The decision as to whether to delimit electoral districts, and by what means, should depend on country-specific conditions that take into consideration the political and social context and available administrative and financial resources. But this is often not the case – in many countries delimitation practices have simply been a matter of historical tradition. In other countries, district delimitation methods have been borrowed from a colonial power or an influential neighbouring country. Delimitation practices that work well in some countries will not work well in others. Electoral districts were developed as a means of providing fairer representation. Under certain circumstances, they may still provide a good option for representation, but this is very much dependent on the country context.
Historical Background [1]
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, representation was based on communities, not on the number of individuals or voters. Constituencies varied greatly in population. In England, for example, each county, borough, and university, regardless of size, had two representatives in the House of Commons. The composition of the House of Commons, and legislatures throughout Europe, reflected the view that communities or distinct categories of society – for example, the clergy and the nobility – should be represented, not individuals or voters.
Beginning in the latter part of the eighteenth century, citizens began to demand a broadening of their franchise and fairer representation in the legislature. Single-member districts for the election of legislators were embraced by this movement as a means towards greater democracy. Not only would single-member districts ensure more equal representation for citizens, it was believed that they would produce a more representative legislature – increasing representation for the urban, working class and other traditionally under-represented groups.
In the eighteenth century, single-member districts were first adopted in the British colonies that later became the United States. During the nineteenth century, many European countries gradually followed suit. Denmark adopted single-member districts for elections to its lower chamber in 1849. A newly unified Italy chose single-member districts to elect representatives to the national legislature in 1861. The North German Confederation adopted single-member districts in 1867; imperial Germany, in 1871. France has used single-member districts intermittently since 1875. Britain adopted single-member districts in 1885, and the Netherlands followed suit in 1887. Norway, one of the last European countries to adopt single-member districts, did so in 1905 when the country obtained full independence.
Most of the remaining European countries that continued to use communities, rather than specially delimited electoral districts, for the election of representatives were the less progressive countries, such as Portugal or the Balkan states. Of the more modern European countries, only Switzerland and Belgium used multimember districts throughout the nineteenth century. Belgium used its nine historic provinces as boundaries for its multimember districts, but it recognised the principle of equal representation by varying the number of representatives assigned to province. When proportional representation was adopted in Belgium in 1899, multimember districts based on provincial boundaries were retained.
In Switzerland, prior to 1848, each canton sent a single representative to the federal assembly. The constitution of 1848 provided for representation based on population; so in 1850, 49 electoral districts, or constituencies, were created. The boundaries of these constituencies went unchanged for 70 years, however. In 1919, Switzerland adopted proportional representation. Since 1919, representatives have been elected from multimember districts that correspond to the canton boundaries.
The trend towards single-member districts in Europe ebbed with the advent of proportional representation in the late nineteenth century. Between 1899, when Belgium adopted proportional representation, and 1921, when Norway moved to proportional representation, most of the continental European countries adopted one form of proportional representation or another.
Because multimember districts are used with systems of proportional representation, countries that have adopted such systems are no longer required to periodically redraw district boundaries. Instead, administrative divisions such as states, provinces, or counties can be used to elect representatives. Equality of population is achieved by varying the numbers of legislators elected from a district, rather than redrawing district lines. Today, the norm in Europe is multimember districts that correspond to administrative divisions and do not require periodic delimitation.
Social and Political Context
The delimitation of single-member districts has several advantages. The three most often cited are simplicity, stability and strong links between elected representatives and their constituents. Each of these advantages may be important ones, depending on the social and political context in which the districts are adopted.
Elections held in single-member districts tend to be quite easy for voters to understand, especially in conjunction with plurality or majority voting rules. Simplicity may be a significant advantage for countries with high illiteracy rates.
Single-member districts promote stability by facilitating strong, single party government. This is because single-member districts tend to produce election outcomes in which the majority party is over-represented. This may be an important advantage in countries that have reason to fear or have actually experienced a proliferation of small extremist parties or coalition governments that have frequently fallen.
Single-member districts provide voters with strong constituency representation. Voters have a single, easily identifiable district representative to whom they can appeal for constituency service. Voters also have a single district representative whom they can hold accountable for protecting constituency interests. This may have a positive affect on voters’ feelings of political efficacy, which may, in turn, increase voter turnout. Political efficacy and turnout are both important ingredients for system legitimacy, which may be important to newly emerging democracies.
Single-member districts have one very serious drawback: they tend to over-represent the majority political party at the expense of the other political parties. Countries that delimit single-member districts must be willing and able to accept disproportional election outcomes. Although it is possible to devise a fair and non-partisan redistricting process, it is not possible to guarantee an unbiased election outcome with single-member districts unless there are provisions for a second, party vote (as is the case with a mixed electoral system).
Disproportional election results may be difficult to accept in a country with many political parties representing widely disparate interests. The results will be virtually impossible to accept if deep cleavages exist in the society. For example, if there is a relatively large, politically cohesive ethnic, racial, or religious minority group that has consistently been denied what it perceives as fair representation, elections could lead to conflict, possibly even violence and instability.
Taking the Politics Out of Redistricting Traditionally, legislatures have been responsible for drawing their own districts. Electoral abuses such as malapportioned districts (districts that vary substantially in population) or “gerrymandered” districts (districts intentionally drawn to advantage one political party or group at the expense of the others) were not uncommon. These abuses led a number of countries to adopt reforms designed to remove “politics” from the redistricting process. In these countries, non-partisan commissions draw district boundaries following a set of neutral redistricting criteria. The public is encouraged to participate through a public inquiry process. And the legislature is permitted only a limited role, if any role at all, in the redistricting process.
These reforms have been adopted by many Commonwealth countries, where the reforms appear to have been quite successful. Redistricting is rarely viewed as “partisan,” even when the outcome of an election clearly favours one party at the expense of the other parties. Despite their success in the countries that have adopted them, reforms of the redistricting process have not been embraced everywhere. For example, legislatures still draw congressional districts in most states in the United States.
In the United States, the political system and political institutions were designed on the premise of competing factions, with special interests and parochial concerns vying for limited resources within the legislature. As a result, Americans tend to assume that “politics” and the pursuit of political self-interest are inevitable. Reforms of the redistricting process are unlikely to be adopted in the near future because many Americans believe it is as impossible to divorce politics from the redistricting process as it is to divorce politics from the legislative process in general.
Only countries that are less pluralistic, more politically ideological, and more public-regarding accept the proposition that politics can be removed from the redistricting process. Furthermore, strong party organisations and centralised legislative authority are needed to enforce sanctions against legislators who attempt to influence the redistricting process. While these conditions appear to be met in most Commonwealth countries, they are not present everywhere.
But countries that adopt independent boundary commissions and neutral redistricting criteria can only prevent partisan interests from controlling the process; these countries cannot alleviate disproportional election outcomes. If political fairness is defined by outcome, rather than by process – and specifically by a proportional outcome for political parties and/or minority groups – then single-member systems will fail the fairness test more often than not, no matter who draws the districts. Countries that value proportionality over all else – perhaps because of the need to ensure equitable representation to deeply divided groups within the society – are wise to choose some form of proportional representation, which may or may not include provisions for single-member districts. If stability in the form of strong, single party government is more important, however, delimiting single-member districts is a good choice.
Administrative and Cost Considerations
Delimiting electoral districts can be a complex, expensive, and time-consuming process. Countries that choose to delimit electoral districts must be prepared to administer what may be a very complicated procedure and must be willing to spend the necessary funds to complete the process.
Administering the process will be complicated. Information from a wide variety of sources must be collected, verified, and synthesised. Districts must be drawn, and then must be evaluated – procedures that could involve political party and other stakeholders input. And after a final set of districts is adopted, they must be implemented. This usually requires changes to voter registration lists, and voter notification of new district assignments. In addition, election officials may have to redraw voting areas and relocate polling places. Ultimately, implementation may require a great deal of co-ordination with local and regional governments as well as election officials at the local, regional, and federal levels.
While computers can make the delimitation process more efficient, computers can also complicate it. Computer hardware and software options must be examined carefully. A decision to acquire a computer system must take into account the amount of money to be invested in hardware and software, the time and expense of acquiring and training staff to operate the system, and the time and expense of converting maps and population data to a computer readable format.
The administration of the delimitation process may be challenging. It may be difficult to find and/or train qualified staff, particularly if the process is to be computerised. There may be obstacles in obtaining accurate and up-to-date information, especially maps. And there may be problems coordinating the collection and implementation processes with election officials and local government officials. All of these challenges must be met, however, if the delimitation process is to be accurate and timely.
The price tag for redistricting varies, some countries spend relatively little to redistrict, while others face increasing costs. The redistribution in Great Britain and Northern Ireland completed in 2008 cost £UK 13.6 million. The previous redistribution cost £UK 5 million. Similarly in Canada, the redistribution concluding in 2003 cost approximately $Can 10.1 million while the previous one in1997 cost approximately $Can 6.5 million. In the United States, enormous amounts of money are spent to redraw congressional districts every ten years. Of course, the redistricting process in the United States is quite decentralised, and the amount of money each state spends varies considerably: some states spend well over US$1 million to draw congressional districts, and millions more to defend these districts if challenged in court; other states, however, spend far less. But regardless of the actual amount spent, countries must recognize that delimitation is rarely a one-time event and must be prepared to devote the time and resources necessary to redraw electoral districts periodically.
[1] This discussion draws heavily from an article written by Michael Steed entitled “The Constituency” which appeared in Representatives of the People? Parliamentarians and Constituencies in Western Democracies, edited by Vernon Bogdanor and published by Gower Publishing in 1985.
