By Vladimir Pran

Statements by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah and Hamas leaders indicate that Palestinian factions have agreed to hold elections in January 2010. There are, however, various contextual challenges that make the implementation of these elections far from certain.

The challenges faced take on a special urgency as the 2010 elections would be an important step for the continuation of the Palestinian government that was formed as result of the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords. In Oslo, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel negotiated the formation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which was led by Yasser Arafat until his death in 2004. Presidential elections were then held in 2005, and legislative elections were held in 2006. These elections resulted in the presidency of Mahmoud Abbas and a majority-win in parliament for Hamas. The 2010 polls would be the third set of elections for the Palestinian government.

Of even greater importance, the Palestinian population feels that a government must be democratically elected in order to be valid. Recent opinion polls suggest that Palestinians believe the government must go through elections in January 2010 to retain legitimacy.

This article presents a brief overview of the roadblocks to the 2010 elections:

Political or "Constitutional" Framework

Once the various Palestinian factions and the President agree to hold the elections, they have to agree on a political/constitutional framework under which to conduct them. The 1996 elections were conducted as a result of the Oslo Accords. When President Arafat died in 2004, Palestinians carried out a ballot to elect a president and members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). They did this without a political agreement with Israel, following the Basic Law and the 2005 intra‐Palestinian Cairo Agreement. It is, however, very difficult to conceive that in light of the current intra-Palestinian conflict both Hamas and the PNA can agree on Hamas’ participation without a new intra-Palestinian political agreement. This agreement will likely require some concessions on Hamas’ side regarding its stance toward PLO commitments.

International Community

In 2006, the international community supported an electoral process in which Hamas took part. The financial and technical support of the international community was essential for the Palestinian Central Elections Commission (CEC). It supported the CEC’s outreach and voter education activities; aided political factions in campaign organizing; and funded international observation missions. The large number of international observers contributed greatly to the credibility of the electoral process. However, similar support for the new elections under the same 2006 framework is uncertain. In the three years since 2006, the rules of engagement (especially for the EU and the US) have changed to become stricter to ensure that no assistance is provided to Hamas.

Israel

Israel's support is crucial for the elections to take place. Even a passive Israeli rejection of the Palestinian elections would render the implementation of the electoral process impossible.

Israeli authorities must facilitate implementation in several ways, including:

• The movement of Elections Commission goods (election materials) and personnel in the West Bank, between the West Bank and Gaza and to Jerusalem, during all of the phases of the electoral process
• The importation of election materials from overseas
• The movement of candidates and voters across the Palestinian territories during the campaign period
• Enabling the registration of candidates and campaigning in East Jerusalem and easing restrictions on voting of the Jerusalemite Palestinians
• The coordination of the deployment of Palestinian security forces

Fatah

Fatah’s situation has not improved much since its 2006 election defeat. Fatah’s political program is unclear and the transition from a national movement into a political party is not going smoothly. The leadership remains divided and cannot agree on a formula for the (s)election of delegates of the long overdue 6th Fatah General Conference. Demands of the party base that the delegates be selected through internal elections processes have been largely ignored and lead to friction between the leadership and the party base. As it stands, Fatah’s position in any electoral process is far from desired. President Abbas must call for elections for them to take place. He might be unwilling to do so while his party is in disarray.

Legal Framework

In September 2007, President Abbas issued an election law under the pretext of an emergency government. Any piece of legislation issued by decree must be ratified at the end of the rule of the emergency government by the Palestinian Legislative Council for it to be legally binding. For this reason, Hamas disputes the validity of the 2007 Elections Law. There are two main areas of contention in the 2007 Elections Law: the system of representation and the “PLO requirements.” If Hamas and the PNA agree on these two topics, it is safe to assume that legality of the law will not be an issue. The CEC is refraining from taking sides, choosing not to interpret either law. Instead, the CEC designed operational plans for either scenario. From the operational perspective, a Proportional List system of representation (as proposed in the 2007 election law) would be much easier to implement than the system used in the 2006 PLC elections.

Election Operations

In 2005 and 2006, the Palestinian CEC successfully defied domestic political pressures and Israeli occupation and organized several large‐scale operations. This helped prove the CEC’s independence and capacity to conduct sound elections. After the legislative elections and voters’ list were updated in 2007, the CEC reduced its staff but preserved its core infrastructure. Since the last elections the CEC has been actively working on building the capacity of its staff, reforming some aspects of the electoral process and fine‐tuning operational plans.

However, despite the fact that the CEC has begun to prepare, it will face a challenging situation if the elections are called without sufficient time for expansion of infrastructure and staff. These are needed to carry out the most demanding immediate task: the registration of voters. While the CEC was developing a plan to introduce continuous voter registration, the plan has not been rolled out because of the intra‐Palestinian conflict. The CEC needs at least three months notice before polling begins to implement voter registration, as registration centers must open directly following the call for elections in order to update the list

Another challenge for the CEC is uncertainty over the system of representation. The registration of candidates, ballot printing, polling procedures and election materials all depend on the system chosen: the current system or a pure List Proportional Representation system. The CEC will also have little time to make arrangements for matters pertaining to Jerusalem, which have to be negotiated between the PNA and Israeli authorities. The Commission will have to invest substantial efforts to provide the best possible voting conditions to Jerusalemite Palestinians.

For more information, or to see the briefing paper on which this article is based, please click here.

Vladimir Pran is Chief of Party for IFES - West Bank/Gaza where he advises and provides training to the Palestinian Central Election Commission