Since different electoral district configurations produce different election outcomes, even if voting patterns remain constant, the designation of a boundary authority and the powers granted to that authority are very important.
In the nineteenth century, districts almost everywhere were drawn by the legislatures. Legislators from the majority political party were often tempted to draw districting plans that favoured their own candidates at the expense of the candidates from other parties. The redistricting, process came under increasing attack for political bias because of this practice.
Over the past fifty years, a growing number of countries have moved to neutral or non-partisan commissions to avoid politically biased redistricting. In 1964, when Canada adopted independent electoral boundary commissions for redistricting, the United States was left as one of the few long-standing liberal democracies where the redistricting process remains in the hands of the politicians. The United States has also been one of the only countries to accept partisanship as an inevitable part of the redistricting process.
Disagreeing with the proposition that politics cannot be removed from the redistricting process, many countries have established neutral commissions and enacted rules for drawing district boundaries. These commissions have no formal links to political parties, and commissioners are not permitted to consider political data when drawing district boundaries. Instead, commissioners are obliged to consider criteria such as equal population and respect for administrative boundaries in deciding upon district configurations. Since the adoption of these reforms, few have questioned the neutrality of the redistricting process in these countries.
The only drawback to the non-partisan approach to redistricting is that it does not necessarily produce a politically unbiased redistricting plan: Ignoring politics does not mean that a districting plan has no political effect. The non-partisan approach guarantees only that any political bias in a districting plan is unintentional.
Solutions for Political Bias in Redistricting
Some countries have attempted to devise solutions to the problem of political bias in redistricting outcomes. One solution, for example, is to allow representatives of all the major political parties to serve on the body that makes redistricting decisions. Another solution is to permit representatives of major political parties to analyse the potential partisan impact of a districting plan before the plan is enacted and comment on the plans. In the United States, one or both of these approaches have been adopted by most of the states.
In the United States, a legislative committee or a bipartisan commission may draw a districting plan. Political data to ascertain the potential partisan effect of a plan will almost certainly be employed. Because a districting plan is almost always enacted by the state legislature, the likely result, however, is a plan that knowingly favours one political party or the incumbent legislators of both parties rather than a politically unbiased plan.
New Zealand has adopted another approach to the problem of politically biased outcomes: Two of the seven members of the New Zealand Representation Commission are political appointees. One of these two partisan members represents the governing party, the other one represents the opposition parties. Their presence on the commission helps to ensure that any egregious political bias is recognised and rectified. Because the two political appointees constitute a minority on the commission, they cannot outvote the non-political commissioners. The neutrality of the commission is, therefore, unquestioned.
