By Leandro Nagore and Domenico Tuccinardi
I. Introduction
The observation of electoral processes by national citizen groups has evolved significantly in the first years of the 21st century. Since its origins in the 1980s, in more than 90 countries on five continents, millions of citizens have joined citizen observation initiatives to ensure integrity and promote accountability in government and among political contestants [1]. As stated in the September 2012 report of the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security, headed by Kofi Annan, “the most important force for elections with integrity is citizen pressure.” [2]
Oversight of the electoral process is an important means to protect electoral integrity, the genuine nature of elections that guarantee the free expression of the will of voters. As expressed in the ACE Encyclopaedia, “active oversight and supervision ensures that participants in an election process are held accountable, promotes transparency, establishes the credibility of the electoral process and helps ensure compliance with the legal framework”. [3] Although integrity is clearly a concern in transitional elections, it is critical to any electoral process, including within more established democracies, as the work of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) missions has shown over the past decades. [4]
Citizen electoral observation has established itself as a systematic and consolidated methodology for national democracy support. Evolving from a purely election day focused perspective; it now aspires to work within the entire electoral cycle, with a broad, holistic and global outlook. Furthermore, with the ongoing revolution in information and communications technologies the potential impact of citizen observation on democracy reform has expanded considerably.
The commemoration at the United Nations (UN) of the Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organisations (the Declaration of Global Principles, hereinafter), in 2012, was a milestone in this evolution. In its Preamble, the Declaration establishes that citizen observers “can be considered as specialised human rights defenders focused on civil and political rights, which are central to achieving genuine elections.” [5]
The consensual nature of this Declaration and the inclusion of a number of forward-looking principles are shaping the future of citizen observation. Among the key developments are the growing understanding of the need to cooperate –or at least work with- national authorities and international stakeholders to contribute to democratic processes and the respect for a country’s own regional and international obligations for elections. Although numerous practitioners still refer to these citizen groups by the term of “domestic” observers, the Declaration of Global Principles opts for the more accurate and positive terms of “citizen” or “national” electoral observer groups; terms which will be used interchangeably in this paper.
The presence of observers in an election is generally seen as a means of promoting security and credibility, and a deterrent to fraud. However, the work and contribution of citizen observers to the electoral process and to the broader democratic framework can go much deeper. According to the September 2012 “Deepening Democracy” report of the Global Commission on Elections Democracy and Security, over the last thirty years non-partisan citizen observers have “made critical contributions to improving the quality of elections. Citizen groups are increasingly playing a front-line role in advocating for electoral reform, monitoring election violence and educating citizens about elections.” [6]
This paper defines citizen electoral observation, and provides a brief outline of its evolution, consolidation and recognition. The relationship between national and international observers is addressed, focusing on the potential for increased collaboration between the two as well as the opportunities that a shift towards a more obligations-based approach presents. Citizen observation groups face numerous challenges: political/philosophical (as regards their nature), methodological, organisational, in their use of technology, in their relations with electoral stakeholders, and regarding legal and administrative challenges to their work. Building on the achievements of the past thirty years and on the foundations laid by the Declaration of Global Principles, citizen observer groups are at an important threshold, with a view to fully consolidating their presence throughout the electoral cycle as key stakeholders in the development of democracy around the world.
II. Citizen Electoral Observation
Citizen electoral observation is essentially an activity carried out by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or civil society organisations (CSOs) [7]. As opposed to private bodies, NGOs and CSOs should seek to advance public interests in an ethical manner; and must not be organised as profit-making enterprises [8]. CSOs can fulfill four main tasks in the public sphere; according to Merkel, they can: “protect the individual from the arbitrary use of state power”; “support the rule of law and the balance of powers”; “educate citizens and recruit political elites”; and, “institutionalise the public sphere as a medium of democratic self-reflection”. [9] When engaging in electoral observation activities, CSOs are potentially fulfilling all four responsibilities, while becoming an interface between electoral authorities and citizens, and taking up advocacy for electoral reform. Citizen observation can thus fill an important gap between delegated, or electoral, democracy and participatory democracy.
Recognition of the role of civil society in electoral processes has grown. In 2014, the UN General Assembly reiterated “the role of civil society and the importance of its active engagement in the promotion of democratisation, and invites Member States to facilitate the full participation of civil society in electoral processes”. [10]
The Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security reiterates that CSOs have two main roles in electoral processes: observation and voter education. [11] Targeted education campaigns for women, new voters, or traditionally marginalised groups can be effective means of bolstering the right to participation. This does not imply that CSOs engaging in one of these activities will also be involved in the other, and there could be potential conflicts of interest at stake as well. However, even CSOs that engage exclusively in electoral observation can increase public stakeholder knowledge of electoral rights, rules and procedures.
CSO involvement in electoral processes and more particularly citizen electoral observation derives its legitimacy from the right to participation enshrined in article 21 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and article 25 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In addition, citizen electoral observation requires respect for the freedom of association (to create CSOs/observer organisations), assembly (to meet, train, and work together) and expression (to publish findings and conclusions).
Citizen observation also requires respect for other ICCPR-enshrined rights and obligations, such as freedom of movement (for observers to move around the country freely), respect for the right to security of the person (ensuring the security of observers) and the right to access information (for the observers to access electoral laws and regulations, polling sites, electoral offices and officers etc.). The right to an effective remedy and to fair and public hearings may also be invoked where applicable. Moreover, citizen observation is a crucial factor to promote greater transparency in electoral processes and to provide the means for citizens to access information on elections.
The Declaration of Global Principles defines the specific role of citizen electoral observation as the:
“Independent, systematic and comprehensive evaluation of legal frameworks, institutions, processes and the political environment related to elections; impartial, accurate and timely analysis of findings; the characterization of the findings based on the highest ethical standards for impartiality and accuracy; the offering of appropriate recommendations for obtaining genuine democratic elections; and advocating for improvements in legal frameworks for elections, their implementation through electoral related administration and removal of impediments to full citizen participation in electoral and political processes.” [12]
This definition implies a number of critical aspects that are developed throughout this paper. First, it is clear that those observing are citizens -nationals of the state, as opposed to foreign nationals (who would be international observers). Secondly, they are electoral observers; they (ideally) observe the entire electoral process and not merely the election day event. Thirdly, they are observers, not supervisors; their responsibility is to observe, not to carry out any specific formal responsibility in the running of the process.
The Declaration also sets forth critical guidelines on election observation methodology. The observation effort should aim to cover the entire electoral process, based on impartial, accurate and timely analysis, with a view to offering recommendations to make future processes conform better to national, regional and international laws and obligations that apply to elections for any particular country. The systematic and comprehensive nature of observation excludes ad hoc observation efforts and underlines the importance of an all-embracing approach –in terms of geographic spread, elements of the process to observe and the time-frames of observation.
The impartial or non-partisan character of electoral observation is, in many contexts, one of its most alluring aspects in the eyes of the general public. Observation enables citizen participation in the electoral process outside political parties and partisan politics. In situations where political parties are poorly prepared or where authoritarian politics are the norm, electoral observation can serve a counterbalancing role that is usually filled by multiparty politics.
III. The Origins of Citizen Electoral Observation
The origins of what is now known as citizen observation lie in the pioneering work of the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), which was created in the Philippines, in 1983. [13] Citizens united within this initiative sought, very simply, to avoid electoral violence and fraud through the monitoring of elections. While active during the 1984 elections, NAMFREL’s rise to national and international prominence came with its work on the 1986 presidential elections in the Philippines.
One of NAMFREL’s main achievements was in carrying out a parallel tabulation of results from the polling stations where it had deployed observers. [14] This revealed significant discrepancies with the official results. Even though NAMFREL’s findings on the elections indicated serious irregularities and suggested that results were likely to have been tampered with, this did not prevent the official proclamation of President Ferdinand Marcos, the incumbent, as the winning candidate. Nonetheless, the courage exhibited by its volunteers and the systematic nature of its findings clearly contributed to popular backing for the military coup that would oust president Marcos a couple of weeks after his proclamation following the February 1986 polls.
NAMFREL’s example had a ripple effect around the region and its model was replicated: Bangladesh in 1990 and 1991, Thailand 1992, Pakistan 1993 and Nepal 1994. In all of these cases, CSOs engaged in what was then primarily poll watching, whereby observers were deployed exclusively to observe polling and counting operations in polling stations. National citizen observation also took root in Latin America in the late 1980s in the wake of different pro-democratic movements on the continent. In Chile, in the run-up to the 1988 referendum, CIVITAS went beyond NAMFREL’s scope of work, focusing on civic education. By the mid 1990s, citizen electoral observation had taken place in El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Nicaragua and Venezuela. [15]
Almost in parallel, a powerful democratisation wave was at work in Central and Eastern Europe with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Among the earlier examples of national observation efforts in the region, the Bulgarian Association for Free Elections (BAFE) perfected the Chilean Committee for Free Elections’ work on a statistically based sampling methodology, carrying out a “quick count”, often referred to as a parallel vote tabulation (PVT), in the 1990 elections, further details on this methodology are included later on in the text. In 1992, citizen observation was also visible in elections held in Albania and Romania.
Citizen observation also started to make inroads into African elections soon after NAMFREL’s success. In 1989, the Namibian Council of Churches collected information and reported on election-related intimidation, whilst the Namibia Peace Plan 435 monitored media coverage. Similar efforts sprung up throughout the continent in the 1990s, such as the National Election Monitoring Unit in Kenya or the Ligue Burundaise de Droits de l’Homme in Burundi. In the Middle East, the Yemenite National Committee for Free Elections observed the post-reunification elections in 1993.
These CSO movements around the globe often emerged from the commitment of grassroots activists and activist organisations, which in some cases merged with reformist groups from disgruntled elites. Frequently, the actual organisations or networks carrying out the observation were created to respond to a lack of confidence and credibility in electoral processes as a whole. For example, in 2000, Transparencia, in Peru, which worked both in civic and voter education as well as observation, helped to fill a large gap in confidence and credibility at a critical point in the country’s history. [16]
IV. Consolidation and Recognition of Citizen Electoral Observation
Although legitimized by international human rights law, as seen above, electoral observation is not explicitly referenced in any of the main international human rights treaties that form the backbone of the international obligations for elections. These treaties focus on a wide array of human rights obligations but lack explicit references to the role of civil society as a watchdog. Moreover, electoral observation was not widespread at the time these treaties were drafted. In 1990 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe -OSCE) adopted the Copenhagen Document, a political commitment, stating in article 8 that the presence of observers “both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process.” [17] Sadly, despite the fact that the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has taken great efforts to assist and promote the work of national observer groups, many OSCE Member States still do not recognise the status of citizen observers within their national legal frameworks.
Following UN support of national observers for the 1994 elections in Mexico, the Secretary-General expressed that assistance for national observers had the potential for long-term capacity building. He added that they could also contribute to the “creation of confidence among citizens in their own electoral process”. [18] In 1996, the UN Human Rights Committee (CCPR), the body responsible for issuing authoritative interpretations on ICCPR provisions, made a reference in its General Comment on article 25 to, “independent scrutiny of the voting and counting process […] so that electors have confidence in the security of the ballot and the counting of the votes.” [19] This reference clearly encompasses the work of non-partisan electoral observation. [20]
In 1997, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) identified five main advantages of including national observers in electoral processes, considering that they: [21]
- Contribute to legitimise the electoral process;
- Help to build confidence in the electoral process;
- Can improve the prospects for democratisation;
- Enhance the electoral process;
- Contribute to reducing or preventing conflict.
In recent years, African regional and sub-regional organisations have played a key role in promoting and recognising the value of citizen observation and CSOs within different treaties and documents. The binding 2002 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (which came into force in 2012) calls upon States Party, to “create a conducive environment for independent and impartial national monitoring or observation mechanisms.” [22] Furthermore, it calls upon states to create conducive conditions for CSOs to exist and operate within the law. [23] Although not binding, the 2002 Organisation of African Unity /African Union (OAU/AU) Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa also calls upon states to accredit national observers to guarantee the transparency and integrity of the entire electoral process. [24]
Although a political commitment, at the sub-regional level the 2004 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections reiterate that the accreditation of observers contributes to the integrity of the electoral process. [25] The 2003 Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA)/SADC Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region go one-step further by calling upon EMBs to “ensure that the accreditation process for observers and monitors is speedy, efficient and non-discriminatory.” [26] Although these principles are not binding, they underscore the need for observers to be trained in polling procedures, be present in polling stations, and assess all stages of the process.
The 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation (the Declaration of Principles, hereinafter), which lays out common principles for credible international observation, recognises the work of citizen observers and calls upon national and international observers to cooperate. This declaration, like the Declaration of Global Principles which it preceded, is not binding upon states, only upon the signatory organisations. Moreover, both declarations reflect the common aspirations of observer groups toward the establishment of a recognised and coherent methodology.
The wording of provisions on electoral observation in both declarations, also reflects an evolution in the work of citizen observers. Initially, the focus was clearly on election day and more particularly on vote counting. This part of the electoral process was seen as the most sensitive and the need for an observer presence clear. As election day was subject to increased observation around the world, electoral malpractice became focused, in many cases, on other phases of the electoral cycle. In parallel, citizen observer groups began to adapt their methodologies to monitor elements of the electoral process that faced considerable confidence and credibility gaps among stakeholders and the public, for example, legal frameworks, party/campaign finance, voter registration and the tabulation of results.
Essentially, citizen observer groups were adopting the electoral cycle, coinciding with broader developments in the international democracy support community. The electoral cycle approach developed by International IDEA, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the European Commission stresses that elections are not an event, but rather a long-term process involving numerous interdependent phases and periods. Although conceived as a tool to help visualise the programming of electoral assistance, the electoral cycle has become an established conceptual framework for understanding the entirety of the electoral process. The broadening of citizen observer groups’ focus towards the electoral process as a whole is reflected in the 2012 Declaration of Global Principles, as well as in the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.
Figure 1: The Electoral Cycle
Beyond their theoretical raison d’être, the existence and operation of citizen observer groups should also be considered from a more pragmatic perspective. States that wish to legitimise elections in the view of national and international opinion recognise the utility of allowing national observers to operate. This recognition should take the form of legal or regulatory provisions that enable the exercise of citizen electoral observation, and thereby the registration and free operation of CSOs, in line with respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms mentioned above. [27]
V. The Regionalisation and Internationalisation of National Citizen Observation
The success of citizen observation organisations, such as Transparencia in Peru, in the 1990s prompted similar initiatives around the world. These initiatives built upon each other’s successes and failures, thanks to a great extent to the work of the National Democratic Institute (NDI). Beginning in 1986, NDI collaborated closely with NAMFREL, [28] contributing to internationalising the work of national citizen observer groups through exchange of knowledge and by inviting members from different national CSOs to observe in other countries. National observation groups around the world have become recipients not only of funds but also of significant capacity-building efforts by international technical assistance providers.
The most long-standing of the regional groupings that deploy international observer missions within their region is the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), established in 1997 by 21 Asian national observer organisations. [29] In former Soviet and Central/Eastern European states, the European Network of Election Monitoring Organisations (ENEMO) groups 21 organisations from 17 countries. [30] Through their experience as international observers in their own region, these organisations have helped to create powerful links between organisations and to establish solid methodologies, which have contributed to the emergence of newer networks such as the Arab Network for Democratic Elections (ANDE).
A decisive boost to the growth of credible and long-term citizen observation methodology in the African continent has been provided by the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). EISA is an international NGO with a continental outreach which has provided technical assistance to a number of different citizen groups and has also deployed several international observation missions in the continent.
Among the regional networks of national observer groups that do not deploy international election observer missions, the SADC Election Support Network (SADC ESN) [31] which includes 15 groups was also formed in 1997. In Latin America, Acuerdo de Lima, created in 2000 at the initiative of Transparencia, now unites 14 organisations. More recently, in 2010 the West Africa Election Observers Network (WAEON) was established, uniting 10 CSOs from the region. [32] These regional networks provide support for their members’ activities in observing elections, through assistance and sharing of good practice in trainings, methodology, manuals, assessments, research, and advocacy.
Interest in international groupings of citizen observers gained momentum in the second decade of the 21st century. NDI’s efforts in this field were behind the creation in 2009 of the Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM), which groups more than 190 CSOs and regional networks from over 75 countries. [33] This network, with which the Declaration of Global Principles originated, is based on the right of all persons to participate in the government and public affairs of their country and their right to associate freely to help ensure that elections truly reflect the will of the people. This global network allows exchanges of experience and lessons learnt from around the world, and produces wealth of common resources. Overall, the GNDEM network and the Declaration of Global Principles provide signatory organisations with a high degree of credibility given their clear commitment to a common set of principles.
In spite of these advances, there is still scope for increased cooperation and collaboration between national observer organisations. In its September 2012 report, the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security noted that the work of CSOs, particularly those involved in citizen observation, could be strengthened “by reaching out to like-minded organisations in other countries”, [34] specifically citing GNDEM. The potential for greater collaboration among national and international observers is addressed in the following section.
VI. Differences between National and International Observation
Although the origins of observation of elections by international bodies can be traced further back than those of citizen observation, the two have evolved side by side in the past thirty years. The surge of observation activities in the 1980s and 1990s prompted the systematisation and methodological refinement of international electoral observation, as seen in the 2005 Declaration of Principles, the 2005 Declaration specifically calls upon international observers to “advocate for the right of citizens to conduct domestic non-partisan election observation without any undue restrictions or interference”. [35]
It is worth briefly noting some differences between the two types of observation.
Legal basis
Although the actual work of observers in the field is fundamentally the same, the legal foundations, for a start, are different. While both require accreditation to observe, the enabling mechanism for citizen observation is based on the respect for fundamental political rights and freedoms (primarily the right to participate in public affairs), while international observation depends on the willingness and invitation of the host state. This applies for both non-governmental international observer organisations (such as The Carter Center) and intergovernmental observer organisations (such as the EU) that observe in countries that are not members of their organisation. Some regional intergovernmental organisations such as the AU, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the OSCE have created a “standing” invitation of international observation missions from their respective organisation for all member states, although host states are still required to issue a formal invitation.
Numbers
Citizen observer groups differ visibly from international observer groups in their sheer numbers. International observer missions deploy smaller numbers of observers due to a series of financial and logistical considerations that have in fact helped to shape their own methodology, with a stronger focus on longer-term observation. National observers, who often are more focused on election day observation, can normally recruit larger numbers of observers at a smaller cost per observer. Therefore, national observers can employ more robust methodologies for widespread election day observation, including the use of PVTs.
Mobility
National citizen observers tend to be “static” observers, whose deployment is limited to observing the entire election day in one polling station. Their continued presence throughout the opening, polling, closing and counting processes is essential for the validity of any PVTs. International observers, on the other hand, tend to be mobile. They observe in a number of polling stations, remaining around 30 minutes in each, according to the methodologies of most international observer organisations. This allows individual observers to cover a larger number of polling stations on election day. Nevertheless, in absolute numbers international observer groups will rarely observe in a greater number of polling stations than their national colleagues.
Duration
Although national observers are so-to speak always “present” in the country, this does not necessarily imply that their deployment as observers is longer than that of international observers. National observer groups often focus only on election day, whereas international observers often opt for longer-term observation. Nevertheless, national observers have greater potential to observe the entire electoral cycle. Although national observers have been broadening the scope of their work, including longer-term observation and, for example, the observation of other phases such as voter registration, they rarely follow the long-term observation methodology used by international observers. However, by adapting the data collection methodologies used for PVTs and appropriate transmission mechanisms, there is enormous potential for national observers to observe other phases of the electoral cycle comprehensively. The continuous presence of national observers in the country can also facilitate their engagement in the observation of local elections, which international observers tend not to observe.
Security
The risks, both personal and organisational, are also different for citizen observers. Whereas international observers may be easily targeted for being foreign, they often are less likely to be intimidated. Their status as “guests” of the host state and the more limited numbers of international –as compared to national- observers as well as the limited length of their deployment period generally contributes to the greater sense of security enjoyed by international observers. The situation for national observers can be dramatically different. National observers are by definition far more exposed to national law enforcement mechanisms and to national conflict dynamics. This greater vulnerability to threats is a concern that CSOs have to address in every case.
VII. Relations between National and International Observers
Despite their differences, national and international observers are essentially performing the same tasks, particularly on election day. The variations in methodology are due more to the different contexts in which they operate than to a set of deliberate considerations. The relationship between these two types of observers merits further consideration.
Cooperation
The Declaration of Principles and the Global Declaration emphasise the need for the two types of observers to cooperate with each other. [36] The Declaration of Principles specifies that this should be “as appropriate” and with “credible” national organisations. It adds that international missions should welcome information from national organisations and consult with them prior to making statements, and that the findings of these organisations can complement those of international missions. Similarly, for national observers, the Declaration of Global Principles sets out an obligation to “cooperate with international election observation missions, including regional election observation missions”. [37]
This cooperation generally takes the form of regular meetings between citizen and international observers. It is worth stressing that such meetings occur at all levels from the leadership at national level to the regional or district levels –through long and possibly short term observers. These meetings serve to share general findings. They rarely are exchanges of detailed information or analysis.
As both declarations stress, observer groups must be independent. Methodologically, all observer groups should rely exclusively on direct observation, which limits the extent to which organisations might seek to share information or sources. Hence, joint deployments, coordinated deployment plans or shared election day questionnaires or statements are not realistic options.
In practice, international observers can refer to the work of national observers for information on parts of the process that the former could not observe, as they were not present in the country, as well as on the general political environment. In addition, national observers can provide international observers with insights into particular aspects of the political, legal, social, electoral or other context that may be relevant to the electoral process. Any such information will be employed with all the caveats on indirect information that international observers employ in their methodology.
International observers can serve as mouthpieces for undervalued or muzzled national groups. Indeed, in some contexts, the presence of international observers can reduce threats against national observers and international observers regularly advocate for CSO’s right to access and observe the entire electoral process. International observers may have specific methodologies to observe particular aspects of electoral processes; [38] on the other hand, national observers have a better understanding of logistical and security aspects in the field, while, ultimately, international observers can contribute to enhance the capacity of national observers.
National observers can facilitate follow-up to international mission recommendations, an aspect that will be developed later in this text. Compared to international observation, citizen observation has far greater potential to build national momentum for sustainable democratisation. Citizen observer groups can contribute to national capacity building and mechanisms for national dialogue, and can act as advocates or focal points for electoral reform movements.
Greater understanding and cooperation –as required in both the Declaration of Global Principles and the Declaration of Principles- is needed to strengthen both types of observation. However, the level of effective cooperation is still very limited. There is an apparent lack of understanding and trust between these observation structures when they meet in the field, and potential opportunities for more effective reform may be being missed.
Closer, mutually beneficial cooperation should be considered, particularly now that the adoption of both Declarations of Principles have brought the methodologies, goals and terminology of national and international observers closely into alignment. Whilst it is still too early to assess the impact of the Declaration of Global Principles, it is hoped that ensuing practice will help to consolidate and systematise greater cooperation between the two types of electoral observation throughout the electoral cycle.
Most electoral practitioners agree that national observation must be effectively promoted, even if that means a lesser role for international observation. In fact, as already noted in 1997 by the UN Secretary-General, “the focus of observation should move from the international to the national level.” He further calls for support to “domestic organizations, both in the performance of their role as electoral observers and in the development of new functions as watchdogs of democracy”. [39] However, the assistance received by citizen observers, be it in terms of funding, training or capacity-building, has been far smaller than what many had anticipated at the beginning of the new millennium. [40] There are many possible explanations for this, including an entrenched sense of risk regarding the true independence and impartiality of national observers, an issue which shall be dealt with in the following sections. Strengthening the technical capacity for national observers to develop and implement methodological improvements and funding for their activities are the means through which the international community can support robust, effective and more far-reaching national observation efforts.
VIII. Standards and Obligations: In Search of a Common Language
Cooperation between national and international observers will undoubtedly benefit from a joint effort to speak the same language. This calls for definition, clarity and consistency in the terms used to assess electoral processes and the sources behind them. From the perspective of national observer groups, a focus on obligations that require their state to guarantee certain rights and freedoms already committed to is desirable. At the national level, a shared understanding could also help CSOs and EMBs to work together in their common endeavours.
Seen through the prism of obligations, the work of citizen observers goes well beyond the detection of fraud and irregularities. The key output is no longer the statement that comes straight after election day, but rather a more comprehensive final report containing specific recommendations on how the process can better comply with the state’s own international obligations. This ties in with the watchdog role they exercise over the entire process and in advocating and pushing for reforms that will help states meet these obligations.
The process leading up to the 2005 and 2012 declarations has led to a greater emphasis on the need to anchor electoral assessments in public international law. As noted in the Preamble of the Declaration of Global Principles, non-partisan election observation assesses election processes based on “the national legal framework and obligations concerning democratic elections that are set forth in international human rights instruments, as well as standards, principles and commitments presented in international and regional charters, conventions, declarations and other such documents.” The first step towards clarity is to unravel the reigning ambiguity by identifying and defining the different sources, be they identified as obligations, commitments, standards, principles or good practices. [41]
Compliance with national laws and procedures is relatively easy to determine. However, the notion that electoral processes must meet certain minimum international or regional requirements is more difficult to establish. The Declaration of Global Principles refers to obligations, standards, commitments, principles and best practices, but does not provide any definitions. International observers have been particularly vague in their recurrent usage of phrases such as “free and fair” or “international standards” and national observers have followed suit with more or less enthusiasm.
Obligations are legally binding as such only for states that have ratified them, all other sources are persuasive at most. Assessments or recommendations based on shortcomings regarding an international or regional obligation require state action. However, the interchangeable use of terms by international and national observers has obscured their meaning and the legal underpinnings of electoral assessments. The imprecise notion of “international standards”, while helpful in certain contexts to reference different examples and practices, overall dilutes the binding nature of the observed violation or gap. [42] Although the terminological debate between “standards” and obligations continues, clarity and certainty in the basis of their assessments is particularly crucial for national observers who are addressing their findings and recommendations to their own state.
Table 1: International and Regional Sources for the Assessment of Electoral Processes [43]
| Source Level |
Definition of Source Level |
Binding force |
Examples |
| Obligation |
Obligations codified in international
or regional treaties.
|
Legally binding on ratifying parties |
ICCPR,
ICERD,
CEDAW, ACDEG |
| Political Commitment |
Non-binding instruments such as
declarations or other political
commitments, which serve as evidence of state practice. |
Non-binding. Persuasive about states and indicative of emerging norms or customary law obligations. |
OSCE/ ODIHR Copenhagen Document |
| Best practices and other sources [44] |
Handbooks, manuals, and other sources that can provide additional evidence of state practice with regard to electoral processes. |
Non binding.
Evidence of state practice and emerging norms and possible customary law obligations. |
2001 SADC
Parliamentary
Forum Norms
and Standards
for Elections in the SADC Region,
Council of Europe Venice Commission |
A number of international and regional obligations relate to electoral processes. The foundational document of international human rights law remains the UDHR. While not legally binding, many of its provisions are now considered part of international customary law.
The ICCPR is a binding treaty that replicates many of the provisions of the UDHR. The ICCPR and other UN-based thematic treaties, such as the 1966 Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the 1990 Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, the 2004 United Nations Convention against Corruption and the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, constitute a solid corpus of public international law regarding electoral rights and obligations.
This coherent and broad set of formal obligations allows for a common and objective interpretation of electoral processes in terms of their respect for a state’s obligations in public international law. With the exception of the UN Convention against Corruption, all of these UN treaties are attached to a body that issues authoritative interpretations and can receive complaints from individuals and civil society organisations, generating considerable jurisprudence on various electoral matters. [45]
Citizen observer groups can present their findings related to the enjoyment of rights contained in the relevant treaties before these bodies, for consideration when the relevant committees assess state practice in respect of treaty obligations. In the case of civil and political rights, the CCPR is the appropriate forum. More significantly, if a particular state is a party to the ICCPR’s First Optional Protocol [46], the CCPR is competent to receive and consider complaints from individuals and organisations alleging violations of ICCPR rights, in cases where national remedies have been exhausted. This provides citizen observer groups with the potential to take their watchdog role beyond the national-level in order to seek appropriate remedies and contribute to further developments in international jurisprudence. However, CSOs working in the field of elections have so far not been very active in bringing reports or complaints [47] before UN treaty-monitoring bodies.
Beyond the global commitments undertaken through UN treaties, numerous regional and sub-regional organisations, such as the AU, the European Union, the OAS, the OSCE, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the League of Arab States and the SADC are developing more detailed international law provisions regarding elections as relevant to their regions. Whereas some of these instruments are political commitments without the status of treaties, they clearly express how electoral matters are understood in those regions.
IX. Challenges for National Citizen Observation
Citizen observation faces an evolving set of important challenges. The following is an overview of key recurrent challenges that confront national citizen observer organisations.
They can be grouped into political/philosophical challenges, methodological challenges, organisational challenges, challenges relating to other stakeholders (including administrative and legal obstacles) and challenges pertaining to ICT. Behind every challenge lies a real opportunity for CSOs to better fulfill their roles within electoral processes.
Political/philosophical challenges
The challenges that citizen observers face regarding their nature have not changed significantly over time, although the consolidation of national observation as a practice and the support of the Declaration of Global Principles have clarified some aspects for both citizen observers and other electoral stakeholders. In this respect, the Code of Conduct for Non-Partisan Citizen Election Observers and Monitors that follows the Declaration is particularly important. Among these ethical considerations, two elements appear almost invariably, regarding the notions of impartiality and interference.
Neutrality and impartiality
The words “impartial” or “impartiality” are mentioned 30 times in the Declaration of Global Principles and the Code of Conduct for citizen observers. Although referenced a bit less, the notion of political neutrality also features consistently. Neither of these terms is defined in the Declaration. Generally, impartiality requires treating all sides equally, not discriminating between any of them. Neutrality, on the other hand, requires detachment, not helping or being involved in the political process. These twin principles establish the basis for non-partisan election observation. Observers are required to observe report and analyse in an objective, neutral and impartial manner. As stated in the Declaration, non-partisan election observation by citizen organisations implies “the mobilization of citizens in a politically neutral, impartial and non-discriminatory manner.” [48]
Impartiality in this context is essentially political. As the Declaration of Global Principles establishes very clearly, “non-partisan election observation and monitoring by citizen organization is impartial towards all political parties, candidates and sympathisers.” [49] However, is it possible for individual observers and/or national organisations and networks to be truly impartial and neutral? This dilemma is particularly sensitive given that most accusations against national observers focus on precisely this point.
In fact, the methodology that has evolved over time and that is encapsulated in the Declaration of Global Principles provides some answers to this conundrum. Objective and professional observers, who abide by the roles and responsibilities that the Declaration (and Code of Conduct) details, are required to leave aside their personal inclinations while performing their duties, and the same applies to their organisations as a whole. Nevertheless, this concept is particularly fragile and very difficult to ensure in practice; CSOs have to be extremely vigilant to prevent the erosion of neutrality and impartiality.
Part of the rationale for this emphasis on impartiality has to do with the need to avoid any association with party or candidate agents or representatives. On election day, the work of party or candidate agents can be perceived as similar to that of electoral observers. Although they have a different function, ultimately, both respond to a willingness of citizens to participate in the public and political life of their country.
Whether interest in citizen observation is due to disenchantment with political parties or unwillingness to be associated, or perceived as being associated, with parties or candidates, it does not imply that individual observers will not have their own political or ideological preferences. In some authoritarian contexts, individuals may engage in citizen observation as a form of participation in the absence of alternative forms of political participation in an electoral process. In these circumstances, citizen observation can be perceived as channeling a feeling of opposition towards a particular regime. [50]
The first line of defense of citizen observer groups against accusations of partiality is the transparency of their actions and the display of the highest standards of professionalism and objectivity, both at the individual and organisational level. Establishing, disseminating and enforcing a methodology through systematic and objective observation tools, trainings and codes of conduct can contribute to positive perceptions. [51]
In many countries, “partisan” national observer groups mushroom around election day. These extremely ad hoc observer groups are generally linked to particular parties or candidates. Although in some ways a testament to the power and effectiveness of citizen electoral observation, their aim is to create a willful cacophony of findings, statements and conclusions, which will dilute those of non-partisan observers. Faced with such groups, non-partisan CSOs have to be even more zealous in the application of their principles and methodology.
Non-interference
The far more limited references to the notion of non-interference regarding the electoral process in the Declaration of Global Principles, as compared to the Declaration of Principles, are extremely revealing. Indeed, the requirement of non-interference, which is mentioned only in the Declaration of Global Principles’ Code of Conduct, can be far tougher to apply for national rather than international observers.
Citizen observers are required by the Declaration of Global Principles to, “respect the roles of impartial election authorities at all levels and at no time interfere unlawfully or inappropriately in the administration of the elections, as well as seek diligently to work in cooperation with impartial election officials, and follow lawful instructions from them or other appropriate authorities concerning protection of electoral integrity.” [52] Whereas on the one hand they are required not to interfere, they are on the other hand called upon to seek to cooperate with the electoral process.
This apparently contradictory set of requirements responds to the dual nature of national observers. Citizen observers have to separate their duties as citizens from those as observers. In some contexts, observers might be required to perform a number of particular tasks on election day (assisting polling staff, or signing results sheets, for example), that would negate any strict non-interference clause. Moreover, it will always be difficult for them –as citizens/voters- to remain silent and inactive when their contribution could help the process. It may be advisable in certain circumstances for organisations to communicate their concerns publicly, when they consider that this could benefit the process, as they are an integral part of it.
Methodological challenges
Long-term observation
Election day observation remains the most common activity carried out by citizen observers. Organisations collect and analyse information, and report on the general election day environment, respect for procedures, the efficiency and transparency of the EMB and the work of party agents. However, the trend is now toward going beyond election day to assess elections as a process, which requires longer-term observation. Combining long-term observation with effective election day observation contributes to a far broader perspective on the quality of the electoral process and its respect for national laws and international and regional human rights obligations.
National CSOs have certain advantages over international observers with respect to long-term observation, noted above. On the other hand, the common shortcomings of citizen observers –lack of training, experience, established reputation or credibility and resources- are often international observers’ comparative advantage. One reason for this relative “weakness” of national observation is the difficulty of obtaining funding for long-term observation efforts and motivating people to carry out systematic observation once the momentum that surrounds an election event has subsided, or before it has appeared. Donors should review their strategies to maximise the potential for comprehensive long-term observation by citizen observers.
In addition to considering ways to extend the duration of their observation of the electoral period per se, CSOs are increasingly making efforts to observe voter registration, political party and campaign finance, legal reform, and crosscutting issues such as gender equality, access, and electoral conflict management and prevention. Thus far, national observers have not focused sufficiently on electoral dispute resolution, an area that merits methodological development. CSOs can also increase their value and visibility by acting as watchdogs of elected officials throughout the electoral cycle. Targeted funding and the development of systematic methodologies will help CSOs to exploit their potential to contribute to the broader democratisation process. Moreover, by not remaining engaged throughout the electoral cycle, citizen observers fail to capitalise on opportunities to raise the profile of CSOs and secure resources, human and financial, for their work.
Early warning
One of the areas that citizen observers have expanded into beyond the monitoring of election events is that of early warning mechanisms. These systems enable the compilation of data and analysis on factors that could generate conflict and violence sufficiently in advance for preventive measures to be effective. Although a different activity from observation and one that can be carried out by CSOs that do not observe elections, there are a number of complementarities in terms of the work. The potential for citizen observer groups to carry out or collaborate with state bodies on early warning information gathering, analysis and dissemination is very high. [53]
Early warning activities can also enable CSOs to establish or maintain good working relationships with other stakeholders, improving understanding regarding their commitment to democratisation as well as confidence in their motives, structure and work. The additional visibility should also help to promote a positive public image. Furthermore, the nature of the work: collecting information systematically, analysing it and making assessments, and releasing public statements and recommendations can also benefit their election observation work.
Parallel Vote Tabulations
Statistical assessments of the quality of electoral result tabulations are one of the oldest tools of citizen electoral observation. The tabulation of votes at the different levels of an EMB’s own consolidation structure is a critical part of any electoral process. It is a part of the process where national observers’ access is often restricted, impeding direct observation. NAMFREL developed as early as 1984 a form of parallel vote tabulation, which was refined significantly for the 1986 elections, in The Philippines. [54] Other pioneering uses of PVTs by citizen groups took place in Chile in 1988, Panama 1989, Bulgaria and Nicaragua in 1990, and Zambia in 1991. [55] The incorporation of statistical sampling methods has helped to create a solid methodology for “quick counts”, whereby national observers can ideally, and without the need to consolidate results from every polling station in the country, arrive at a scientifically valid and representative conclusion regarding the accuracy of official results. [56]
National observers are better suited to carry out quick counts than international observers. While some international missions have sufficient observers for PVTs, national observers are more likely to be able to deploy observers to a sufficiently large representative sample of polling stations. In addition, these methodologies require that observers remain in the selected polling stations for the entire process, which is how many national observer groups operate normally. Beyond the results, these methodologies allow for the collection of other statistically relevant data on the electoral process, something that is far more difficult for international observers.
Although often a very sensitive proposition for authorities, particularly regarding the timing of their publication vis-à-vis the proclamation of official results, quick counts are among the most effective and powerful tools at the disposal of national electoral observer groups. This tool can play an important role in instilling confidence in the electoral process, or provide evidence of fraud or malfunction. To ensure maximum effectiveness, the methodology employed and the relevant outreach and communication strategy must be transparent and agreed upon with other relevant stakeholders, especially the EMB.
The Declaration of Global Principles recognises the value of statistical assessments, but cautions that, “Decisions about the timing of reports, statements and releases, concerning findings and conclusions based on such methodologies must carefully consider the credibility of observer reports, the sufficiency of the information received and the accuracy of analysis of the statistical data, as well as electoral rules concerning the timing of reports. Such reports should include information about statistical samples and margins of error of the findings.” [57]
Organisational challenges
Structure/ organisation
Citizen observation organisations may be permanent or temporary –they may only exist for a single election event. In either case, proper organisation is one of the prerequisites for effective national observation that are identified in the ACE Encyclopaedia [58]. Establishing an organisational structure for the headquarters with the right presence and skills is complex as is configuring the organisation’s reach and coordination at the grassroots level. Since NAMFREL’s first monitoring exercise in 1984, [59] one of the key challenges of citizen observer groups has been recruiting volunteers and resources.
Many citizen observer groups are created ad hoc for a particular electoral process. In other cases, CSOs and NGOs unite under a common banner to form a coalition or network. Citizen associations, citizen networks, human rights groups, student associations, trade unions, and religious groups are among the CSOs typically involved in citizen observation. The breadth of a citizen electoral observation mission will depend largely on how firmly these organisations are established throughout the country.
Organisational structure throughout a country can vary significantly, from highly decentralised structures to very centralised ones. The challenge is always how to coordinate, systematise knowledge-transfer and consolidate information to and from observers and mission headquarters. Whether this is done through a specific coordination structure or through existing organisational structures is one of the aspects that each observer group or network will have to assess. Effective training of observers is another key concern that will be affected by the organisational configuration.
The chosen coordination scheme will have profound effects on the efficiency of information flows up and down the structure. If various organisations are working in a network, coordination structures at the highest level must be in place and tested to ensure they are truly operational, on and after election day, with a view to the drafting of the network’s reports and statements. Whether the network will present a joint statement or separate reports must also be agreed well in advance. Continuous dialogue and regular meetings, at the leadership level, are essential to harmonise approaches, methodologies, deployments, findings and conclusions well before election day, when tensions and deadlines make dialogue difficult.
Funding
Funding is typically the biggest concern and one of the most frequent sources of tension within observer organisations and networks. The availability of funds and the timely disbursement of funds are all potential sources of friction amongst and within observation groups.
Citizen electoral observation is fundamentally a voluntary undertaking for individual observers. Although observers are volunteers, they should not be obliged to finance the observation operation themselves. In first elections or transitional contexts, or where citizen commitment generates a powerful civic momentum, observers may be willing to fund themselves. However, this notion often wears off for the next electoral cycle. Thus, transport, communications, daily stipends and other costs incurred by individual observers are often borne by the observer organisation. The financial burden on an organisation or network that seeks to deploy a large number of observers nationwide is significant. Beyond the cost to deploy each observer, organisations or networks have to budget effectively for training (including transport, stipends, facilities, trainers, etc.) communications/data transmission, printing (questionnaires, handbooks) and visibility (t-shirts, caps, websites, press statements).
Although national funding has been possible in some contexts, the growing trend is for national observers to be funded by foreign donors’ democracy support programmes. While this has allowed for the growth of citizen observation, it comes with risks. The “professionalisation” or at least “monetisation” of national observation erodes the nature of observation as a voluntary citizen engagement that is at the core of its legitimacy and evolution. It also compels national organisations to compete for funds rather than focusing on cooperating to ensure the most effective observation possible. The funding issue also plays a role in the concentration of citizen observation efforts around election day, as funds are more readily available in this phase of the cycle than in other equally important phases. This is an aspect that donor organisations should reconsider, opening up funding possibilities throughout the electoral cycle. Foreign funding can also have a negative impact on the national ownership of the democratisation process, as observation priorities, methodologies and findings may be shaped to accommodate foreign donors rather than to serve national democratisation processes.
To avoid being “crowded out” in an increasingly busy and competitive field, observer groups have to consider diversifying or specialising in different aspects of observation throughout the electoral cycle if they wish to survive. Particular fields such as media monitoring (MEMO 98 [60] in Slovakia), political finance (Poder Ciudadano [61] in Argentina), voter register audits (Electoral Assistance Bureau [62] in Guyana), and conflict prevention (EISA [63] in the SADC region) have become specific foci for some CSOs.
Challenges relating to other stakeholders
CSOs rely on positive relationships with all electoral stakeholders, including the EMB, political parties, public authorities, the media, the judiciary, security forces, other CSOs and international stakeholders (donors, observers, and assistance providers) to carry out their work. The relationships that citizen observers have with other stakeholders depend largely on their credibility, and on the trust and confidence that these stakeholders have in their work. At the same time, CSOs are a key generator of trust and credibility in the process. In this regard, they serve as an intermediary between different stakeholders and most importantly between citizens and electoral authorities. However, while working closely with different stakeholders, CSOs must be careful not to lose their independence –or taint the perception that others have of their independence.
The Declaration of Global Principles explicitly calls on national observers to “seek to cooperate with EMBs and other governmental authorities related to election processes.” [64] EMBs and other government authorities must not perceive citizen observers as a threat. They should recognise the inherent value of national observers, whose comments and recommendations on the process –even an ongoing one- can help to improve it, better aligning it with the state’s international and regional obligations, and national law. In their dealings with each other, it is essential that both arrive at a common understanding that despite their different roles, their objectives are actually the same –to contribute to genuine democratic elections. The work of citizen observer groups between elections, working towards electoral reform or following up on recommendations made by observers, provides an opportunity for fruitful cooperation between CSOs and EMBs.
In some cases, CSOs’ expertise in electoral processes can lead to recruitment by EMBs, even as commissioners, as has been the case with Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Indonesia’s General Elections Commission and the Philippines’ Commission on Elections. In other countries, such as Niger, a background in civil society is a requirement for at least one of the EMB commissioners.
Citizen electoral observer relationships with the media and political parties are affected by the credibility and perception that these stakeholders have of the observer organisation. Ensuring regular interactions can help to dispel initial misconceptions and cement solid and constructive relationships, which can be useful for public outreach. Citizen observers must be careful to maintain neutrality and balance in their contacts with political parties to avoid perceptions of bias. The reduced political tension in the period between elections can be particularly conducive to the establishment or consolidation of positive relations with political parties.
Administrative and legal obstacles
Inadequate or cumbersome legal and administrative provisions can hinder greatly the work of observers. No legal or administrative provision should represent an unreasonable limitation or obstacle to the exercise of citizens’ right to participate, in the political life of their country through the operation and funding of citizen electoral observation. Taking measures to give full effect to such rights is an obligation for ICCPR signatory states.
Fundamental Freedoms
Respecting the right to freedom of association (as established in article 22 ICCPR) is a prerequisite for effective citizen electoral observation. It is essential that CSOs be legally allowed to be founded, to register and to operate. This requires that any limits on the freedom of association or their freedom to operate, be necessary and proportionate. Limitations on their ability to access foreign funding, or restrictions on the scope of their work following acceptance of foreign funding will damage their capacity to operate effectively. Restrictions on the enjoyment of the right to freedom of association are contrary to ICCPR States Parties’ international obligations.
For observer groups to contribute fully to an electoral process, they must be granted freedom of movement (article 12 ICCPR) and access to all stages of the electoral process. The latter requirement is essential for observers to carry out their role in enhancing transparency. Observers’ right to freedom of opinion and expression (article 19 ICCPR) must also be respected. Restrictions on the publication of findings must not hinder the enjoyment of this right beyond what is reasonable for the maintenance of public order. The publication of reports and statements is observers’ most powerful tool and is firmly rooted in the fundamental right to freedom of expression. Any restrictions on national observers’ freedom to publish findings or statements, including PVTs, must fulfil the twin conditions of necessity and proportionality.
The security of electoral observers must be guaranteed by the state and its security forces, as established by the ICCPR enshrined right to the security of the person (article 9). Citizen electoral observers must be protected from any pressure or intimidation that can jeopardise their security and work. National electoral observers have been victims of innumerable acts of intimidation, harassment and violence over the last 30 years. Although there are no compiled statistics, the reports of attacks against citizen observers from the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) in Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections, including torture and at least one killing, are chilling examples. [65]
Accreditation
Accreditation is a critical threshold for a citizen observer group. Although many observer groups have carried out limited observations without being officially accredited, accreditation is usually a precondition for the lawfully recognised exercise of citizen electoral observation. This can be perceived as implying “officialisation” or acquiescence to authorities, which may be seen by certain opposition stakeholders as compromising observers’ capacity to make legitimate critiques of the process. Observation carried out without any legal foundation or administrative permission may be risky. Without the support of an accredited organisation, individuals who carry out observation activities are even more vulnerable to arbitrary abuse [66]; and the outcome and repercussions of observers’ work might not correspond to their commitment. [67]
As noted in the ACE Encyclopaedia, “Integrity problems may arise if accreditation procedures or requirements are used to limit the number of observers, or to deny access to certain groups of observers or monitors. If the procedure is too time-consuming and cannot be completed before election day, or if accreditation is selective, the electoral process may lose credibility and the election management body will be viewed as having something to hide.” [68] As mentioned above, states –at least those bound by the ICCPR- must take all necessary steps to give effect to the rights protected by the ICCPR; which include the right to participate, as exercised by citizens through national observation.
Challenges pertaining to ICT
The exponential development of ICT in the 21st century is revolutionising civic participation and increasing demands for transparency and accountability at all levels, including political leadership. ICT encompasses various technologies that allow users to collect, process and share vast amounts of information almost instantaneously with a nearly unlimited number of recipients.
The power that tools such as SMS, Twitter, Facebook, blogs and RSS feeds can have in mobilising citizens has been demonstrated in the last five years. [69] These technological tools, in addition to other older ones such as email and voice over IP communications (i.e. Skype and Viber) facilitate free communication and access to information by bypassing traditional forms of censorship. While significant disparities exist between “connected” and “unconnected” citizens, ICTs have created a new immediacy in the manner in which people interact.
The greater reach of mobile phone networks and their gradually diminishing purchase and communication costs have contributed to the greater use of this technology by national observers. Mobile phones are the cheapest and most effective means to communicate directly with the largest possible number of observers on election day. Advances in the use of SMS reporting and the extension of smartphone and/or tablet functions are also accelerating the transmission and reliability of observation data.
The development of new technologies also poses the problem of how to observe their use by electoral stakeholders. This is particularly true of social media, and the increasingly intensive use made by political parties and candidates of such platforms in their electoral campaigns. How can social media be observed in a useful, systematic, comprehensive and accurate manner? There is still no effective and tested methodology to observe these flows of information in a manner that allows for systematic analysis.
Another challenge that national (and international) observers face lies in the observation of new voting technologies. Electronic voting has been adopted in numerous countries around the world to facilitate voter access, limit costs, reduce the potential for human error and provide safeguards and accelerate the announcement of results. However, these technologies, “pose risks to the integrity of the electoral process that can quickly erode public confidence”. [70] Although a number of methodological milestones have been set, [71] there is still no systematic and commonly accepted means of observing electronic voting. Indeed, many elements of electronic voting are beyond the scope of traditional observation. Increased international donor attention to the funding and capacity-building of national observation efforts in this field are necessary to consolidate effective methodologies.
Crowdsourcing
The development of crowdsourcing applications, exemplified by the Ushahidi platform, born out of the electoral violence in Kenya in 2008, can be seen as a tool for national observers or as a new form of citizen participation in electoral processes. Crowdsourcing, originally conceived as a manner of tasking large segments of the population (i.e. “crowds”) with data collection is one of the most visible and recent applications of ICTs to the field of elections.
Ushahidi (“witness” in Swahili) [72] and its derivatives enable visualisation of field reports through open-source mapping tools. [73] Essentially, citizens can send their reports of electoral violence, malpractice, etc. by SMS (or other means) directly to a reception point where reports are validated and mapped practically in real-time. Mapping facilitates comprehension of the overall picture and helps to identify trends.
The challenge is how to ensure quality, objectiveness and neutrality when dealing with such large numbers of reporting sources. Crowdsourcing potentially enlarges the reporting sources far beyond the numbers a citizen electoral observer mission could ever muster, as it extends to all persons with operational mobile phones. This responds partly to the traditional complaint that observers are never present where things happen. However, its indiscriminate and multitudinous reach also generates suspicions and genuine concerns regarding the verifiable and factual nature of the information.
In any case, crowdsourced citizen observation differs from “traditional” citizen observation. It is not carried out by trained and identifiable persons and it is not constructive in its approach (it does not aim to present recommendations). It is inherently anecdotal and subjective, and not representative: it merely compiles first-person witness reports, wherever and whenever they are posted. The vetting or validation of citizen reports is the most ideologically controversial element. Who has the right to censor what can be seen as an exercise in freedom of expression? However, it is generally considered a prerequisite to try to filter false, contradictory, or offensive reports. The desire to preserve the near real-time application of such mapping platforms can often be an obstacle to the screening of reports.
Crowdsourcing empowers citizens; the anonymous nature of reporting can contribute to greater citizen engagement. From a purely theoretical point of view, crowdsourcing expands citizens’ opportunities to participate directly in the political life of their country. It can offer an “insight into situations that otherwise would have remained out of sight and out of mind.” [74] It can be a powerful tool, assuming that a “crowd” can be wise and dispelling the atavistic fear of crowd or mob rule. Some argue that if the number of reports received by a crowdsourcing application is sufficiently large and varied, the sheer numbers could provide the necessary crosschecks and validation, increasing the probability that the crowdsourced findings truly reflect the events. [75] Variation still must be representative in order to be meaningful, however. In addition, the sharing of crowdsourced reports is a powerful tool to sensitise citizens, particularly in contexts where traditional media is muzzled. [76]
Electoral observers have started to combine the enhanced potential for communication that new ICTs provide with the capacity to visualise information that crowdsourced mapping offers. In such cases, the actual “crowd” is limited to persons working/volunteering for the electoral observation organisation or network. These persons will ideally be trained in the use of the technology and observation methodology, significantly easing screening requirements. This reduces the number of reports but increases confidence in their accuracy. Such hybrid systems facilitate the consolidation of qualitative and quantitative data.
Whether ICT based tools will stand the test of time as “liberation technologies”, to use Larry Diamond’s phrase, has yet to be seen. [77] Technologies and methodologies are just tools: What really matters is how they are used and what is made out of the information they collect. [78]
X. After Election Day: Recommendations, Follow up, Advocacy
In first election contexts, CSOs are sometimes uncertain how to continue their work after the immediate election period. While many national organisations stop working on electoral issues or disappear altogether, others engage in the post-election period and begin preparing for the next pre-electoral period (which might be four/five years away).
The focus on international obligations to which states have committed by ratifying international treaties alters the relationship between citizen observers and the state. Observers must go beyond their role as evaluators or certifiers; their attitude and outputs must be more ambitious, responsible and constructive, although more challenging. Indeed, they should contribute to help the state to better fulfill its own human rights obligations. Their recommendations on the process and increased attention on following up on recommendations are the most visible manifestation of this shift in focus. As the Declaration of Global Principles states, the transmission of recommendations to the relevant stakeholders is now possibly the most significant contribution of citizen observers to the electoral process. These recommendations should form the basis of any future programmes advocating for reform or for electoral assistance.
These recommendations should be constructive, and framed in a manner that will help the referenced stakeholder to better abide by the country’s obligations. Recommendations must be useful, realistic and achievable in order to gain acceptance and stand a chance of being implemented. CSOs should discuss them with different stakeholders throughout the process to increase their chances of acceptance and implementation. Tracking implementation may allow them to expand their scope of operations beyond election day. The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network Tracking of Recommendations Database can be a particularly useful tool for national observers working in this field. [79]
Advocacy for electoral reform is one domain where several national observer groups and coalitions, such as the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) [80], or the Nigerian Transition Monitoring Group`(TMG) [81] as well GONG [82] in Croatia and the Centre for Electoral Reform (CETRO) [83] in Indonesia have been working fairly successfully. In terms of national ownership of recommendations and as advocates of reform, they can be key agents of dialogue and national democratic promotion. International donors can facilitate citizen groups’ progressive expansion of responsibilities in this domain. The renewed interest and focus on recommendations and follow-up by international observer groups should be paired with greater technical assistance and funds for national observers.
CSOs engaging in national electoral observation can carry out extremely valuable exercises in terms of political party finance monitoring -a key tool in the fight against corruption which can compromise the genuine nature of electoral processes. Organisations such as Poder Ciudadano [84] in Argentina and Acción Ciudadana [85] in Guatemala are among many that have committed to this particular watchdog role. Their presence throughout the electoral cycle enables them to carry out such monitoring far more effectively than their international counterparts. Increased cooperation with international observer groups can enhance the impact of their work in this field. The development of crowdsourcing tools can also be usefully tailored for political finance monitoring.
As noted by the UN Secretary-General in 1997, “There are already many cases in which the organizations that observe elections redefine their functions so as to continue observing the behaviour of the elected officials and the fulfillment of election promises”. [86] Indeed, Eric Bjornlund signals that, “international advisors and donors too often fail to recognize the most important benefits of domestic election monitoring and adopt strategies that work against efforts to sustain domestic networks and the momentum for reform after elections.” [87]
XI. Conclusion
Over time, citizen electoral observation has become more credible and sophisticated, better organised and more influential. However, there are still many ways in which non-partisan and effective citizen observation can further contribute to improve the quality and transparency of electoral processes. In so doing, citizen observers can bolster confidence in genuine electoral processes.
New methodological approaches, such as extending the range of observed activities around the entire electoral cycle, anchoring assessments more clearly on states’ international obligations, and the incorporation of ICTs are changing the work and role of national observers. In particular, crowdsourcing technologies have yet to be fully exploited in a systematic manner to harness their quantitative and qualitative potential for citizen participation.
The basic principles of neutrality and impartiality are still as fundamental today as they were in the early days of national observation. Demonstrable neutrality and non-partisanship remains a challenge for observer groups in some contexts, especially as support for democratic change can itself be perceived as a political standpoint. This challenge can be overcome by anchoring assessment more and more firmly on UN treaty obligations for democratic elections. Their role in promoting respect for their state’s international obligations and their capacity to inform and present cases before the relevant UN bodies can also be strengthened.
Observation, dissemination, civic education and promoting political participation (beyond the act of voting) are areas where systematic and competent efforts can yield significant results for the development of a truly democratic culture. Citizen observation can help to mobilise, structure and strengthen civil society, helping to establish networks and relationships that will continue well beyond election day. Empowering citizens and civil society are among the most significant contributions that citizen observer groups can make to a democratisation process, particularly if they can demonstrate their value beyond election day. Considering that funding and capacity-building are two of the main obstacles for citizen observer organisations to develop their full potential, the international community should pay greater attention to their work and the new areas they are exploring.
As the UN Secretary-General indicates in his biennial report on UN electoral assistance, “a robust civil society” is one of the conditions for peace and development, together with “an independent and professional judiciary, full respect for human rights and gender equality, open and pluralistic media […] and a responsive Government.” [88] In this same report, the UN Secretary-General highlights that “the deliberations on the development agenda beyond 2015 offer a good opportunity to discuss the linkages between development, peace, human rights, good governance and elections.” [89] The role of civil society and particularly citizen electoral observation must be taken into account in these deliberations as key players in providing sustainable, national efforts towards democratisation.
In this respect, it is worth recalling the words of Kofi Annan in his 1997 report as UN Secretary-General:
“Development of civil society and a democratic culture of participation will take much longer than the establishment of political institutions. However, a vital civil society and a culture of participation are effective ways and means of cementing the democratic commitment of the whole population.” [90]
A vibrant and independent civil society is a significant indicator of democratic development. Indeed, the work of non-partisan citizen electoral observers is a manifestation of a vital and robust civil society. As such, they have an increasingly important role to play in electoral processes as observers, educators, watchdogs, and as representatives of people’s fundamental right to participate in the political life of their country.
Citizen electoral observers are powerful vectors for democracy. They have the capacity to stimulate fellow citizens, reminding them that power is ultimately in their hands. As human rights defenders, their collective and individual commitment must be protected, cultivated and praised.
[1] Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizen Organisations, GNDEM, 2012, Preamble.
[2] Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security, “Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide”, September 2012, para. 101.
[3] ACE Project, Encyclopaedia, “Electoral Integrity”, p. 10.
[4] To view reports on elections in OSCE/ODIHR Member States, see the OSCE/ODIHR webpage.
[5] Ibidem.
[6] Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security, “Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide”, September 2012, para. 102.
[7] While recognising the diversity of non-governmental actors and their denominations, this paper adopts the definition of CSOs established by the 2007-2008 Advisory Group on CSOs and Aid Effectiveness which has been adopted by the OECD DAC, and therefore defines them as including “all non-market and non-state organisations outside of the family in which people organize themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain”. Although the term NGO is still used in many contexts interchangeably with CSOs they can be understood as a subset of CSOs.
[8] ACE Project, Encyclopaedia, “Electoral Integrity”, p. 47.
[9] Merkel, W., “Embedded and Defective Democracies”, Democratisation, 11:5, p. 47.
[10] UN General Assembly Resolution 68/164 “Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization”, 21 February 2014, article 17.
[11] Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security, “Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide”, September 2012, para. 30.
[12] Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizen Organisations, GNDEM, 2012, para. 4.
[13] Bjornlund; E.C., “Transition Elections as End or Means? Lessons for Democracy Assistance from Domestic Election Monitoring”, in McMahon and Sinclair (eds), Democratic Institution performance, Praeger, 2002, p. 3-4. For a more detailed historical overview of NAMFREL’s work Bjornlund, E.C., “Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy”, Woodrow Wilson Press, Washington, 2004, p. 211-217. See also, NAMFREL webpage.
[14] A more refined and statistically relevant version of this parallel tabulation effort is now known as Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT).
[15] Núñez Vargas, E., “Observación Nacional de Elecciones”, p. 4-5.
[16] Bernbaum, M., “Transparencia: La sociedad civil peruana observa las controvertidas elecciones del 2000”, Asociación Civil Transparencia, 2002. See also, O’Grady, P., López-Pintor, R., and Stevens, M. (eds.), Promoting and Defending Democracy: The Work of Domestic Election Observer Groups, ERIS, undated, p. 18-24.
[17] OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, 1990, article 8.
[18] UN Doc. A/49/675, Report of the Secretary-General, “Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections”, 1994, para. 28.
[19] UN CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and their right of equal access to public service, 1996, para. 20.
[20] Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizen Organisations, GNDEM, 2012, Preamble.
[21] International IDEA, Code of Conduct for the Ethical and Professional Observation of Elections, 1997, p.9.
[22] African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 2002, article 22.
[23] African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 2007, articles 12.3, 27.2, and 28.
[24] OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, 2002, III i).
[25] SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, 2004, article 7.8.
[26] EISA/SADC Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region, 2003, Recommended principles for Observation.
[27] International IDEA, “International Obligations for Elections; Guidelines for Reviewing Legal Frameworks for elections”, 2014 (forthcoming publication).
[28] Bjornlund, E.C., “Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy”, Woodrow Wilson Press, Washington, 2004, p.218
[29] ANFREL webpage.
[30] ENEMO webpage.
[31] SADC-ESN webpage.
[32] WAEON webpage
[33] Information obtained from the GNDEM webpage.
[34] Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security, “Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide”, September 2012, para. 110.
[35] Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, 2005, para. 16.
[36] Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, 2005, para. 17.
[37] Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizen Organisations, GNDEM, 2012, para. 21 (j).
[38] Such as the gender-based analysis developed by the Organization of American States (OAS), see Muñoz-Pogossian, B., The Responsibility to Expose: The Role of the OAS Electoral Observation Missions in the Promotion of the Political Rights of Women, International IDEA, The Integrity of Elections: The Role of Regional Organizations, 2012, Chapter 5. See also, Muñoz-Pogossian, B., “The Role of International Electoral Observation Missions in the Promotion of Political Rights of Women: The Case of OAS” Election Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2013, Editor Mary Ann Liebert Inc.
[39] UN Doc. A/52/513, Report of the Secretary-General, “Support by the United Nations system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies” 1997, 21 October 1997, para. 41.
[40] Shifter, M., “Latin American Democratization: The Civil Society Puzzle” in Ottaway, M. & Carothers, T. (eds.), Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 2000, p. 265.
[41] See, Carroll, D & Davis-Roberts A “The Carter Centre and Election Observation: An Obligations Based Approach for Assessing Elections”, Election Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2013, Editor Mary Ann Liebert Inc.
[42] See, Meyer-Ohlendorf, N., ‘Forget International Standards’, DRI Discussion Paper no. 2, November 2010.
[43] The following table is adapted from a forthcoming Carter Center publication.
[44] The use of the term “standards” generally combines a varying configuration of these distinct notions. The International Organization for Standardization usefully defines standards as documents that detail requirements, specifications, guidelines or characteristics about processes that are accepted by a group of individuals, states or organisations and that can be used consistently to ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for purpose. Black’s
Law Dictionary defines them as a “criterion for measuring acceptability,
quality or accuracy”.
[45] Jurisprudence from UN treaty-bodies can be found on the webpage of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (which also hosts a general database on UN treaty-body jurisprudence), the webpage of the Centre for Civil and Political Rights and the webpage of the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library.
[46] 1976 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. The status of ratifications for treaties and protocols can be accessed on the webpage of the United Nations Treaty Collection.
[47] The CCPR and OHCHR webpages provide complete details on complaints procedures and on how to submit complaints.
[48] Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizen Organisations, GNDEM, 2012, para. 4.
[49] Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizen Organisations, GNDEM, 2012, para. 5.
[50] Lidauer, M., “Democratic Dawn? Civil Society and Elections in Myanmar 2010-2012”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 31, 2, p. 103-105.
[51] National Democratic Institute (NDI), How Domestic Organizations Monitor Elections: an A to Z Guide, 1995, p.23-25.
[52] Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizen Organisations, GNDEM, 2012, mode of conduct 5.
[53] International IDEA, The Guide on Action Points for the Prevention and Mitigation of Election-related Violence, Stockholm, 2013, p.37.
[54] Bjornlund; E.C., “Transition Elections as End or Means? Lessons for Democracy Assistance from Domestic Election Monitoring”, in McMahon and Sinclair (eds), Democratic Institution performance, Praeger, 2002, p.3.
[55] Bjornlund, E.C., “Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy”, Woodrow Wilson Press, Washington, 2004, Chapter 13.
[56] Estok, M., Neville, N., and Cowan, G., The Quick Count and Election Observation: An NDI Guide for Civic Organizations and Political Parties, NDI, 2002.
[57] Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizen Organisations, GNDEM, 2012, para. 14.
[58] ACE Project, Encyclopaedia, “Electoral Integrity”, p. 67.
[59] Bjornlund, E.C., “Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy”, Woodrow Wilson Press, Washington, 2004, p.212
[60] MEMO 98 webpage.
[61] Poder Ciudadano webpage.
[62] O’Grady, P., López-Pintor, R., and Stevens, M. (eds.), Promoting and Defending Democracy: The Work of Domestic Election Observer Groups, ERIS, undated, p. 42-47.
[63] EISA webpage.
[64] Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizen Organisations, GNDEM, 2012, Preamble.
[65] Human Rights Watch, Bullets for Each of You: State-Sponsored Violence since Zimbabwe’s March 29 Elections, Chapter VII, Attacks on Election Observers, June 2008.
[66] See, Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizen Organisations, GNDEM, 2012, para. 18(a)
[67] Lidauer, M., “Democratic Dawn? Civil Society and Elections in Myanmar 2010-2012”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 31, 2, p.102-105.
[68] ACE Project, Encyclopaedia, “Electoral Integrity”, p. 65.
[69] Hussain, M. M., and Howard, P. N., “What Best Explains Successful Protest Cascades? ICTs and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring”, International Studies Review, 15, 2013, p. 48-66.
[70] The Carter Center Handbook on Observing Electronic Voting, second edition, The Carter Center, January 2012, p. 1.
[71] See, Introducing Electronic Voting: Essential Considerations, International IDEA Policy Paper, December 2011; Observing the Use of Electoral Technologies. A Manual for OAS Electoral Observation Missions, Organization of American States, Washington, 2010; The Carter Center Handbook on Observing Electronic Voting, second edition; Barrat, J. “Observing E-enabled Elections: How to Implement Regional Electoral Standards”, International IDEA, 2012, The OSCE/ODIHR Handbook for the Observation of New Voting Technologies, OSCE/ODIHR; October 2013; Implementing and Overseeing Electronic Voting and Counting Technologies, NDI/IFES, December 2013.
[72] Ushahidi webpage.
[73] See other examples of crowdsourcing: Thai Election Watch (Thailand); Uchaguzi (Kenya); Amatoro Mu Mahoro (Burundi).
[74] Internews, “Mapping the Maps: A Meta-Level analysis of Ushahidi & Crowdmap”, A Report from the Internews Center for Innovation and Learning, Washington, 2012, p. 19.
[75] Grömping, M., “Many eyes of any kind? Comparing traditional and crowdsourced monitoring and their contribution to democracy”, Paper presented at the Second International Conference on International Relations and Development (ICIRD 2012), 2012, p. 13.
[76] Ibidem.
[77] See, Diamond, L., “Liberation Technology”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21. No. 3, July 2010. p. 69-83. Also, Meier, P., “Ushahidi as a Liberation Technology”, in Diamond, L., and Plattner, M. F., Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy, A Journal of Democracy Book, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2012.
[78] See, Citizen Participation and Technology. An NDI Study, NDI, 2013.
[79] ACE Tracking of Recommendations Database, available at: http://aceproject.org/electoral-advice/dop/recommendations, accessed on 6 July 2014.
[80] LADE webpage.
[81] TMG webpage.
[82] GONG webpage.
[83] CETRO is the ACE Regional Centre for South East Asia, its webpage was not active at the time of writing but additional information can be found on the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network webpage.
[84] Poder Ciudadano webpage.
[85] Acción Ciudadana webpage.
[86] UN Doc. A/52/513, Report of the Secretary-General, “Support by the United Nations system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies” 1997, 21 October 1997, para. 30.
[87] Bjornlund; E.C., “Transition Elections as End or Means? Lessons for Democracy Assistance from Domestic Election Monitoring”, in McMahon and Sinclair (eds), Democratic Institution performance, Praeger, 2002, p. 5.
[88] UN Doc. A/68/301, Report of the UN Secretary-General “Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle for periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization”, 9 August 2013, para. 56.
[89] Ibidem.
[90] UN Doc. A/52/513, Report of the Secretary-General, “Support by the United Nations system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies” 1997, 21 October 1997, para. 32.
