Any effort to make electoral assistance more effective must also tackle the issue of the
increasing use of technology in electoral processes. The accelerating development of ICTs
applications available for electoral purposes and the appeal that such applications have
for partner countries’ EMB are factors to be considered by all EMBs, development agencies,
electoral assistance providers and practitioners. ICTs have already dramatically changed
the way elections are conducted in many developed countries.
This process is likely to continue and affect more and more emerging democracies,
regardless of their level of preparedness to introduce such applications, and despite the
fact that the cost implications can be enormous. It seems that post-conflict and emerging
democracies, in particular, are making, with donor funds, the biggest leaps in technology,
with sometimes serious deficiencies in sustainability. There is a great demand from
partner countries, in which suppliers of ICTs solutions often play a role, to development
agencies to invest in ICTs applications for electoral processes, which should consider the
level of capacity already attained by the respective EMB. Among others, recent examples
are Benin, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Togo, Mauritania, Ivory Coast,
DRC and Nigeria.
The biggest challenge is how to ensure a sustainable,
appropriate, cost effective and transparent
use of technology, particularly in postconflict
elections, and in fragile and emerging
democracies. There is no fixed solution that can
be applicable everywhere: different situations require different solutions. As a general rule, the level of technological upgrades suitable for
a given partner country should always be directly related not only to the capacity, but also to
the trust and independence enjoyed by its EMB. These elements – trust and independence – are
decisive to the acceptance of the use of ICTs by the public and, as a consequence, influence the
level of trust in the electoral process.
Provided that technologies are legally supported, operationally appropriate, accurate,
cost-effective, timely implemented, transparent and sustainable, they can build credibility
by improving the speed and efficiency of the electoral process.
However, too much attention to technology applications may divert the EMBs from other
important matters and may drain development agencies’ or EMB budgets. Costs associated
with purchasing and distribution, system defects, poor design or testing may leave
development agencies captive to increasing costs in order to save what they have already
invested in. There is a need to “skill up” staff to implement sustainable systems, and this
may not be easy given the short timetables that are often involved. Finally, undue influence
in favour of one solution or another may be exerted by interested vendors or even by
development agencies who wish to introduce a technology similar to the one in use in their
own country. Also, it might be so that political groups in power view the use of technology
as the ultimate and the most effective method to control the electoral process.
Within this framework of possibly conflicting interests, EMBs, development agencies,
practitioners, academics and electoral assistance providers have an important role to play
in influencing the technological choices to be adopted in a given electoral process, so that
it meets the appropriate needs of the country. Added conflicting interests appear when
developing technical specifications, validation testing, allocating budgets and deciding
on available timelines for appropriate implementation.
