by Homeyra Mokhtarzada

On September 18, Afghan men and women headed to the polls, marking an important milestone in their country’s transition to democracy. It was the second time Afghans had the opportunity to vote in less than a year (though these were the first local elections held since 1969). In 2004, Afghans had elected President Hamid Karzai and this time, they were electing members of a new lower house of the National Assembly (the Wolesi Jirga) and of 34 provincial councils. Despite predictions of election-day violence, 6.4 million of Afghanistan’s 12.5 million registered voters cast ballots and, on November 12, the certification of results completed the process laid out in the Bonn Agreement in 2001 following the fall of the Taliban. Months of planning and preparation culminated in an election day that, by official accounts, was credible and its results accepted. But the challenges the new elected bodies will face are far greater and more complex.

Organizing the Elections

With just six months of lead time, Afghans—working in concert with international donors and consultants—took on the task of organizing one of the most complex post-conflict elections in history.  The price tag: US$159 million.

To make the elections a success, at least two intangible elements had to result from the tangible preparations.  First, there had to be buy-in and understanding on the part of the Afghan populace.

With this in mind, a civic education and outreach campaign was launched. Through face- to- face sessions, about 8 million Afghans heard and discussed information about the election process and the new representative bodies. Both traditional and innovative techniques were used to communicate voter and civic education messages. These included mobile cinema and theater as well as a Voter Information Center that fielded over 110,000 election-related calls from the Afghan electorate on a toll-free number.

Second, Afghans needed to perceive the election process as credible. Just a few of the measures taken to promote fair treatment of all electoral participants included reviewing candidate nominations, designing a  complicated series of ballots for the 69 separate elections and establishing an Election Complaints Commission to adjudicate complaints in Afghanistan’s volatile environment.

On Election Day, Afghans voted for the 249 members of the Wolesi Jirga as well as members of 34 provincial councils. The number of representatives to come from each province depended on provincial population estimates. However, even if their region was to send several representatives, Afghans could only vote for one candidate for parliament or council, rather than (for example) a slate of candidates from the same party who shared the same political platform. Afghanistan’s president and cabinet decided on a Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system. One reason for the choice was President Karzai’s known distrust of political parties, due to their disruptive role in Afghan political history (in fact, Karzai himself has refused to establish a political party). A second reason was the desire to maintain a strong executive branch.

The SNTV system proved problematic. Because individuals ran as independents, the list of candidates (each with name, number, symbol and photograph) was typically long and the final ballots unwieldy. In Kabul for example, 400 candidates vied for 33 Wolesi Jirga seats. Rough estimates put the time required at seven minutes for a voter to identify his/her candidate and cast a ballot. In most districts, because of the sheer number of candidates, the total vote was so fragmented that many candidates were declared winners with percentages of the total vote in single digits. In the long-run, the lack of blocks or parties in the new National Assembly will make it very difficult for the institution to organize and counterbalance the power of the executive.

The Winners

Among the multitude of candidates, there were some notable winners. Nearly 600 women ran as candidates, and in a country where—until just a few years ago—women were virtually forbidden from appearing in public, this in itself was a great marker of political change. Despite intimidation and harassment, Afghan women candidates also beat the odds. The constitution calls for just over 25 percent reservation for women in the National Assembly, and women captured 27 percent of the seats, several winning their contests outright.

In Herat province, the top vote winner was a woman: Fauzia Gailani. A candidate for the Wolesi Jirga, she won 16,885 votes, or 3.6 percent of the provincial total. A mother of six who started a chain of fitness clubs in Herat after the fall of the Taliban, she has become well known for her rhetoric on equal rights and against child marriage.  Gailani will be joined in the National Assembly by conservative religious leaders, former Mujahedeen (including top vote-getters Younus Qanooni, a Tajik, and Mohammad Mohaqeq, an ethnic Hazara), and a 100-person strong Pashtun contingent (among whom tribal factions are strong). Even four former Taliban will join the ranks of new parliamentarians.  

But while there were no major disruptions on Election Day, there were clearly some areas of concern. Ballot boxes from approximately 4 percent of 26,000 polling places were set aside for investigation into charges of fraud, including ballot boxes with broken seals and evidence of ballot box stuffing. The Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) took a strong stand on attempted fraud. In the end, 3 percent of ballot boxes were excluded from the count. In addition, the JEMB dismissed 50 election workers who were implicated in attempted fraudulent activities. Among voters, cases of proxy voting were noted as well as possible intimidation of voters to influence their choices. Nevertheless, international organizers and monitors insisted that the integrity of the election was not affected by these problems.

Analysis

At 51 percent, turnout was lower than in last year’s presidential election but still higher than that in many so-called “developed democracies,” like the United States. This lower-than-expected turnout can possibly be attributed to three main factors: (1) Afghan disenchantment with the slow pace of development and accompanying widespread corruption; (2) the security concerns of Election Day; and (3) the overwhelming multitude of choices on the ballot.  

The problems encountered and the challenges overcome in mounting these elections are important steps in the process of Afghanistan’s democratization, but the real test will be in how the National Assembly and provincial councils will function and the role they will play in this country’s nascent democracy. 

National Assembly

The effectiveness of the newly elected Wolesi Jirga will be determined by the answers to the following questions:

1. Will it become mired in internal politics—unable to coalesce into working coalitions—and come to be seen as an ineffective institution?
2. Can it strike the necessary balance of power with President Karzai?
3. Will it be able to deliver tangible results to voters?

Once the Wolesi Jirga convenes, which is expected in mid-December, the answers to these questions will begin to emerge. Many of them depend on how the new body’s power structure evolves.

If leaders emerge who are able to forge working alliances then perhaps the Wolesi Jirga will be able to influence the national agenda and provide the democratic check on Karzai’s power envisioned by Afghanistan’s constitution. Any coalitions are likely to form around three principal groups: (1) the opposition National Understanding Front—a coalition of Islamic and former Mujahedeen parties—headed by Younos Qanooni, a former Minister of Education and Northern Alliance commander who also ran against Karzai last year; (2) the National Democratic Front, which includes about a dozen groups that support

Karzai and come in large part from the Pashtun ethnic group; and (3) the Kabul Agreement, seen as the swing vote camp, made up of liberals and leftists. With women making up 27 percent of the new body, it would be shortsighted not to mention that they, too, could play a key role if they are able to organize themselves into a caucus.

However, this coalition-building faces real challenges. First, because each elected member ran as an individual (rather than as part of a party), they don’t have the loyalties one would see in a traditional parliament. Second, most of the legislators are unfamiliar with the functioning of a National Assembly. They will need training on their individual functions as well as the procedures of the Wolesi Jirga. In addition, a civil service staff must be trained from scratch. These are just two reasons why there is real danger that the Wolesi Jirga may not be able to take on the executive in any meaningful way.

With respect to whether candidates will be able to deliver results to their constituents, there is likely to be a great deal of disappointment on this front. Some candidates promised to build roads or schools or to bring electricity to local communities. Others campaigned on platforms that promoted disarming armed groups and fighting corruption. However, these priorities will require time, money and a member who can deliver funds to his/her local communities. As the government remains severely cash-strapped, these challenges are not small. Given this circumstance, and the fact that a number of candidates financed their campaigns through opium revenues, the possibility that new National Assembly members will turn to corruption or the illicit narcotics trade is real. Revenue from narcotics in Afghanistan is about six times the government’s budget, and—in this decentralized country—it is not a stretch to say that narcotics is a primary source of local revenue and will continue to be so.

Provincial Councils

The signatories of the Bonn Agreement had envisioned that district elections would be held when provincial and national elections took place. Correspondingly, they had expected that the upper house of the National Assembly (the Meshrano Jirga) would be composed of representatives chosen by the provincial councils, district councils and the president (1/3 each). However, logistical problems prevented these elections from being held. After some debate, it was decided by the cabinet, after consultation with the Supreme Court, that rather than convening an incomplete Meshrano Jirga, 2/3 of its seats would be filled by representatives from the provincial councils until district council elections are held.

The role of the provincial councils is defined only vaguely in the Afghan constitution, which states that they should “take part in securing the developmental targets of the state and improving its affairs in a way stated by the law” and give “advice on important issues falling within the domain” of each province. In the immediate term, though, they have little on their agenda besides selecting representatives to sit in the Meshrano Jirga, and the danger exists that these councils will be toothless bodies with little relevance—particularly since they will not receive the attention, funding or training that the National Assembly will to promote their empowerment. In conclusion, the new Meshrano Jirga, Wolesi Jirga and provincial councils have a difficult path ahead. Expectations of these bodies should be tempered because, following post-conflict elections, newly formed legislatures take time to develop into fully functional institutions. The success story is that Afghans once again succeeded in surprising the international community. But the last year’s sprint toward the elections, and the victory they represent, should not be a signal to those who have helped this shattered country come this far to now turn their attention to the next “hot zone.” Afghanistan will continue to need international assistance and expertise if it is to complete its marathon toward democracy, prosperity and stability.

Homeyra Mokhtarzada is an IFES Program Officer.