Original question:

I am a reporter for The Associated Press in Bangkok, Thailand. Thailand is facing a political crisis now because a popular movement calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra - for alleged corruption and abuse of power - has evolved into a boycott of a snap election called by Thaksin.

There now seems to be a serious deadlock with the potential for violence. We are trying to prepare some articles about the issues at stake, and wondered - based on your organization's areas of expertise - whether one of your experts would care to comment on some matters.

What role does an election boycott play in a democracy? What, in other words, justifies opting out of the democratic process? The case here, I might note, seems different than elsewhere: it is not so much matter of outright fraud or intimidation being expected, but rather the feeling that the ruling party with its power and money, and several quirky statutes in the Constitution securing their power, has the deck stacked in its favor.

Are election boycotts effective tools? With or without an election boycott, what are the responsible limits for street demonstrations? Is it incumbent upon anti-government demonstrators to avoid confrontations that risk violence, or do circumstances - or the rules of pragmatic politics - put this responsibility in the hands of the authorities?

In both cases, can you cite some examples?

The second subject concerns the Southeast Asian situation specifically, and I can understand if you may or may not feel qualified to comment. (In this case, recent events in the Philippines are on our mind as well.) But this is what we are interested in:

• Are there any common trends as far as the progress - or lack thereof - in democracy in Southeast Asia is concerned?
• Has the impetus for general democratic reform been blunted or reversed in recent years in some countries? (Personally, I am not convinced there is a connecting thread for the countries of the region, but perhaps there is a case to be made otherwise.)
• Without making a judgment on US policy, has the Bush administration's war on terror - and I believe downgrading of making a priority of human rights, etc - had an effect on the democratic process in Southeast Asia?
• In other words, as seems to be the case in Russia, particularly, is the US hard line being used as justification for political crackdowns by repressive regimes who claim to be fighting terrorism?
• Have the models of government shown by Singapore and China been having an increasing influence on Southeast Asian political leaders, in terms of preferring more authoritarian models?
• Do the problems perhaps all boil down to the region's countries having immature democracies, open to manipulation? What are the prospects for improvement?

Summary of the individual responses received:

Election boycotts have no place in a functioning democracy; participation being at the heart of the democratic process. However, boycotts could have a role to play in a democracy that is not functioning as it should be and where fair competition is impossible. The problem lies in determining at what point conditions for a fair election are being violated to such an extent that a boycott is justifiable. Even if justifiable it should be considered as a last resort. In most cases opposition parties have concluded that participation in the electoral process – even if it is unequal – is more beneficial than boycotting it. Choosing to be outside the electoral process is a highly risky political tactic and can come with high costs. Both the degree of sympathy and interest in any boycott by the wider electorate is a crucial factor in determining the impact of any boycott. Their impacts are often minimal and can be managed by the incumbent government unless the boycott is accompanied by other measures which hinder ability to govern or there is a minimum voter participation required. Boycotts therefore often impact upon legitimacy but not the final result. There is also a very real danger that resorting to a boycott can have a long-term and damaging effect on the democratic process.

There is a danger that street protests (as a means to bring about a change in government) are resorted to too easily and become less then exceptional events, thereby undermining the constitutional process.

There is a general trend in South East Asia of elections being regarded as standard practice. There is, however, a widespread deficit of the necessary accompanying democratic culture. Most countries in the region are in a better position then a decade ago but there widespread evidence of a political culture which favours strength and wealth. Many people are frustrated with the results of democracy and populist leaders are gaining support.

Links to the ACE Encyclopaedia and other related resources:

• ACE: Election Authority and Other Statutory Bodies as Stakeholders in Voter Education Mandate
  
• ACE: How to Deal with Difficult Stakeholders
  
• ACE: Electoral Integrity
• Non-Participation of Some Oppositional Parties Cannot Hurt Legitimacy of Elections, CEC Chairman, Trend News (2008)
  

Quote from the ACE Encyclopaedia on the challenge presented by election boycotts:

"Broad-based election boycott movements will present particular challenges to voter educators and must be taken into consideration. If a particular "side" in the election contest, as represented by any number of political parties, special interest groups, and civil society organizations, opts to boycott -- and encourages its support base to boycott -- an election which it perceives to be illegitimate, then efforts to inform, motivate, and mobilize voters become less neutral. This is to say that any attempt to get out the vote may be viewed as support for the government and party (or parties) in power.

This situation is most likely to affect international organizations and civil society groups, as election authorities may be legally bound to provide voter education despite the circumstances. Even so, civil society groups may be divided about whether participation or boycott is the best means of affecting social, legal, or political change. As noted above, an assessment may have to be made about the relative scope and importance of the boycott. For those opting to proceed with voter education initiatives despite a broad-base boycott, attempts should be made to meet with both sides and clearly explain to voters the ramifications of their decision to vote or not vote".

Individual responses in full:

In Sri Lanka the LTTE have at various times called for boycotts to establish that the government in Colombo does not represent the Tamils. It has been effective in the general debates BUT there have been MPs elected in Tamil areas where only 10 persons voted and the person who got those 10 votes happily sat in Parliament. (I think this is in the Guinness book of records as the MP with the lowest votes)

Again, the LTTE called for a boycott of the Presidential elections and as a result President Rajapakse got elected. In Nepal, the political parties boycotted the local elections and there was only a 20% turnout. But local bodies will be formed on the basis of this vote unless there is a complete boycott.

Boycotts make a temporary statement but some parties are able to live with it. UNLESS the boycott is accompanied by ungovernability. (Violence as used in South Africa / blockades/ Satyagraha campaigns - as used by Gandhi etc). Some countries may require a minimum participation to carry legislation / referenda but I do not know of any country that requires a minimum participation in National Elections.

Some countries may require parliaments/Presidential terms to follow a set term or at least a minimum term to prevent ad hoc calls for elections. Sri Lanka set the Presidential term at 6 years and 2 terms to provide the executive with stability and the chance to make hard decisions. However, when it was expedient, the President changed it by constitutional amendments to be able to call for new elections after a minimum of 4 years had passed. It was justified on the grounds that he was not autocratically extending his term but rather democratically going back to the people to express their will!

Are election boycotts effective tools?

Answer: See point above about the 10 voters in Sri Lanka who have an MP!

With or without an election boycott, what are the responsible limits for street demonstrations? Is it incumbent upon anti-government demonstrators to avoid confrontations that risk violence, or do circumstances - or the rules of pragmatic politics - put this responsibility in the hands of the authorities?

Answer: Anti government demonstrations in South Africa did not start off being violent but rapidly turned violent and the Indian independence movement relied heavily on anti-government demonstrations (peaceful and sustained over time and even some that turned violent). But neither the governments of Apartheid South Africa or colonial India were democratic. Also remember the street protests against Suharto which he eventually could not withstand.

However, if the military has a stomach for high levels of blood shed the street protests can lead to high casualties (as was the case in Burma after the elections of 1990). Different dilemma when the people do elect a government, have parliamentary representatives and procedures to check governments and then report to the streets.

The Philippines is the most remarkable case of People's protests in the streets to change governments. In the anti-Marcos demonstrations there was a moral legitimacy for this action. Then it brought down Estrada and has been used against Arroyo too. There is a danger in routinizing this and it will eventually undermine the constitutional process.

In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics too -  huge street protests have brought down governments. But oppositions that rely heavily and regularly on such tactics must also expect to receive the same when they form a government. Street protests become the first report or too easily resorted to and there is no patience for seeing a government finish its term.

Are there any common trends as far as the progress _ or lack thereof _ in democracy in Southeast Asia is concerned? Has the impetus for general democratic reform been blunted or reversed in recent years in some countries? (Personally, I am not convinced there is a connecting thread for the countries of the region, but perhaps there is a case to be made otherwise.)

Answer: There was much enthusiasm for the democratic trend in Southeast Asia after the Asian Financial crisis, the changes in Indonesia etc. Prior to that people noted the trend of authoritarianism of the Tiger Economies and even justified that it was the authoritarianism that contributed to high growth! Clearly, popular participation forces greater responsiveness of the government towards the people (though it can also lead to Pork Barrel Politics) I think Southeast Asia remains a very mixed region and generalisations are difficult to make.

Malaysia has turned out to have a more responsive democratic government; Thailand has rolled back to populist politics - depending on electoral processes to establish its democratic credentials rather than on the substance of its politics. Indonesia is consolidating its democracy and in the Philippines the people can not be shut out of the process although formal politics is still captured by the elite political clans. No change in Burma although its democratic potential remains unrealised, no change in Vietnam politically but great strides in the economy. Laos remains a closed political system and No real changes in Singapore and China has not gone beyond local elections even though it has high growth rates.

Interesting that ASEAN as a regional organisation recognises that non-interference in each others politics is no longer practicable and the ASEAN parliamentarians have started to put pressure on Burma. Indonesia and Malaysia's leadership could make some impact but China's internal politics and its external relations are very important.

Without making a judgment on US policy, has the Bush administration's war on terror - and I believe downgrading of making a priority of human rights, etc - had an effect on the democratic process in Southeast Asia? In other words, as seems to be the case in Russia, particularly, is the US hard line being used as justification for political crackdowns by repressive regimes who claim to be fighting terrorism?

Answer: The US war on terror and the US's own laws and practices (Patriot Act, Guantanamo camps etc) which permit a denial of human rights do have an impact on the democratic processes and protection of Human rights. 1) It makes it difficult for the US to point figures and uphold standards that it violates itself; 2) The US will be willing to overlook abuses by its allies The national / internal security debate is winning over the human rights and human security.

Have the models of government shown by Singapore and China been having an increasing influence on Southeast Asian political leaders, in terms of preferring more authoritarian models?

Answer: The Asian Values /authoritarianism is necessary for rapid economic growth argument is not new. It gained much currency in the 1980's and when the Asian financial crisis exposed the corruption and nepotism which eventually unraveled the tiger economies / regimes and eventually the authoritarian approach lost favor.

However, democracy has not fulfilled all expectations (and there are rising expectations) in Asia. Economic development has not taken place and there is no social equity either and these frustrations are making people turn against democracy and start believing again in populist leaders who make unrealistic promises.

Do the problems perhaps all boil down to the region's countries having immature democracies, open to manipulation? What are the prospects for improvement?

Answer: Democracy takes time to consolidate and it is more than a matter of a few good institutions. There must be a multiplicity of institutions capable of protecting democracy at different levels (constitutions, Parliaments, political parties, courts, media, civic organizations etc) Those institutions should be committed to democratic values and not simply reflect the cleavages and insecurities found in society. Those institutions must also be staffed and protected by People.

Those people must have the mindsets for democracy - and that takes time to develop -- especially in cases where people have been educated and nurtured for decades in command/ control economies and regimes. People can be manipulated through a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons. Sectarianism, fear and security, economic underdevelopment and insecurity are all factors that can leave people open to make short-term choices that in the long term may undermine their democracies.

Democracy is a work in progress and no country should be sanguine and take it for granted that there democracy is mature and can function on Autopilot!

I know some members of the opposition are deeply divided by the election boycott, and also by the call for the monarchy to appoint a caretaker prime minister, because these are both seemingly anti-democratic actions. Election boycotts, I consider, are a very risky manoeuvre. The Singaporean opposition tried in the 1960s, and they have never been able to get back into government even at the most basic level. However, what is likely here is that a new government will never be formed because the Southern provinces will not go to the polls (being pro democrat) and hence no one can  fill these seats and government cannot convene. The effectiveness of the boycott is that it has forced some major outcome, and Thaksin cannot divert from this issue.

On the street protests, there have been rumours about violence, and Coup rumours, but this is a standard part of Thai (or more precisely Bangkok) political culture. I doubt very, very much there will be any kind of violence like ’76 or ’92. There may be confrontation when the pro- and anti- Thaksin groups meet. Human rights and democratic values are more entrenched and the military or police will not open fire on Bangkok protestors. Even though the army has killed unarmed protestors very recently in the South, this was a very different issue. Thaksin has been noted for his strong arm response in the south, and people have (unfortunately) supported this violence, much like they supported the crack down on drug dealers leading to around 3,000 deaths. However, these people were seen as not Thai, and the protestor are claiming to be more Thai than Thaksin – there is a call that he has sold out the country to Singapore. The responsibility is on the authorities to avoid any confrontation. The protestors will be civilly disobedient.

On the status in SEA. Looking at Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, and Thailand, there is a very definite trend towards elections as being the standard practice. However, the technical election process is often not connected with a culture of democracy. Vote buying, intimidation, unfair promises, rural elites have often limited the way people understand and use the election process. For instance, democratic reform in Cambodia through some of the local NGOs (such as Cambodian Centre for Human Rights or Licadho), has moved to issues of freedom of speech and not so much the election process. And in both Cambodia and Thailand human rights advocates are facing criminal libel charges by the government, testing the limits of freedom of speech. They are copying Singaporean politics here.

I don’t see USA has had much of a democratic impact on the current situations. Sure recently some governments have used the USA actions as an excuse, but the anti-USA movement is more popular (Thailand is currently negotiating an FTA with Thailand which is broadly disliked).

On the standard of the democracies, most countries are better than they were 10 years ago, but still could improve much more. I wouldn’t call them immature, but rather commercialized democracies, and a political culture that appreciates strength and wealth.

Response Nr. 3: My brief opinion is that what is happening in Thailand is very similar to what happened in the Philippines a few years ago, and the movement itself is probably inspired by the Philippine example, so there is some thread connecting these events.

In general, an election boycott when the election process can be expected to be free and fair is anti-democratic. In essence, a small group is attempting to use force (the threat of economic or political instability) to impose their will on the majority. This is clear in the example of Bangladesh, where the Awami League threatens boycott (and implicitly violence) because they are not confident they can win the election.

In the Philippines and Thailand the situation is different in that the movements are or were led by NGOs, an educated elite, that were supposed to be in the forefront of supporting democracy, but whose policy preferences were ignored by populist presidents. In the Philippines, rather than making their case through debate and political advocacy, activists took to the streets to oust Estrada. Its true that he was corrupt, but their resort to extra legal and anti-democratic means set a precedent that continues to affect the quality of Philippine democracy.

In Thailand, activists first objected to Thaksin's ownership of media outlets, and then to his sale of those outlets. Essentially, they are political opponents, who lack confidence they can achieve their ends through the democratic process (convince the majority their policies are best), or are impatient. Since the majority of Thai people continue to support their president, the activists are searching for another way to remove the president that doesn't rely on the consent of the fickle people. It is an anti-democratic approach borrowed from the Philippines, and is certainly not a tactic I would think that would contribute to the long term health and stability of the country. Better they organize politically, then take their case to the people, or pursue criminal charges through the courts (though as far as I can see, unlike the case of the Philippine, no criminal act has been committed).

So, election boycotts are unjustified if an election process is relatively free and fair. They can also be political suicide for the parties involved, if the majority views the elections as legitimate.  Resort to boycott can permanently damage the democratic process and lead to seemingly endless political violence (see Bangladesh and Nepal). On the other hand, in places like Zimbabwe, where there is no expectation the process will be fair, a boycott could be appropriate.

Demonstrators in a democracy do not resort to violence, and I was a bit astonished that your questioner sought approval of the practice. Democracy in Southeast Asia is advancing at an astonishing pace, unmatched by any other region in the world in my opinion. It’s not perfect, but the trend is generally positive.

Aspects of Boycott: The simple answer to the question is: A boycott does not have any role in a democracy.  A democracy is about participation not about boycotting which is nothing but organised non-participation.  Some countries have participation as a legal requirement to all voters, such as Belgium, even though in most countries the decision on whether participating in an election or not is an individual choice.

When the question still is being asked it is mainly because some democratic rights may have been violated and a boycott is being considered as a counter-act against such violations.  A boycott is not a normal behaviour in a democracy.  The question is rather whether it is a legitimate tool to protect democratic rights which have been violated.

Before discussing that question I will first mention a few points on non-participation as a tactical behaviour.

In an election some voters may feel that they do not have any alternative to vote for.  In such case it is clearly legitimate not to show up for the elections, or to cast a blank vote.  However, in a functional democracy it would be even better if such voters had used their right to organise and to propose their own candidate for the election.  Non-participation or casting blank votes does not have the same prominence in a representative democracy as making a positive choice.

There may be tactical reasons for an organised non-participation.  The most obvious example is when a referendum needs a certain turnout to be valid.  In such cases it might be rational for those supporting a “No” alternative to ask their supporters to refrain from voting instead of voting “No” because it may be more likely to obtain a low turnout than to win a majority for the no-vote.

The discussion above was about non-participation in functional democracies, not about boycott as an act of demonstration when the democracy fails, which is the subject for the rest of the discussion.

Is Boycott a Legitimate Tool? I believe that everybody would agree that there are situation where a boycott of an election is a legitimate tool and maybe even the only democratic act possible.  That would be in situations where the legal framework or the context of the election is such that a fair competition is impossible.  The clear cases would be in circumstances which would not disserve the label ‘democratic elections’.

The problematic question is at what time are the conditions for fair elections being violated to such an extent that the opposition [1]  would or should call for a Boycott.  When should the opposition try to do the best out of a difficult situation and try step by step to try to improve the rules of the game, and when is a confrontation the right choice?

There are no simple answers to the question.  In transfer democracies the condition for holding elections have varied from a situation where the incumbents are organising elections only because it is required due to international or domestic public opinion, to a situation where all parties have a genuine wish to provide for fair elections but where the technical capabilities may fall short in a number of important areas.

Even in such cases where the incumbents organise multi-party elections with no intention to create a level playing field for all parties the opposition has in most cases decided to participate.  Zimbabwe (2001, 2002 and 2005) and Belarus (2000, 2001, and 2004) are examples of elections where the opposition participated within a legal and political structure which was far from meeting any criteria for fair elections.  The view was that even though the conditions were extremely difficult it would not help in the long run to be outside the parliament.  Participating would also give an opportunity to mobilise supporters at regular intervals if not for other reasons than to demonstrate the shortcomings of the elections and to give their supporters a chance to show their views.

In situations where the shortcomings may not have been due to ill will the participation has normally not been an issue and even in countries which started from technically fairly disorganised processes, the elections improved over time.

One may conclude that in most countries the opposition has found it more useful to participate even if the conditions have been far from equal for all parties.

If one considers a boycott one needs to assess the consequences of such a position carefully.  The most obvious result would be that the incumbents would win the elections without competition.  And not only that:  The opposition would be out of the Parliament and lose their access to a channel for information, to the media etc.  It is often doubtful whether such a loss can be compensated by extra-parliamentarian forums, in particular over the period of a full parliamentary term.

In very serious circumstances the international community may act upon bad elections with measures such as embargos, travel restrictions on the leaders, freezing of accounts, and exclusions from international organisations (e.g. Zimbabwe).  Such measures are taken only in very exceptional cases, where the international community (often together with a suppressed opposition) assesses that the measure may help.  A boycott of an election does not necessarily mean that the international community should consider measures but it is often considered in the same circumstances.

If the opposition calls for a boycott, they would have to be prepared fro at least one term out of the parliament and positions following representation.  What would then the next step be?  In some cases where boycotts have been used the strategy has been that a dramatic change outside the parliament is the only possibility.  Such a change could come as a result of a national crisis, international pressure, demonstrations or other means.  In Serbia the small democratic opposition waited for a drastic change back in 1996 and 1997.

In conclusion a boycott could be a legitimate tool under circumstances where the democratic rules of the game are grossly violated and where there seems to be few other ways to improve the situation.  However, boycotts have costs both in terms of being outside the parliament and channels where it might be possible to mobilise for future elections.  The costs may be high.

To what extent a boycott would serve democracy in situations where the democratic rules of the game are violated can not be answered in a simple manner.  Should one, however, use boycott in a situation which is not sufficiently serious it is more than likely that the sympathy would rather decrease than increase for a democratic opposition.  It might be difficult to explain such a decision to the domestic public as well as the international community and the purpose may be lost.

Examples and Comments from the International Community: In the following I will mention a few examples, none of them being from Asia though.

Albania 1996: Albania has had a strong polarisation ever since the first multi-party elections in 1991 and 1992.  Both the two dominant parties have boycotted the parliament at times.  On Election Day in May 1996 the Socialist party (opposition) withdrew from the elections based upon what they assessed as being serious election fraud.  After a year of severe unrest new elections were held in 1997 under international supervision.  The Socialist Party won and after some time the Democratic Party decided not to participate in the parliament.  During the referendum on a new constitution in 1998 the Democratic Party boycotted the vote and the new constitution passed.

It is difficult to see how the frequent boycotts in Albania have improved the Albanian democracy and political life, despite the clear violations of democratic rules which have also been reported by international observers.

Serbia 1997: The small democratic parties boycotted the elections held in Serbia in 1997.  The background was the efforts made by the Milosevic regime to prevent the opposition winners of the local elections the year before.  After that a high profile international effort failed to create improvements to the election law in such a way that all opposition parties found it worthwhile participating.  In 2000 a better organised broad coalition of opposition parties managed to win elections in Yugoslavia.  The effects of the boycotts in 1997 are difficult to assess, but it is doubtful if they played a very positive role, and in 2000 participation was decided even though the conditions had hardly improved.

Belarus 2000: In Belarus the opposition has participated in elections under extreme circumstances.  The conditions for proposing candidates, running a campaign, observing elections, etc have been increasingly difficult.  The international community found the context of the elections to be so bad that the OSCE decided not to send full observer missions in 2000 and 2001. After that the situation has rather become worse, but the OSCE did observe the elections in 2004 and plan to do the same in 2006 mainly because it is important for the opposition to have witnesses in the country.  A boycott of a regime like Lukashenka’s may be easy to defend from a principle point of view but may not be the best strategy for a democratic change in the long run.  The courageous participation of the opposition and the civic society may prove to be a better strategy for a long term change.

Zimbabwe 2005: In Zimbabwe the opposition did surprisingly well in the 2001 elections.  There is no doubt that this encouraged the democratic opposition to an autocratic regime.  In 2002 and 2005 the conditions were still far from equal for the parties competing in elections.  The government party won sufficient majority in 2005 to change the Constitution and used it to introduce a two-chamber system.  In the fall of 2005 elocutions to the Senate were held and the main opposition party (MDC) had a damaging internal conflict on the issue of boycott or not.  This led to a split of the party and right now the opposition seems to be weaker than ever in Zimbabwe.  Again it is easy to defend a boycott under the circumstances but to what extend it would be the right strategy – even without the internal conflict – is difficult to assess.

The more overtly a political process is stacked against the opposition the easier it is for the opposition to decide not to take part without loosing the confidence of the electorate. However, if the incumbent only recently and in not so blatant manner improved its chances the more difficult it is for the opposition to win the argument and thereby the continued support by the people. An important factor here is, of course, how sophisticated the average voter is. If mostly illiterate and politicians in general have a low among the average citizen the higher the likelihood that voters will not care and the opposition can boycott all it wants without making any headway.

An election boycott can be very effective. The most recent local election in Nepal is a good example. There the seven-party alliance containing all the major opposition parties urged the voters to stay away from the poll and only 21% of the electorate took part, and that even after the government forced all its civil servants to take part in the election. As a result, all the major international players in Nepal (US, China, EU, Britain, India), even including the Japanese who are usually very careful in its public statements, denounced the election as being a hollow exercise, or even calling it a step in the wrong direction. Having said that, if the opposition party decided to boycott several polls in a row they are running the risk of undermining its standing as it has not access to the parliament and cannot use that important forum to scrutinize and criticize the governing party. It is also very difficult to hold party together if it is not running for office for a long time as most politicians want to test their chances. They are to certain extent like professional athletes and need to test its strengths occasionally. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe is a good case in point.

Violent demonstrations have rarely been rewarded by the electorate. What is important here is the number of demonstrators. It is a mix of number games, reactions by the security forces (willing or not willing to side with the demonstrators and allowing them into government offices of importance such as parliament, national TV stations etcetera) and support by non-political institutions of importance in the country in question. Here we are talking about religions leaders, culture personalities such Nobel laureates, union leaders etcetera.

Many thanks to all that contributed!

The ACE Practitioners' Network

The opinions expressed by members of the ACE Practitioners' Network do not necessarily reflect those of the ACE Partner organizations.

[1] It would almost always be the opposition who would consider a boycott even though there are examples of presidents encouraging people not to vote (Lukashenka in the parliamentary elections in Belarus in 1995).