In broad strokes, security arrangements can be divided into three main types: static (e.g. protection of warehouses, polling stations and offices), mobile (e.g. protection of voter registration teams or campaign rally sites) and reserve (e.g. contingency forces to support either static or mobile forces as required).
Within these three broad categories, the types of security tasks involved vary widely and depend upon significantly different capacities (skills and numbers) and lawful authorities. In many cases, the assignment of these tasks will be dictated by ‘best fit’ to function (involving a division of labour among several security institutions or contractors), but can be constrained by legal, financial and political conditions.
Legally, the assignment of security responsibilities to institutions for an election varies significantly worldwide. In many cases, the police force is designated with the primary responsibility for election security, due to constitutional limitations imposed on the domestic deployment and use of military forces.
In some countries, the involvement of the military forces is outright prohibited and uniformed personnel are required to stay in barracks on polling day. In other countries, the military is integrally involved, but may do so under special arrangements, such as the head of the electoral management body temporarily assuming the mantle of Commander-in-Chief of military forces. Elsewhere, police forces may be able to utilise military personnel and equipment through regular legal provisions (such as secondment arrangements).
The financial arrangements for security services can become a controversial issue between security and electoral institutions. This controversy (if it arises) principally stems from the high costs associated with such large scale operations, additional costs incurred by late amendments, and whether the costs should be borne as part of the electoral process (and therefore by the electoral management body) or as a function of the security forces (and therefore by the budget of the security forces).
The resolution of this problem will depend on the formal arrangements of government in a particular country, but is also influenced by the electoral and security institutions ability to identify the problem early in the strategic planning phase, and find a mutually satisfactory solution.
Political constraints may also affect the assignment of security forces to particular tasks in the electoral period. If a security actor has been the subject of controversies relating to partisan bias, the use of these forces in some aspects of the electoral process may be counter-productive to gaining the trust of the participants. For example, in a post-conflict environment, the involvement of the State security forces in the conflict may have created a level of distrust that can necessitate alternative arrangements.
In this post-conflict scenario in particular – especially if military and police forces are undergoing major reforms in parallel to the election process – the deployment of these forces can be detrimental not only to the election, but to the reforming institutions.
Neither are security actors in an election process limited to formal security institutions. Political parties, civil society groups, non-governmental organisations (NGO’s), the media and election observer groups can all have an influence on the security environment through various mechanisms.
Political parties may enter into a mutually agreed Code of Conduct that guides the behaviour of their supporters and candidates. Civil society and NGO’s (national and international) may undertake information campaigns, public debates or use other strategies to assist in defusing political tensions.
Media outlets may also follow a Code of Conduct that deters speculative reporting that could unnecessarily heighten political tensions. And, electoral observers may also mitigate intimidation and other threats to the process, by virtue of their presence and scrutiny of the process.
