Integrity problems may arise
at the polling station or counting center where the ballots are counted and/or
tabulated. They may be the result of a genuine mistake or a deliberate effort
to manipulate the outcome.
Machine counts reduce the risk
of error but a machine cannot determine a voter’s intention if the voter did
not mark the ballot precisely, in a way that can be read by the machine.
To maintain the integrity of
the electoral process, vote counting must produce results that are valid,
accurate and accepted by all participants. A number of important measures must
be taken to achieve this objective:
Counting
should be done as soon as possible after the polls close
The longer that ballots remain
uncounted, the higher the risk of tampering with the results. Before beginning
the count, however, it is important to ensure that the site is secure and
observers are present.
When there are problems of
intimidation or security, counting at the polling station may be impossible. In
this case, counting may be moved to a different site (for example, a regional
centre) where ballots from several tables are brought together before counting.
This provision is included in the election laws of several countries, including
South Africa, which allows electoral
administrators some discretion to move the counting location if necessary.
The
voter's intention must be properly determined
A voter may mark the ballot
but miss the designated box or space, making it difficult to know how to count
the vote. Too strict an interpretation of the rules may invalidate an otherwise
valid vote.
A best practice in this area
is to adopt, through legislation, a tripartite approach. First they should look at
whether the voter has made a mark, and in the correct area. Then examining whether any
other marks (that could be interpreted as possible alternative votes, or
evidence of ballot spoilage or which could identify the voter) had been made
elsewhere. Lastly, looking as to the apparent intention of the voter, when the first
two criteria were not sufficient to resolve the matter. (This approach is followed, among other
places, under the Electoral Code of FRY Macedonia.) In cases where an approach like this is
followed, there is a definite need for the counting official to display the
ballot at issue and solicit the views of those present, including members of
the voting committee and candidate/party monitors.
Not using the designated space
to mark the vote is a major problem if machines are used for counting. Machines
can read only the designated spaces and cannot take into account a voter’s
obvious intention.
During Indonesia’s 2004 presidential election, ballots
that were perforated twice became a
major issue in the electoral process. Each ballot had been folded in such a way
that a voter could perforate it without opening the ballot fully. The poor
design raised the number of invalid ballots. Indonesia’s General Election
Commission had to pass an emergency order allowing use of the criterion of
obvious intention. Nonetheless, some counting centres did not comply.[1]
Accuracy
of the count must be ensured
The following should be
applied to guarantee the accuracy of the count:
- Good management of the
count is essential, as is proper training of all the counters.
- A transparent count with
monitors and observers present is highly desirable. Monitors and observers
compare the official results with the results they received; their
participation is a good mechanism for ensuring accurate counts. In some
countries, such as Denmark,
anyone may attend the count, increasing the transparency of the process
still further. [2]
- There should be
predetermined rules about what to do with spoiled ballots and ballots on
which the voters’ intention is not clear.
- Spoiled or rejected
ballots should be separated from ballots that are marked and valid.
- Disputed ballots also
need to be separated for review at a higher level.
- All relevant tally sheet
information should be recorded, including: the number of ballot-papers
delivered to the polling station; the number available at the start of
voting; the number of ballots issued; the number of ballots voted; the
results; and the number of disputed, spoiled or unused ballots.
- In many countries where
ballots are counted by hand, the choice marked on each ballot is read
aloud. The ballot is shown to all monitors and election officers present
to demonstrate that the vote has been properly counted. In some countries, where there is a
higher level of confidence among election workers (staff and political
party representatives, if any), the counters may instead take a more
cooperative approach.
- It is important that
monitoring continue through the consolidation of the count until release
of the official results, since tampering may occur after the initial
count.
- In many systems, monitors
keep track of the count and sign the tally sheets to indicate their
agreement or disagreement with the results (stating their reasons in the
case of disagreement).
- An effective appeals
process is necessary. Candidates and monitors should be able to challenge
the results of the count. The appeals process is usually set out in the
legal framework. Since it may allow a recount, ballots are usually kept
for as long as the law requires, and at least through conclusion of the
appeals stage.
- Good law enforcement is
crucial. In every system, it is a crime to tamper with election results by
not counting some ballots, deliberately misreading votes, changing the
results, destroying ballots or falsifying tally sheets. Election fraud may
be averted by investigating allegations of tampering as soon as they are
reported, and by enforcing the law strictly.
Secrecy
of the vote must be protected
The secrecy of the vote is best
maintained when ballots are not marked in a way that could identify the voter.
If ballots are validated by a stamp or signature, the use of a standard mark
can minimize the possibility of connecting a particular ballot with a voter.
The secrecy of the vote may be
at risk when votes are counted locally. If few people voted at a table and the
votes are counted at that same table, it may become obvious who voted for whom. In this case, it may be an important
protection for vote secrecy if the ballots from areas with few voters are
admixed with ballots from other areas before being counted. In extreme cases, in which voters from
certain areas could face repercussions from having voted in a particular way,
it may be advisable not to include the results from those polling stations in a
published breakdown of the results by station.
[1] The
Carter Center, The
Carter Center 2004 Indonesia
Election Report, June 2005
[2] Folketing (Danish Parliament),
“Parliamentary Elections and Election Administration in Denmark”
