By Dimpho Motsamai
Namibia has a pluralistic political system characterized by regular, free, and fair elections. Most observers have generally lauded the country’s stability and democracy, which are strongly anchored in its constitution.[1] Although Namibia has a multiparty democratic dispensation, the Southwest Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), a former liberation movement, has dominated the political landscape since independence. SWAPO’s liberation credentials have played a significant role in securing party loyalty across the board. The party has enjoyed comfortable majorities in Parliament since the country’s independence in 1990. In fact, it has secured two-thirds majority wins in all national elections. SWAPO has also retained control of most authorities in regional and local elections. The opposition is small in Namibia and their numbers in parliament have been decreasing in past elections.[2]
However, each election is unique and so is the nature of the political competition. They tend to depend on the domestic context within which the election takes place. An important context of the 2014 poll was that the country had just made changes to both the constitution and the electoral legislation.[3] The changes not only created uncertainty over their impact on the electoral outcome. Questions were also raised on how they could impact voting patterns and demography. The demography in question was the youth, which in Namibia constitutes a third of Namibia’s total population. Youth turnout in past elections has been far lower than any other group.[4]
Months before the 2014 elections, various political stakeholders including youth organisations, political parties, and the Electoral Commission of Namibia (ECN), raised concerns over low turnout from young voters.[5] The ECN specifically highlighted that apathy among the youth had to be addressed to avoid the credibility of the election outcome being undermined.[6] Voter apathy has been a strong feature of Namibian elections since independence. The trend has been worsening if one contrasts the 97 per cent turnout in the 1989 founding elections with 67 per cent in 2009.[7]
The 2014 elections reversed this. Both registration and turnout especially of the youth, increased substantially. The group recorded the largest percentage of registered voters at 44 per cent. According to the ECN, it was the largest registration turnout of young people since independence.[8] The ECN also indicated that a sub category of this group, referred to as ‘born-frees’, basically those born after Namibia’s independence, constituted 19.73 per cent of the overall registered voters.
‘Born-frees’ are usually disaggregated in voting figures to analyse generational trends in voting behaviour and the extent to which younger voters break with historical ideals and brands of post-independence parties. The ECN disaggregated ‘born-frees’ from the data because the 2014 poll was Namibia’s second election open to them. According to the Namibia Youth Council (NYC), an umbrella body of all youth organisations in the country established in 1994, Namibia’s ‘born-frees’ generally feel alienate from political parties and they vote less in comparison with other youth.[9] So their participation signalled a change in political engagement. [10]
Namibia, like the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, has a large youth population. The number of Namibian youth aged 18-35, eligible to vote, is around 600,000 out of a total population of 2.2 million.[11] The ECN recorded 508,459 young voters in 2014, which is 44 per cent of the overall number of registered voters. When calculated against the total youth population of around 600,000, it translate to 85 per cent of Namibian youth who registered to vote in 2014. The youth therefore represent the largest age grouping eligible to register and vote in Namibia. They are an important political constituency.
Namibia does not fare well in terms of the participation of young people in politics compared to other countries in the sub-Saharan region. While the desire for change and improvement is strong, youth political participation is uneven across the electoral cycle.[12] Namibian youth are generally disillusioned with electoral politics. Many factors drive youth apathy in Namibia. These include: perceptions that political activism and engagement does not yield results; the distrust of political parties; and the lack of access to political leadership.[13]
In 2012, the ECN conducted a baseline survey to measure the level of public understanding of electoral and democratic processes and the effectiveness of its programmes.[14] This was to improve its civic and voter education initiatives with a view of increasing voter turnout for the 2014 elections. The survey measured the success of the ECN’s voter education aims and objectives, focusing on the levels of: understanding of democracy and democratic processes; public and voter confidence in the electoral system; perceived violations of the electoral laws; turnout in national, regional and local elections; communication approaches to voter education; stakeholders’ satisfaction with electoral service delivery; gender mainstreaming and people with disabilities in electoral processes; youth involvement; and the effectiveness and the efficiency of the legal framework. The study used a quantitative opinion survey and targeted all Namibian citizens aged 18 years and older in Namibia’s 14 regions.
The survey found that the main challenges for youth participation include: limited opportunities to participate in decision-making processes; distrust between youth and institutions; and the lack of capacity development especially of young women.[15] On youth political participation, it concluded that: more than half of the respondents (54.6 per cent) thought that its communication tools were not attractive to the youth; and 74.8 per cent of respondents felt that its youth activities had to be linked to national initiatives. In many ways, the baseline survey highlighted challenges it has in being more visible and attractive to young voters.
Following the baseline survey in 2012, the ECN initiated voter engagement activities for young voters, from late 2013. These initially focused on increasing youth voter registration. But as they were implemented, it became clear that the ECN needed a broader and more distinct framework on youth political participation.[16] Developing it took time, partly because the ECN had to wait for the electoral reform process to be concluded. The process resulted in a new electoral act, which the ECN thought would alter its mandate and focus. It did not. Its objectives, which were to: organize, direct, supervise, manage and control the conduct of elections and referenda, remained the same. [17] The new electoral act also maintained its other functions, relating to cooperation with electoral stakeholders, research and development, and promoting electoral expertise and technology in all spheres of government.
But, the new legislation does not have a provision on youth political participation. It only makes a small reference to ‘the youth’ in section 49, which covers voter and civic education. It states that, “..the ECN must, when promoting voter and civic education: ensure that they particularly address the young population; and should cooperate with the ministry responsible for education regarding the development of a syllabus for material relating to voter and civic education and involve the ministry responsible for information in voter and civic education”.[18] There is no other reference to the youth beyond this. Shortly after the elections, the ECN started drafting a comprehensive Youth policy. It was yet to be concluded at the time of this research was conducted.
The ECN’s Youth activities
In past elections, the ECN’s youth engagement activities were conducted under its voter education program. As highlighted, the ECN used findings from its 2012 baseline study to shape its approach to youth engagement, opting for long-term activities instead of ad hoc ones. This approach to electoral programming, where organisations look beyond the immediate electoral event, is referred to as the “Electoral Cycle Approach”.[19] It divides the electoral process into three main periods: the pre-electoral period, the electoral period and the post-electoral period. The approach treats elections as continuous processes rather than isolated events and interventions are tailored in advance before elections are held. Between 2012 and 2014, the ECN initiated the following programs:
Box 1. The National Youth Council’s Stop Waiting campaign
The NYC’s Stop Waiting Campaign targeted Namibian youth between the ages of 18–35. The initiative complemented the ECN’s GRV mandated to get eligible Namibian population to register for the 2014 elections. The NYC’s main consideration for the campaign was that it must be fresh, innovative and cut across all demographic and socio-economic youth segments in the country. Its key objectives were to: (1) Encourage Namibian youth to go out and register between the 15th January – 02 March 2014; (2) Promote conversations and debates around the registration and voting process among Namibian youth; (3) Promote a sense of national pride and a culture of responsibility among Namibian youth; and (4) Get Namibian youth to vote during the November elections.
The NYC established a National Youth Election Drive (NYED) Steering Committee with ECN officials to provide technical and substantive input as the campaign was implemented. The Steering Committee also monitored and evaluated the project.
Source: National Youth Council of Namibia, 2014 |
The ECN works with a host of stakeholders involved in youth engagement, electoral and political processes to increase the reach, scope and effectiveness of its youth outreach programs. These include:
The ECN’s main challenge has been that it lacked a comprehensive strategy on youth engagement. Its youth related activities were conducted under its civic and voter education program. This often led to intervention being ad hoc, limited and unsustainable.
Other constraints include:
The main recommendations from this study that can also be used by other electoral management bodies (EMBs), include the need to:
Conclusion
The opportunities for youth to engage in political processes in Namibia largely depend on the country’s political, socioeconomic and cultural contexts. While Namibia is an upper middle-income country, inequality, poverty and unemployment are still disturbingly high. These negatively affect young people. The issue of youth political engagement therefore needs to be viewed in conjunction with problems of social, political and economic exclusion. The study recommends a range of actions for the ECN to encourage greater youth political participation throughout the electoral cycle. This includes the need to:
African Development Bank, Republic of Namibia Country Strategy Paper 2014-2018, prepared by Southern Africa Resources Centre
Electoral Commission of Namibia, 2012. Namibia National Electoral and Democratic Process, Baseline Survey, Windhoek, Namibia
Electoral Commission of Namibia, Official Announcement of final election results of the 2014 presidential and national Assembly elections, at http://www.ecn.na/en/current-affairs/-/asset_publisher/ZWZZbh7wiVh7/content/official-announcement-of-final-election-results-of-the-2014-presidential-and-national-assembly-elections
Electoral Commission of Namibia Performance Assessment and Post election Report, 27 November 2015, at http://www.ecn.na/documents/27857/193258/ECN+Elections+Report.pdf/be9c1c04-7e37-4bf9-9cb8-c6d1a29ec988
Gerhard KH Tötemeyer, Electoral Law and Reform Project: Revision and Reform of the Namibian Electoral Act (Act No. 24 of 1992), Law Reform and Development Commission (LRDC) Consultative Discussion Paper 19, Windhoek, June 2012, 28
National Youth Council Namibia, a report on the NYC Youth Registration Drive, February- March 2014
Partnership for Local Democracy, Development and Social Innovation, Unemployment and the Youth in Namibia, A booklet for Stakeholders
Republic of Namibia, Electoral Act, 2014, No. 5 of 2014.Government Gazette, No 5583, 8 October 2014
The ACE Electoral Knowledge Project at http://aceproject.org/
UNICEF, the Fourth Session of the Children’s Parliament of Namibia Special Edition 6 - 10 May 2013
[1] See EISA Election observer Mission report, Namibia Presidential and National Assembly Elections 15-16 November 2004, EISA Election Mission Report No. 18; EISA, Technical Observer Team Report, Namibia Presidential and National Assembly Elections 27 and 28 November 2009; African Union, Preliminary Statement of the Africa Union Observer mission
[2]This is best illustrated by a comparison of the country’s 2009 election results to those in 2014. In 2009, the 72-member National Assembly was dominated by SWAPO with 54 elected seats. Eight was the highest number of opposition seats held by, the then official opposition, the Rally for Democracy and Progress(RDP).The remaining seats were divided among seven other opposition parties, with the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance(DTA), the National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) obtaining two seats each. Four parties obtained one seat each, namely the Congress of Democrats (CoD), the Republican Party (RP), the All People’sParty (APP) and the South West Africa National Union (SWANU). In 2014, SWAPO won 77 out of a total of 96 seats in parliament and got 86 per cent of the overall vote.
[3] See Gerhard KH Tötemeyer, Electoral law and reform project: revision and reform of the Namibian Electoral Act (Act No. 24 of 1992), Law Reform and Development Commission (LRDC) Consultative Discussion Paper 19, Windhoek, June 2012, 28.
[4] See, Electoral Commission of Namibia Performance Assessment and Post election Report, 27 November 2015, at http://www.ecn.na/documents/27857/193258/ECN+Elections+Report.pdf/be9c1c04-7e37-4bf9-9cb8-c6d1a29ec988 p. 21
[5] D. Ndimbira, “Politicians target youth”, Windhoek Observer, 16 January 2014, at http://www.observer.com.na/8-latest-news/2794-politicians-target-youth
[6] The official range for youth eligible to vote is between the ages of 18–35
[7] See See, Electoral Commission of Namibia Performance Assessment and Post election Report, 27 November 2015, at http://www.ecn.na/documents/27857/193258/ECN+Elections+Report.pdf/be9c1c04-7e37-4bf9-9cb8-c6d1a29ec988 p.p.14
[8] Author interviews with ECN staff, Windhoek, Namibia, 8-9 July 2015
[9] Author interview interviews with officials from the NYC, 9 July 2015
[10] See National Youth Council Namibia, A report on the NYC Youth Registration Drive, February- March 2014, p3
[11] These statistics are contained in the ECN, 2012. Namibia National Electoral and Democratic Process, Baseline Survey, Windhoek, Namibia
[12] Author interviews with officials from the ECN and the National Youth Council of Namibia, July 2014
[13] Author interviews with ECN officials, Windhoek, Namibia, 7 July 2015
[14] ECN, 2012. Namibia National Electoral and Democratic Process, Baseline Survey, Windhoek, Namibia
[15] ECN, Namibia National Electoral and Democratic Process Baseline Survey 2012, p.68
[16] Author interviews with ECN staff, Windhoek, Namibia, 8-9 July 2015
[17] See Republic of Namibia, Electoral Act, 2014, No. 5 of 2014.Government Gazette, No 5583, 8 October 2014
[18] As above, Section 49.
[19] The Electoral Cycle model was developed by the European Commission, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as a response to obstacles to the implementation of long-term assistance in the field of elections. See more at The Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, at http://aceproject.org/electoral-advice/electoral-assistance/electoral-cycle
[20] See, Electoral Commission of Namibia Performance Assessment and Post election Report, 27 November 2015, at http://www.ecn.na/documents/27857/193258/ECN+Elections+Report.pdf/be9c1c04-7e37-4bf9-9cb8-c6d1a29ec988
p.3
[21] See the Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural Development at http://209.88.21.36/opencms/opencms/grnnet/MRLGH/local_A.html (last accessed August 2 2015)
[22] ECN Baseline Survey 2012 p, 82