Why has electoral-related violence increased in such
an alarming manner?
Guatemalan society has been forced to witness
violence for a long time. After 36 years of internal conflict and more than
three decades (1954-1986) of authoritarian regimes, Guatemalan society has
beheld the massacre of indigenous communities, disappearance of students, and several
atrocities committed by the state [2]. Even after the signing of the peace
agreements (1996) and the instauration of a democratic regime the levels of
violence have not decreased. The murder rate is of 5500 per year in a country of 14 million inhabitants (United States
Department of State, Bureau of Diplomacy Security, 2014) placing the country in
the list of the most dangerous countries in the world. Electoral processes are
no exception, and during the last two processes several electoral-related
violent incidents occurred. According to the publication “Prevention of
Political Violence and Electoral Conflicts” (Acción Ciudadana, 2011) during the 2011 electoral process, 9 of 333
counties were in high risk and 36 counties presented a medium-high risk
situation. “Even
before the political campaign started 29 people were killed
and several political parties’ members denounced threats and intimidation” (Insight
Crime, 2011).
The question that arises is what triggers the
electoral-related violence in Guatemala? Authors and organizations agree that
three main causes are the presence of drug cartels, nonexistence of penalties
for breaching the electoral law and existence of corruption networks that
control the state.
Insight Crime
and International Crisis Group both emphasize that drug cartels presence is a
fact that explains the high levels of violence and electoral- related
violence. “As drugs cartels battle over
transit routes, competition in those areas for the local government posts whose
collusion facilitates trafficking may be particularly fierce” (International
Crisis Groups, 2011). During the 90’ and early 2000 the majority of drug
activities -transit and storing- where controlled by local cartels. There was
tacit agreement between the government and cartels; cartels kept low profiles [3]–meaning
no violence against civilians, and operating in zones that were previously
agreed- and the government giving a blind eye to drug dealing issues. The scenario got complicated for Guatemala
when Mexico decided to embark on the “War against Drugs”, Mexican cartels
migrated to the north-west zones of Guatemala.
As reported by Insight Crime, Mexican criminal gangs, such as the Zetas,
have been stepping up their presence in Guatemala, which could explain the
higher level of pre-election violence this year (Insight Crime, 2011). The new cartels started a fight to control
routes, reduce the influence of local cartels and gain the support of public
authorities. In contrast with local drug
cartel, Mexican cartels use violence to guarantee the support of communities
and politicians.
The inexistence
of penalties for breaching the electoral law and codes of conducts opens the
door to actors that care little about respecting the law. This situation can be
observed clearly in the violation of the electoral campaign spending limit. During
the 2011 electoral process it was reported that the main parties – Patriot
Party (PP), National Unity of Hope
party (UNE) and Leadership Party (LIDER) - considerably exceeded the expending
limit, “On August
31st the electoral authority said that the Patriot Party had already exceeded
the $6.2m spending limit; its two closest rivals were not far behind” (Huffington
Post, 2014) The
overspending is mainly worrying because the money spent has no clear sources
and it’s not channeled to parties in a transparent manner. Political parties
sustain that all those millions come from private donors; nevertheless there is
enough evidence to affirm that drug traffickers are financing campaigns to
guarantee their security during the next years. “Drug traffickers are
said to be financing some campaigns, and to have already had considerable
success in placing their supporters in various elected political posts” (The
Economist, 2011).
In addition, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has no mechanism to prevent the
overspending during campaigns, the former president of the institution, Maria
Eugenia Villagran, admitted that the penalty -$125- is laughable and useless (The
Economist, 2011).
Finally, having
a state that has been co-opted by corruption and criminal networks and that is
known for its high levels of impunity facilitates electoral-related violence. From
the violent incidents that occurred during the 2007 and 2011 electoral
processes less than 2% have been solved (Freedom House, 2014). As it was said
before, having no penalties for breaking the law and a weak judicial system
allows corruption and criminal networks to act freely. The moment the state
allows impunity the members of these networks know that they can impose their
will and that disputes can be solved with violence. Some of the
electoral-related incidents were caused by disagreements between political
parties’ members or inside the party, “During 2011 elections candidates decided
to kill their opponents, raising the electoral-related violence” (Prensa Libre,
2015. Spanish to English translation).
It has to be
highlighted that the phenomena mentioned above are not the only causes of electoral-related
violence. There are many other factors that need to be considered, for example
the lack of ideologies among the parties, poor leadership (caudillismo) and
clientelism.
What has been done and what can be done?
Acknowledging
the risks that electoral processes bring it’s vital that the civil society in
Guatemala participates more actively during the processes. In 2011 a consortium
of civil society organizations –Mirador Electoral – mapped zones that were
prone to suffer electoral-related violence. These maps were shared with the
Supreme Electoral Tribunal (SET), international community and other members of
the civil society. This effort helped to implement preventive mechanisms and to
reduce the amount of incidents, for example, citizen electoral observers were
deployed in these areas in order to prevent conflicts and communicate to authorities
possible risks. In addition, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal provided special
training to the personnel that were located in these areas. Moreover, Mirador
Electoral introduced the software Ushahidi. This allowed engaging with citizens
that were not part of any organization but were interested in participating and
supporting the electoral process, many marginalized communities were reached
and the participation of women and youth was encouraged. According to the official webpage of the
consortium several violations were recorded – the majority from Guatemala City -
and presented to the Election Dispute Resolution Body.
For future elections,
the scenario continues to be complicated with political parties starting to
campaign far in advance, lack of ideologies, inexistence of concrete political
programmes, and a SET that has little room to impose sanctions. Civil society
organizations need to be more active than ever and invest more efforts in the
use of Technology, Information and Communications (TICs), for example Ushahidi
can be used to combat electoral malpractices, identify actors that commit
malpractice and the areas that are more vulnerable to conflicts. Also, civil
society has to support and work in coordination with the SET, double efforts
need to be avoided and traditional marginalized groups have to be reached and
involved.
[1] The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance defines electoral-related violence as: “Acts or threats of coercion, intimidation or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arises in the context of electoral competition. When perpetrated to affect an electoral process, violence may be employed to influence the process of elections — such as efforts to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll — and to influence the outcomes: the determining of winners in competitive races for political office or to secure approval or disapproval of referendum questions”. (“Elections-Conflict-Prevention.pdf,” 4)
[2] For more information about the internal conflict in Guatemala please go to: http://www.ijrcenter.org/cases-before-national-courts/alien-tort-claims-act-litigation-u-s/
[3] The majority of local drug lords were support and beloved by communities, the reason is that they provided basic services –education, health, and recreation- jobs, and protection against ordinary violence. (International Crisis Group, 2011).
References
·
Acción Ciudadana, 2011. Prevención de
Violencia Política y Conflictos Electorales. Mirador Electoral 2011.
·
Bevan Claire, 2011. Politics is a death sentence in Guatemala. http://newint.org/blog/2011/07/07/guatemala-election-violence/#sthash.QRiJfdaM.dpuf. Consulted: December 1st,
2014.
·
Freedom House, 2011. Guatemala.
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/guatemala#.VHyM0DHF-s0. Consulted: December 1st,
2014.
·
Huffington Post, 2011.Guatemalan Elections, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/09/guatemala-election-2011-perez_n_955679.html?view=print&comm_ref=false. Consulted November 27th,
2014
·
Ibid, 2014. Countries at the Crossroads, Guatemala. https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/guatemala#.VLUebyvF-s0. Consulted January 9th,
2015.
·
Insight Crime, 2011. Drug Gangs Cast Shadow over Guatemala
Campaign Funding. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/drug-gangs-cast-shadow-over-guatemala-campaign-funding. Consulted Dec 3th,
2014.
·
Insight Crime, 2011. Electoral Violence Escalates in
Guatemala.
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/electoral-violence-escalates-in-guatemala.
Accessed October 29, 2014
·
Insight Crime, 2011. Why Violence Could Boil Over in
Guatemala Elections. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/why-violence-could-boil-over-in-guatemala-elections. Consulted November
27th, 2014.
·
International Crisis Group, 2011. Guatemala’s Elections:
Clean Polls, Dirty Politics - International Crisis Group. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/guatemala/B024-guatemalas-elections-clean-polls-dirty-politics.aspx. Consulted Dec 2nd,
2014
·
International Crisis Group, 2011. Guatemala: Drug
trafficking and Violence. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/guatemala/139-guatemala-drug-trafficking-and-violence.aspx. Consulted Dec. 5th,
2014.
·
Prensa Libre, 2015. Se vislumbra campana negra
y pocas propuestas. http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/politica/Se-vislumbra-campana-negra-pocas-propuestas_0_1283271677.html. Consulted
January 13th, 2015.
·
Schneider, Mark, and Javier Ciurlizza. 2011. “Guatemala
Elections and Drug Cartels – Also a Risk for America.” Christian Science
Monitor, August 11.
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/0811/Guatemala-elections-and-drug-cartels-also-a-risk-for-America.
·
The Economist, 2011. The return
of the iron fist. http://www.economist.com/node/21528620.
·
United States Department of State, Bureau
Of Diplomacy Security, 2014. Guatemala 2014
Crime and Safety Report. Consulted January 8th, 2015 https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=15656
·
Vox, 2014. How the War on Drugs Perpetuates
Violence in Latin America. http://www.vox.com/2014/11/14/7189219/drug-war-mexico-colombia. Consulted November
27th, 2014.
