Political and election administration
leaders on both continents seem to at a minimum express a desire for biometrics
and in some cases have infused, or are in the process of infusing, their
registration and documentation systems with biometrics.
Although biometrics can help address the
problem of multiple registrations and thus in that respect increase trust in
the legitimacy of the process, it is unclear what precisely is driving such a
strong and pervasive move towards biometric technologies in registration and ID
cards across Africa and Latin America at this moment. Biometric technology is
expensive, requires training and sufficient staff to implement, and
necessitates that all the citizens at some point re-register and/or get the new
card. At the same time it only addresses one aspect of potential fraud:
multiple registrations. Multiple registrations may or may not be the gravest
problem confronting a country’s electoral system. Moreover, multiple voting, which is the true
concern, can be addressed through low tech alternatives such as use of
indelible finger ink on Election Day and greater transparency and wider spread
publication of the registration list in advance of elections.
Moreover, launching a new biometric system,
because it can be so complex and vulnerable to so many different variables,
such as environmental and geographical challenges, lack of training and skills,
mechanical breakdowns, delays, and usually necessitates to re-registration of
every citizen in the country within a finite period of time, can cause
disenfranchisement. As Michael
Yard has pointed out, “A new way of doing things should not be judged either as
good or bad simply because it is new, but should instead be evaluated upon the
basis of whether it helps to make elections more or less democratic given the
resources, risks, and alternative solutions available.”[i]
Are politicians truly moved by the desire
to address duplicate registration and voting or is there some other political
interest that drives them? What outside pressures exist? Perhaps technology
companies or the international donor community have taken action that is
facilitating or accelerating the race to biometrics? There does not seem to be any strategy,
cost/benefit analysis or long term thinking when it comes to this subject among
most of the parties involved. It is
still unclear whether biometric technologies are the most efficient use of
resources given the particular problems individual countries in Africa and
Latin America confront. In some cases increased use of biometrics may make
sense; in others it may address a less than urgent problem and only make the
process more complicated. These issues require further exploration. Although
there have been a small handful of technical studies of biometric systems, little
research has been done on the advantages and disadvantages of deploying such a
system in the first place. It appears
that the only work that has addressed this issue head on is the report Voter Registration in Africa, an edited
volume published by the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy
in Africa (EISA).
Richard Atwood, writing for the European Parliament,
has stated, “EMBs and donors like the EU should… take care that new
technologies adopted to prevent registration fraud – like biometric technology
– do not themselves lead to citizens’ disenfranchisement...For example, due to the cost of biometric kits, countries may
purchase fewer and rotate them round the country, which can reduce the time
available for communities to vote and may increase the distance they have to
travel to do so. Note also that biometrics – if they work -only resolve
multiple registration. They can’t resolve issues of identity…Any erosion in the EMB’s integrity through its procurement of
costly equipment will increase risks of conflict and outweigh any of
technology’s potential benefits.” [ii]
Moreover, no matter how sophisticated a system is
used, if there is lack of faith in the management body responsible for
implementing it, it will not help increase trust in the integrity of the
elections.
There are countries that have implemented biometric
systems relatively successfully, but at the same time one must ask at what financial
cost in the immediate and as important the long term in maintaining and
upgrading the systems going forward, at the sacrifice of other needs.
There are countries in both regions where biometric
technology is being used to varying degrees. Countries that have or are moving
toward biometrics include Kenya, Bolivia, Cameroon, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire,
Ghana, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Uganda.
a. Foreign Vendors
Procuring
biometric registration technology from foreign vendors can be fraught with
potential difficulties, particularly if they then hold the technological
expertise and capacity to maintain and improve the systems to the exclusion of
the election commission and local technologists. “If it is not possible to
retain adequate in-house staff, the EMB should carefully consider whether there
will be adequate funds to pay for continued support from external vendors, and
whether fostering continuous dependency on external vendors is in the best
interest of the EMB."[iii] If a government contracts with
a foreign vendor, depending on the state’s internal capacity, “the system may
be difficult to use in future registration exercises when donor participation
in the electoral process is likely to dwindle.” [iv]
According to the EISA report, in the
DRC for example, external stakeholder influence on the process was very high.
This was
clearly manifested in the following activities:
• The tender process was handled by IAPSO Copenhagen.
• The number of foreign technical assistants used was high, turning the
process into a veritable international affair.
• The decision on the choice of the system used was not mooted by the
CEI alone. There were reports that some of the major donors at the time (like
the European Commission) had clear preferences when it came to technological
choices…[v]
EISA further points out that
It may be
difficult for some EMBs to analyse and fully understand study results
presented by vendors who are eager to sell their products. Simple
studies are
good for obtaining a rough overview of a system’s performance;
however,
more in-depth studies are crucial before a system is deployed to
ensure that real
performance will meet EMB requirements and that the system is fully
operational
in specific country conditions...Case studies conducted in an air-conditioned
office using college students are not a realistic representation of how the
voter registration system would work in extreme African conditions.[vi]
b. Implementation
Problems
As Astrid Evrensel writes in the EISA
publication’s introduction,
Even international donors and technical electoral advisors seem to support
the use of biometric-based voters’ rolls and other high-tech solutions to deal
with integrity issues and possible political challenges to elections. A
registration process that uses sensitive high-tech equipment not only adds significant
‘integrity’ costs to the core costs but also increases organisational and logistical
challenges. These include the increased need for technical training as well as
continuous supervision and support for registration staff in the field to ensure
that the data is captured, collected and processed to the highest possible standard.
If EMBs lack organisational and logistical resources while attempting to organise
such a complex task, the resulting voters’ roll can be replete with errors. If
the voters’ roll is too faulty, polling staff may not even use it on election
day. Following generally accepted principles, the voters’ roll should be as
accurate and complete as possible to provide for maximum inclusion of all
groups. Voter inclusion and the enfranchisement of disadvantaged groups have to
be balanced against the security features of a system, which prevent double
registration by technological means…[vii]
Echoing Atwood, Evrensel also points out that “Travelling long
distances to registration centres disenfranchises thousands of voters especially
women, people with disabilities and others who cannot journey easily for
whatever reason.”[viii]
There is also the problem of the
false positive and the false negative. “A person is falsely rejected, for
example, when s/he is already enrolled in the database but the system fails to
positively identify her/him. The false reject rate depends on the situation
under which the system is used, such as operating conditions and user
cooperation. A slight change in one’s fingerprint due to dust, moisture or
other environmental conditions can increase the false reject rate. A person
could be falsely accepted, for example, when one person’s biometric data is
similar to another’s and a match is made erroneously.”[ix]
There are also those citizens for
whom recording a fingerprint is not possible and mechanical failures that lead
to an inaccurate or unclear recording. “In
Zambia in 2010, for example, a ‘failure to acquire’ rate of over 10% was
observed at field level in the system’s attempt to capture the digital fingerprints
of voters. In other words, even before any further processing of voters’ data, already
10% of voters are excluded from the system’s attempts to detect double registrations
because of technological registration issues…”[x]
In a sad example in Kenya recently, an 82 year-old man was turned
away after a BVR kit failed to detect his fingerprints. IEBC clerks at the
station tried their best several times but failed to register Mr Ole Nzuka,
even after he washed his hands. Mr Nzuka who had trekked for more than 10
kilometers from Kibiku area to register in Ngong as a voter told The Standard,
that he was under medication yet he failed to register.”[xi]
EISA further argues that
[T]here are numerous ways in which an election can be stolen, and
devoting massive resources to advanced registration techniques – even if they
are well implemented and work perfectly – may simply displace fraudulent activities
into other areas of the process. Electoral authorities and donors are attracted
by the opportunity to make improvements to their systems rather than to address
the more sensitive and difficult problems of misconduct by politicians,
political parties and voters. These actors may in fact be happy to see the EMB
and donors pursue a course of action which, in reality, would not disrupt their
entrenched activities…[xii]
c. Examples
One example of biometrics gone awry is
Fiji. Michael Yard writes for IFES that
In 2009 there was a
strong push in Fiji to include automated fingerprint identification as a
requirement for every person on the voter list. Responses to the question of
how this would improve voter registration were wide-ranging, with expectations
that it could eliminate impersonation at the polling station, remove deceased
persons from the voter register, and prevent registration by non-citizens and
underage voters. None of these issues were addressed in any way by the proposed
technology. A survey of political party members and field election staff
indicated that there was very little concern about persons registering more
than once, the one issue that the proposed system could help to address. …
Identifying the problem is not always a simple exercise. Surprisingly, the
aforementioned survey also indicated there was minimal concern about
impersonation, deceased persons, underage voters or non-citizens. Even the
largest city on the islands was small enough that poll workers knew almost
every voter who came to cast a ballot. The biggest problem raised in
stakeholder discussions was suspicion that some parties were bussing voters
from polling station to polling station, allowing multiple voting – a suspicion
that, according to most observers, was completely unfounded and was only used
by losing parties to cast doubts on the legitimacy of the ruling party. So, the
main problem was really a lack of trust, which could have been more effectively
addressed by voter information, publicizing the controls that were already in
place to prevent bussing in voters.[xiii]
In the Democratic Republic of Congo,
the biometric registration exercise reportedly cost $58 million. In a case study of the Congo, it was found
that “US$40,160,000 was needed to buy the 10,000 biometric registration kits
and to have them transported by air from Brussels to Kinshasa. Apart from these
initial costs, the CEI would have to raise a yearly or second yearly budget of
some US$2.5 million1 for equipment maintenance and replacement of lost or
damaged equipment to ensure the continued use of this technology.”[xiv]
And yet it still resulted in disenfranchisement. “[T]he system was not able to
capture most people because the number of units acquired was not sufficient to
cover the entire country (especially the outskirts), and people who had to
travel several kilometres to register either missed the chance or found it too
difficult to make the effort.[xv]
In 2007 the election commission in
Guatemala (RENAP) decided to completely overhaul the system using biometrics.
This overhaul required all Guatemalans to re-register and get new identity
cards to replace the old ones. In a report published in advance of the 2011
election, the International Crisis Group (ICG) described this process as having
been fairly disastrous:
The
exercise was overambitious from the start. Planners misjudged the time required
to retrieve and sort old data from municipalities and then collect and verify
new data from around fourteen million Guatemalans. The bad design was
compounded by corruption. Deputies in Congress and RENAP’s managers, who have
since been replaced, reportedly awarded contracts inappropriately, or at least
without sufficient transparency. Ill-qualified cronies were appointed to key
positions. The combination of poor design, nepotism and incompetence led,
unsurprisingly, to a deficient registration. The exercise has cost far more than
originally projected but remains incomplete. Politicians, especially from
opposition parties, and some in civil society have accused RENAP of inflating
registration numbers so as to benefit the ruling party.[xvi]
Sierra Leone
used a biometric system for the first time in their 2012 election. Yet “the integrity of the electoral register
has still been questioned by opposition parties who accuse the government of
covertly registering individuals under the legal voting age and foreign
nationals…In Sierra Leone, there is no historical evidence of a deliberate
strategy by any political party to rig elections through multiple
registrations. All previous electoral registers have erroneously contained
names of the deceased, the under-age and foreign nationals. But the most
significant type of electoral misdemeanor has been physical stuffing of ballots
and false recording of results by temporary election workers. Both the All
People's Congress and Sierra Leone People's Party, when in power, have at times
used their position to fund political campaigns and buy voters. This practice
remains widespread. Political parties continue to organize and condone the
intimidation of voters, often perpetrated by their youth wings. Biometric
technology offers little scope to tackle these transgressions.”[xvii]
Kenya started its 30 day process of biometric
voter registration exercise on November 19, making it an interesting current
case study. Reviews so far have been
mixed. The Star newspaper says that , “According to the contract, the price quoted by the
Canadian Commercial Corporation for the 15,000 [Biometric Voter Registration]
kits was Sh6.1 billion (€56.21 million).[xviii]
Some
reports have focused on the number of Kenyans who do not have the identity
cards necessary to register. One press report stated that four million Kenyans
lacked ID cards and that only a small percentage of them had even applied for
the card.[xix]
Early on in the
process there were problems with the passwords on the registration kits
expiring, the lack of sunlight causing solar power failures in the kits’
batteries, and problems with transportation and logistics.[xx]
[i] Michael Yard, Direct Democracy: Progress and Pitfalls of Election
Technology, IFES, 2010, p. 9
[ii] Richard Atwood, How The EU Can Support Peaceful Post-Election Transitions Of Power:
Lessons From Africa, Directorate-General For External Policies Of The
Union, Directorate B , Policy Department, Briefing Paper, P. 19
[iii] Michael Yard, Direct Democracy: Progress and Pitfalls of Election
Technology, IFES, 2010, p. 22
[iv] Astrid Evrensel, Ed., Voter Registration in Africa, EISA, 2011, p.
98
[xi] “Hitches slow down the
registration of voters,” The Standard Digital News, November 22 2012.
[xiii] Michael Yard, Direct Democracy: Progress and Pitfalls of Election
Technology, IFES, 2010, p. 20.
[xvi] International Crisis Group, Guatemala’s Elections: Clean Polls,
Dirty Politics, June 16, 2011, p. 9.
[xviii] Walter Menya, Kenya: Government Loses
Billions in BVR Deal, The Star, November 3, 2012
[xix]Moses Njagih, “IEBC starts off race to register 20 million voters,” The Standard
Digital Review, November 17, 2012.
[xx] “Hitches slow down the registration of voters,” The Standard Digital News,
November 22 2012
