Integrity in elections depends
on the institutional foundations set forth in the legal framework. The institutional
framework is composed of the agencies and organizations that implement or oversee
specific aspects the electoral process.
The main institutional players
in an election are:
- those responsible for
election policy and administration – the electoral management
body;
- oversight agencies;
- political parties and
candidates competing in elections
- groups interested in the
election outcome and attempting to influence it;
- independent electoral observers;
- media and the press; and
- supervisory/enforcement
agencies, including investigative agencies, prosecutors and the courts
The roles of these
institutions in maintaining electoral integrity are discussed in the following
subsections.
It is important for the roles
of each institution involved in maintaining electoral integrity to be clearly
defined in the legal framework. A clear separation of powers and an
integrated system of checks-and-balances can help maintain effective oversight.
As discussed in the Guiding Principles, for instance, if an electoral
management body is given too many (potentially conflicting) roles—such as
drafting electoral legislation, applying and enforcing the law, then acting as
a court of last resort for electoral matters—there would be few effective institutional
checks and balances on its actions.
One of the primary
institutional questions is whether or not to have an independent electoral
management body. In emerging democracies, or countries in transition which have
a history of one-party domination or authoritarian rule, the creation of an
independent electoral commission is widely viewed as a vital measure to ensure
impartial administration of elections and help build the confidence of voters
and parties.[1]
At the same time, the benefits of autonomous electoral
administration are largely based on perceptions; so an independent electoral
commission must prove itself before lasting improvements to the image of
elections are achieved. The establishment
of an autonomous commission does not, in and of itself, guarantee a successful
electoral process.
If the main political and
civil society actors agree on the type of institutional framework to be
adopted, the result will be a more credible election administration structure.
Without agreement, discontent and distrust can spring up and continue to fester
throughout the process. As noted
earlier, since some electoral issues are likely to be resolved by a voted
decision of the electoral authority, the selection of the Chair of the
commission requires special care and attention.
Confidence can be increased if the Chair is chosen in a way in which
various governmental branches and socio-political sectors play a role in the
selection.
[1] Goodwin-Gill,
Guy S. Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice, Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union,
1994
