In emerging democracies, the funding of an electoral budget by the international community, totally or in part, is an important component of democracy assistance. The amount varies from practically funding an entire election in a post-conflict scenario to more limited support of a specific phase of the electoral process, such as voter registration, civic education, and the provision of some materials like ballot papers and indelible ink. The following are illustrative country examples.
In Afghanistan, as in Kosovo since 2000, elections in 2004 were financed completely by foreign donors, with an overall cost per registered voter of more than $20. An additional peculiarity was the financial management of the election. Even though the JEMB was responsible for the election, it did not have complete authority over finances; that authority rested with UNDP and its Voter Registration and Elections Project. According to a conservative estimate by the unit responsible for the election budget, more than $190 million was spent to obtain 8,128,940 ballots, resulting in a cost of $23 per vote. This figure excluded all costs related to the security operations conducted by 18,000 US troops and 8,000 ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) soldiers. Other costs not included were related to expansive civic education activities and logistic assistance provided by international NGOs but paid by individual donor countries; the total amount of such assistance may have amounted to more than $30 million. More than 2,000 domestic electoral monitors were separately funded by USAID. Special election support teams from the European Union ($2 million) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were also separately funded by their respective organizations.
The estimated total cost for the direct polling operation inside the country was $55 million. In addition, UNAMA spent almost $21 million, and support to the Ministry of Interior for security cost a further $10 million. The latter funds were primarily spent on salaries, new vehicles fitted with communication equipment, and other equipment (except weapons and ammunition) necessary for the national police to perform its duties. Not included in these totals was the $23 million contract to Global Risk Strategies (GRS) to field 96 international staff to conduct security coordination and perform logistical planning for the EMB in the field. In fact, to a very large extent, GRS became the JEMB’s field structure.
There was also the issue of funding external voting processes for Afghan citizens living elsewhere, particularly refugees in neighboring Iran and Pakistan. Significant resources were needed to set up and run, in fewer than 80 days, a registration and voting operation in those two countries for more than one million potential voters,. In Pakistan an in-person registration exercise was conducted prior to Election Day (this was not feasible in Iran). On Election Day, both Pakistan and Iran offered in-person voting at a limited number of polling centers, primarily near locations with large Afghan refugee populations. The cost, excluding resources spent by host countries (in particular, for security arrangements), amounted to nearly $30 million. This exercise resulted in 818,189 votes being cast.
It is not surprising that the 2004 elections in Afghanistan were so complicated to arrange and proved quite costly. The election authority charged with organizing the 2004 presidential poll was faced with an electorate that had not experienced an attempt to hold democratic elections in four decades. Instead, more than 25 years of violence had dominated the political landscape and colored the political climate of the country. A significant amount of money was therefore needed to recreate the election authorities’ infrastructure, as well as on civic and voter education to facilitate the electorate’s understanding of a democratic electoral process. The electoral administration had a huge pool of internationals teaching Afghans how to run elections via on-thejob- training, which affected the cost of the election. Security concerns also played a significant role. Preparing and organizing elections is more costly in a post-conflict society, as much of a country’s physical infrastructure has been destroyed and large segments of the population have moved internally or become part of a diaspora. The late decision to allow eligible Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran to take part in the poll further increased the costs.
In Haiti, it is likely that a three-election event in November 2005 will be almost entirely financed internationally. As in Afghanistan and Iraq, the electoral budget in Haiti is illustrative of the exceptional electoral setting in post-conflict societies. First, there is the overall cost of approximately $10.5 per registered voter, not including political party funding and international and domestic observer missions. The voter registration operation alone will cost around $2.10 per registered voter. Typical of post-conflict situations, infrastructure and technical equipment costs (i.e. transport, office space rental, communications and computer facilities) will require approximately $2.30 per registered voter. It should be noted that the electoral cost per registered voter in 2005 will be higher than it was ten years ago in 1995, when it reached $4 (López-Pintor 2000, p. 74).
The total resource requirement for the period October 2004 to December 2005 amounts to $48,893,180, which is expected to cover personnel and operational costs for municipal, congressional and presidential elections. The Haitian government will finance the cost of 82 headquarters electoral staff and also contribute $2.9 million to the extraordinary electoral budget, to which three main international donors (Canada, the European Union and the United States) have committed $41 million. International financial resources for operational items have been linked to objectives of quantitative output through a result-based framework created by the electoral commission. Of the $41 million committed by donors, which will be administered by UNDP, $9 million has been allocated for voter registration to be conducted by the Organization of American States (OAS). The international community has pledged additional funding for security services and civic education and election observation programs, including political party activities. The following countries and regional organizations have pledged or are considering technical assistance opportunities prior to the 2005 elections in Haiti: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Japan, Mexico, Spain, Venezuela, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Organization of French Speaking Countries (OIF). The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is also preparing to establish a Trust Fund aimed at mobilizing additional resources for the elections as may be required. The substantial contribution of the international community is the only hope to sustain the entire electoral operation, as the national contribution amounts to less than 10 percent of the total budget.
International financial assistance for Cambodia has consistently decreased every election since 1993. In 1998, international assistance funded almost 80 percent of the total cost of the election, but this percentage declined to around 60 percent for the 2002 commune elections and to less than 50 percent for the 2003 national election. The estimated cost per registered voter was $45.50 in 1993, but dropped dramatically to $4.40 in 1998, and continued to decrease to $2.30 in 2002 and $1.70 in 2003.
For the 2003 national election, the budget was funded at 24,344,723,000 riels ($5.68 million) from a Trust Fund for Elections in the National Treasury and 24,931,681,000 riels from the international community. Seven billion riels were provided to the National Election Committee (NEC) from UNDP; six billion riels was provided by one donor country to the NEC through the Ministry of Finance; and only 536 million riels went from donors directly to the NEC. The donors’ money covered, for the most part, the non-salary, non-contingency budget costs. UNDP signed funding agreements with 12 donor countries and coordinated the earmarked funding to cover all the various phases of the process in agreement with each country. The Cambodian government’s money was used almost exclusively for salaries. The NEC accredited over 1,000 international observers, with two most important observation missions being conducted by the Asia Foundation (305 observers) and the European Union (some 120 observers). The approximate cost was $1.5 million for the EU Election Observation Mission and $240,000 for the Asia Foundation observation effort. These costs offer proof that international funding of civil society activities in election monitoring sometimes comes in relatively massive amounts. For example, in the 2003 Cambodian general election, external funding amounted to almost as much as the entire electoral budget of the NEC.
In Guatemala, the electoral budget was generously funded by international assistance up to $9 million (not including international observation missions), with assistance provided mainly by Canada, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. Of the $9 million, $3.5 million flowed through the Organization of American States (OAS) for technical assistance on voter lists, and the remaining $5.5 million was provided directly to the national electoral agency. The distribution of this aid by item was approximately as follows: voter registration, $2.5 million; voter education, $2.5 million; purchasing of equipment, $2 million; and training for poll workers, $2 million. To a lesser extent, external aid was provided to civil society organizations monitoring the elections. All in all, electoral expenditures amounted to around $23 million, which is equivalent to $4.6 per register voter. There were also several large international observer missions, including particularly extensive ones from OAS and EU, with an average cost of around $1 million each.
