By Dimpho Motsamai and Hawa Noor M

I. Background

A discussion on young people’s democratic participation in Kenya’s political processes immediately stokes debates concerning their role in the violent aftermath of Kenya’s 2007 general elections – and the country’s failures to engage its youth constituency effectively in political, governance and electoral processes.[1] The 2010 Kenyan Constitution defines youth as any individual between 18 and 35 years in age. Equally, many of the country’s different youth development programmes have the same categorization. According to this categorization, youth constitute more than a third of the entire population, while nearly 80 per cent of Kenyans are less than 35 years old.[2] Just over fifty per cent are young women. The population of Kenya’s youth grows annually by an estimate of about 400,000.[3] Young people in Kenya’s political landscape therefore represents the largest demographic unit and political constituency.[4]

According to various reports, among the primarily responsible for engaging in the devastating violence that ensued post the 2007 election period were young people (70 per cent of the perpetrators).[5] More than 600,000 people were internally displaced, with hundreds of lives lost and billions in infrastructure damage. Youth criminality in Kenya is also a longstanding phenomenon and some of the youth groupings that orchestrated the violence existed prior to the 2007 elections. While the 2007 post election violence was largely defined as ethnic and politically motivated, the ethno-political framework undergirding Kenyan politics reflects a diverse set of structural challenges the country continues to face. These include land grievances, weak government institutions, growing income inequalities and negative ethnic relations – all of which manifest politically. Kenya is comprised of more than 40 ethnic groups.  But 2 (Kikuyu and Kalenjin) of the majority 4 (Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya and Luo) have dominated political life since independence.[6] President Kenyatta is the son of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s first African president while his deputy, William Ruto is from the same ethnic group as Daniel Moi who ruled the country through a dictatorship for 24 years. The duo ascended to power in 2013 by successfully mobilizing their regional votes. But deep ethnic animosity reigns silently and poses a threat to peace especially during electoral periods. This is because structural grievances, particularly on the issue of land are yet to be addressed despite inquiries having been launched and recommendations produced by various regimes. The emergence of violent groups in marginalized areas of the country poses an even larger threat. 

Indeed Kenya is gradually emerging and transforming politically and economically since 2007. In its general elections held in March 2013, the country broke from its violent electoral past because it was largely peaceful and was the first to be conducted under a new legal framework, defined by a new constitution that was adopted through a national referendum in August 2010. Moreover the elections were under the management of a new electoral management, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) set up in 2011. Of additional significance was the high voter turnout at 85 per cent of registered electorates. The country witnessed a peaceful political transition notwithstanding the narrow margin of victory between the two main presidential candidates – current President Uhuru Kenyatta from the Jubilee Party with 50.07 per cent of the vote and his opponent Raila Odinga from the CORD party with 43.31 per cent.[7] Despite election recount and general discontent regarding the outcome from the losing coalition and others, violence was largely averted. The elections were generally deemed free, fair and credible by most international and domestic observer missions – who also noted some irregularities.

But a break from the violent past has not translated into improved prospects for stability and development for Kenya. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), while Kenya has the potential to be one of Africa’s best-performing economies, the country still exhibits some fragility that undermines its democracy and development.[8] Most importantly, the AfDB cites high levels of poverty, regional developmental disparities as well as high youth unemployment (64 per cent of the nation’s total unemployed population) as threats to the country’s overall stability. The country also faces a large skills gap of its work force as the massive numbers of unemployed young people, constitute a large group of those unskilled. In essence, Kenya’s economic growth has not been sufficiently inclusive with almost half of its overall population living below the poverty line. Limited access to basic services, inadequate infrastructure, inequality and unemployment has had a negative affect especially on the poor. Other factors include terrorist activities and ethnic tensions compounded with a postcolonial land allocation that left minority communities and vulnerable groups such as young people feeling dispossessed and created unrest. There is, a strong need to create opportunities for disadvantaged and marginalized groups, in particular young people, to avoid conflict and violence in the future and to build inclusive societies. Young people’s inclusion and addressing disenfranchisement is therefore not only a socioeconomic imperative but also key to preserving stability and building peace. In this context, there has been a renewed impetus for reforms in inclusion of young people and political participation from the government and from the IEBC.

During the 2007 elections, over 3.7 million young people voted, making them a critical political constituency. However, beyond elections, they rarely have a say in the country’s affairs and this fuels perceptions among them of being sidelined. This prevails despite a variety of interventions introduced by the government. For instance, Article 55 of the Constitution elaborates on the rights of the youth and their contribution to national development. It places an obligation on the state to take measures, including affirmative action programmes to ensure that young people have access to education, training and opportunities for association, representation and participation in political, social, economic and other spheres of life. Article 100 further charges Parliament with an obligation of enacting legislation to promote the representation of women, persons with disabilities, youth, ethnic and other minorities, and marginalized communities in Parliament. There is also a provision for young people in governing bodies. For example, Article 98 of the Constitution states that the composition of the Senate must include 47 members, two of which must represent the youth.[9] Moreover, the Kenya National Youth Policy has been designed to recognize the needs and concerns of young women and men and attempts to address issues affecting young people to enable them to reach their maximum potential. Kenya´s National Youth Council as established through the National Youth Council Act in 2009 is mandated to co-ordinate youth organizations, design and continuously review the National Youth Policy. In addition, Kenya has also ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.[10]   

However, legal provisions and existing initiatives are far from enough in improving young people’s political engagement and participation. Youth Kenyans interviewed for this study reinforced feelings of exclusion concerning decisions that impact their lives and marginalization from political and governance processes. These sentiments have been flagged as some of the major sources of alienation and anger that often trigger political and election violence.

III. Youth participation in politics and elections

Despite constituting more than 60 per cent of the country’s population, Kenya’s young people have had low formal participation in both the electoral and political spheres. They have been insufficiently represented in public policy and decision-making forums. Prior to the 1990s multiparty politics political apathy was high. But throughout the 1990s the trend shifted to more political engagement but often in the form of activism, rebellion and violence.[11] There are also criminal groups in Kenya's cities and towns constituting young people – which have been growing from mid-2003 and oftentimes mobilised for political ends. Some violent youth movements have also sprung up in recent years with many of the country’s young people having been mobilized into such political-militant networks. This is attributed to a combination of many factors including social-economics, politics, religion and the manipulation of generational identities. The latter also concerns the mobilisation of youth wings by parent political parties to reinforce their coercive strategies. Outside party structures has become common for young people to receive bribes from politicians to destabilize the political and electoral process or give them an upper hand.   

In spite of this, young people’s formal political participation has been improving. There is notable increase in their participation mainly as voters from 2010 with the promulgation of the new constitution and supplementary youth laws mentioned earlier in this paper. That said, some of the recent efforts to improve youth political participation emerging from the National Youth Policy have been shrouded with controversies and allegation of political manipulation and corruption.  

Voter participation was notably high during the 2013 elections with an 85 per cent turnout.  This was out of 14,3 million voters registered to vote in the 2013 elections. In terms of youth registration, initial figures at the beginning of the registration drive indicated some voter apathy among young Kenyans. According to the IEBC, they appeared non-responsive to political campaigns and continuous voter registration programmes. A final breakdown of youth registration figures and the component of women and youth are represented in figures 1 and 2. 

Figure 1: Voter registration among youth 

Figure 2: Voter registration among youth, by gender

Source: IEBC 2015

Only about 57 per cent of the eligible youth were registered during the last registration drive prior to the 2013 presidential elections, leaving approximately 43 per cent of the eligible not registered.[12] According to the IEBC, the figures could have been higher. More than three million eligible voters were not registered because they did not have the national identity card (ID) required by the Elections Act. Many Kenyan communities and marginalized groups including unemployed young people were disenfranchised as a result of not having national identity cards (ID) cards. According to research conducted by one of the IEBC’s partners, the Institute of Education in Democracy (IED), the system of registration for ID cards contributes to disenfranchisement due to the bureaucratic process of registration and some of the unreasonable requirements that makes its acquisition expensive for the poor.[13] There is also evidence that the young people were heavily engaged in electoral malpractices. For example, about 46 per cent of rural young people and 41 per cent of urban young people were reported to have sold their ID Cards to individuals representing politicians’ interests so as to increase the latter’s chances of winning an election. [14]

The IEBC also experienced delays in the initiation of the voter registration process and was only able to do so within a constrained 30-day time span.[15] This is in addition to criticism that the IEBC’s voter registration drive fell short of sensitizing  young people to vote and to remain engaged in overall political matters beyond polls. The shortfall was also thought to be taken advantage of by some politicians who ´had to do the work of sensitizing their constituents on the importance of registration and voting, something that is ideally the work of the IEBC´.[16] Additionally, the looming fear of election violence as experienced in the previous polls contributed to lower participation in both political and electoral processes.

Beyond electoral periods, many challenges hindering youth participation remain. These include:

• Public confidence and trust in the IEBC: As a relatively new entity, perceptions of the IEBC as an unaccountable and politicized institution remains. Segments of the young people are aggrieved about the 2013 electoral outcome. Moreover, the voting process has been misused and so for many, elections are easily predictable based on candidates´ financial power and ethnicity.
• Mistrust in political leadership: Young people’s perceptions of national and local government are consistently low; and access to established channels to voice grievances regarding governance issues have been ineffective.
• Party politics: Young people’s participation in the political party nomination process is constrained by internal politics, which has demotivated them from participating.  Political parties’ tendency to violate the age limit of 35 years for youth candidates by having older people vying for these positions adds to this situation.
• Cultural hindrances such as those against women participation in politics limits their participation. For example, there are often more male candidates compared to women because women’s rights are often violated in political campaigns and so this does not offer motivation for younger women willing to vie for political seats.
• Financial constraints and the issue of money in politics: The lack of finances among young people to fund their candidature when they wish to vie for elected positions represents an additional limitation.

III. EMB entry points

The IEBC is a relatively new institution created after the 2007 elections. The latter replaced its predecessor, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) – then thought to be partisan towards incumbent President Mwai Kibaki. Following the 2007 polls, a commission of inquiry into the conduct of the 2007 general elections - the Kriegler Commission recommended the establishment of a new electoral management body as a measure to bolster the credibility of elections and ensure peaceful elections in future.  According to Article 88 of the 2010 Kenyan, the IEBC is mandated to conduct referenda and elections to any elective body or office established by the constitution and any other elections as prescribed by an act of parliament.[17] The IEBC is responsible for: continuous registration of voters and revision of the voter’s roll; delimitation of constituencies and wards; the regulation of political parties; the development of electoral code of conduct and monitoring of compliance with electoral legislation; electoral dispute settlement; voter education; facilitation of the observation, monitoring and evaluation of elections; and the regulation of party funding and expenditure.[18]  The Commission has a secretariat, which manages its day-to-day affairs.[19]

With regard to young people’s participation, constitutional provisions for inclusive representation bind IEBC. But the IEBC is yet to develop a specific policy on special groups’ participation (including youth) in elections as well as related monitoring mechanisms. Furthermore, the IEBC does not have adequate strategies and budget for a continuous, standardized and targeted voter education to reach out to all young people.  

In the 2013 election, the IEBC’s young people’s engagement activities were largely confined to voter education and the acquisition of identity cards. This, according to the IEBC was because of pervasive misunderstandings related to participation in electoral processes; and motivations for their political engagement. The strategy involved developing targeted civic education campaigns, sensitizing young people on the importance of voting and of having national identity cards. The IEBC also worked with the Ministry of Education to develop curriculum for voter education that will be part of the school curriculum. A number of implemented actions related to this included incorporating civil education as part of the school subjects, having a voter education week in place and using specific mediums such as vernacular radio to encourage debates in the local language. The Commission also provides support to school and college election processes to instill a culture of political/electoral participation in young minds. The IEBC also used strategic communication to sensitize the public. For instance, it sponsored music and drama festivals with targeted youth electoral participation messages. Communications using ICTs was also employed throughout the election phase that included mass media messaging and distribution of information materials to different youth groups. There was also a short message service (SMS) systems available for immediate reporting of violence on the day of election dubbed the Uwiano platform for Peace that was developed in collaboration with other stakeholders.[20]

Additionally the IEBC supported other institutions youth programs. A case in point is the ‘Yes Youth Can’, program, a partnership between government and international partners which, under the ‘My ID, My Life’ campaign helped over 500,000 Kenyan youth to obtain their ID cards required for voter registration and established over 22,000 village-level youth bunges (Swahili for parliaments) to provide structures for young people to ´take action and improve their lives, develop new leadership skills, promote transparent decision-making, prioritize key issues and emerge as positive forces for change in their communities´.[21] The IEBC equally supported an initiative by the National Youth Sector Alliance (NYSA), which provided forums for the government and private sector to engage with youth leaders and to help traverse tribal differences.

Since the 2013 elections, the IEBC has further sought to strengthen its capacities for young people’s engagement and also develop conflict mediation programmes throughout the country that focus on young people. Key areas for electoral reforms ahead of the 2017 General Elections have also been identified namely; voter registration and in particular the registration of Kenyans residing outside the country, the rights of prisoners to vote, the nomination process, dispute resolution process and election petition management. All these will in one way or the other impact positively on the cause of young people by making them aware of political participation processes.[22]

IV. Challenges and lessons learned

Essentially, the IEBC is a relatively nascent organisation and still grappling with emphasizing its role as an apolitical, independent, non-partisan electoral management body. Given past scandals of the ECK, negative perceptions have dented its image. Restoring credibility and public confidence – especially from the youth has been a challenge. Policy development and strategic programme development can also be slow in new institutions. However, despite IEBC’s youth policies and programmes still being weak, it is slowly gaining some traction. The Commission is yet to mainstream young people’s inclusion into all its programming and integrate it into important activities such as voter registration, voter education, polling and post polling processes throughout the electoral cycle. IEBC also has to address women and youth participation and the barriers that hinder their engagement. Another challenge is developing the most suitable instruments among young people with high illiteracy levels. On the operational side, the most marked challenge was ensuring accessibility of ID cards to young people in a timely manner and finding alternative measures to allow the registration of youth voters.

The wider policy environment within which the IEBC operates is also a constraint for its work. Of specific mention is government’s failure to create longer-term activities that addresses underlying grievances of the youth and meaningful and viable economic opportunities that directly impacts on the work of IEBC. On the legislative side, the constitutional requirements for increased participation by young people are yet to be fully realised. Some provisions to do with young people’s inclusivity are yet to be legislated upon and complemented by a sound policy framework. Similarly, there is a need to put in place proper regulations for sanctions against political parties that fail to comply with young people’s inclusivity provisions. Failure by political parties to adhere to the law and promote the participation of young people in the electoral process peacefully, also affects the IEBC’s approach to their engagement.

V. Recommendations

Five sets of recommendations for the IEBC from this study include:

• Developing a coherent strategic plan comprising a youth policy to expand the programmatic reach and impact of its activities. The plan should incorporate areas where IEBC is already working including for instance sensitisation of young voters; promoting awareness of democracy and election-related issues in the educational systems. It may also evaluate how the IEBC can work with young electoral candidates as well as young election administrators as part of the IEBC itself. Given the specific context of Kenyan electoral politics, the policy may also feature IEBC engagement to prevent or mitigate elections-related violence linked to young people. The policy should also ensure careful monitoring of election results.
• Promoting inter-agency cooperation when approaching young people’s participation issues. Cooperation with the youth ministry, non- governmental organisations, religious groups, community associations and others involved in political engagement of young people is recommended. This will help build political will and momentum within government and broader society.  
• Strengthening IEBC’s internal research capacities on young people’s political participation. This could include research on factors that make young people more resilient to election violence triggers such as electoral and political events and the types of strategies that would most influence young people’s propensity towards political engagement. Evaluating patterns of young people’s participation can also be improved by using the available disaggregated election registration data to understand the practices of various age groups. The mechanism through which young people participate during political parties’ registration processes can be better captured and used to inform future policy interventions.
• Improving< civic and voter education as well as sensitisation throughout elections. IEBC’s work with the educational system ought to be institutionalised. Taking into consideration the technology literacy among young people, the IEBC may need to strategize around how the commission can use the opportunities presented by such technologies such as the internet and social media in engaging with young people.
• Strengthening political party engagement on young people’s political participation. The IEBC could encourage political parties to revise their constitutions, recruitment rules and procedures, nominations and other basic documents, which govern their internal affairs to ensure effective inclusion and participation of young people in elections. In liaison with the political parties, IEBC may also consider the possibility for engaging in capacity development for young electoral contestants.>

Annex 1: List of references

African Development Bank, Kenya Country strategy Paper, 2014-2018

C. Schulz-Herzenberg, P. Aling’o and S. Gatimu, The 2013 general elections in Kenya: The integrity of the electoral process, ISS policy Brief No. 74, 2015,

FIDA - Kenya, Key Gains & Challenges: A Gender Audit of Kenya’s 2013 Election Process

Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission website, at http://www.iebc.or.ke/index.php/about-iebc/vision-mission-and-mandate

Institute for Education in Democracy, Post 2013 Learning and Dialogue Forum on election and electoral processes in Kenya, 25-28 November 2014, Learning Platform Report, April 2015

Mercy Corps, Understanding Political Violence Among Youth: Evidence from Kenya on the links between youth, economic independence, social integration and stability, June 2011

P. Kagwanja, Power to Uhuru': Youth Identity and Generational Politics in Kenya's 2002 Elections, African Affairs Vol. 105, No. 418,  2006

The National Youth Council Act, 2009

The Kenyan Section of the International Commission  of Jurists; International Human Rights Standards: Reporting Obligations. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 2005.

UNDP Discussion Paper, Kenya’s Youth Employment Challenge, January 2013

UNDP Website at  
http://www.ke.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/operations/projects/
peacebuilding/uwiano-peace-platform-project.html