Original question:

This question was posed by Tim Meisburger who is a member of the Practitioners' Network. To view his profile, please click the "Members of the Practitioners' Network" link on the left hand side of this page.

In the country I am working in the election commission is currently trying to develop procedures for accrediting domestic observers. Some advisors have suggested that the commission individually assess and accredit each observer for every organization, while I would say that it makes more sense to accredit organizations, and have them provide identification for their observers. That would make the organizations, and not the commission, accountable for observer neutrality. Also, because observers are normally not identified until just before the election, having the commission issue individual accreditation creates a huge additional burden for the commission at the time they are most busy preparing for the election.

I would appreciate your opinions on what would be considered best practice, and any good examples of laws or regulations that describe accreditation processes for domestic observer organizations.

Best,

Tim Meisburger

Regional Director Elections and Political Processes

The Asia Foundation

Summary of responses:

Posted on 3 May, 2007

The question of whether an EMB should accredit domestic observer groups or the individual observers directly renders itself to at least five sub questions:

What is the EMB’s logistical capacity to accredit observers?

It is clear that accrediting individual observers rather than focussing on the organizations requires a much heavier burden on the EMB in terms of cost and time. It is therefore necessary to look at such constraints before deciding what type of accreditation will be used. If individual observers are to be accredited it is possible to ease the burden on the EMB on a central level by decentralizing the accreditation process to regional and municipal levels.

What is the EMB’s responsibility towards the voters?

The reason EMBs provide specific accreditation is that observing some aspects of the electoral process requires access to places where the number of persons present has to be limited to safeguard a smooth and safe administration of the electoral process, for example the polling places, the registration sites, the counting centres, and the transportation of sensitive materials. It is the EMB’s responsibility to ensure that the voters can vote freely and that the count is done in a safe way without intimidation or obstruction from anybody, including observers. It is therefore vital that the accreditation and deployment process is done in such a way to minimize the negative effects they might have on voters – ensuring for example that the number of observers in certain places is not too large, that badges are worn and that all observers are aware of the legislation and the code of conduct before Election Day. If the choice is made not to accredit each individual observer, it is still possible to require the groups to send lists to the EMB for information and planning purposes rather than approval.

What will best facilitate the future improvement of the electoral process?

By accrediting observer groups only, and not allowing any individual observers who are not linked to one of the accredited groups, it is easier for the EMB to get an overview of the methodologies used. Also, the reports emerging from the observation missions will both be more likely to reach the EMB in the first place and be consolidated in a way that makes them easier to use for revisions and improvements of the electoral process.

What is the EMB’s responsibility towards the observers?

The legislation in many countries allows observers to observe the electoral process freely, without unnecessary restrictions imposed on them. Any accreditation procedures risk limiting that freedom and it is therefore necessary to make sure such limitations are kept at a reasonable and acceptable level. Accrediting individual observers rather than observer groups may lead to suspicions of a more arbitrary or subjective selection than if common criteria are set for accreditation by observer groups.

Who should be held accountable for breeches of the regulations/codes of conduct?

If observers are accredited through the organizations, it has in some cases been suggested that the sanctions for individual observers’ breeches of the regulations should be directed at the organization who accredited them rather than punishing only the individual observer. This is seen as a way of ensuring that the organizations take full responsibility for their observers and the observers’ actions. Also, depending on the country’s legislation it may also be easier to take action against groups rather than individuals. However, it has also been suggested that this form of sanctions is disproportionate to the violations, and that ways should be found to facilitate the control of the individual observers by their respective organizations instead – through information, training, signing of codes of conduct etc.

Replies were received, with thanks, from:

• Carl Dundas
• Ray Kennedy
• Francisco Cobos Flores
• Ruth Meyer
• Ammar Al-Dwaik
• Debashis Sen
• Sa Ngidi
• Simon Osborn
• Fida Nasrallah
• Horacio Boneo
• Kate Sullivan

Links to related resources:

• Organized National Election Observation in ACE
• Role of Party/Candidate Representatives - Ensuring Integrity and Transparency in ACE
• Journalists' Right of Access to Election Events
• Election bulletin prepared by the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (1996) on the accreditation of domestic election observers
• Accreditation procedures and codes of conduct for domestic and international observers in Ethiopia
• Press release on accreditation of domestic observers by the Joint Electoral Management Body Secretariat in Afghanistan (2004)
• Pre-election statement on the 2003 Nigeria elections by the Carter Center focussing partly on the accreditation of domestic observers

Quote from the ACE Encyclopaedia on accreditation of observers:

“Observers and monitors can function more effectively if they are officially accredited by the electoral management or policy-making body. Accreditation gives them access to election sites. Integrity problems may arise if accreditation procedures or requirements are used to limit the number of observers, or to deny access to certain groups of observers or monitors. If the procedure is too time-consuming and cannot be completed before election day, or if accreditation is selective, the process will lose credibility and the election management body will be accused of having something to hide.”

Individual responses in full below:

It is good practice in dealing with large numbers of domestic observers, particularly in a relatively large country geographically, to accredit the organisation which in turn issues the EMB's approved identification instrument to each of its members involved in the observation exercise.

Many election laws and regulations on the subject tend to make it discretionary as to how EMBs handle this procedure, depending on the election process or processes being observed.

Carl W. Dundas

Tim,

Here in Mexico, those wishing to observe elections can request accreditation individually or through the organization to which they belong, anytime from the beginning of the electoral process (approximately nine months before the election) until about five weeks before the election. Application forms are submitted to the president of the district or state electoral council corresponding to the domicile of the individual or the headquarters of the group. Applications are supposed to be reviewed individually within five days, and any deficiencies notified within an additional 48 hours.

There is also a requirement here that individuals seeking accreditation as observers attend a course on the subject, which can be offered by an observer organization as long as it is supervised by the electoral authorities.

Once all the requirements are met, the applications, whether submitted individually or by groups, are submitted individually to the respective electoral council for approval.

In order to control the accreditation process most EMBs I have come across accredit both the organization and the individual observers. The organization at central level and observers at the different levels (national, region/department, municipality) to ease the burden on the central office with the accreditation process. Some impose minimum requirements to be accredited as an observer, like prior training, educational level, etc.

Attached the guidelines for Nicaragua (Sorry, only available in Spanish). 

Hi Tim

I agree with you that the accreditation of individual observers by the EMB could make the burden of work extremely difficult to manage. In the elections which I have been involved with (mainly in post-conflict situations), the EMB has accredited the organisations, and the organisations have usually been asked to submit the list of observers which they intend to field, for information rather than for approval. The organisations have been asked to sign a code of conduct on behalf of their observers, and they have been made responsible for ensuring that each observer signs a code of conduct and acts in an appropriate, impartial manner. There have been penalties for either/both organisations and individual observers who contravene the code.

I haven't got any procedures that I would recommend as models, but am attaching the regulation on observers and the observer code of conduct from the Iraq elections of January 2005.

Best

Ruth

In Palestine, we accredited both organizations and individuals (you can visit www.elections.ps to see the procedures). However, organizations were required to submit all the forms along with the pictures of their observers. We also did data entry to make sure there is no duplication between observers or between observers and representatives of candidates. Data entry also enables us to provide reliable and accurate data on the number of observers, organizations, and observers for each organization, in addition to other data about gender, age and distribution of observers.

Here are steps followed in some countries:

1. Create criteria for observers (for example, no adverse record or partiality)

2. Ask pre-selected organisations to propose names based on these criteria

3. The Election Commission has the right of further screening

4. The Election Commission maintains a panel of past well-performing observers for redeployment.

In adding support for the accreditation of organisations rather than individuals, I'd say that this can in fact lend itself to better opportunity for screening. What can be done is that in creating the regulations around this, criteria can be built in to allow the Electoral Commission to screen particularly the founding documentation of the organisations applying to ensure for example that they are not in conflict with accepted democratic principles including in particular fairness & freeness. Through such screening the Electoral Commission can assume some responsibility for observer neutrality (which seems to be a concern) and leave the rest of the responsibility to the organisation being accredited. It is also a practice in Southern Africa to still request the submission of a list of observers although accreditation is done through an organisation.

Being observed by an organisation also improves the chances of the Commission receiving reports, which of course are a key outcome. It is also probable that the value of say 100 individual observer reports might be less useful than a consolidated report from a group of observers. For one, the separate individuals could be observing the election using a myriad of methodologies which might make it difficult to compare the findings. Organised observers also have a better chance of observing a more representative sample of polling stations.

Hi Tim

Hope all is well and that the following might help.

I think the question is whether it is reasonable for organisations and individuals to be faced with regulations that are unreasonably onerous (not only for the applicants but also for the EMB itself), when the law provides that people have a right to observe the polls? What after all is the purpose of the regulation?

In 1999 I was party to a debate on this issue between various South Africa organisations (SA Council of Churches, SA Justice & Peace Commission and EISA) that had approached the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to observe the elections.

Initially the SA IEC lawyers took the view that all individuals selected by the organisations should seek accreditation.

In response the organisations argued that it would be unnecessarily burdensome for them to provide the IEC in Pretoria with all the names and i.d. of every single observer. Furthermore they argued that it would be extremely burdensome to the IEC to verify and individually issue accreditation to them. However they were happy to provide lists of names, for information, to district officials.

Whilst the IEC accepted ultimately this argument they then drafted regulations that implied the organisations would be liable for the actions of all the individuals they had recruited.

In response the organisations argued that the punishment for a breach of the code by an individual - ultimately the removal of accreditation from all - was disproportional.

Ultimately they agreed to a compromise - the regulation is attached - which allowed a juristic person (i.e. a legal entity) to seek accreditation and that organisations must ensure that the observers understand and are aware of the code of conduct, must retain a specified form of accreditation card, must wear apparel that states they are an observer (with the name of the organisation), and that if any individual so accredited by the organisation breaches the code that individual would have the accreditation (and privileges) withdrawn.

My sense is that the South Africans probably got this right in their deliberations.

The EMB has a responsibility to the electorate in that those allowed to remain in the polling stations is limited and conform to certain rules. They agreed that the organisations would do everything they could to ensure observers understood these rules, but individuals that break the code of conduct are liable and that liability should be limited to them alone (unless, of course, there is legally proven evidence of a broader conspiracy).

It is ultimately impractical for an EMB to be able genuinely to verify the bona fides of what could be thousands or even tens of thousands of individuals. Even to ensure that they are voters could cause a headache in the time available! If, therefore the EMB is unable to do this, then what is the purpose of requesting each individual applies for accreditation? It is easier for an EMB to check whether an organisation has a track record of law breaking or other illegal activities (although defining whether an organisation is partisan is far more difficult) than an individual. Finally any penalties proscribed for a breach of the regulation should be proportional and enforceable.

Hi Tim

While accrediting organisations and making them liable for breaches undertaken by their members certainly facilitates the accreditation process for an EMB, it is equally judicious in some cases that a degree of control remain within the hands of the EMB. The EMB may find itself in a situation where once it has accredited a domestic organisation, that same organisation could flood the country with ‘observers’ that are neither professionally trained nor actually observing – but acting on behalf of a political party. This is exactly what happened in the country where I was working last summer where a host of domestic observers could not even identify the organisation under whose name they were accredited (they had to check their badges!).

Such situations could possibly be avoided by carefully vetting the organisations before accrediting them. That would, however, generate accusations of an EMB becoming exclusionist and preventing access to domestic observers by imposing restrictions based on its own judgements of what it considers to be a serious or credible organisation.

While individually accrediting the observers of each domestic organisation - be it at headquarters or lower administrative levels - will not necessarily resolve the issue of partisanship, it could instil a measure of control and oversight. The EMB could arguably be able to gauge whether the number of observers accredited under each organisation matches the organisation’s ability to garner such support. This is especially true in cases where new domestic organisations sprout specifically for that purpose at election time.

Hi Tim,

I had prepared an answer writing in Word to cut and paste.  When I opened the web site I found this enormous amount of useful and considered information.  However, it is too late to edit what I had already written.

Best,

Horacio Boneo

We should start by reflecting on the reasons why electoral organizations need to place some restrictions on observers.  Observers do not require any authorization or accreditation from electoral authorities for the observation of many aspects of the electoral process – there is no overwhelming need of accreditation for evaluating the legal framework, the delimitation of constituency boundaries, the freedom of campaign, press, etc.  The essential reason for which electoral authorities provide specific accreditation is that some targets of observation require access to places where the number of persons present has to be limited to safeguard an adequate administration of the electoral process, namely the polling places, the registration sites, the counting centers, and the transportation of sensitive materials. 

It should be noted that holding an observer identification is not enough for guaranteeing access to restricted areas.  Electoral legislation usually places a limit on the number of observers that can be simultaneously present inside a registration or polling center and, in the case of counting centers, there might be special requirements or limitations.  Occasionally legislation will place restrictions on who can be observer, excluding members of the armed forces, church or political parties, etc.

A second issue related to the accreditation of observers is the requirement of receiving a minimum amount of training as a precondition for accreditation, which is a common and advisable party.  At a minimum, the training should make observers aware of the rules related to the management of the polling station, registration or counting center.  This is in most cases the key precondition for observer accreditation (bona fide being difficult to establish a priori).

As to who should or could issue the accreditation, the answer might be different according to context and the following factors should be taken into consideration:

Number and characteristics of observers organizations:  If there is a single (or at most a few) networks of observers, it might make sense to give the organization the authority to issue accreditations. However, this is rarely the case, and observer organizations might be quite heterogeneous and numerous: national or international, small or large, specialized vs. non specialized, ad hoc for the election or organizations with an extensive background in observation.  There are always special groups that want to observe an election – the prototypical case being members of the Diplomatic corps that request accreditation as observers. If the number of observers/observer organizations is too large, attributing them the authority to issue accreditations might mean a total loss of control over the process.

Availability of funds by the electoral organization: The issuance of accreditation is an expensive affair.  It should be done in a decentralized way, which involves affecting a certain number of electoral officers to the accreditation exercise at the most difficult time for electoral authorities. The cost of accreditation also depends on the characteristics of the document issued to observers. If it is issued on security paper, includes photographs and is laminated, the cost might become significant.

I would consider the following suggestions as reflecting good practice – certainly recognizing that they are essentially opinions:

1. Keep direct control of the issuance of observers accreditations, with the only exception of the few organizations that will field a large number of observers, with whom special agreements might be established, clearly defining the obligations assumed by the observer’ organization and the characteristic of the identification to be issued (to avoid problems of interpretation at the polling stations). At a minimum, the observer organization should submit lists and information on observers to the electoral organization a few days before the elections and be prepared to have their training programmes supervised by the electoral authorities.
2. Establish a decentralized system for the issuing of accreditation to smaller organizations or single observers, usually in charge of the local electoral organizations. Make the document simple enough so that they do not involve a large cost. Photographs should be avoided, and replaced by the requirement that the observers should carry with them not only the accreditation but also an ID document. The decentralized system should include offering training programmes for observers to be held shortly before the elections (as related to access to polling centers)

A last word of caution: the issue of accreditation is only a minor, though complex and time-consuming, aspect of the regulation of observation. Some countries, for instance, request that observers make their observation methodology public.  In other cases, the accreditation is valid for only one specific polling station, while in others it authorizes the access of the observer to any polling station. Legislation should also specify the duties and responsibilities of the observers, including, for instance, the obligation of informing the electoral authorities of any observed irregularity as soon as possible. Legislation also make clear the distinction between observers, press and political party agents. While regulating the content of final reports is inadequate and beyond the question, some electoral authorities place some limitations on the issuance of preliminary report before the conduct of the election and/or commentaries by individual observers.

Hi Tim

Here in the UK we have just opened our observer accreditation scheme, following legislative amendment to the electoral law. Our law is structured so that domestic and international groups are treated the same, but that there is a twin track approach for individuals and organisations.

I can't really tell you how this will work as we've only had one individual apply so far, but all the information is at the electoral commission's website and the legislation can be found in section 29 of the Electoral Administration Act 2006.

All individuals sign a declaration to abide by our guidance, which is based on the 2005 international code of practice. UK electoral law is structured to provide that you accept such declarations on their face and then have recourse to deal with misbehaviour, which in this case could mean the withdrawal of accreditation. Again, it's hard for us to say how this will work.

We will provide the identification for each observer, whether an individual or one nominated by an accredited organisation.

There are some unhelpful parts of the law that may limit our ability to take action against individuals nominated by organisations, which could be a problem if only one person does not abide by the Code. The up side is that it requires organisations to be more proactive in who they nominate for accrediation.