in Wallonia, 49% in Flanders, and all voters in Brussels) were due to vote electronically. As in the previous election of May 2003, electronic voting took place exclusively at the polling stations through a voting machine, which has a screen, a magnetic card reader and an optical pen.
BRAZIL (polling place e-voting)In 1987 Brazil's Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE) began building a centralized database of registered voters to be able to identify multiple registrations by a single voter and other irregularities. This database was assembled three or four months before an election consolidating voter registration data provided by all states. Then in 1993 /1994 a network connecting all regional electoral Tribunals was built which allowed all the regional electoral registers to communicate among themselves and to regularly update a centralized national register eliminating the need for consolidation of register data prior to an election. At the end of 1994, the specifications for an electronic voting system were prepared and in the 1996 elections, about 30% of the Brazilian voters were able to cast their vote with a Direct Recording Electronic Voting System (DRE), called "urna eletrônica". The use of these urnas eletrônicas in Brazilian elections grew progressively from election to election, unit it reached the totality of precincts. By the 2000 and 2002 elections more than 400 thousand electronic voting machines were used nationwide in Brazil and the results were tallied electronically within minutes after the polls closed. Data was transferred on secure diskettes or via satellite telephone to central tallying stations. These in turn transmitted data electronically over secure lines to tabulating machines in the capital, Brasilia, where the results were consolidated and announced within hours. For more information see www.tse.gov.br and www.observatorioelectoral.org CANADA (remote e-voting)In the Canadian State of Ontario, from November 5 to November 10 2003, 12 municipalities from the Prescott Russell and Stormont Dundas & Glengarry Counties held the first full municipal and school board electronic elections in North America using either the Internet or the phone but no paper ballots. These elections included choices for mayor, deputy mayor, assistant deputy mayor, ward councilors and school boards members. About 100,000 voters in 12 municipalities of eastern Ontario were registered to cast their ballots online or through the phone ; see also an example of Voting procedures published by the Township of South Dundas . Each of the 100,000 registered voters had received a Voter Identification Number and a password, allowing them to vote by Internet or touch-tone telephone. The e-voting system helped increase turnout to 55% in some places, against normal municipal election rates of 25 to 30%. After the elections, the Ontario Secretariat for Democratic Renewal was created to work on proposals for a reform of Ontario electoral process including to make the Internet a voting option. ESTONIA (remote e-voting)Discussions on remote e-voting started in Estonia in 2001 and one year later, in 2002, the legal provisions for it were put in place. During the summer 2003 the National Electoral Committee started the actual e-voting project. A public procurement procedure was carried out and the Estonian company Cybernetica Ltd. was mandated with the development of the e-voting system. The system includes the use of smart cards and electronic signatures. The software should be ready by autumn 2004. In late 2004 the first test of the whole e-voting system is supposed to take place during a consultative referendum in the capital city of Tallinn. The next test is planned for the local government council elections in October 2005. (see General Description of the E-Voting System (PDF file)) The EU CyberVote Project (polling place e-voting, remote e-voting)In September 2000, the European Commission launched the CyberVote project with the aim of demonstrating “fully verifiable on-line elections guaranteeing absolute privacy of the votes and using fixed and mobile Internet terminals”. The project involved partners from industry (EADS Matra Systèmes & Information of France, Nokia Research Centre of Finland, British Telecommunications of the United Kingdom), universities (K.U.Leuven Research & Development of Belgium, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven of The Netherlands) and potential users (Freie Hansestadt Bremen of Germany, Mairie d'Issy-les-Moulineaux of France, Kista Stadsdelsnämnd of Sweden). The CyberVote project involved the development of an e-voting system that was tested in different elections in 2002-2003. The first test was held on 11 December 2002 in the French town of Issy-les-Moulineaux. 860 voters have elected their representatives to the city boroughs' counsels electronically. The second test took place in Germany on 13-15 January 2003 at the Bremen University. The trial covered the elections of the three University's representative bodies: the university council, the councils of the different university departments and the student council with a total of 47 voters casting their votes electronically. The last test took place in the Swedish Kista with the participation of the elderly citizens in Kista. Much work was needed to attract voters aged over 55. The trial was open all day during the week of 27-31 January 2003. At the end of that period, 226 voters had participated in the electronic voting. In July 2003, the CyberVote project has officially ended. FRANCE (polling place e-voting, remote e-voting)On the 1st of June 2003, French citizens residing in the USA were given the possibility to validly elect their representatives to the Assembly of the French Citizens Abroad (Assembée des Français de l’Étranger - AFE, ex- Conseil Supérieur des Français à l’étranger – (CSFE ) by remote e-voting. The AFE is a public legislative body, which elects 150 delegates who elect the 12 members of the Upper House of the French Parliament to represent the French citizens living abroad. 8,77% of the 61,056 registered voters in the US representing 60.6% of the actual voters cast their vote over the Internet (PDF file). In 2003, the ‘Internet Rights Forum‘ (Forum des droits sur l'Internet ), a private body supported by the French government, published recommendations on the future of e-voting in France. They recommend that remote e-voting should not be introduced, except for French citizens abroad who should be able to elect the AFE delegates by voting over the Internet. However, they recommend that every voter should be able to use polling place e-voting (at a voting kiosk in the polling place (PDF file.) The use of polling place e-voting for legally binding political elections in France was made possible by a decree passed by the Government on 18 March 2004 . This decree authorises 33 municipalities to deploy electronic voting machines (the authorisation was subsequently extended to 20 further communes). Following successful trials in 6 cities during the regional elections held in March 2004, 18 communes conducted e-voting tests during the European elections on 13 June 2004. Some of these experiments where legally binding (e.g. in the city of Vandoeuvre-les-Nancy), while others were not. GERMANY (remote e-voting)Germany started e-voting tests and pilot projects in 1999. The tests were held at non-political elections, like at universities (Osnabrück, Bermerhaven), at local advisory level (youth community and senior citizens councils) as well as at public and private employees councils. The system used in most of the German tests was the i-vote system developed by the Research Group of Internet Voting . Recent efforts in the field of e-voting in Germany concentrate on the connection of all polling stations through an electronic network and the building of an electronic voter register ) INDIA (polling place e-voting)Since 1998, the Election Commission ) has increasingly used Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) in polling places. In 2003, all state elections and by-elections were held using EVMs. Encouraged by this the Commission has decided to use only EVMs for the Lok Sabha (Lower House) election in 2004. EVMs were used throughout India with a voter population of about 672 million. Nearly 700‘000 polling stations spread over 35 states and Union territories were equipped with EVMs to elect the 543 representatives to the Lok Sabha and 697 representatives to four state assemblies of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Orissa and Sikkim. Over one million EVMs were used in these elections (Further information on the functioning of the voting machines is available at www.eci.gov.in/EVM .) IRELAND (polling place e-voting)Ireland was planning e-voting since 1999. In that year the basic legislation for e-voting was introduced, tests started in 2000. E-voting in polling places was supposed to be available during the elections to the European Parliament and local elections in June 2004. Based upon a critical paper by two scientists (PDF file)), reinforced by opposition action, and finally upon the negative interim report of a government-sponsored independent Commission on Electronic Voting (PDF file)), e-voting at polling stations was not introduced for the mid-2004 elections. NORWAY (polling place e-voting)The Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development accepted pilot projects in three municipalities at local elections in 2003. Voting in the pilots was carried out on voting machines in the polling stations using touch screens. An evaluation of the tests showed that the system was well accepted by the electorate and local election officers. However, the evaluation report, which followed the pilots, also stated that questions regarding e-voting and security needed further clarification. The Norwegian government therefore has stopped further use of the system until a working group appointed by the Ministry delivers its views on these questions. The working group will submit their report to the Ministry in December 2005. PORTUGAL (polling place e-voting)On 13 June 2004 Portuguese citizens could participate in a non-binding polling place e-voting test during the European elections. The pilot project allowed voters in 9 municipalities to try one of three different e-voting systems (a touch screen e-voting machine, a light pen system or an electronic card solution). From a total of 128,060 registered voters in the 9 municipalities, 50,562 actually voted and 9,390 of them participated in the pilot project after casting their (binding) vote. The Portuguese Prime Minister, who was one of the voluntary participants, considered the pilot project a "very positive" experience and said he would like to be able to implement legally binding e-voting in the future. The Portuguese Government had explained that the non-binding tests were a first step to put electronic voting on the agenda SPAIN (remote e-voting)Since 1995, the Generalitat de Catalunya (the government of the autonomous region of Catalonia located in the north-east of Spain;) had run several pilot projects in parallel to public elections using electronic voting machines inside polling stations. In November 2003, a non-binding remote e-voting pilot was held in parallel with the Catalan parliament elections. Over 23‘000 Catalans resident in Argentina, Belgium, the United States, Mexico and Chile were invited to participate using any computer connected to the Internet. The Generalitat de Catalunya sponsored this pilot to examine the use of secure electronic voting for the future. 730 voters participated in the pilot). Furthermore, on 14 March 2004 several non-legally binding electronic voting trials were conducted in Spanish municipalities. In the municipality of Jun, near Granada, a total of 597 citizens tested electronic voting systems, with 400 people voting through computers connected to the Internet and 197 people voting by SMS sent via their mobile phones. Internet voting pilots were also carried out in three polling stations in Zamora and Lugo, where 274 citizens tested Internet voting machines at a number of polling stations. (www.laflecha.net/canales/e-administracion/200403151, www.laflecha.net/canales/e-administracion/200403152) On 10 August 2004, the Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, and the First Deputy Prime Minister, announced that in September the government will consider modifications to the law on general elections and the law on referendums with a view to introducing the possibility of using remote electronic voting in the referendum on the European Union Constitution in February 2005 (www.laflecha.net/canales/e-administracion/200408101). SWITZERLAND (remote e-voting)The Swiss government commissioned the Federal Chancellery in August 2000 with the task of examining the feasibility of e-voting. A first report on the options, risks and feasibility of e-voting was delivered in January 2002 (see www.bk.admin.ch/themen/pore/evoting/index.html?lang=fr). Since then, a variety of legally binding tests of remote e-voting has been carried out in the canton of Geneva . Voters in the community of Anières were the first in Switzerland to be able to vote electronically in the communal voting, which took place on 19 January 2003. Further tests took place in Cologny on 30 November 2003, in Carouge on 18 of April 2004 and in Meyrin on 13 of June 2004. On the 26 of September 2004 in all these four communities, e-voting is used in a national referendum. Further tests will be carried out in 2005 in the cantons of Neuchatel and Zurich . The legal basis for the testing of e-voting in Switzerland is provided in article 8a of the Federal Act on Political Rights and in articles 27a-27q of the Decree on Political Rights). An interim report on the development of e-voting in Switzerland was published in August 2004 and is available at www.bk.admin.ch/themen/pore/evoting/index.html?lang=fr. The pilot projects in Geneva, Neuchatel and Zurich are due to be completed and evaluated in 2005. The government and parliament will then decide whether and how electronic voting should be made available in Switzerland as a supplementary form of voting. THE NETHERLANDS (polling place e-voting, remote e-voting)In most districts in the Netherlands, voting is done electronically in polling places. The Dutch government also considers and tests remote e-voting. During the European elections in 2004, citizens who stayed abroad on election day and who registered explicitly for using remote e-voting could cast their vote via Internet or telephone. However, remote e-voting will not be generally deployed in 2004. (see www.minbzk.nl ) UK (polling place e-voting, remote e-voting)In 1997, a government working party set up to examine and review electoral procedures, recommended that pilot schemes of innovative electoral procedures should be used to evaluate their effectiveness. The recommendations of the working party were given effect by the Representation of the People Act 2000, which allowed local authorities to run electoral pilot schemes at local elections in England and Wales. Election pilots have taken place in a number of English local authorities in May 2000, May 2002 and May 2003. In May 2000, 32 local councils ran a total of 38 experimental voting arrangements, including electronic voting and counting. In May 2002, 30 local authorities piloted a total of 36 innovative voting procedures, amongst others remote e-voting using telephones, the Internet and mobile phone text messaging. In May 2003, pilot schemes to test innovative voting and counting methods took place in 59 local authorities across England. Approximately 6.4 million people were eligible to vote in these pilot areas – over 14% of the English electorate. 17 schemes offered electors the chance to cast a vote electronically through a variety of channels – on the Internet, by telephone, via text messaging and for the first time through interactive digital television. In its report on the 2003 pilot projects , the UK Electoral Commission recommends that technical requirements for future e-enabled elections should be further developed. The Government accepts this recommendation in its response to the Electoral Commission's report . It was expected that the UK would extend the e-voting pilots at the 2004 EP election to a few million electors. In its recommendation for the electoral pilots at the 2004 elections , the Electoral Commission did not recommend that an e-enabled element be included in any pilot schemes, as no region was ready for such an innovation. USA (polling place e-voting, remote e-voting)Polling place e-voting will affect nearly one-third of American voters (PDF file) when it comes to the 2004 election of the next president. However, widespread reports of voting terminal failures, and growing concern about the security of these machines, are giving raise to a debate over how to ensure the integrity of the presidential elections. An important part of this discussion has focused on whether to equip direct recording electronic (DRE) voting terminals with a voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT). Seven states have directives or laws requiring VVPAT, and 14 others have introduced similar legislation. Federal legislators are considering reforms that would mandate a VVPAT for DREs. (see the EFF's E-Vote White Paper (PDF file)) A broad discussion about the feasibility of remote e-voting has evolved after the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment SERVE (the website is no longer online.) designed for expatriates participation in the US presidential elections of November 2004, was stopped in spring 2004 based upon a report of four members of a review group financed by the Department of Defence. They recommended shutting down the development of SERVE immediately because they considered the Internet and the PC as insufficiently secure to cast a vote (see www.servesecurityreport.org .) The SERVE system was planned for deployment in the 2004 primary and general elections, and would have allowed the voters overseas and military personnel to vote entirely electronically via the Internet, from anywhere in the world. It was expected that up to 100,000 votes would be cast electronically. Initial findings of a national survey of election technology applications in the United States can be found at IFES' Election Technology Survey . Selected websites: democracie-electronique.org , is a French Portal on e-democracy
Next: Contributors to this Focus On Contributors
Contributors to Focus On E-VotingFocus on e-voting was produced by Nadja Braun, whilst on secondment to International IDEA from the Swiss Federal Chancellery in cooperation with Maria Helena Alves (Independent Consultant of the ACE-Project), Jeff Brady (IFES), Kristina Lemon (Senior Administrative Officer at the Swedish Election Authority), Anna Kessling (Analyst at the Swedish Ministry of Justice) and Robert Krimmer(Research Group E-Voting.cc of the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration). Ms Nadja Braun worked as an expert forthe Council of Europe working group on e-enabled voting and as a legal adviser for the Swiss e-voting projects
Guiding PrinciplesAdministrative ConsiderationsCost ConsiderationsSocial and Political ContextElectronic/Mechanical Voting SystemsOptical Scanning SystemsFocus on HIV/AIDS and Elections
HIV/AIDS poses a major challenge to many developing countries. Besides constituting a tremendous medical emergency, countries already saddled with poverty, are caught up in a vicious circle of lower capacity, loss in human resources and poor growth. Nevertheless, besides being a threat to socio-economic development and human well-being, HIV/AIDS also poses major challenges to democracy and good governance. South Africa is the country worst stricken by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Currently, more people are infected with HIV/AIDS in South Africa than in any other country. There are 4.7 million South Africans affected by the pandemic, which makes up to 20% of the adult population (HIV/AIDS, Democracy and Citizenship p. 2). In November 2004, IDASA (The Institute for Democracy in South Africa) published the report HIV/AIDS and Democratic Governance in South Africa - Illustrating the Impact on Electoral Processes (IDASA 2004) by Kondwani Chirambo , which studies how HIV/AIDS can and does impact on electoral democracy in South Africa.
The key findings of the report by IDASA's Governance and AIDS Programme (GAP) are highlighted in the following sections of this Focus On:
Selected Articles:
Electoral management and administrationElectoral Management Bodies (EMBs) are vital for accrediting the election result with the stamp of approval that the elected regime needs to win national and international legitimacy. In order to successfully carry out its mandate, an EMB needs both qualified and experienced staff as well as accurate demographic statistics to feed into the national voters’ roll. Where the HIV/AIDS epidemic reduces the availability of such appropriately qualified staff and where increased mortality is not accurately reflected in the voters’ roll, the risk of electoral fraud increases manifold (ibid.: 29). In general EMBs which rely on public service workers for support during elections are vulnerable to the pandemic’s effects that might compromise its institutional capacities. This vulnerability is aggravated by the fact that most temporary staff are from the public service, particularly the teaching profession, which is one of the hardest hit by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. As the conduct of elections requires experienced staff, the vulnerability of support personnel to the disease is likely to reduce the EMB’s ability to rely on them to bring their accumulated experience and skills to bear on future elections.” (ibid.:14). Mattes notes that besides decimating the number of public servants, the pandemic could severely harm the processes of political institutionalism. A shrinking body of civil servants will have been at their position long enough to develop the specialised skills, expertise, and professionalism needed to do their work. Furthermore, there will be fewer experienced officials available to train younger personnel in key formal skills, or pass on more informal standard operation procedures or norms (Maanda David Nelufule, AIDS and democracy: what do we know, 2004:19). Next: Electoral systems and power shift Electoral system and power shiftsThe electoral system in a democracy is the crucial institutional device While much analytical attention has been spent on exploring how electoral systems differ in their construction and in terms of what democratic principles they entrench, little if any attention has been given to how sensitive they are to the effects of an epidemic such as HIV/AIDS (ibid.: 28). The report suggests that the Westminster electoral model, or First-Past-the Post (FPTP), is more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS than the Proportional Representation (PR) system. The effects are felt in the process of replacing Members of Parliament who succumb to the disease (ibid.: 15). The FPTP has serious cost implications for sustainability; this system is particularly vulnerable as in most cases by-elections must be held in order to replace any members who die. Preliminary evidence of by-elections generated by increased deaths and the cost of holding them is provided from three Southern African countries to underline this fact. While South Africa uses the PR method at national level, it does operate a hybrid system (FPTP and PR) at local level and might yet endure the effects of the disease. Conversely, a pilot study by IDASA undertaken in 2003 in Zambia – which uses the FPTP electoral method – indicates that between 1964 and 1984 (the 20-year period before the advent of HIV/AIDS) a total of 46 by-elections were held, and 14 of those were a result of death by illness and accidents combined. While over an 18-year period (from 1985, the year the first case of AIDS was documented in Zambia, to February 2003) 102 by-elections were held and 59 of those were due to death by disease. The majority of the 59 by-elections, a total of 39, were held between 1992 and February 2003, which coincidentally are the years in which the HIV/AIDS pandemic peaked in Zambia While there may be no specific information on the nature of the illnesses that led to the deaths of representatives, trend analyses can be indicative of the influence of the pandemic.” (ibid.: 15f). The report notes that disease in general, and especially HIV/AIDS, will contribute to power shifts in countries operating the FPTP electoral model. The effect of illness, combined with vacancies generated by expulsions, resignations or floor crossing by members, has compelled Zimbabwe to hold 13 (+1) by-elections since the 2000 legislative polls. Eight of the by-elections arose because parliamentary representatives had died prematurely of “illness”. The sum effect is that the opposition parties have lost the majority of the by-elections, partly perhaps due to their inability to perpetually compete with a well-resourced ruling party.” (ibid.: 16) Next: Political parties Political partiesGiven the overwhelmingly representative nature of democracy in the world today, the political parties that contest elections to win seats in legislative assemblies are of course absolutely essential for the democratic process. While Members of Parliament (MPs) win personal mandates from electoral constituencies in countries like Botswana and Zambia, these nevertheless co-ordinate their parliamentary work under direction from their respective political parties. Under the alternative electoral system, where voters can only vote for parties and not individual MPs, as in South Africa and Namibia, the parties are all the more important for the electoral process and the legislative work in parliament. Where the HIV/AIDS epidemic undermines parties’ capacity to campaign in elections and to effectively represent its voters during parliamentary sessions – through the loss of leaders, MPs and active members to AIDS-related illnesses and death – parties will be less representative of the electorate and less effective in shaping legislation in accordance with the mandate they have been given by their voters (HIV/AIDS and Democratic Governance in South Africa - Illustrating the Impact on Electoral Processes, 2004: 29). Additionally, HIV/AIDS has put some strain on party structures by creating an increased need to replace cadres who have succumbed to illness or who have died. Although no severe functional defects have arisen in party structures, the loss of seniority and experience nevertheless is reported to have reduced parties’ capacities and ‘intellectual memory’ somewhat. (ibid.: 17f). Next: Public opinion Public opinionThe report suggests that there is a general increase in public awareness of HIV/AIDS as a political and social problem. There is, however, no basis to argue that HIV/AIDS is shaping public opinion in a consistent fashion Willan notes that the high HIV/AIDS prevalence in South Africa has generated high mobilisation around the issue from civil society, as in the case of the Treatment Action Campaign (Samantha Willan, “HIV/AIDS, Democracy and Governance in South Africa”, African Civil Society Governance and Aids Initiative, Issue Brief No. 1 May 2004). Next: Special vote Special voteCaesar stresses the correlation between low voter turnout and HIV/AIDS related issues. Voters too ill to cast a vote or people pre-occupied HIV/AIDS related demands are often disenfranchised (Chirambo & Caesar “Emerging Theories and Perspectives” Aids and Governance, v 1(1), march 2003). In the IDASA report it is acknowledged that the “special vote” is a very useful institutional arrangement to ensure, as far as possible, that people are not disenfranchised by being ill, disabled or pregnant. The mere fact that it exists and was delivered to more than 650 000 voters in the last election is a powerful indication of the commitment of the South African authorities to making democratic participation through the vote as inclusive as possible. However there is a need to categorically state to the public whether people suffering from debilitating or chronic illnesses qualify for this facility. The report finds for instance that some People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) who might wish to have access to the special vote lack sufficient information on whether they are eligible or not. This is likely to have implications for participation by people who are infected by diseases such as HIV/AIDS that are accompanied by stigma and discrimination (HIV/AIDS and Democratic Governance in South Africa - Illustrating the Impact on Electoral Processes, 2004: 17). Next: Stigma and discrimination Stigma and discriminationStigma and discrimination has been found to be the single most dominant determinant for lack of participation in elections by PLWHAs and care givers.
The respondents’ opinions correlate with the findings of studies on stigma and discrimination, particularly South Africa’s Department of Health study of 2002, that HIV/AIDS remains a taboo amongst some South African communities, especially in the rural enclaves. The sense of stigma, it seems, would be strongest amongst people who are symptomatic; respondents argued that most members of the communities would not stand in the same queue with someone with visible signs of disease e.g. body rashes or sores. Based on these discussions, the report concludes that people who have visible signs of illness from HIV/AIDS, and those who have publicly declared their status, are more likely to eschew from public voting, particularly if they are located in a rural area. There is nothing to suggest in the main that PLWHAS have lost the will to participate in political life. Quite the contrary. The majority of respondents expressed a desire to participate but were constrained by attitudinal and structural factors. These results are not representative of the opinions of all PLWHAs as only 68 people participated in the focus groups, but they are indicative of such attitudes and may have external validity.” (HIV/AIDS and Democratic Governance in South Africa - Illustrating the Impact on Electoral Processes, 2004: 18) Voter MortalityNAIDS, the United Nations body responsible for the coordination of the UNs efforts to fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic, estimates that 5.3 million South Africans of all ages were infected with HIV at the end of 2003. The IDASA analyses of deaths between 1999 and 2003 among voters registered on the voters’ roll strengthen the argument that critical segments of the South African electorate are dying from AIDS. Overall, between 1999 and 2003 nearly 1.5 million South African registered voters died of various causes. The report argues that the unusual mortality profiles in the electorate to a large extent can be explained by AIDS. This argument is based on the strong correspondence found between the profiles that the analysis generated and those that have been described by the expert demographers in the field of HIV/AIDS, as well as on the report’s statistical analyses (Ibid.: 15). With a start to the epidemic in the early 1990s, South Africa has only more recently entered the phase when devastating effects will become increasingly clear and painful in terms of sharp increase in AIDS-related morbidity and mortality. That is unless a quick and extensive treatment campaign can effectively halt this tragic development (ibid.: 27). Next: Contributors to this Focus On ContributorsContributors to Focus on HIV/AIDS and ElectionsThe HIV/AIDS Focus On is based on a report developed by Kondwani Chirambo at IDASA (The Institute for Democracy in South Africa). It was compiled and further enriched with external sources by Johan Lindroth, whilst on secondment to International IDEA. Since HIV/AIDS was first discovered in 1981 more than 20 million people have died from AIDS, and today one person is infected with HIV every five seconds. Africa is the continent worst stricken by HIV/AIDS, and Asia and Eastern Europe are experiencing a terrifying increase in the number of persons infected with the virus. The IDASA research project had the objective of investigating the probable impact of HIV-AIDS on electoral processes as a key facet of the democratisation process in Africa. The rationale is that democracy requires strong institutions and the full participation of citizens in political, social and economic life to be sustainable. The main message from the research report is that the legitimacy and effectiveness of the South African democracy and its electoral processes risk being undermined by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. On behalf of IDASA we would like to thank the following persons and institutions for their cooperation and support: the Rockefeller Brother Fund, the Ford Foundation, the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Citizen Surveys, the Electoral Institute of South Africa, Derek Davids, Mary Caesar, Marietjtie Myburg, Vasanthie Naicker, Shaila Gupta, Paul Graham, and People Living with HIV/AIDS and care givers who supported the project.
IntroductionThe past decade has seen an enormous increase in the use of Information and Communications Technology (ICTs) in election management, which has considerably changed election administration in many countries. The use of ICTs can positively impact election management, especially in making some processes quicker and more efficient. But ICTs solutions also carry risks, they often suffer from unrealistic expectations, and they may not be appropriate in some contexts. In his 2009 statement to the UN General Assembly, Secretary General Ban Ki Moon expressed his concern that “…some of the poorest countries in the world have chosen some of the most expensive electoral processes and technology…”. The global electoral assistance community is still in the early stages of developing and adopting best practices for ICTs in elections. This paper offers towards this process the following guiding principles, which are not exhaustive. ICTs solutions in electoral process should be:
The complexities and costs of ICTs solutions make it absolutely imperative that their procurement takes place effectively and transparently. This paper identifies key challenges in procuring electoral goods and services, with a specific focus on electoral ICTs. In relation to electoral procurement the paper emphasizes how it has a much larger scope and impact than is often acknowledged, being often one of the most expensive lines in an electoral budget. It cuts across a wide array of activities around the electoral cycle and should therefore be adopted as an integral part of electoral management and assistance – both in planning and implementation. Delays and shortfalls in procurement and distribution of materials can critically impact the execution and outcome of an election. Therefore, procurement planning is vital and should always be integrated into the programming phase of electoral management exercises and assistance. Planning should include: the development of a procurement strategy and risk management analysis; analysis of supply chain constraints; cost analysis; and assessment of implementing partners’ capacities. The “EC-UNDP Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of Electoral Assistance Projects” note that sensitive, highly specific or costly election materials should preferably be procured with the close collaboration and involvement of the UNDP Procurement Support Office (UNDP/PSO)7. For very expensive, highly technical materials UNDP procurement procedures would include additional risk mitigation mechanisms, such as pilot and validation tests to be conducted as part of the evaluation and before a vendor is selected. The paper focuses also on voter registration, arguably the area where the use of ICTs is expanding most rapidly. Voter registration is a crucial and considerably expensive undertaking in an electoral process, as an accurate voter register is a cornerstone of a credible election. This paper distinguishes three categories of voter registration methodologies according to the level of technology used: low-tech, medium-tech and high-tech. Current trends show how countries, including impoverished post-war countries, are introducing high-tech systems using biometric features, such as Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) or facial recognition scanning, for civil and voter registration. When such complex technological solutions are considered to be procured and adopted, it is fundamental to acquire a full understanding of needs and requirements, and an accurate procurement plan. Procurement for voter registration systems, particularly biometric systems, involves diverse complexities: procurement of biometric-experienced ICTs specialists; decisions regarding local versus international competitive processes; minimum standard requirements; security issues; cost-effectiveness; disaster recovery issues; total solution models (i.e. build operate transfer models) versus technology transfer models, and change management issues. This paper addresses these and other issues in the context of UNDP procurement. While focusing on UNDP’s recent experiences, it outlines potential lessons learnt and best practices in terms of planning and managing procurement of electoral goods and services which are relevant to a wide variety of stakeholders. Procurement at UNDP is in line with policies, regulations and best practices of International Public Procurement, and therefore it is a useful reference for any public institution or organisation involved in procurement for elections. To conclude, the paper’s main topics are summarized and considerations and best practices are mapped for future reference of practitioners in the introduction and use of ICTs in electoral processes. Procurement in Electoral ProcessesElectoral goods and services represent one of the most important and costly parts of an election. Any delay or shortfall in the procurement or distribution of electoral materials or timely receipt of required services can have serious implications for an election, potentially affecting its schedule or even outcome. Procurement does not, however, relate only to buying materials – ballot boxes, polling kits etc. It also involves the procurement of services or building infrastructure. In terms of services, contracting a CSO to conduct trainings or voter education, identifying and hiring specialists on short-term contracts, buying radio and TV spots – all these services must be contracted through a procurement process. In addition, many different types of infrastructure may be required, just a few examples are: furniture and refurbishment of buildings, hardware and software equipment, vehicles, communication tools and supplies. As an example, the following separate electoral activities often require a vast list of items to be procured (particularly if the election is a ‘first generation’ election following the establishment of the EMB after, for instance, a conflict):
Procurement is generally defined as “the overall process of acquiring goods, works or services, which covers all functions from the identification of needs, solicitation and selection, preparation and award of contract and administering the contract through all phases till the end of a service contract or the useful life of an asset”. This indicates that procurement is not an isolated action in time, but rather a continuous process of variable complexity which typically involves several stages, different stakeholders and parties, legal and contractual obligations and consequences. As electoral procurement often utilizes public or donor funds, Public Procurement principles apply and rules and procedures must be observed and followed to safeguard the use of such funds. Such rules will govern the complete process for procurement of goods and services as well as the resulting contracts. Procurement Challenges in Electoral AssistanceAn electoral procurement process aims at delivering all requested goods and services of the required quality, quantity and standards within the established timelines for the agreed price. An electoral procurement process may face number of different challenges:
Electoral Procurement Processes and Procedures at UNDPUNDP has, over the years, developed an extensive understanding and experience in providing technical assistance and support to the conduct of democratic elections, as part of the Democratic Governance practice area. A key support area is the procurement of electoral items, ranging from ballots and ballot boxes, to ink, stationery, and lately, biometric voter registration equipment as well as services. UNDP has recently increased its focus on the crucial pre-polling period of planning and budgeting, which also reflects an increasing concern over how public funds are managed in general; recognising that the procurement of electoral material and services is one of the most expensive parts of an electoral budget. Procurement in UNDP is guided and must be conducted in accordance to specific principles, processes, procedures and best practices applying at all levels from strategy to operation. For instance, in UNDP electoral assistance projects, a competitive tendering process must be undertaken unless detailed outlined in the ProDoc, including a separate budget line and supportive proposal, and then vetted by UNDPs LPAC.8 Such process will be in any case guided by specific procedures and rules. Similarly to other entities conducting public procurement, UNDP uses principles and procedures that help in streamlining the procurement processes, mitigating risks, ensuring optimal quality of the process and the result. Procurement Principles of UNDPThe main principles which guide UNDP procurement in general and for extension apply to any UNDP procurement project in relation to electoral processes are: Similar procurement principles, guidelines and practice are observed in other major International Organisations. For example, the EU procurement directives determine how contracts should be awarded for public works, supplies and services. They set rules for competitive tendering procedures, open up the EU’s public market to competition, prevent ‘buy national’ policies and promote the free movement of goods and services. They aim to foster quality, transparency and fairness. Member States have implemented the EU Procurement Directives in national law. The World Bank similarly focuses on nondiscrimination between bidders, transparency of procurement proceedings, economy of government contracting, effectiveness of procurement processes and accountability of both the private and public sectors. UNDP Procurement ProcessesIn general, public procurement differs from procurement amongst private entities in the formality and measures applied to guarantee the observance of the governing principles, as listed above in the case of UNDP. For an easy overview, the following chart outlines the major steps applicable to UNDP, but it also reflects generally for any public procurement. Strategic analysis and procurement plan: Identifying needs and developing a strategic approach to the procurement thereof through appropriate and timely planning are key elements to successful procurement, regardless of whether it is goods and/or services. Early and detailed planning should ideally address challenges in procurement and facilitate efficient, effective, and transparent procurement. Next chapter is dedicated to this fundamental step of strategic planning in procurement. In accordance with the procurement plan and strategy, the procurement action will initiate with a request being defined through Technical Specifications (for Goods and Equipment) or Statement of Works (SoW for Works) or Terms of Reference (ToR for Services). In practical terms, this is typically prepared and finalized with the involvement of procurement personnel and approved, including the allocation of dedicated funding being assured. Thereafter a method of procurement or a modality by which to solicit offers for the required goods, works and/or services must be selected depending on the nature and value/size of the project and its procurement elements. Methods of solicitation in UNDP, for example, are 1) Requests For Quotations; 2) Invitations To Bid; 3) Requests For Proposals; and 4) Local Shopping. Such methods involve different levels of formality, complexity and process. They can also target different scopes of supply markets, being the process based on either open international competition, limited international competition or local and/or national competition. The tender (bidding) period initiates with the issuance/ publication of the Solicitation documents, which will include among other sections, the corresponding instructions to bidders, terms and conditions, technical specifications or TORs/SOWs, price schedule, and evaluation criteria. Also essential aspects as technical, commercial and qualification documents to be provided; quantities, terms of delivery and conditions are detailed, contributing to minimizing risks and ensuring quality. Once the bidding period closes, bids received will be correspondingly opened and handed over to procurement staff for evaluation. UNDP defines Evaluation of Bids, as “The process of assessing offers in accordance with the established evaluation method and evaluation criteria, with a view to obtain best value for money for the organisation. The process needs to be conducted in a fair and transparent manner to ensure equal treatment of all bidders”. Evaluation results in the selection of supplier/s considering the specified evaluation criteria and based on procurement principles including best value for money. A Contract or Purchase Order can be awarded to the selected supplier/s only following internal approval from the corresponding contract committees. If necessary negotiations may be conducted with the selected supplier to finalise matters before a contract or purchase order is issued. Contract Administration or Management is often an ignored but important stage of the procurement process to ensure that the time, cost and quality criteria are met. This will involve monitoring and liaison as necessary with the supplier and end user to ensure that all parties in a contract fully understand and fulfil their respective obligations. Procurement Around the Electoral Cycle Strategy and PlanningProcurement should be understood and treated as a managerial discipline running through all parts of the project management rather than simply as an administrative undertaking. Procurement planning should include the development of a procurement strategy, plans and risk analysis from the early project formulation phase and address the identified challenges in electoral procurement. Electoral procurement strategyFor each procurement project a procurement strategy must be defined, intended to ensure that all relevant aspects are covered during the process to be conducted, starting with the selection of a procurement method to asset disposal considerations. In short, a procurement strategy should involve the following issues:
Electoral Procurement PlanningA full integration of procurement planning into the programme design phase is essential for an electoral assistance project. A joint planning process between programme and operational staff, allows for the necessary understanding of procurement requirements, the market and associated risks. During project formulation, procurement plans should be developed in line with and operationalizing the corresponding procurement strategy, including thorough discussion and accomplishment of the following: Procurement planning also means that key objectives, timeframes, roles and responsibilities are clearly identified and operationalized in the plan. Procurement plans, like operational plans and budgets, are dynamic documents that need continuous updating through the project, in order to reflect changes and address any new challenges that may arise. As shown in the figure, planning represents the highest savings potential of the procurement process, as the earlier we find ourselves in the process the more we can influence costs, quality and timelines. Therefore, appropriate planning at the start of the process contributes to timely procurement and a better allocation of resources, avoiding the risks of unjustified higher costs due to late action, and without compromising established regulations or quality levels. If procurement has not been planned well in advance – and all identified risks been mitigated - it often leads to rushed processes and eventually undesired procurement outcomes, delays or non-performances. Procurement should ensure that the solicitation of offers is timely, purchases are cost effective and materials are delivered on time as per required quality. In relation to this, procurement officers should be encouraged to develop the necessary understanding of supply markets through market research, and include such factors and their interrelations in the corresponding procurement plans. Time, Cost and Quality, the same pillars that define “best value for money”, are crucial factors to be carefully considered when planning procurement of electoral materials as well. Each of them interrelates and influences the other two, resulting in a matrix of relations which needs to be factored in from the start, at planning stage. First, timing is an essential factor in electoral procurement as it affects the complete project implementation, the pricing and total costs, the credibility of the electoral process, and ultimately the results. Here, timing is not only considered as delivery time but also the time needed for further inland distribution, especially when goods are consolidated from all over the world, as well as time needed for mobilization of staff and preparedness. Major system enhancements — e.g. new IT systems and/or voter registration systems — should aim to start as early as possible in the post-election period to maximise the time for testing, procedural development, training, cultural acceptance, as well as durable and institutionalized adoption of the solution. All these will have a great impact on the sustainability of the solution. Secondly, in relation to costs and pricing, it is worth to note that in the case of electoral processes a considerable part of the materials sourced for may be low-tech and relatively easy to produce, hence low cost “a priori”. However, the urgency and need for expedited response and extreme consolidation capacity make that for certain usual items in elections only a limited number of specialised suppliers that can respond under such circumstances exist. When timelines are tight, the buyer becomes highly dependent on suppliers, while suppliers must deploy more resources and effort to respond, all in all potentially resulting in dramatic increases in their prices. Later Part 2 provides a complete overview on budgeting and issues related to costs. Last but not least, quality requirements need to be factored in the procurement plan, as they determine major aspects including what is to be sourced, where it can be sourced, the appropriate methods, etc. The overall implementation of the project will highly depend on having procured the right items for the job, i.e. the right quality in broad meaning. In terms of quality issues then, procurement plans should consider for example the implications of the quality level/standards required on the range of available products/equipment and responsive suppliers; interrelations with cost and time, i.e. the higher the quality requirement the more that prices and timelines tend to increase; considerations in terms of necessary testing; considerations on alternative solutions; and quality specifications such as materials, sizes, performance, standards, in order to minimize involved risks. Technical Specifications and their Role in the Process: Solicitation, Evaluation and TestingTechnical Specifications, as the principal means to define the procurement requirement, deserves special attention for its important role in procurement, especially for complex equipment and new technologies. In short, the specification is the “heart” of the procurement transaction as it: Specifications in the case of goods should involve most importantly all technical/physical details, complemented as necessary by functional and performance specifications, defining the purpose and capacities of the item. It is important to not limit specifications for goods to only physical details, especially when procuring equipment, new technologies and complex systems. In addition, specifications should be stated in a generic manner, avoiding the use of brand or trade names as far as possible. In the case of services, requests are mainly defined based on functional and performance criteria, being the principal specifications to use for services. For example, requests for services should provide background and objectives, the terms of reference (ToR) or Statement of Works required (SoW); quality standards; the qualifications and experience of consultants required; time period; deliverables/output; milestones and reporting; provisions for monitoring and evaluation, etc. Specifications, wherever possible should use internationally accepted Standards to provide a recognized and measurable reference for compliance, remove uncertainty and provide a clear benchmark the suppliers should meet. A typical use of standards is in relation to quality. Quality refers to the perception of the degree to which the product or service meets the customer’s expectations. It actually has no specific meaning unless related to a specific function and/or object, as quality is a perceptual, conditional and somewhat subjective attribute. Therefore, using established and specific standards helps in clarifying what is the exact level of quality requested. In UNDP electoral procurement activities where typically there is an international basket fund electoral assistance project managed by UNDP, (UNDP conducting the procurement under UNDP procurement procedures, in support to an EMB), the technical specifications should be developed at the earliest stage possible within the project and jointly by UNDP and the EMB. It is absolutely necessary in this context that the final technical specifications are agreed and signed off by the EMB before the procurement request is issued to the suppliers. This approach ensures involvement, agreement and adoption of the solution by the beneficiary – the EMB, which is part of the process. The signed-off technical specifications form the backbone from which the evaluation criteria are established. Attempting to draw up such evaluation criteria in the absence of a pre-established, signed-off, technical specification can be troublesome. For example, evaluators might disagree on what criteria should be used and what is each one’s relative importance. Absence of clear and agreed specifications will prevent development of proper offers from suppliers and complicate evaluation, the supplier selection phase and after-delivery stages. The following points illustrate this: In addition, where no efforts have been made towards appropriate definition of specifications, standardisation of practices and early establishment of criteria in the process, procurement has faced risky situations of vendor lock, where the vendor may influence to define the specifications, limiting competition and eventually developing a monopoly type situation. There are additional advantages when a technical specifications document is drawn up and it forms an integral part of the procurement process and order placement. For example, ideally it should be possible to fully test a product’s conformance before sign-off and deployment. In practise however this is not always feasible. For example, the specifications for a biometric voter registration kit may include the criteria of registering at least 10,000 voters, as well as detecting, via fingerprints (or a fused algorithm of fingerprints and facial recognition) any attempt to register a person more than once on the same kit. Therefore, we should then register 10,000 different people as voters while occasionally testing the duplicate voter registration functionality. In reality, however, a more reduced number of mock voters are registered during the test sessions and based on that functionalities are tested. Following this example, in case that during implementation kits are discovered not to adhere to the specifications despite tests were considered passed, supplier selected and offered equipment is signed-off for conformity, then the purchaser has the recourse to request the supplier to meet the established specifications as per solicitation documents. Solicitation documents typically form an integral part of the contract, and therefore they become legally binding once signatures are stamped as contract being accepted by both parties. Stakeholder Interactions and CommunicationThroughout the project, but especially in the initial planning stages, good communication between the programme and operations components of the project is vital.10 All programme staff -- election operations, training, voter education etc – must be clear early on their requirements. Coordination between UNDP representatives should inform and agree with the EMBs and the donors on the procurement requirements that must be followed. Interaction occurs in electoral procurement processes typically as representatives from EMBs are encouraged to participate in evaluation processes conducted by UNDP, as observers. Participation seeks to ensure EMBs provide the necessary technical inputs and are familiar with the goods or services offered. Nevertheless, if any EMB requests participation as a full evaluation team member, i.e. with voting rights, the request must be authorised by UNDP, when UNDP is the responsible and accountable procuring entity. In such cases, the composition of the evaluation panel shall be in accordance to UNDP rules and regulations. International and local rules & legislationEMBs in developing countries are not always regulated by the rules that multinational organisations such as UNDP have developed and honed over decades. But many of UNDP’s procurement principles can ideally be transferred to the EMB for sustainability. National partners should be involved in, and familiar with, UNDP’s procurement process. First, this enhances transparency and shared ownership – national partners will also feel responsible for selected goods and services. Second, it assists the EMB’s staff in familiarizing themselves with UNDP procurement principles, which are usually also relevant to any national public procurement rules the EMB must follow once direct UNDP procurement support has ended. However, the compatibility of UNDP, EC and international procurement principles with any local procurement regulations that the EMB will have to comply with should also be kept in mind – especially when the EMB takes ownership of the procurement systems. Even if the principles are similar, discrepancies between the procedures required by national legislation and those required by UNDP and the EC can be significant. International and local marketsA commonly faced challenge in applying International Public Procurement principles, which also affects the interaction between stakeholders, lies in ensuring the most cost effective and efficient procurement process while at the same time fostering the development of local markets for electoral supplies/goods. Procurement has to be undertaken on the basis of above-mentioned principles, i.e. ensuring transparent competition, achieving value for money and mitigating procurement risks. UNDP procurement rules require international competition (for processes of volume above a certain threshold) and unfortunately this does not always support the development of the local market or the capacity of national partners. Yet, in some cases, overall development objectives can influence the procurement strategy. For example, occasionally a project may waive the requirement for international competition for some products so as to support the local economy/markets and build local capacities. However, a decision like this would be contingent to a number of internal approvals in the case of UNDP, and more in general should be based on a country-specific risk analysis, proper planning and a timely start to the procurement process. Risk and feasibility studies may reveal though that a certain item is not available from local sources. For example, digital mobile registration kits may not be available on the local market, or there may not be facilities to print ballots with sufficient security features. Even other materials, like stationary items, that are available locally are often required in such large quantities, or as part of polling kits with other items that cannot be bought locally, so that local procurement may not be feasible. In all cases the comparative importance of using the local market must be determined at the outset of the project and ideally included in the overall country program and in the procurement strategy. It must be noted that equipment internationally procured could be costly to maintain (purchase of spare parts, purchase of additional units, servicing, etc.) independently by an EMB, which needs to be taken into consideration for technologic equipment, for example, when defining the scope of the technical specifications, technical support, guarantee and after sales services. For instance, in Afghanistan, there were strong imperatives to use the local market to stimulate Afghan business as part of reconstruction and recovery efforts. As a result, the electoral assistance project’s procurement plan involved local contractors and service providers to the extent possible within the UNDP rules that require competitive international bidding. In Afghanistan this involved a partnership with an international NGO, who trained Afghan businesses on UNDP procurement rules and how to tender for UNDP contracts. Management Arrangements and Types of EngagementUNDP has different management arrangements, units and tools to help with the procurement process in support to EMBs. The following is a short introduction to these topics. The choice of implementation modality assigns the policies and procedures to be followed when implementing UNDP-supported programmes and projects. UNDP can arrange for its support to programmes/projects in one of the following four ways, using the following implementing partners (or institutions): UNDP will always continue to pursue national capacity development under DEX/DIM which is the default modality in electoral assistance. However, UNDP can, if it deems it necessary, engage with other implementation partners under DEX/DIM. The use of ‘implementing partners’ is initially identified during the formulation of the project. Upon the appropriate implementation modality, the implementing partner to undertake the programme/project arranges for the procurement of inputs and is fully responsible for further implementation in compliance with international practices. Regardless of whether management arrangements are fully DEX/DIM or partly NEX/NIM, UNDP can engage NGOs/CSOs for specific sub-components in three possible ways: In short, if a UNDP project is identifying an NGO/CSO as an implementing partner, this is a programming decision made on the basis of a vetting process/recommendations of UNDP’s LPAC (Local Project Appraisal Committee) at the project formulation stage. Whilst, if the NGO/ CSO is a contractor of a UNDP project, this is a procurement decision made later on the basis of a competitive bidding exercise. Finally, UNDP can fund, through grants, proposals prepared and submitted by CSOs. This modality is different from contracts as it provides an opportunity to CSOs to design proposals themselves, in the form of micro-capital grants up to $150,000. Centralized Procurement Support within UNDPOrganisations, especially if highly decentralized as it is UNDP in terms of programming and operations, may largely benefit from maintaining specific support functions at central level. In the case of UNDP procurement, this is achieved through UNDP/PSO (Procurement Support Office) Global Procurement Unit (GPU), which provides support and conducts procurement on behalf of UNDP COs for strategic or capacity-related reasons. PSO GPU focuses only on UNDP Practice Areas, being Electoral Procurement and Assistance a major one. Advantages experienced from such set up are visible in terms of results: streamlined and quality-assured procurement of complex items and equipment or in high risk situations. For that, there are a number of factors that directly contribute to GPU’s capacity to provide so, including: Regarding the type of support functions proving suitable to perform at a central office, in the case of GPU in support to electoral processes are:
Functions above and benefits from a central support office become more value adding and useful as the more experiences are achieved. Accumulated experience and knowledge from a wide range of projects including various Country Office different election systems, different technical solutions, and different political, institutional and security landscapes, becomes a key asset to effectively provide quality and expert services to UNDP. Another aspect facilitated by the existence of a central support office is the production of statistics and cross-organisational analysis of demand factors and markets’ responses, such as product trends and procurement volumes, among others. In terms of volumes and products, how does electoral procurement look currently from a central support office? As per data from PSO GPU procurement, the below illustration shows which items represented during the period the main expenditures overall. Among them, it is remarkable the volume that biometric registration equipment and technology represents, being by large the product group that concentrates most of the cost. This confirms a trend towards an increasing use of biometric/digital registration technology, and of overall budget expenditure around this highly costly technology investment. Should a similar overview be established today, the commodity expenditure volumes would confirm even further such trend, with approximately 10 African countries currently introducing biometric civil/voter registration technology, including Zambia, Kenya, Benin, Togo, DRC, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, etc. (The graphic below includes only 2 countries at that time). Finally, support from central office shall include at the top of the priorities longer term focus and activities, as continued resources development and coordination at institutional level. With regards to this fundamental aspect, UNDP PSO GPU is part of the Joint ECUNDP Task Force on Electoral Assistance collaborating and participating regularly in joint EC-UNDP formulation missions with an operational focus, workshops and other initiatives within the field of electoral assistance. CASE STUDY: The Cross-Institutional Strategists Process in ZambiaThe recent example of Zambia illustrates a case of a cross-institutional joint strategizing process. This included an early analysis of technical specifications, market research, testing and validation of various kinds of biometric registration kits, and an analysis of associated risks to the process. All this took place even before the procurement planning phase. The process was facilitated by the Joint EC-UNDP Task Force which undertook a number of missions in Zambia during 2008 and 2009. The missions, aimed at electoral assistance project formulation and identification covering the 2009-2012 electoral cycle in Zambia, included the following activities: The procurement process was conducted by UNDP PSO GPU, in support to the UNDP Zambia office. Specifications development and bidding period took place during the last quarter of 2009, arriving the last kits to Lusaka in May 2010. Zambia is thus among one of the most promising case studies both in terms of the potential integration of the civil register and the voter register in a seamless manner, and also for the related programme/operational/procurement planning. A Tool for Efficiency in UNDP Procurement: Long Term AgreementsLong Term Agreements (LTAs) are framework agreements maintained with one or more suppliers for a certain commodity, service, or group of them for a period of up to 3 years typically. The purpose of establishing Long Term Agreements (LTAs) includes among others: UNDP/GPU maintains LTAs with several expert suppliers for a vast range of strategic and essential electoral materials typically required. The main focus of LTAs in the past has been to cover commonly procured items for manual registration, following past trends. Materials requested are in most cases highly diverse, requiring consolidation and special packing/integration for later distribution. This typically involves complex logistics. Electoral related materials covered by LTAs include items such as ballot boxes and seals, voting booths, indelible ink, registration/polling kits, IT equipment, power supplies and freight forwarding services. Most of these goods are not normally available locally and therefore covered through global LTAs. Recent needs assessments, mapping exercises, analysis on conducted procurement and feedback from field missions, show a trend towards higher technological solutions, e.g. using Optical Mark Reader (OMR) methodology or introducing comprehensive digital biometric voter registration solutions. The strategic focus for the immediate future is thus to increase the scope of procurement tools, such as LTAs/prequalification lists, etc. to include items of higher level of technology, higher production complexity and higher security requirements. Another potential area of expansion for procurement tools and agreements is consultancy services in the field of elections, for example provision of support and training for domestic observers; training of political parties on voter registration and polling procedures, etc.; media support and monitoring services; and support to civic and voter education services. Nonetheless, tendering processes will continue to be routinely launched due to the different needs and individual character of each project complexity, volume, promoting local involvement, etc. Costs and Budgeting for Electoral ProcurementCosts of elections include costs incurred in undertaking activities in support of the functions of the electoral cycle – including among others voter registration, boundary delimitation, civic and voter education, professional development and training, voting operations, result tabulation and transmission of results, audits etc. Substantial sums are spent on the procurement of goods and services in support of these activities. The most expensive type of elections are ‘first generation’ elections carr ied out in post-conflict countries or in newly formed States. The most expensive activities typically relate to the setting up of the election administration and its territorial structure (the so called “securitisation” of the elections), the first voter registration exercise of eligible voters from new, the procurement and distribution of election materials, the recruitment and training of inexperienced staff, the development of an initial stakeholders’ capacity, extensive voter information and education campaigns. Other relevant costs that might have a big impact on the budget are transportation (including vehicles, boats, helicopters, charter planes) and security, especially in relation to the specific electoral event. In some extreme cases like Afghanistan and Iraq, these costs might reach almost 50% of the budget. Second or third generation elections might still incur high implementation costs related to, for example, higher voter registration costs and systematic improvements to existing technology but in general terms, cost reductions should arise over time due to improvements in planning and training, and the re-use of equipment (polling station kits and the like). Ideally, a country should aim to bring its electoral costs down from one electoral cycle to the subsequent one. The reduction might be expressed as a percentage of the total costs of the previous election, such that cumulative reductions will enable national appropriation of the total costs. However, there are many relevant logistical (e.g. security concerns, geographical extension of the country, weather conditions) and technical/political factors (e.g. electoral systems and voter registration systems) that might keep costs high. Other key operational decisions to be taken by the EMB can considerably affect the electoral budget, such as the decision to increase security features to be applied to ballot papers (increasing design and printing costs), or to increase the level of technology to be introduced from new. Procurement costs constitute a bulk of electoral budgets. Tracking the costs of procurement and establishing a well-functioning budget, however, are complex tasks. While the price of the goods and services to be bought can be well-known, procurement officers need to take into account less visible costs related to, for example, acquisition, installation, maintenance, storage and disposal. These costs also include training of electoral staff using technology, and consequences that can occur if training has been poor. Hidden costs equally include supervision (operational and technical). Consecutive electoral cycles need to be taken into consideration when estimating the following distinctive costs in the budget:
These are all costs which impact sustainability and constitute the so called ‘Total Cost of Ownership’ (TCO). Erroneously, often only purchase price is taken into account in assessing value for money. Cost effectiveness, involving direct and indirect costs as mentioned above, need to be well understood. At the same time TCO may be difficult to quantify, where “Creative” TCO calculations are also a possible source of tender manipulation and inflation of prices. Applying common sense – especially in cases of big discrepancies – can help. Risk ManagementRisk assessment is carried out in order to predict possible problems and to identify their likely sources with the primary objective of preventing such problems from arising in the first place. Risks need to be identified, analyzed, quantified and prioritized. Risks can be grouped in two categories - both of which need to be taken into account in the procurement plan. Endogenous risks are risks that are largely within the control of the organisation. Examples are poor procurement planning, poor contract management, inadequate forecasting procedures etc. Exogenous risks, on the other hand, are risks that are largely outside the control of the organisation such as the risks of weather, military activities, political activities etc. These risks require contingency planning. Risk assessment requires careful and systematic analysis of endogenous and exogenous factors that may influence the smooth implementation of a well-defined procurement plan. It provides an important basis for risk management at the subsequent stage. Based on the reasons above, and the fluid nature of election budgets, it is thus immensely important to include, as possible, contingency line items in the budget. The most commonly experienced challenges in electoral procurement preparations, which increase the risks of the process relate to: decisions on implementation methodologies; development of technical specifications and terms of reference; time constraints; insufficient budgets for procurement needs; and national ownership and capacities. Here are some examples: Contingency planning is to have a reserve for when something not under our control goes wrong. Some examples of risks requiring contingency planning in the ICTs area include:
Appropriate Technologies and ICTs for DevelopmentAppropriate technology refers to technology applications designed with special attention towards environmental, ethical, cultural, social and economic aspects of the community it is intended for. With these goals in mind, appropriate technology usually requires fewer resources, is easier to maintain, has a lower overall cost and a decreased impact on the environment. The term is also often utilized to describe suitable simpler technologies in developing countries and emerging democracies that can most effectively achieve the intended purpose in a specific location. Thus, taking the level of development into account, the term therefore is usually used in two ways:
Information and Communication Technologies for Development (ICT4D) refers to the application of ICTs within the field of international socioeconomic development. In this case, ICT4D aims to apply information technologies to alleviate poverty, and ICTs can be applied to directly benefit the disadvantaged population, or in an indirect sense where the ICTs assist governments (supported by non-governmental organisations) in order to improve the socio-economic conditions in a given country. Therefore, examples of appropriate technologies in ICTs are, for instance, mobile phones, which reach a wide geographical coverage. In a similar vein, e-mail and web-access provides rather inexpensive services through the utilization of cooperative computer networks that can run wireless ad hoc networks. For remote areas, satellite internet access is more expensive but has the advantage of operating on a higher speed and increases connectivity. Types of initiatives in relation to ICT4Dev are:
Introduction of ICTs in Electoral ProcessesAny effort to make electoral assistance more effective must also tackle the issue of the increasing use of technology in electoral processes. The accelerating development of ICTs applications available for electoral purposes and the appeal that such applications have for partner countries’ EMB are factors to be considered by all EMBs, development agencies, electoral assistance providers and practitioners. ICTs have already dramatically changed the way elections are conducted in many developed countries. This process is likely to continue and affect more and more emerging democracies, regardless of their level of preparedness to introduce such applications, and despite the fact that the cost implications can be enormous. It seems that post-conflict and emerging democracies, in particular, are making, with donor funds, the biggest leaps in technology, with sometimes serious deficiencies in sustainability. There is a great demand from partner countries, in which suppliers of ICTs solutions often play a role, to development agencies to invest in ICTs applications for electoral processes, which should consider the level of capacity already attained by the respective EMB. Among others, recent examples are Benin, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Togo, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, DRC and Nigeria. The biggest challenge is how to ensure a sustainable, appropriate, cost effective and transparent use of technology, particularly in postconflict elections, and in fragile and emerging democracies. There is no fixed solution that can be applicable everywhere: different situations require different solutions. As a general rule, the level of technological upgrades suitable for a given partner country should always be directly related not only to the capacity, but also to the trust and independence enjoyed by its EMB. These elements – trust and independence – are decisive to the acceptance of the use of ICTs by the public and, as a consequence, influence the level of trust in the electoral process. Provided that technologies are legally supported, operationally appropriate, accurate, cost-effective, timely implemented, transparent and sustainable, they can build credibility by improving the speed and efficiency of the electoral process. However, too much attention to technology applications may divert the EMBs from other important matters and may drain development agencies’ or EMB budgets. Costs associated with purchasing and distribution, system defects, poor design or testing may leave development agencies captive to increasing costs in order to save what they have already invested in. There is a need to “skill up” staff to implement sustainable systems, and this may not be easy given the short timetables that are often involved. Finally, undue influence in favour of one solution or another may be exerted by interested vendors or even by development agencies who wish to introduce a technology similar to the one in use in their own country. Also, it might be so that political groups in power view the use of technology as the ultimate and the most effective method to control the electoral process. Within this framework of possibly conflicting interests, EMBs, development agencies, practitioners, academics and electoral assistance providers have an important role to play in influencing the technological choices to be adopted in a given electoral process, so that it meets the appropriate needs of the country. Added conflicting interests appear when developing technical specifications, validation testing, allocating budgets and deciding on available timelines for appropriate implementation. Guiding Principles for Procurement of ICTs Applications for Electoral ProcessesBest practices in the use of ICTs in elections are still developing. However, drawing on recent experience of election practitioners, the ACE project identifies several guiding principles for the adoption and use of ICTs in an electoral context.21 When an EMB considers introducing and procuring technology, these principles provide a useful starting point. They can help to establish and maintain public confidence in the electoral process. These guiding principles are: 1. Take a holistic view of the new technologyTechnology is just a tool and therefore it is not an end in itself. When technology is applied to any activity related to electoral administration and elections, it is important to consider carefully the electoral context in which the technology is used. For example, if technology is being considered for vote counting, the guiding principles that apply to vote counting also apply to the technology. It is also good to keep in mind that electoral processes involve more than just operations and technology. They include relevant laws, regulations and guidelines, social and political contexts, the organisational culture of the body implementing the technological solution, the procedures developed to complement the technology and the training of technicians and users. 2. Consider the impact of introducing new technologiesWhen a new system is being considered to replace another, an evaluation is needed to assess the impact of the change on all stakeholders. Once the system is adopted, the transition phase needs to be carefully managed to ensure that problems do not occur and that all functions can continue to be effectively carried out. Some strategies that can be used by electoral administrators to minimize the impact of new systems, new technology and changes on electoral processes are: 3. Maintain transparency and ensure ethical behaviour while adopting new technologyTransparency – meaning openness and accountability – is a key feature for the credibility of democratic elections. An indicator of transparency can be the access afforded to electoral observers, both domestic and international, to all procedures at every stage of the electoral process. With manual processes, transparency is relatively straightforward, as the processes are usually visible and it is not difficult to provide meaningful access to observers. By contrast, with the use of some technologies it may be more difficult or even impossible for observers to testify that the outcome is correct. Electronic voting systems are one example where in some cases it can be very difficult to ensure that the vote that is registered is indeed the vote cast by the voter and, therefore, that the resulting vote count is accurate. On the other hand, the use of technology may enhance transparency once the data entry into the respective system is proved to be accurate and large quantities of data can produce meaningful reports with very few errors. It is useful to compare “micro” and “macro” perspectives when analysing the transparency of manual and electronic systems. With manual processes, transparency is relatively straightforward at a micro level. For example, observers or party agents can easily observe operations in a paper-based voting station, and compare results in that station to those published centrally. However, a macro-level perspective is more difficult. Results are not immediately available and there are no assurances that unobserved voting stations that haven’t been observed directly are presenting accurate results. In contrast, electronic systems can facilitate transparency at the macro-level. For example, electronic systems can allow for results to be easily generated almost immediately after polling stations close, with results for the entire country tabulated and presented at different regional levels all the way down to individual stations. But one downside of electronic systems is that an observer may not always be confident that the vote cast by the voter is indeed the resultant vote counted at the end of the process. If a random sample of the equipment is tested and found to be accurate, however, then an observer can reasonably assume that the rest should behave similarly. Whether an electronic system is observed or not it will behave the same way. By contrast some argue that a manual process may be affected by whether or not it is observed. For example, voting station staff may pay more attention to adhering to rules and regulations and accurately counting the votes while they are being observed, and less so if left to their own devices. Knowing that a small percentage of voting stations observed operated correctly does not necessarily extrapolate to the remaining percentage of unobserved stations. With the use of technologies, transparency may be achieved in different ways depending on the technology. This may involve the use of techniques, such as the creation of audit trails, creation of log files, code verifications, digital signatures and compilation checks, among others. As a result, the skills needed by observers of electoral processes using various technologies, may be completely different than those needed to observe manual processes. To ensure transparency, the election management body may seek the assistance of specialized experts or auditors able to verify the accuracy of their systems and to provide special training to observers. In addition, auditing the implementation of technology is required. External audits are recommended. Regarding issues of transparency and trust, EMBs are expected to follow appropriate ethics when implementing new technology. For instance, when choosing technology suppliers, EMBs should ensure that the tendering process is fair and open, without favouritism or corruption, and that all government purchasing procedures applicable to the selection of technology are followed. When buying hardware and software, EMBs should ensure that proper licenses are obtained. Apart from the legal and ethical issues with using unlicensed or unregistered software, users also run the risk of not being notified of known bugs, software fixes or upgrades. Antivirus software should be used for laptops and desktop computers. A complication is that most antivirus software programmes will not update their virus definition files without an internet connection. This poses a serious problem for laptopbased kits deployed to remote regions without internet access. 4. Consider the security issues related to the new technologyComputer systems used for elections must include high levels of security. Unauthorised persons must be prevented from accessing, altering or downloading sensitive electoral data. Demonstrable security levels are another way of ensuring that election IT systems are transparent and trustworthy. Various mechanisms exist to provide for computer security. These include password protection, encryption, verification programmes and physical isolation. 5. Test the accuracy of results produced by the use of technologyAccuracy is vital to the credibility of an election, particularly for voters’ lists, vote recording, vote counting and the reporting of election results. To ensure that technological systems are trustworthy, there must be ways to test and verify that data is recorded properly and that the manipulation of this data produces accurate outputs. System accuracy may be tested by randomly entering known data into the system and verifying that the resulting outputs are correct. In addition, for voting systems, a test should be performed to verify that the same set of data processed through several randomly chosen, similar but independent systems produces the same results. On the whole, it should be expected that accuracy increases as new and improved technologies are adopted. 6. Ensure privacyElectoral computer systems often contain sensitive personal data for large numbers of individuals, which can include names, addresses and other personal details. Many countries have privacy laws and policies that place restrictions on access to personal information, under the general principle that every person has the right to personal privacy. If a person’s privacy is invaded by improper use of electoral data, both the person and the respect accorded to the electoral process may suffer. Accordingly, security features in electoral computer systems should take account of the need to protect the privacy of personal data. Audit trails can be built into systems containing personal data to track and monitor which individuals have accessed or modified personal data and to prevent any unauthorised invasion of privacy. 7. Voter privacy in electronic voting/internet votingConflicts arise when an electoral IT system needs to ensure that a person that voted is a citizen, has the right to vote, and did not vote more than once. To ensure this security, the system should know the identity of the voter. But the system should not, however, know how the voter voted. There are solutions for these issues, but EMB’s and voters need to be educated on these solutions. EMBs need proof that the electoral IT system ensures a valid voting process, and the voter needs to be ensured of his voting privacy. 8. What services are to be provided by the technology?Elections are largely about providing a service for its clients, the voters. When choosing a new technology, the level of client service, including the ”ease of use and voters’ satisfaction”, as well as how the technology is perceived by its users’, needs to be a priority consideration for the EMB in order to ensure that the credibility of the electoral process is not jeopardized. There are a number of strategies that can be adopted to reduce users’ unrealistic expectations or suspicion, and in order to ensure trust. There should be: 9. Ensure inclusivenessWhere a technology with impact on internal and/or external users is being adopted, it is advisable to organize a consultation process with those users or their representatives to ensure that their needs are met and that they are satisfied that the new system is acceptable and reliable. It is important to provide sufficient information to users to enable them to feel included in the process and therefore increase the likelihood that the new technology will be successfully implemented. Since election technology has the potential to directly affect the political process, it is important to engender a sense of ownership in its users, much more so than might be considered for other government systems. In addition, access and equity considerations should be taken into account when adopting new technology to ensure that people with special needs are included. 10. Consider the technology cost-effectivenessTherefore, before making a commitment to implement new technology, it is important to determine whether it is financially viable, by getting a complete account of all likely costs and savings, namely: In addition, carrying out the following studies might also prove useful: These considerations and the results of these studies can help to identify additional functions, benefits and user satisfaction to be provided by the technology under consideration. These considerations can also help to provide a realistic estimate of the expected costs or savings needed for a thorough evaluation of the proposed technology’s cost/efficiency ratio. This, in turn, can help determine whether the technology is worthwhile, viable and affordable. Relatively minor improvements may not justify the extra cost and by the same token, if a low-cost, low-tech solution is available and it is acceptable for the specific task, there may not be a need to implement a proposed high-cost, high-tech solution. Whenever possible, the expected life-span of the technology should also be determined. In principle, a technology that can be re-used for more than one purpose or for more than one election is more cost-effective than one that can only be used once before it needs to be replaced. 11. Evaluate efficiencyAlthough it is often expected that a new technology is more efficient than the old one, it might not be the case in practice. It is possible to replace an efficient manual process with an inefficient automated one if the new process is not carefully thought through. When deciding to implement a new technology, it is important to ensure that the new system is more efficient than the one it replaces. One of the anticipated benefits of technology is the ability to perform accurately large complex tasks in a relatively short time compared to the time needed to undertake the tasks manually. While this may enable EMBs to reduce costs by deploying fewer staff, it may also lead to additional pressure on staff as productivity rises and more is expected of them. 12. Evaluate sustainabilityEvaluating sustainability is one of the most important criteria in the adoption of new technologies. In his 2009 report on elections, the Secretary General expressed his concern that some of the world’s poorest countries are adopting some of the most expensive technology for elections. Technology is generally expensive to acquire, but if it is sustainable, and able to be used for more than one purpose or more than one election, it can be more cost-effective in the long term. New technology may also require the use or availability of other technologies or specific infrastructures, such as communications and electrical energy networks. For example, if a country has an intermittent power supply, implementing a network of personal computers may not be the best choice. High humidity or high levels of dust or sand may also restrict the choice of appropriate technology. In general, local infrastructure must be capable of supporting a chosen technology. If it is not, it could mean that the technology being considered is not appropriate or that there is a need to upgrade the infrastructure, in which case additional costs and benefits should be carefully assessed. There is also a need to evaluate the technical and financial capacity of the electoral management body (EMB) to maintain a new system during an agreed upon or required time span. Usually, it is desirable for an adopted technology to be used for several years; therefore funds will need to be secured, not only for the initial implementation, but also for the foreseeable lifespan of the technology. These funds need to be budgeted for and guaranteed before committing to a new technology. Another aspect related to the sustainability of a new system is the availability of appropriately skilled staff to run and maintain it, either by the EMB or by outside service providers. The costs associated with keeping staff skills up-to-date and the capacity of both EMB and service providers to retain trained staff needs to also be considered. Another potential pitfall is attempting to do too much too quickly. Instead of implementing a radically new technology (compared to the existing local technology) in one step, it may be more appropriate to gradually implement change over a series of electoral events. 13. Evaluate the flexibility of the technology to adapt to new election regulationsA technology that is flexible is also more likely to be cost-effective and sustainable. It may be desirable to adopt a technology that has the potential for more than one use if this does not compromise the primary need for the technology. In cases of transitional environments, where the future of election management methods is uncertain, it is desirable to avoid purchasing technology that is highly specialised and inflexible, and to purchase instead more generic products that can facilitate the use of a wide range of applications. Another of the perceived advantages of using technology for elections is its ability to provide users with greater flexibility and more options. Therefore, procedures should be implemented to ensure that the new technology does not reduce flexibility by limiting the number of options available. 14. Ensure the legal ownership of the output of the system as well as the system itselfEMBs, Government agencies, donors and UNDP need to ensure that the product of implementation of high-tech IT systems – the databases that contain the registration details of potentially millions of citizens, remain under the control of the EMB and/or Government bodies at all times, and are accessible indefinitely regardless of the interfaces, software platforms, encryption methods or other hosting systems put in place by the vendors/suppliers of the system. EMBs and their partners should never remain permanently tied to one supplier. Scope and opportunity should always exist for the EMBs/Government agencies to “move” supplier in the future, if there is a day to day management component built into the supply contract, should the management and day to day operation of the system lead to implementation difficulties that may lead the national authorities to consider switching the managers of the system. In any case, high-tech solutions, no matter how “cutting edge” today, will eventually require upgrading, and possible re-tendering, at some point in the future. Legal advice should be employed at the outset, including at all stages of the procurement process and particularly upon contract signing, to ensure that the national authorities have the right to eventually consider “taking” the file databases in the future to a new system manager, without having to request of citizens to return to register all over again, under the system of a new supplier. ICTs and electoral integrityProcurement of electoral services and goods constitutes a major part of the organisation of elections in terms of planning, costs and implementation (purchasing and distribution). Integrity and transparency is thus essential - lack of integrity in the purchasing system may put the legitimacy of the whole electoral exercise at risk. Integrity-related risk factors: There are several measures available in order to lesson the possibility for integrity problems to arise: Voter RegistrationVoter registration is an important, and often very expensive, part of an election. Also, it is one of the areas of the electoral cycle where the influence and the application of ICTs are growing the most. Voter registration establishes the eligibility of individuals to cast a ballot. As one of the more costly, time-consuming and complex aspects of the electoral process, it often accounts for a considerable portion of the budget, staff time and resources of an election authority. If conducted well, voter registration can confer legitimacy on the process. A flawed voter registry, on the other hand, complicates electoral planning and removes an important safeguard against fraud. A voters list makes it possible to separate two of the most important functions of the election authority: verifying voter eligibility and controlling the legitimacy of the balloting process. The list may also be used in voter education, and may be provided to political parties and candidates to aid them in their campaigns. While elections may proceed without it, a voters list offers advantages that readily justify its use. By confirming that voters have met all eligibility requirements, the voters list helps confer legitimacy on the electoral process. Conversely, the legitimacy of the process will immediately be called into question if there are problems with voter registration, and particularly with the integrity of the voters list. Voter registration therefore is one of the most important tasks of election administration and there are three options to implement it:
Periodic ListA periodic register of voters, or a “periodic list,” is established for a specific electoral event, and electoral administrators do not necessarily intend to maintain or update the list for future use (although it may be used for by-elections in the period of time after its compilation and before the next occasion a periodic list is compiled). Normally the list is drawn up immediately before the election, although this need not be the case. This system is relatively expensive and time-consuming since it requires direct contact with all eligible voters before the election. It may be particularly useful where the infrastructure is lacking to maintain a continuous list, where population mobility is high or where there is opposition to the maintenance of lists of citizens by the government. The periodic list may also be preferred by quasi-governmental agencies, such as electoral management bodies or commissions, particularly as a periodic list is often “owned” by the EMB as the agency that compiles it. Continuous ListA continuous list of voters is a list that is maintained and regularly updated by the electoral administration. This system depends on an appropriate infrastructure to maintain the list. Maintenance typically involves adding the names and other relevant information of new people that satisfy the eligibility requirements (e.g. those reaching the voting age, naturalised citizens, etc.), deleting the names of those who no longer meet the requirements (e.g. through death), and altering the details of those voters whose recorded data in the voters list requires updating (e.g. through name change form marriage or change of residence). Since the continuous list is updated on a regular basis there is no need for a full or final registration drive immediately before an election (although a period is often designated for revising the list during the election campaign). A continuous list may be maintained either locally or nationally. To facilitate list updates, many election authorities form data-sharing partnerships with other government bodies. For example, when citizens change their place of residence, they may inform the tax bureau, the post office, the housing authority or the health system. In many countries with a continuous register, partnerships allow the election authority to receive regular updates of changes to these bodies’ files. This makes it possible to update the electoral register without any direct contact between the voter and the election authority. In some cases, on learning about a change of address, the election authority may send the voter a new voter registration card with a request to update and confirm the information that appears on it. Voter List drawn from the Civil RegistryA third option for registering voters is to generate the voter list from the civil registry. Civil registries are maintained, to various degrees, in many countries. Civil registries may contain a variety of information on all citizens, such as name, address, citizenship, age, marital status and identification number. In certain countries, particularly in Europe and Latin America, the voters list is produced from information contained in the national civil registry. In countries with a civil registry, a central question, as it pertains to elections, is whether the body responsible for maintaining the civil registry (often the interior ministry) should be responsible for the voters list. Some countries give the same institution responsibility for both registries; others choose two agencies, each with responsibility for one of the lists. If a civil registry is in place, producing a voters list from it is relatively efficient and costeffective. This is because the major costs are borne in the first place by the civil registry authorities. And while it is relatively expensive to maintain a civil registry, the information recorded may be used for multiple purposes, reducing the government’s overall data management costs. The major drawback of the system is its major strength. Even though the high cost may be justified, data sharing among government institutions may give rise to controversy. Concerns may be expressed about the loss, or potential loss, of privacy, particularly if the government decides to add additional data fields, or merge the registry with, for example, the tax authority’s database. If the concerns are widespread, a civil registry may be simply unacceptable despite its usefulness. Voter Registration MethodologiesThe type and sequence of registration activities vary considerably according to the specific system and methods chosen for gathering voters’ data. These methods can be divided into three broad categories based on the levels of technology currently applied to the process: Biometric systems are used to measure physical characteristics and behaviours (fingerprints, speech, face, iris and the like) with the objective of recognizing patterns to distinguish those that match closely enough to be considered identical from those that are different enough to be considered non-identical. Biometric systems have proven particularly useful in two specific segments of the electoral cycle, namely voter registration and voting operations. If Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) technology is used during voter registration, duplicate registrations can be detected. AFIS technology refers to software applications capable of establishing the identity of an individual through fingerprints by the use of biometric functions. AFIS technology has been included in many voter registration processes in the last years, and in some cases it has been included in the legal provisions governing voter registration. Biometric systems are in fact increasingly considered to be the definitive solution to voter impersonation and multiple voting practices. They are especially popular in post-conflict countries and emerging democracies with either very limited or non-existent forms of civil registry identification, such as DRC, Togo, Guinea, Angola, Nigeria, Mozambique and Pakistan, and are under consideration in a large number of developing countries. The importance of the centralised matching function – It is imperative, for a biometric registration system to be successful, that the data for all voters is matched against all other voters to allow the system to identify all potential double registrants. Many biometric registration kits, for an additional cost, can be fitted with an inbuilt “Micro AFIS” that allows a suspected double registrant to be immediately detected by the software on the laptop computer where he or she registers more than once, i.e. in the same registration centre. As most voters that attempt to double register will do so in different registration centres, however, there is a requirement for the data on all kits to be matched against the data of all other kits in a centralised location. If there is a live (e.g. by satellite) link-up between all kits at all times during the registration process, it may be possible to “catch” a double registrant that is attempting to double register in two different registration centres when he registers at the second centre. This would be an extremely expensive method of detecting double registrants, however. If the data from all the kits is only recorded on compact disc or external memory cards and periodically delivered to the centralised data centre at various times during the voter registration process (e.g. once every week), then all data from all the biometric registrations kits will need to be merged in order to allow the technology to throw up all the suspected double registrations when the data for each voter is matched against every other voter, and therefore potential double registrants may only definitely be caught at the end of the process.23 Electoral management bodies should not underestimate the amount of time and resources that need to be allocated to the matching task, depending, particularly, on how they address the following issue. Prior to commencing the data matching, the electoral management body that decides to employ AFIS or other biometric technology will be faced with the issue of whether or not to allow the technology to definitely determine what is a double registrant, or whether such a decision, which may, in some cases, result in sanctions such as the forfeiture of the right to vote (as in Kenya), should be taken by an EMB official on presentation of a suspected double registration by the technology. Conducting a “naked eye” inspection of a suspected double registration from two digital fingerprints, however, is not an accurate way to decide on a suspected double registrant. In order to improve the accuracy of the decision, therefore, the biometric software can sometimes employ fused algorithms to match both the digital fingerprints with the facial features from the digital photos to arrive at more definitive possible duplicates. EMB staff will then be able to take a decision on what is a double registrant from the photos. Implementation of such a system, however, needs to be well planned. If, for example, 2 million voters are registered using biometric technology, then the central matching exercise will need to conduct up to 2 trillion matches. An enormous ampount of computing power is necessary for that number of matches to identify a possible, lets say, 0.001% double registrants. EMBs need to plan the manpower, the computing power and the time necessary to conduct the central matching exercise , particularly in cases where the EMB officials make the final decision on each suspected double registrant case thrown up by the system. Dealing with double registrants – Different countries and EMBs deal with confirmed double registrants in different ways. In some countries, the EMB will simply make a decision as to which of the voter’s registrations (usually the first) is considered the legitimate one, and the second and subsequent registrations will be removed from the voter lists database. In other countries such as Kenya, however, double registration is a criminal offence. The double registrant not only will lose his or her right to vote, but the details of the double registrants may be handed over to the police authorities for prosecution. The issuance of voters cards at the time of registration may complicate matters further. If the registrant has been issued with his or her voters card at the time of registration (a common practice) then the electoral management body will be faced with the challenge of either trying to recover the voters cards from the double registrants, or, which is the more usual practice, of notifying each polling centre on polling day, of the voters that registered in both that centre and other centres. This list may be required if the double registrant attempts to vote with the voter card issued by that centre. If the voter is not on the real voter list for that centre,24 and has a legitimate voter card for that centre issued during the voter registration period, then the polling staff should be instructed to check the list of double registrants to see whether the voter is a confirmed double registrant. An exhibition period, where a provisional voter register is displayed some time before the elections in order to allow voters to confirm that their details were entered correctly and lodge objections against voters who they claim are not entitled to vote at that centre (or at all), can be an excellent opportunity for the EMB to address the double registrants issue prior to polling day. Four potential intervention points to support registration are:
Case Study: AFIS in PracticeNigeria is one country in which AFIS has been used for election purposes. The EMB identified and removed millions of duplicates from the voters register based on decentralized datasets (using a number of local government areas rather than the whole country as one dataset) using AFIS. AFIS has also been used in the voter registration process in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Venezuela and electoral rolls have in previous elections been produced by Pakistan’s National Database and Registration Authority (which has database systems including fingerprint biometrics) on behalf of the Elections Commission of Pakistan. It was also considered for the 2003 elections in Yemen to address problems with the voters register. In Yemen, the issue was not to develop a new AFIS system, but rather to explore the possibility of merging the voter register with the existing AFIS-based civil registry system. ACE Consolidated Reply: "EMBs using Automatic Finger Identification Systems (AFIS)" Voter Registration Technologies and MaterialsWhile technology could be an important tool to reduce costs and improve sustainability, the danger for EMBs, electoral assistance providers and donors is that they become hostages to vendors, who have been known to opt for technological solutions which might not be standard compliant, suitable, cost effective and/or sustainable for the partner country in the long run. An important issue is also whether the system proposed by the vendors is a proprietary system, where the security encryption algorithms or other methods used by the vendor to maintain a commercially competitive advantage are protected by the suppliers contract and thus render it impossible for the EMB or any other relevant Government body to “move” suppliers once the system has been established. In such cases, complex matters of intellectual property rights can arise, resulting in issues as to who “owns” and controls the databases that are created by the use of the technology. It is important to remember also that the “depreciation costs” are high in terms of the equipment procured and are aggravated by a failure to properly store and look after the equipment. In this context, it is convenient to study, at the identification/formulation stage, the institutional context of a given country, its capacities and the potential and synergies ICTs can offer. Another risk is the failure of the whole system due to the low quality of the collected voters’ data, failure of equipment before data has been retrieved, or mistakes in its processing during the registration updating, which can jeopardise the significant investments made in the technology. Thus, a careful feasibility and sustainability analysis covering the whole electoral cycle should be made before embarking on large scale support to “medium or high-tech” solutions. Currently UNDP is experiencing a strong interest from African countries such as Benin, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Togo, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, DRC and Nigeria in the procurement of ‘high-tech biometric voter registration kits’. The systems need to gather data via so called “mobile biometric or ID registration kits”. In general terms these kits have all of the hardware and software needed to identify eligible voters and issue them with either the voters’ cards or a proof of registration on the spot. All the components of the kits are contained in an ergonomic robust case and are: UNDP and the EC have, in last the five years, acquired a lot of experience in support of biometric voter registration processes via the different projects implemented or in the process of being implemented, such as in the Portuguese-speaking African and Asian Countries, DRC, Togo, Guinea, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Zambia, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire and Cambodia, etc. From a technical point of view, experience demonstrates that it may be sound to separate the supply of the biometric registration kits from the supply of the AFIS system, for the specific reason to have the fingerprint images and the templates meet standards that are industry-wide compliant, therefore not making one country hostage to a specific vendor and at the same time, ensuring long term sustainability. If a single vendor has provided both the biometric kits and the AFIS system, nobody can check the quality of the biometric data captured. Afghanistan example time line to establish a 15 millions fingerprint Biometric solution from the Vendor after contract with UNDP was signed Voter Registration – Project LifecycleBased on literature review and experiences in the field, the EC Study on the Use of Information and Communication Technologies in Electoral Processes (forthcoming) identifies five steps in the voter registration project lifecycle: Phase I: Project initiation and requirement gathering – During this phase, the formal request indicating the type of the project is formulated, e.g. whether it entails the creation of a new voter register or the updating of the previous one. Afterwards, the main stakeholders are identified who meet and discuss the project objectives, the expected challenges, and the main expectations in terms of deliverables and targets. A working group is established within the EMB (which may include also external actors). The working group first ensures the compliance of the project with the legal framework and the mandate of the EMB. Second, it defines and validates the operational concepts, which are presented to the stakeholders who then decide on the fate of the project. Phase II: Detailed planning – At this stage the operational plan and the preliminary budget are developed thus providing an overview over resources, timing, deliverables and milestones of the voter registration project. Elements to be included in the operational plan and the budget are, for example, training, logistics and procurement, implementation and post-implementation activities, communications, sensitization and cross-cutting issues (e.g. gender balance). The results are integrated into a single plan and budget which should be approved by the stakeholders. Phase III: Implementation – This phase involves the execution of the plans developed in Phase II. Sometimes simulations are used in order to better understand the expectations of the targeted actors. When technologies are involved in the project, it is at this stage that hardware and software are acquired on the basis of well defined technical specifications. Phase IV: Rollout and evaluation – During the rollout, the voter register is finalized. At this stage, it is critical that not only the project performance and quality indicators are fulfilled, but also that stakeholders (political parties and candidates etc.) accept the outcome. In order to evaluate the level of acceptance, metrics based on the main guiding principles are developed. The below figure provides an overview of the principles, how they can be measured as well as the degree to which they are possible to measure. Phase V: Post-implementation – At this stage the project reaches the end. Contracts and outsourced activities are terminated and the voters register is maintained between elections. Auditing of the Voter ListAuditing of voter registration is of prime interest to stakeholders of the electoral process. It provides the opportunity to understand the processes for establishing/updating voter registers as well as assessing the resulting voters register. Given the role played by voters registers in elections, several attempts have been made to standardize their auditing procedure. However, u to now, there is no systematic approach to their verification. This is in part due to the complex process leading to establishing or updating voters registers. The approach suggested to auditing voter registration is based on first assessing the process itself and later using statistical testing as a tool to collect auditing metrics (i.e. evidence) to enable interpretation of facts discovered when evaluating the registration process. The electoral cycle approach provides three entry points for the audit of voter registration processes: The Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) represents a set of rules that facilitate the audit of an organisation’s – such as an EMB in charge of the voter registration process – internal processes. The stages of an independent COBIT-based audit process are as follows: Audit of voter registration processes entails the audit of two elements, namely the registry itself but also the procedures for its creation and/or update. Three techniques are used to this end: Case Study: Voter Registration Audit in YemenThe National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), in collaboration with the Yemen Electoral Monitoring Network (YEMN), carried out an audit of the voter registration process in Yemen in 2008. The audit was undertaken partly as a result of distrust among the local political parties regarding the impartiality of the electoral commission and partly because of the widespread protests that occurred during the registration process. NDI and YEMN selected 13 governorates to monitor. The governorates chosen were particular in two respects: they either had disproportionately low levels of female representation in the registry and/or the number of registered voters exceeded the actual population. A 5% random sampling method was used to further select the registration centres to be monitored. In total, YEMN monitored 330 of 5620 centres (5.8%) in the 13 selected governorates. Examples of the findings of the monitors include:
Procurement of ICTs SpecialistsICTs is a highly technical and specialised field with normally high costs involved. IT Advisors, Specialists and/or Consultants should have at least a degree in an ICTs related field with adequate experience. This person(s) should have the knowledge and confidence to make decisions or advise on large ICTs investments. Experienced ICTs experts are in high demand and therefore cost more. Adequate budget and procurement and recruitment time should be allocated for ICTs person(s). In most cases, the EMB needs to approve the UNDP personnel to be recruited. In a few other cases it is the responsibility of UNDP Country Office. In both cases special attention should be given to the UNDP IT Advisors / Specialists / Consultants. Evaluation of ICTs person(s) is a demanding task and non-ICTs staff do not always recognise the qualities needed for the ToR at hand. Almost in all the cases CV’s of ICTs persons is littered with ICTs jargon and buzz words. Therefore it is recommended to make use of rosters such as the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UN-EAD) and the Joint EC-UNDP Task Force rosters for ICTs persons. Local vs. International CompetitionIn IT, as in many other areas, local vendors may be competitively disadvantaged against international companies that might have more experience in composing tender documents. Local vendors may be competitive, but companies who have dealt successfully with UNDP before often know how to refine their tender documents and handle the process of bidding better. Language may also be a entry barrier for local companies if the tender documents are in for example English, or not in the local language, as for example is the case of Cambodia where the language was Khmer, Afghanistan where the language was Dari or Pashto and Moldova where the language was Russian or Romanian. Most of these local markets are very small and to afford a translator is for them already a considerable investment for one process. To avoid this issue, in many cases the tender are specified “local only.” Yet in many cases the local market is very small and many vendors fail the minimum requirements of the tender. In such situations, in order not to compromise competitive requirements while still aiming at including as possible local vendors, a potential strategy is to encourage international companies to partner up with local companies. Another solution would be to host a pre-bid conference/training explaining the different required documents to the prospective vendors. The conference can for example clarify on issues related to: Minimum Standard Requirements and the Procurement ProcessAlthough a large number of ICTs standards define the minimum requirements of (for example) biometric systems exist, attention should be drawn to the fact that – in the context of electoral processes – EMBs and other national institutions, UNDP and other international development partners believe that these standards are not mandatory and therefore do not assert compliance with standards. This creates an environment which is not conducive to convergence of the procured solutions with other needs within the country, e.g. public administration. Furthermore, many EMBs, UNDP offices and other actors do not perform acceptance testing of provided solutions beforehand. These issues, which impact upon sustainability, should ideally be carefully revised in the specifications phase. As an example of how using standards can simplify long term planning, standards specified in 1984 by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Document 9303 can be used to specify the layout of the civic ID or voter card. The same standard can be used to specify photo sizes to be used on these cards. This ICAO 9303 document also specifies how the photo should look like with regards to lighting, distance, coverage, etc. This standard will ensure that future electoral cycles will have the same look and feel, same standard layout, no matter which vendor is used. This will reduce costs (same graphics design, same printing facilities, etc.) and reduce confusion with election officials on Election Day. ICAO 9303 also specifies the electronic information standards to be used on e-voter or e-citizen ID’s. ICAO also recommends that the fingerprints image should be stored in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) developed compression format called Wavelet Scalar Quantization (WSQ). This ensures that the captured fingerprints could be re-used when a new biometric vendor is selected in following electoral cycles. The WSQ standard is also the most effective compression format for fingerprints. The same goes for the photos, recommended to be stored in the JPEG 2000 (J2K) format. This will reduce storage size (and therefore costs) and ensure sustainability. The technical specifications sections of the ICAO 9303 document, Parts 1, 2 and 3, have received the endorsement of the International Organisation for Standardization as ISO Standards 7501-1, 7501-2 and 7501-3, respectively. Such endorsement is made possible by means of a liaison mechanism through which manufacturers of travel documents, readers and other technologies provide technical and engineering advice to the Technical Advisory Group/Machine Readable Travel Document (TAG/MRTD) under the auspices of ISO. Through this working relationship, the ICAO specifications have achieved the status of worldwide standards by means of a simplified procedure within ISO. The liaison mechanism with ISO has been successfully applied not only to the endorsement of new specifications for travel documents as ISO Standards but also to the approval of amendments to the specifications. Subsequent revisions to Doc 9303, Parts 1, 2 and 3, will therefore be processed for ISO endorsement in the same manner as previously. Risks involved increase even further if, in addition to not requesting compliance with practises and/or standards, EMBs choose not to perform acceptance testing of provided solutions. Because of the importance of the software component of the biometric solution, EMBs (and national authorities in charge of civil registration) should adapt common standards in procurement of software products and services as described in IEEE 12207. This standard presents the commonly accepted practices for ensuring a well-defined and persistent assurance process for acquired software. The 12207 framework describes a complete set of practices for software, which range all the way from conceptualization through retirement. This translates into the following activities: Formal acceptance of the solution includes preparation and performance of test cases, test data, test procedures, and a test environment. Inspections and audits are rigorous but they require resources and have concomitant costs. It means that when drafting the Request for Proposal (RFP) for procuring a biometric voter solution, the RFP has to be both feasible and cost justifiable. In this way, EMBs and Procurement Officers will have the adequate decision-making tools when it comes to ICTs, especially for biometric voter registration projects. Security Issues Related to New TechnologiesComputer systems used for elections need to include high levels of security. Unauthorised persons must be prevented from accessing, altering or downloading sensitive electoral data. Demonstrable security levels are another way of ensuring that electoral processes are transparent and trustworthy. Various mechanisms exist to provide for computer security. These include password protection, encryption, verification programs and physical isolation. Disaster RecoveryA voter registration process, being not only expensive but also potentially very political, may be subject to malicious attacks in some circumstances. Being that this paper mainly targets post conflict and emerging democracies, attacks on EMBs are a viable risk. This section deals with the process, policies and procedures related to preparing for ICTs continuation of normal operation after a natural or human-induced disaster. Disaster Recovery Site (DRS) is a duplication of the main IT items on the primary site for use in case of fire, sabotage or disaster. It could be in another building or on a separate premise. The operation will be able to continue using the DRS (secondary site). A thorough and well-equipped DRS could almost duplicate both the size and the cost of hardware of the primary site. It would also almost double the set-up time. Careful planning should be conducted as to what the purpose of the DRS would be. For example, is it to protect the process, the data or both? If the objective is to protect the process and the data, then enough space should be allocated to the processing workstations too. This should be budgeted from the beginning of the project. Total Solution vs. Technology TransferWith respect to services with a high ICTs content, there is a tendency to adopt methodological approaches that set the roles and responsibilities in two distinct ways: “total solutions” versus “technology transfer to the EMB.” In short, total solutions mean the provider controls the process end to end. Technology transfer to EMB means at the end of the process, the EMB is capable of repeating the process itself without external assistance. While technology transfer is indeed often desirable this is not always necessarily the case. Deliberately choosing to outsource certain systems may sometimes be more efficient than having everything run directly by the EMB. It is however important that any such outsourcing is a conscious decision based on an efficiency analysis and not the by-product of a failed technology transfer. Of course avoiding “vendor lock” must be part of such an analysis too. The EMB should also always have an in-depth understanding of and insight into and ultimate control over the outsourced services provided to them. The issue of appropriate transfer requires further study since it impacts on the project’s management, costing and sustainability. The level of the possible transfer should be factored into the specifications writing, before the solicitation documents are prepared. It is important to ensure that any technology transfer in place is directed at key employees of the EMB that form part of their permanent staffing structure. Staff temporarily employed and released on a cyclical nature (in line with electoral cycle demands) should possibly be excluded from consideration in this regard as they may not be available for employment during a future electoral cycle. Adequate budget must be provided to not only attract the required talent for these key posts but also to keep them. From a procurement perspective, these key role players (i.e., posts) should be identified and included in the knowledge transfer responsibilities in the supplier’s contract. There is also the need to be aware of approaches that advertise the use of a public-private partnership known as Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT). This is a kind of form of project financing, wherein a private company receives a concession from the Government to finance, design, construct, and operate, for instance, the production and issuance of ID cards (with a fee to be paid by end users) in the context of a civil registration. This enables the project proponent to recover its investment, operating and maintenance expenses in the project. Due to the long-term nature of the arrangement, the fees are usually raised during the concession period allowing the proponent to reach a satisfactory internal rate of return for its investment. Traditionally, such projects provide for the infrastructure (in this case biometric voter registration kits and servers) to be transferred to the government at the end of the concession period.31 (BOT) can be controversial and is not necessarily recommended when it comes to the electoral process because of the dangers of vendor lock. There may also be issues that the technology that was built and operated by the vendor becomes obsolete and requires large upgrading a shortly after the transfer. The Impact of Introducing New TechnologiesWhen a new system is being considered to replace another, an evaluation is needed to assess the impact of the change on all stakeholders. Once the system is adopted, the transition phase needs to be carefully managed to ensure that problems do not occur and that all functions can continue to be effectively carried out. These are some strategies that can be used by electoral administrators to minimize the negative impact of new systems, new technology and changes on electoral processes: A system implementation schedule can be influenced by whether there is fixed term or variable term election systems. With fixed term elections, implementation schedules can be set around a known election date while with variable term elections, new systems should ideally be in place and ready to go before the earliest likely date for the election. However, election calendars are not always set in stone and due to unforeseen activities elections could suddenly be called for in the middle of an on-going voter registration process, and EMBs may have to prepare for the use of both new and old voters cards simultaneously for casting the ballots. Change ManagementICTs projects in many countries fail not because the solution is not apt but because the aspect of change is often neglected. Implementation of new systems and procedures means that staff will find changes in their roles and in ways of conducting their business. If the issue of change is not dealt with in a sensitive and professional manner then one is likely to encounter failure in implementing new systems. It is, therefore, important that advisors to EMBs also have the skills that are required to be agents of change. Managing change refers to the making of changes in a planned and managed or systematic fashion. The aim is to more effectively implement new methods and systems in an ongoing organisation. The changes to be managed lie within and are controlled by the organisation. The purpose is to avoid knee-jerk or reactive responses and to demonstrate anticipative or proactive responses. The content or subject matter of change management is drawn from psychology, sociology, business administration, economics, industrial engineering, systems engineering, and the study of human and organisational behaviour. Creating a Voter Registry on the Basis of the Civil RegistryIn the context of voter registration processes, convergence between civil and voters’ registers is the approach toward a common processing of population and voter information in order to achieve cost effectiveness, completeness and accuracy in voters registers. It involves replacing the costly electors enumeration process by abstracting from a population register a sub-file to be used as a matrix for generating voters lists. When the properties of the population registers enable such an abstraction, both the population and voters registers are said to be “convergent”. Convergence in this instance is defined as the interlinking of population registers and voters registers. In order for the population register to be enabled to exchange information with the voters lists format, completeness and integrity must be assessed. For obvious reasons, using a population register to identify individuals eligible to vote is only as reliable as the civil register itself. If the register is outdated or full of errors, many eligible voters will not be identified, and names that should be removed from the voters list will remain. In addition, computer errors are possible when names are moved from the population register to the voters list. This problem is likely to be more pronounced when multiple databases (health, driver licenses, taxation, passports etc.) maintained by different government agencies are merged to create the voters list. Lack of reliable data in the population register will compromise the reliability of the voter registry. If the voter register after abstraction cannot be trusted, not only will there be a lack of public confidence in the register, but the register may also cause more political worries than if no data were available at all. The Overall Responsibility of the EMBNot with standing the approach of abstracting the voter registry from the civil registry, it is important that the election administration should remain responsible for generating the voters lists. There are several arrangements throughout the world where the public administration (e.g. Ministry of Interior) produces voters’ lists which are then used by the election administration. However, such arrangements are problematic. The difficulty lies in the following question: who is responsible for the quality of voters lists and their impact on the outcome of an election event? To avoid such issues, it is advisable to have a single entity in charge of both producing and using voters lists, therefore being responsible for all outcomes related to their use. Creating a civil registry on the basis of the voter registryWhilst still in an experimental phase, it is possible to build a civil register on the basis of a voters’ register. The figure below exemplifies a structured way of transforming the electoral register into a civil register over consecutive electoral cycles. A periodic voters register cannot serve as the basis for building a civil registration system since it lacks the structure enabling continuous registration of events. However, when it has been transformed into a fully-fledged permanent voters register the opportunities are open. Voter registration ought to be compulsory as voluntary registration is not conducive to complete, current and accurate vital statistics. It should be noted that the approach is not uniform throughout the country. Compulsory registration can be coupled with incentives - such as linking the possession of the voters’ card to obtain basic public administration services such as for example health, attendance to school for ones’ dependants, banking, etc.- to further enhance the reliability of the civil registry to be constructed. Once continuous voter registration activities are optimally performed, it is possible to extend the data collection component with recorded vital statistics. Challenges to the implementation of this process are many and the process needs to be carried out in a systematic manner to be in the forefront of possible setbacks. First, a wellfunctioning public administration that supports the continuous voter registration activities needs to be in place. Moreover, legislation could further support the integrity of the data by encouraging compulsory registration. Finally, the absence of good coordination between the different agencies involved (e.g. the EMB and the Ministry of Interior etc.) may result in the production of different series of vital statistics which are inconsistent. Coordination needs to take place at two levels: the data-collection level and the data processing level. Case Study: From voter registration to civil register in DRCRecently, in the DRC, as mandated by law, voter registration was successfully conducted in 2005-2006. It has resulted in a single comprehensive file containing demographic and biometric data (portrait and two index fingers) of about 25 million inhabitants from a population estimated to be 65 million inhabitants. Given a relative young population in the country, it is assumed that 38.46% of the population captured by the electoral register represents above 80% of the adult population. Therefore, the electoral register is currently used as the national identification file. In order to obtain a passport, the single document to be presented is the electoral card, making the electoral card not only a de facto national identification document but enabling the electoral register to play the role of a civil registration system. However, this approach has its limits and disadvantages. For instance:
ConclusionThe overall objective of this paper is to shed light on the main issues related to procurement of goods and services for electoral processes, with particular attention towards the procurement of goods and services related to the introduction or upgrading of ICTs in these processes (especially in relation to voter registration). The initial argument highlighted the importance of procurement planning as well as the integration of procurement plans and strategies in the programme formulation stage as an integral part of the wider electoral cycle approach. Notwithstanding the importance of these activities, the procurement planning phase has thus far arguably not received enough attention. The unawareness of procurement planning stands in stark contrast to the actual importance of and costs related to procurement issues including pilot and validation testing. As mentioned throughout the paper, any delay or shortfall in the procurement or distribution of materials could have serious implications for the rest of the voter registration or electoral schedule, thus potentially affecting the outcome of the voter registration or election, or even be the reason that the voter registration or election is not implemented at all. With a well-defined procurement plan at hand, the electoral assistance project/ programme is more likely to achieve appropriate identification of needs and strategies, analysis of associated risks and supply chain management constraints, and assessment of implementing partners’ capacity facilitating proper management arrangements and appropriate types of engagement. The footprints of the ICTs revolution are particularly strong in the electoral field: ICTs have dramatically changed the way elections are conducted not only in democratic states, but also in post-conflict states and emerging democracies. Consequently, when it comes to decide how to tackle the increasing use of ICTs in electoral processes, all stakeholders in a given electoral process, including development partners in the context of electoral assistance projects, has an important role to play in influencing the technological choices to be adopted. Being among the most crucial and expensive undertakings, as well as within area where the influence of ICTs applications is growing the most, requests of electoral assistance for voter registration processes is particularly important. More and more countries are requesting assistance to introduce and use biometric features in voter registration processes, especially using Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) in the hope of enhancing the sustainability and credibility of their voter registers. For successful support to technological upgrade to voter registration processes, electoral assistance providers need to acquire a better understanding of procurement planning and strategy for the purchase of goods and services for the implementation of, in particular, biometric voter registration systems. This relates essentially to procurement requirements and selection of the adequate level of technology, development of comprehensive technical specifications, appreciation of associated risks, timely procurement and an appropriate allocation of resources. When it comes to specific issues related to procurement for biometric voter registration, there are several issues that need to be confronted: Finally, there is a need to look into the total solution, build-operate-transfer methodologies versus technology transfer to the EMB. “Total solutions” mean the provider controls the process from end to end. “Technology transfer,” on the other hand, means that at the end of the process, the EMB is capable itself of repeating the process without (too much) external assistance. While technology transfer is often desirable, it is not always so because outsourcing of certain functions and services may be under some circumstances more efficient. When transfer prevails, factors related to project management, costing and sustainability need to be carefully analyzed. More generally, as the election process and the electoral assistance project proceeds, the procurement plan needs to be adjusted according to current developments, thus emphasizing the procurement plan as a living and flexible document available for updates and modifications. As with procurement processes for elections in general, the delay or shortfall of procurement of goods and materials related to voter registration processes may affect the outcome of the voter registration process itself and also impede on the overall electoral schedule and process. Through its daily project/programmatic work, UNDP is heavily involved in electoral procurement and key issues identified throughout the paper rely primarily on experiences and lessons learned drawn from UNDP-managed basket funds with important contributions of the European Commission and/or EU Member States. Through the Global Procurement Unit (GPU) as part of UNDP PSO advisory services and direct procurement support are made available to UNDP Country Offices and EMBs. GPU is part of the Joint EC-UNDP Task Force providing continuous assistance to UNDP Country Offices and EMBs in procurement planning and budgeting, on-site training and, in many cases, targeted exploratory, formulation and assessment missions relating to procurement and operations for each step of the electoral cycle. Moreover, UNDP Long Term Agreements (LTAs) have been established to ensure efficiency in the procurement process, including turn-around times that comply with UNDP rules and regulations and quality of procured goods and services. Given the current role of ICTs in electoral processes in both emerging democracies and post-conflict states, the strategic focus of GPU for the immediate future is to increase the scope of LTAs and other procurement tools to address systems including items of higher level of technology, higher production complexity and higher security requirements. Over the last decade, electoral assistance practitioners and the donor community have experienced great opportunities, but also coped with substantial challenges in formulating and implementing projects and programmes seeking to introduce or upgrade ICTs usage in electoral processes. Some best practices have thus already been identified: AcknowledgmentsThis is the first paper in the Operational Paper Series published by the Joint EC-UNDP Task Force on Electoral Assistance, prepared in collaboration with the International IDEA and the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. This paper would have not been possible without the key contributions of a number of individuals who provided and shared their expertise, insights, comments and thoughts for the original concept and various draft versions that brought to the final product. Those individuals, include, in alphabetical order: Anne-Sofie Holm Gerhard, Chris Kyriakides, Domenico Tuccinardi, Dunia Ramazani, Fabio Bargiacchi, Francesco Torcoli, Frick Olivier, Linda Maguire, Mette Bakken, Niall McCann, Richard Atwood and Victor Margall von Hegyeshalmy. Useful insights and additional contributions have also been provided by Angela Bargellini, Benjamin Clarholm-Anton, Lee Kironget, Ola Petterson, Peter Wolf, Ricardo Godinho Gomez, Sara Staino, Teresa Polara and Tomas Matraia. The graphic concept and design of this paper was created by Adelaida Contreras and Tomas Matraia. ACE Focus On...ProcurementThis is the first paper in the “Operational Paper Series” published by the Joint EC UNDP Task Force on Electoral Assistance (JTF). It was prepared in collaboration with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (ACE). It is therefore also published as ACE Focus On.1 This paper is the result of operational lessons and best practices learned since 2004 through the partnership between the European Commission (EC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The collaboration between the JTF and International IDEA since 2004 has enabled continual support to the ACE Project using materials and tools derived from: EC–UNDP projects, UNDP and IDEA Guides on Electoral Assistance/Electoral Administration and Joint EC-UNDP-IDEA face-to-face Training and eLearning Course on Effective Electoral Assistance. The paper aims to provide a resource for stakeholders contributing to or benefiting from electoral assistance. While focusing primarily on UNDP rules, its major aspects involved in the procurement and the application of ICTs solutions in voter registration, of interest to: electoral management bodies (EMB) local civil society organisations (CSO) involved in elections; political parties; media actors; EU Delegations and headquarters; UNDP Country Offices and headquarters; the wider community of development partners and donors; as well as service providers and vendors. The issues outlined in this paper, will be elaborated further in a handbook on “ICTs civil/ voter registration and data transmission” and an “eLearning Course on ICTs in Electoral Processes and Electoral Procurement” currently being finalised by the Joint Task Force and IDEA in the context of the ACE activities. In addition, these aspects are regularly addressed in UNDP electoral assistance projects as part of the work of the Joint EC-UNDP Task Force and the support of the UNDP Global Programme for Electoral Cycle Support (GPECS). |
Lessons Learned”, Reilly 2003) and there is still a relative scarcity of literature on electoral assistance and academic research dedicated to it. This is reflected in the limited availability of comparative documentation in terms of historical background, content, methodologies and potential approaches to electoral assistance. 
between electoral assistance (as opposed to election assistance) and democracy development objectives. Indeed, it was believed that the focus of democracy assistance could quickly move to other areas of democratic development, such as rule of law, or parliamentary support programmes after the first wave of democratic elections.
In the past three years, some key global players in development assistance such as the European Commission (EC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and International IDEA have undertaken concrete steps to make a more holistic approach to electoral assistance possible in the practical implementation of electoral projects
the UN to designate
a senior official to act as a Focal Point for electoral assistance activities
inter alia to ensure consistency in the handling of requests of Member States
organising elections, to assist the Secretary-General to coordinate and
consider requests for electoral verification, and to channel requests for
electoral assistance to the appropriate office or programme.
Similarly,
towards the end of the 1980s the US
started to offer electoral assistance through the 
however, they often made the
achievement of the partner countries’ long-term development goals far more
difficult. By promoting this type of intervention, the international community
often locked the transition countries into an artificial and unsustainable
“democratic development process” steered from outside and not from within, with
high financial and technical demands, but without letting the “assisted”
countries benefit from the skills and knowledge transfer which is an essential
component of technical assistance projects. 
meeting the actual needs. Traditionally, short-term
targeted training of polling officers, ad hoc electoral material and voter
education were the items preferred by development agencies, despite the fact
that in most cases they were not sustainable and did not produce lasting
effects that contributed to the overall process of development and democracy
building in the partner country.
implications that such reforms had in the organisation of new elections, and hence
belated requests for support to the international community that had to be met
at the political level in order to maintain the partner country on the
“democratic path”. In these situations, the role of international politics may mean that electoral assistance
was to unwittingly serve national political agendas rather than primarily
assisting the partner country in improving electoral systems and processes
within the framework of advancing democratic governance. 
to immediate but
unsustainable expenses, rather than to long-term beneficial investments (see
paragraph on embracing technology). Moreover, delays in development agencies
reaction in identifying assistance needs and planning their responses could be
used by recipients to exercise yet more pressure.
Elections are composed of a number of integrated
building blocks, with different stakeholders interacting and influencing each
other. Electoral components and stakeholders do not stand alone. They are
interdependent, and therefore the breakdown of one aspect (for example the
collapse of a particular system of voter registration) can negatively impact on
every other, including human and financial resources, the availability of
supplies, costs, transport, training and security, and thus on the credibility
of the election itself. In turn, if an electoral process suffers from low
credibility, this is likely to damage the democratisation process of the partner
country and block its overall development objectives.
fully taken into
account in project design. In several cases, UNEAD, UNDP and the EC have
organized joint assessment and formulation missions, with more coherent and
coordinated approaches emerging as a result. The enlargement and standardisation
of this practice will be crucial for ensuring adequate coordination from the
outset. 
standard
development cooperation mechanisms. The design needs to consider the
practicality of multi-faceted programmes in light of the local availability of
management capacity, and whether better outcomes could be achieved by having
multiple programmes of narrower focus within a coordinated, holistic framework
for democratisation assistance.
assistance shows that professional development of electoral officials must be factored in as a permanent activity by assistance providers and partner institutions. This offers the best chance of ensuring institutional sustainability for the electoral institutions of the partner countries and a successful gradual disengagement strategy for the development agencies of the development agencies countries.
the skills required to attain these through the career development goals of its staff. Staff development may take a number of basic forms, such as customised short-term informal training, mentoring of staff by senior EMBs or another organisation’s officials, and long-term formal training in the form of courses or academic development programmes. 
should serve as knowledge hubs for the generation, sharing
and application of electoral knowledge to future electoral assistance projects
characterised by a demand-driven and partner country-led approach which will be
highly contextualised to the regions and countries in which it will be applied.
In addition they should foster the regional cooperation between electoral administrators
that has proved to be a useful tool to enhance the credibility and sustainability
of electoral processes. 
Furthermore, new complementary knowledge services products offered by
initiatives like “
introduce such applications. In general terms, ICT applications in the electoral process can be categorised into three broad groups: a) communications, telecommunications, radio, networks and the Internet; b) computer hardware and software, word processing/spread sheets, database management systems; c) specialised electronic/mechanical devices, non-electronic innovations and materials.
systems, and this may not be easy given the short timetables involved. In addition, technology will have an impact on voters – in terms of the perceived integrity of the electoral process – and possibly also on the community, for example, when centrally supplied voting machines replace locally constructed wooden ballot boxes. 
The success of these training programmes, which will continue in 2008 with more joint training programmes (the next event is planned for the Srping of 2008 in Johannesburg and will see the launch of the e-learning pilot version of the course) has been the springboard for the consolidation of the EC-UNDP-IDEA partnership in developing tools and policies for making electoral assistance more effective. This programmatic partnership inspired the “Global Training Platform on Electoral Assistance” proposal, presented at the Annual Joint Donors’ Competence Forum (“
Legally, the assignment of security responsibilities to institutions for an election varies significantly worldwide. In many cases, the police force is designated with the primary responsibility for election security, due to constitutional limitations imposed on the domestic deployment and use of military forces. 
Under relevant Public Law and Order provisions, electoral and security officials may require political parties to register the date, time and place of campaign rallies. In these circumstances officials may impose schedules, to ensure opposing rallies do not occur in a proximity that could create conflict. Arguably, this may be deemed to be a restriction on the right of freedom of association in some circumstances; however, this constraint can be justified if public law and order issues are a valid risk. 
CORE 
Direct democracy is the term used to describe particular forms of vote within any democratic system. The term direct democracy is commonly used to refer to three distinct types of vote:
A recent high-profile recall case involving a prominent figure has increased public exposure to the recall mechanism. In California, the actor Arnold Schwarzenegger was elected Governor after a successful recall campaign to oust Governor Gray Davis.
Once the Secretary of State certifies that the petition has qualified, the Lieutenant Governor is required by the California Constitution to set the date of the recall election. The election must be held in the period between 60-80 days after the date on which the Secretary of State certified that the petition qualified, unless there is a state-wide election within 180 days of that date (in which case the Lieutenant Governor has the option to hold the recall election on the same day).
government. Although Switzerland retains features of a representative democracy (e.g. it has an elected Parliament), various forms of direct democracy are used frequently at national, cantonal and local (commune) level. This case study focuses on the mechanisms and use of Switzerland's direct democracy.
Every vote counts. The secret ballot is the cornerstone of democracy. The right to vote is universal.
The vote is then registered and stored in the voting machine. Then there is the voting over the Internet that uses a PC with an Internet-connection to cast the vote and send it to be stored in another remote computer. Personal Digital Assistants (PDA’s), telephones or mobile phones can also be used to cast a vote electronically.
More than two decades after the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) was first identified, HIV/AIDS has become one of the most devastating diseases mankind has ever faced. Since the breakout of the disease, more than 39.4 million people are living with the disease worldwide, and 2.3 million have died in Africa only (
through which opinions among the electorate are translated into seats and power in legislatures. 
across the Southern African region. South Africa is an exception though as statistical patterns indicate that people who suffer personal loss are more likely to prioritise HIV/AIDS in their demands on government interventions. There is nothing, however, that suggests at this point in time that people affected by HIV/AIDS would change their choice of political party as a result of this disaffection. (ibid.: 17). 
Focus group discussions held in urban and rural areas of KwaZulu- Natal with PLWHAS and care givers who were all registered voters for the 2004 election yielded seemingly well-founded fears that communities will ostracise or marginalise those infected and affected further, if they exposed themselves to the major public events. 