Author: Carlos Navarro
In 1988, a systematic crisis of confidence in the Mexican electoral system ensued after the official results of a rather controversial presidential election were announced. Until then, elections had been controlled by successive governments belonging to a hegemonic political party that had remained in power for nearly 60 years.
In order to face this crisis and address all the demands and expectations of democratic change, a series of constitutional and legal reforms was agreed upon between 1989 and 2007. These reforms significantly modified the rules, institutions and electoral procedures in order to adhere to standards of rigor, impartiality and transparency. These reforms contributed to creating a solid multiparty system and promoting important guarantees and equity conditions in the competition for the vote.
The creation of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) in 1990 was a key piece of this transformation process. The IFE was conceived as a public, permanent, independent and specialized body, responsible for conducting federal elections in Mexico.
Mexico is a federal state, made up of 32 autonomous entities (31 states and the capital, which is the venue of the federal powers) that comprise its internal governmental regime. From 1946–2014, this federal arrangement expressed itself, in electoral terms, as a clear division of competences between the federation and its 32 entities; even when they shared a series of common precepts, each governmental order had its own rules, institutions and electoral procedures.
This legal-institutional arrangement functioned for almost seven decades, until a constitutional reform agreed on at the end of 2013 and in place since the beginning of 2014 brought substantial change. An essential component of this change is the replacement of the IFE with the National Electoral Institute (INE). The INE has most of the same characteristics and structure as the IFE, but its range of powers is broadened.
Although the creation of the INE does not imply the elimination of the bodies responsible for conducting elections in the 32 entities, its name does accurately suggest the implications of changes in the legal-institutional design. The INE is not only responsible for organizing federal elections, but it also has the power to collaborate and intervene in local elections (executive and legislative authorities at the municipal and state levels). All this, governed by the laws of the national political parties and electoral procedures.
This case study analyses the origin, nature and scope of the IFE, and sketches some of the implications and challenges of its replacement by the INE. IFE has played a key role in the reform and modernization process of the Mexican electoral regime during the last three decades and the fact is, as of May 2014, neither the new electoral laws nor the electoral procedures common to all the states have yet been approved. The characteristics and scope of the new electoral organization model will be examined, particularly those related to the INE’s powers and organization.
It is also worth pointing out that the Mexican model of electoral institutions assigns administrative competences (preparing, organizing and conducting the elections) and jurisdictional roles (solving controversies and applying electoral justice) to different, specialized organizations at each level of government. This text is solely focused on the IFE/INE as an EMB.
Mexico, like most Latin American countries, obtained its independence from Spain at the beginning of the 19th century. Even though a large share of its first 100 independent years was characterized by intense political instability due to the fact that access to power was frequently settled in the battlefield, elections — even if they were a mere formality — took place regularly.
Originally inspired by political slogans such as ‘Sufragio Efectivo, No re-elección’ (Effective suffrage, no re-election) the country experienced one of the first social revolutions of the 20th century. Once the turmoil it caused was over, a new political regime was established at the end of the 1920s. The regime was characterized by the centralization of political power in the president of the republic, and was structured around a hegemonic party system with accentuated authoritarian characteristics.
While the four decades that followed the Mexican Revolution saw profound social and economic transformations, the political regime was practically unaltered. There was a formal multiparty system and elections were duly observed, but the nominal opposition was very weak.
It was not until the mid-1970s that intense social pressure and mobilizations contributed to the first important changes in the political regime. Legal means were opened for the political participation and representation of different social forces (particularly leftist) that had been systematically excluded from the political arena until then.
By the end of that decade, new forces had burst into politics and the growing electoral competition was quite visible. However, even though political plurality had been encouraged, the rules and practices related to electoral management had not been modified. The operation of the electoral machinery was set in motion only during electoral periods under the control of the executive, which caused great distrust. The organizing of elections and their results were, for many Mexicans, synonymous with manipulation and fraud.
Such circumstances turned the federal elections of 1988 into a landmark. The crisis came to a head when, amid questions and doubts regarding the fairness of the process and the certainty of its results, the victory of the ruling party and its candidate was announced. It became inconceivable to all political forces and actors to hold another election without comprehensive and thorough reform of the legal and institutional framework governing the electoral competition.
In this context, a very important cycle of constitutional and legal reforms took place between 1989 and 1996 to progressively answer the demands for greater transparency and impartiality in the organizing of elections. The reforms also helped strengthen the multiparty regime and guarantee an equitable context for electoral competition.
That set of reforms, and the ones approved in 2007 and 2008, had two distinctive features. The first was its inclusiveness, not only by involving all the political forces represented in congress in the entire process of negotiation and agreement, but also by taking into account the reflections and proposals made by specialized and interested groups and stakeholders. The second feature was the comprehensive scope and completeness of the reforms, which responded to a number of demands about the regime’s composition.
It is important to remember that the negotiations and agreements for this first cycle of reforms took place from 1989 until 1996, when the hegemonic political party was still in power — it held control of the executive and had an absolute majority in both chambers of congress.
The 1989–90 constitutional and legal reforms substantially modified the institutions and procedures that govern federal elections in Mexico. One of the most important changes in the new Mexican electoral architecture was the creation of the IFE. Following the mandate of the constitution and the issuing of a new electoral law in 1990, the IFE was founded that year as a permanent public organization, autonomous in terms of its decisions and professional in its performance — which represented a fundamental change in the nature of the institution responsible for organizing federal elections.
The constitution states that the IFE must abide by five fundamental principles when executing its powers: certainty, legality, independence, impartiality and objectivity. While the various constitutional and legal reforms that have been approved over the 20 years since the IFE’s foundation have altered some of the formulae and mechanisms conceived for its composition, organization and functioning, the intention of each change has been to safeguard or heighten those principles.
The significant expansion of the IFE’s powers through reforms was also meant to respond to the demands that have emerged from new circumstances and dynamics in the competition for votes. There are now higher expectations around the world that electoral rules and institutions will guarantee free, fair and credible elections and ensure an equitable competitive environment.
Thus the two main elements of the electoral reforms in Mexico focused on impartiality in the organization of elections and equity during the competition, in efforts to build trust and strengthen the electoral regime. The shaping of the IFE’s structure, along with its powers and the ways it has wielded them for over two decades, are clear examples of these reforms.
True independence of EMBs includes a financial dimension related to their ability to plan their own budget and, just as importantly, receive and spend funds promptly. In this sense, attention must be drawn to the budgetary independence of the IFE from its creation (since only congress can modify it) and its very generous and timely public funding, which has enabled it to efficiently carry out its responsibilities.
The budget that the IFE administered, and now administered by the INE, comes solely from public funds. During the 2012 elections, USD 473.3 million was allocated for ordinary operational expenses, USD 316.3 million for organizing the electoral process and USD 392.0 million as public funding for political parties to meet their own ordinary and campaign expenses, for a total of USD 1.2 billion.
To demonstrate its proper management of resources, the INE is compelled to abide by rules on transparency and public accountability, and is overseen by a General Comptroller’s Office with broad powers to perform its duties; the head of that office is independently appointed by congress.
In order to ensure that the IFE’s responsibilities were carried out in a professional manner, the 1990 legislation stipulated the creation of an electoral civil service, which was effectively established in 1992. All IFE officers in the executive areas that handle key functions related to planning, organizing, conducting and surveilling elections had to be part of this electoral civil service. In this regard, no major changes should be expected for the INE.
Since its creation, the IFE was empowered to directly perform all activities related to preparing, organizing, conducting and surveilling every federal electoral process, as well as other activities attendant to the law (such as contributing to the enhancement of democratic life, preserving the political parties’ regime and contributing to the dissemination of civic education).
In this regard, perhaps the most important feature of the reforms approved during the IFE’s existence was the systematic enlargement and diversification of its powers. In addition to its essential electoral organizational and logistical powers (e.g. candidate registration; accreditation of citizen and international observers; selection and training of polling site officers; design, printing and distribution of all electoral materials; provision of preliminary results and official vote tallying), the IFE was also responsible for many other tasks that have been inherited by the INE, which are discussed below.
Periodic Revision and Adjustment of Electoral Boundaries
The composition of the Lower Chamber of the Federal Congress is a variation of the German mixed-member proportional representation (PR) system, in which 300 of the 500 representatives are elected using a first past the post (FPTP) system in an equal number of single-member districts distributed among the 32 entities of the federation according to the population distribution. The IFE was responsible for conducting a periodic revision of those 300 single-member districts in order to preserve the principle of equal representation. The INE also exerts this power for state-level constituencies.
Integration and Permanent Updating of the Federal Registry of Voters and the Issuing of the Voting Card
The IFE was — and now the INE is — responsible for the integration and permanent updating and refining of the electoral roll that is used for all the country’s elections. Registration in the electoral roll is voluntary, so each citizen must do so personally. Upon registration, the INE issues a voting card with a photograph, free of charge, which is valid for a period of ten years. Since Mexico has no national identification document, this photo-voting card has in practice become Mexicans’ most common ID. There were 79.5 million citizens enabled to vote in the 2012 federal elections.
Control and Oversight of Parties and Campaign Financing
During the last two decades, Mexico has developed one of the world’s most generous permanent public financing systems for political parties. The constitution stipulates that public financing must prevail over private financing. The IFE was (and the INE is) responsible for administrating the public subsidy assigned to the national political parties (nearly USD 400 million in 2012).
At the same time, private financing is subject to very precise regulations and restrictions regarding its origin and amounts. Consequently, political parties have very strict obligations to account for the origin, management and use of all the resources they get for both their organization and functioning and for campaigning.
The exercise of its very ample powers regarding national political parties’ finance control and oversight, as well as that of federal campaigns, was the IFE’s sole responsibility during its existence. In order to achieve this, it constructed one of the most complex and sophisticated systems imaginable. This important and delicate function has now been taken over by the INE, but it has significantly expanded: it also has to control and oversee the financing of parties and campaigns at the level of the 32 federal entities. These functions also include independent candidates, who may now run for office for all kinds of elections, after a reform was approved in 2012.
Administering State Times in the Media
Until 2008, Mexico had a regime that combined a generous allowance of free media (radio and television) access for parties’ electoral propaganda, subsidized by the state, and a basic group of regulations to purchase additional time under equal conditions. In 2008, a set of important constitutional and legal reforms brought about a dramatic transformation: neither political parties nor individual or legal entities were allowed to buy time to broadcast any political propaganda or electoral publicity in the media.
Since then, any access to or use of the public or private media for political-electoral propaganda is reserved for political parties and candidates. This access is only granted through the (very generous) time the state provides in all radio stations (around 1,600) and TV channels (around 750) that operate in Mexico.
All the arrangements and facilities comprised in this free service for parties and candidates, which also reserves time for messages from the electoral authorities, is now the INE’s responsibility. Its realization has required the installation and operation of an enormous and very sophisticated technical-administrative mechanism in charge of distributing the 42 minutes of programming available to the political parties and candidates every day during campaigns; the technical validation and national distribution of the material produced by the parties; the verification of its broadcasting in the space and time previously agreed on; and the generation of the consequent informative reports.
Organizing Electoral Debate
A 2008 reform gave the IFE the power to organize two debates between the registered candidates for presidential elections. The most recent constitutional reform requires the new legislation to set the rules for the electoral authorities to organize mandatory debates among candidates to all electoral posts. Therefore the INE’s powers in this matter may expand to at least the legislative elections.
To fully accomplish its purposes and powers, the IFE established — and the INE is expected to maintain and even expand, according to its new and extended powers — a vast and complex organizational structure, in which four different kinds of bodies can be highlighted:
Aside from its headquarters in the capital city, the IFE operated and the INE now operates in a decentralized fashion, with 332 permanent offices all over the country (where the directive, executive and surveillance bodies have representation).
The most important mechanisms for guaranteeing the independence and impartiality of an institution are the integration of its directive bodies and decision-making methods. Although each of the INE bodies has equal representation of the political parties, and parliamentary groups are represented at the highest council, the only members with the right to vote are those with no partisan affiliation.
The main directive body of INE is its General Council, formed in April 2014, which consists of 11 members who have a right to voice and vote, and a variable number of members who are entitled to participate in debates, but not vote. The 11 voting members are the president councillor and ten electoral councillors. All of them shall be elected, as a general rule, by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Lower Chamber, following a complex procedure that involves different stages that are clearly established by the constitution. Their eligibility depends on meeting certain requirements that guarantee, first and foremost, their independence and impartiality, but also their ability to perform their duties. All voting members shall serve a nine-year term and be replaced on a staggered basis.
Non-voting members include one representative of each nationally registered political party (currently seven); one for each parliamentary group with party affiliation in either chamber of Congress (currently also seven); and the executive secretary of the INE. The General Council is currently made up of 26 members. All General Council sessions are public and take place in a facility that is equipped for media coverage and live transmission on the Institute’s website. Debates are regulated, decisions are taken by majority vote and the voting members do so openly.
Even though the essential electoral procedures such as casting a vote, scrutinizing and tallying the votes at the polling stations (roughly 143,000 were installed at the July 2012 federal elections) are done manually, the IFE used (and now the INE uses) technology intensively to carry out many of its organizational and electoral process activities. For instance, technology is used to establish a permanent connection between its offices throughout the country and provide the mass media, and all other interested audiences, with timely information.
In addition to the impressive technological platform used for the integral management of state broadcasting times, biometric systems are used to create the electoral registry and produce photo-voting cards (which also have visible and invisible security measures that make them almost impossible to forge or alter). Another key use of new technologies is the design and operation of an intranet devoted solely to the real-time dissemination of preliminary elections results on more than 25 public websites.
The Mexican electoral architecture, and particularly the IFE’s (and now INE’s) nature, organization and powers, are clear examples of how far efforts (and regulations) can go to guarantee the transparency, trust and credibility of elections and their results in an environment that can be characterized by systematic distrust, which is particularly apparent among the main contenders.
A little over 20 years after its creation, and after conducting eight federal elections (four general and four mid-term elections), the IFE was able to fully accredit the impartiality, rigour and professionalism with which all of its powers and responsibilities were carried out. In this regard, the IFE’s existence very much contributed to the strengthening and dissemination of democratic rules, institutions, values and practices.
From this perspective, it was very surprising that the constitutional reform approved by Congress at the end of 2013, as part of a wide consensus between the federal government and the main political parties, involved not only the substitution of the IFE with the INE, but also altered in a very significant and unconventional sense the bases on which the model of distribution of competences between the federation and the 32 federal entities had been structured and conducted in the political-electoral field.
Most analysts think this was a reform that went astray. The original idea behind it, which, even if arguable, made sense: to confer on a single body the responsibility for conducting all the elections and popular consultations in the country. This would have served to avoid administrative and budgetary duplicity and to guarantee homogeneity and impartiality in the management of all electoral processes. Moreover, and in contrast with the previous reforms of 1989–90, this reform does not solve a real problem or address clearly identified insufficiencies, but rather is the result of strict negotiations and trade-offs among the main political actors.
A hybrid model for electoral management without precedent among federal states has been adopted with the new constitutional reform. This model will require the law to clarify and specify the INE’s scope of competencies and collaboration powers with the 32 local electoral authorities. There is also the aggravating factor that the national authority will not only have the power to choose the voting members in the highest decision-making bodies in the local entities, but will also be able to directly assume functions related to the organization of elections in the states, as well as handle legal matters regarding these elections that may require its intervention or set a court precedent.
In any case, during the IFE’s existence, it systematically enlarged the scope of its powers. With the creation of the INE, and more generally, with the adoption of the new electoral management model for the federal agreement, this logic has remained, and is likely to be intensified and reinforced.
Thus the Mexican model may well be an excellent example with which to evaluate, deeply and rigorously, the challenges and risks of enlarging and making electoral regulations more sophisticated (especially those regarding the competition for the vote, which involves a more ‘referee’ than managerial role) — and, consequently, of broadening the scope of powers of the authority in charge of putting them into practice or ensuring their compliance.
It is still a paradox that neither the IFE during its time nor the INE currently, as a national authority, has any formal power to participate in the process of creating or reforming legal rulings in electoral matters, as other EMBs in the region do. This, despite the densely regulated and sophisticated model of electoral management and competition of the Mexican system, which has a huge constellation of permanent electoral bodies that are independent and highly specialized.
