E-voting and election observation
Several international organizations have complemented their methodology of election observation with regard to the use of e-voting:
Elections and referendums that make use of e-voting are usually more difficult to observe than traditional elections and referendums. Steps of the electoral process that take place electronically are not observable by the naked eye of an observer. What´s more, the technology applied is in most cases only comprehensible to technical experts. Key elements in the observation of e-voting include (based on the OSCE/ODIHR Handbook for the Observation of New Voting Technologies):
- the decision-making process to introduce New Voting Technologies (NVT)
- the legal context,
- the electoral system and NVT political parties,
- civil society,
- media and NVT
- procurement and acquisition of NVT
- the role of the election administration in the use of NVT and its handling of the voting process to take into account NVT, its oversight of NVT and risk management policy, the role it accords to vendors, the training of officials and education of voters
- security and secrecy of the vote,
- integrity of results
- usability, ballot design, voter accessibility and reliability
- public testing
- evaluation and certification
- verification methods, among which universal or individual verifiability, auditing of results, paper audit trails,
- observer access, documentation and other transparency measures-elections
Existing experience with the observation of e-voting shows three important differences compared to traditional election observation:
Firstly, the period of observation tends to be longer than traditional election observation. Preparation has to start at a timely point in order to gain a comprehensive picture, ideally with the setup of the system or, at the latest, when private encryption keys are being generated. Some very early stages in the development of e-voting (e.g. procurement of the e-voting system) can simply not be covered by election observation. Observation should end only after the voting data and/or private keys have been destroyed. Usually such a long period cannot be covered by an observation mission. Instead, spot visits prior to and after the actual observation mission need to be undertaken in order prepare and follow up adequately.
Secondly, the result of an observation of e-voting tends to be much more detailed than the result of traditional election observation. It usually results in more recommendations than the observation of traditional elections or referendums. This is due to the fact that e-voting is still a new method and only few standards exist that could be referred to. Hence, election observation is focused on bench-marking and best practice, and at the same time, it leads to more normative recommendations. Sometimes even minor details are tried to be improved with regard to the e-voting system. And of course, rapid evolutions in technology always need to be taken into account.
Finally, it can be noted that e-voting experts are still scarce and hard to find. The combination of policy thinking and technical expertise in the field of e-voting is not widely spread.
For further information also see:
EMBs
The EMB should have or build the capacity to retain overall control of the e-voting system and sufficient resources must be available to the EMB, not only during the initial introduction but also for the long-term operation of e-voting systems in order to avoid complete dependence on an external entity.
Voters
A new e-voting system should not only help the election administration; it should also be a service to citizens. Ideally, it should make it easier for voters to cast their vote.
Especially remote Internet voting is supposed to facilitate the voting process for voters. In this context one of the interesting questions is, whether and how e-voting changes electoral participation. Several years of experience with remote Internet voting in several countries have been accompanied by a big range of socio-economic studies looking into the composition of the voters who use e-voting. In general terms it can be stated that the thesis that mainly young, male, well-educated high earners would benefit from remote Internet voting can be partially confirmed. According to various studies the age of voters is the most significant variable. The gender gap however is less significant. However, all studies reveal a slight over-representation of male voters among the e-voters.
For more information cf. the study of Alicia Portenier, Micha Germann und Uwe Serdült (2014) which analyses 22 studies on e-voting in Switzerland, Estonia, the USA, Canada, Norway and the UK: http://www.preferencematcher.com/edc/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Bericht_A1F7_PortenierGermannSerd%C3%BClt.pdf
Citizens living or staying abroad
E-voting, especially in the form of remote Internet voting, sometimes is considered an effective way of allowing citizens living or staying abroad to vote in elections or referendums. E-voting is supposed to make it easier for citizens abroad to participate in national elections and referendums. It can provide a more reliable channel than postal voting since postal services are sometimes too slow for delivering ballot material before voting day and thus some external electors are prevented from voting. Other voting channels for external voters, such as voting at an embassy or diplomatic mission, are not as convenient for voters, since they need to go to a certain place during certain opening hours. Apart from convenience to external voters, there are other reasons in favour of remote Internet voting for citizens living or staying abroad: sometimes this group of people is considered as an ideal test group for remote Internet voting, in some cases, depending on the alternative voting channels offered to voters abroad, remote Internet voting might save costs. On the downside, concerns against remote Internet voting for external voters are being expressed. They include general security concerns about remote Internet voting (doubts about the Internet as a means of transmission of confidential information, fear of hacker attacks, anxiety of undue influence on the voter during the voting process) and concerns that remote Internet voting for only a small group of voters might be too costly.
Vendors
EMBs usually do not have the capacity to develop the e-voting system themselves. They usually have to rely on vendors and buy voting machines or e-voting system components. Sometimes, EMBs trust international vendors with broad experience in the field of e-voting more than domestically developed systems. However, developing and maintaining e-voting solutions provided domestically do not only support local economy but also building local competence. However, when developing local e-voting solutions, it is important to compare with internationally available systems. A mixed approach, between local and international sourcing options, is to have international vendors partner with local companies to produce some of the e-voting equipment in country.
