By Raquel Fontanés
I. Introduction
In recent years, the political landscape in Zimbabwe has been marred by its political parties’ infighting and bleak economic growth. Following the controversial 2008 elections and leading up to the 2013 elections, Zimbabwe’s electoral system underwent extensive and significant reforms including changes to several electoral processes and the mandate and composition of the Electoral Management Body, as well as electoral law reforms, a new absentee voting system, drastic changes to the election results system, and a major update of the country’s voter register. [1] The country also experienced a constitutional drafting process and a constitutional referendum. These developments offered a good opportunity for civil society to contribute to the electoral reform process but from an election administration perspective, some of the recommendations advocated by well-intentioned civil society organizations were either too broad, simplistic, or just not feasible within the context of Zimbabwe. [2]
Although relatively organized and robust, Zimbabwean civil society has suffered many setbacks when it comes to its ability to considerably further the change agenda. For instance, civil society organizations became less united and more competitive for resources after the 2008 elections. There was also a shift in focus with the formation of a Government of National Unity, which undermined their advocacy impact and efforts to actively perform as watchdogs for those organizations that drifted towards the former opposition. By the 2013 elections, civil society was suffering from fragmentation and insufficient election technical knowledge and expertise, which prevented its full grasp of the electoral calendar and its key technical issues. Furthermore, civil society had largely remained static in its approach to outreach methodologies and messages by not adjusting its discourse in relation to the changing socioeconomic conditions in Zimbabwe. All these factors most likely contributed to weakened advocacy calls around the electoral reform agenda and the thwarting development of more viable working solutions for the key institution responsible for elections, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), and other policymakers prior to the 2013 polls.
Amidst the challenges of competition, incomplete understanding of certain election technical issues, and a polarized environment, can civil society still find a common voice to advance the necessary electoral reforms in a transitional society like Zimbabwe? Could shortcomings in civil society’s ability to coordinate advocacy efforts actually be the single most important factor undermining its impact on reforms rather than financial constraints and/or a shrinking operational space?
II. Methodology and Material
This case study was developed using primarily a qualitative methodology comprising of in-depth interviews with key informants representing a cross-section of election-centric CSOs in Zimbabwe. [3] The information was collected through a semi-structured assessment questionnaire and relevant follow up in-person questions as the primary data source. The questionnaire specifically aimed at evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of a select group of Zimbabwean civil society organizations publicly engaging on electoral reform and advocacy initiatives individually and through collaborative efforts. The author collected a portion of this data as part of an assessment team funded by the Humanist Institution for Co-operation with Developing Countries (Hivos) and International Media Support (IMS) program. Secondary data employed for this case study involved public and media reports, Zimbabwe’s legal and regulatory framework, and internal documentation from sample organizations.
III. Advocacy Model
A number of internal and external factors can contribute to the success of an advocacy campaign. A good advocacy plan should consider how these factors intertwine to form a solid advocacy strategy. This case study is written under the assumption that effective advocacy around electoral reform in Zimbabwe will result from addressing the internal and external factors outlined below.
IV. State of Civil Society
Zimbabwe has nearly 1,000 organizations registered under the Private and Voluntary Organisations Act plus a number of organizations registered as trusts. [4] As in other countries, these organizations are mostly established to serve vulnerable groups and advance human rights, democracy and good governance. However, the environment in Zimbabwe has not traditionally enabled an active civil society that could challenge state authority and there is still suspicion and even hostility from some in government towards these organizations. [5]
Although Zimbabwe heavily relies on external funding for sustenance, Western funding of civil society has also resulted in the government accusing many organizations of undermining Zimbabwe’s sovereignty and threatening national interests. Furthermore, there is a perception that the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and a number of civil society organizations are inseparable, which fuels the opinion of many that Zimbabwean civil society is unable to be independent and will most likely always align itself with either the ruling party or the opposition. Unfortunately, the confusion on identity and role extends to some civil society leaders and activists, who fail to clearly appreciate the role of civil society and believe that relevance is only derived from political association and alliance. Often partisan civil society activists deploy the argument that in a highly polarized environment, there is no neutral or autonomous space. [6] However, the role of civil society organizations must be to safeguard certain fundamental principles that should govern irrespective of political affiliation or party in office. By defending these principles, civil society can uphold its credibility and by extension maximize its advocacy impact.
The results of the 2013 elections have heightened awareness amongst stakeholders of the inadequacies of the reform process and the state of civil society. This awareness has given rise to various civil society organizations reflecting on their role in becoming too closely identified with the MDC. [7] However, initial discussions following the aftermath of the election have so far almost exclusively focused on the types of specific technical electoral reforms required rather than how Zimbabwean civil society organizations can collectively and more effectively analyze their abilities to act as drivers of change, remain independent, and move the reform agenda forward. The derailment of what would constitute the right steps towards strengthening advocacy calls around election reform is compounded by the fact that these organizations mostly lack the necessary funding and technical support to move forward.
V. Common Agenda for Reform
Historically, civil society in Zimbabwe has not always been able to operate free of unwarranted state interference. But despite the challenging environment, organizations focusing on democracy and governance issues, such as free and fair elections have opened the space to much needed advocacy efforts. On the other hand, strong emphasis on policy discussions and political advocacy has often taken precedence over the importance of engaging and mobilizing grassroots communities in advocacy efforts. This could be in part because many advocacy strategies are based on the assumption that policy change will be sufficient to achieve lasting social change. But while policy change is essential, advocacy cannot be undertaken without a clear understanding or proper analysis of how change occurs. [8] In the case of Zimbabwe, there has not been enough analysis of why some policies are not passed or monitoring of why other policies are not implemented, or how decision and policy-making processes work in the Zimbabwean context. The undermining of grassroots engagement also shows a tapered understanding on how cultural and social factors influence the mobilization of citizens behind certain positions, which is fundamental to sustainable change. However, there seems to be a shift from some of these organizations to want to address socioeconomic issues as part of their civil and human rights agenda at the grassroots level. As stated by the Zimbabwe in Crisis Coalition “…there is need for a broad-based approach that also places emphasis on economic governance issues including corruption, social services delivery and the enjoyment of all human rights, that is, civil, political, social and economic.”
But while thorough analysis and monitoring of desired policy changes and the mobilization of grassroots networks are equally important, how much change can actually take place in the absence of a coordinated advocacy strategy? Although there have been instances in which organizations rallied together behind position and policy statements, these efforts have not resulted in long-term coordination surrounding true advocacy around an electoral reform issue. The absence of regular coordination has not only resulted in civil society’s failure to establish collective long- and short-term advocacy objectives that are reform-oriented and not activity-oriented, but it has also impacted these organizations ability to conduct adequate empirical-based research to support many advocacy calls; this is due in great part because civil society organizations can weaken their advocacy efforts by operating within Zimbabwe’s shrinking operational space and under extreme financial constraints in isolation rather than in collaboration with each other where they can leverage their strengths and resources.
A successful advocacy campaign depends on the unity, dedication and perseverance of civil society organizations. Alliances and coalitions can greatly enhance advocacy by bringing together the strength and resources of diverse groups at the national, regional and international level. But as it is in the case of Zimbabwe, coalitions are difficult to form and sustain in an environment of extreme external funding competition. In addition, the formation of donor-initiated consortiums in Zimbabwe has undermined the willingness of organizations to come together out of common goals rather than preferential donor treatment. The inability of civil society to collaborate and leverage its respective unique expertise into a common reform platform and action plan has certainly weakened advocacy efforts. These organizations scrambling for resources and primary recognition in this advocacy space has also led to mistrust and lack of information sharing. Unfortunately, inconsistent collaboration has often led to the dissemination of confusing advocacy messages and an absence of a shared voice amongst civil society on what are the necessary reforms to ensure constructive and sustainable changes to the electoral system. Even in a utopia of Zimbabwean organizations properly developing detailed advocacy campaigns that target both grassroots mobilization and policy stakeholders and with long-term and short-term measurable objectives needed to strengthen advocacy efforts and provide outcomes, could any advocacy effort really flourish without coordination? For instance, when it comes to voter registration and the condition of the voters’ roll, civil society organizations all agree there are inconsistencies but they also hold strong disagreements around what is the best approach for addressing irregularities. With a limited understanding and experience around voter registration systems, what happens when one organization wants to advocate with little or no consultation with other election-focused organizations for a biometric system? What is the likelihood of success for advocacy efforts around improving the transparency and credibility of the voter registration process if various organizations simultaneously promote multiple and intricately different solutions to the system?
VI. Conclusion
This post-election period in Zimbabwe is suffering from increasing voter apathy from both the electorate and civil society. The outcome of the 2013 harmonized elections and the acceptance of the election by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) left many organizations disillusioned around their advocacy efforts for free and fair elections. This creates an increasingly challenging environment to find the necessary momentum to adequately support electoral reforms. Unfortunately, in an emerging democracy like Zimbabwe, true democracy can never occur until institutions meant to serve as checks and balances such as those responsible for elections and a vibrant and non-partisan civil society offering concrete options on the way forward emerge. [9]
Zimbabwean civil society still needs to work towards the sustainability of its advocacy efforts around electoral reform. Advocacy has mainly entailed a reaction to various events with waves of enthusiasm when some of these organizations came together but did not remain consistent. The over emphasis on a few regional lobbying events like the SADC summit or regional representatives in neighboring countries also kept many organizations from making a concerted effort to reach out to other influential stakeholders within Zimbabwe. In addition, understanding of the technical electoral issues at hand have been left wanting resulting in a lack of pragmatism to a number of the reform related statements and recommendations released by these organizations. But most importantly, advocacy efforts have suffered from the absence of a common voice among civil society organizations impacting these organizations’ ability to truly advance the reform agenda.
Zimbabwean organizations are already well positioned to complement each other’s research and advocacy initiatives. In times of economic distress and uncertainty, a common strategy would enhance the capacity of civil society to take advantage of its respective comparative advantages and resources to more effectively impact reform. For instance, coordination could be prompted by donors and other implementers by helping these organizations conduct a mapping exercise to determine how they can better complement each other and develop a comprehensive strategic plan for election advocacy initiatives that considers diverse stakeholders’ interests, alternative approaches, and effective ways to monitor and evaluate short and long-term results. In addition, donors could play a role in increasing their own understanding of civil society by leveraging from their various strengths to design more effective and results-driven electoral reform advocacy programs.
As Paul Graham, former Executive Director of IDASA (Institute for Democracy in Africa), eloquently stated efforts should be made to continue to promote collaboration amongst Zimbabwean civil society and boost their mechanisms for policy discussions and consensus building. Long-term collaboration could be further improved by offering incentives for these organizations to rely on each other’s strengths and resources and hold each other accountable for their role in promoting the proper environment for credible elections. Incentives, for example, could include providing these organizations with core funding to address their staff turnover and its impact on sustainability of skills and institutional memory. Organizations could also be brought together by bridging the need for collaboration to civil society’s role in gathering evidence to build election petitions and credible cases that can be successfully litigated.
Ultimately there is always strength in numbers and having a shared voice amongst civil society could only improve the chances for a more powerful delivery of the electoral reform agenda.
[1] See for instance, International Crisis Group. Resistance and Denial: Zimbabwe’s Stalled Reform Agenda. Africa Briefing N°82 16 Nov 2011. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/B82%20Resistance%20and%20Denial%20-%20Zimbabwes%20Stalled%20Reform%20Agenda.pdf. Accessed November 12, 2014; International Crisis Group. Zimbabwe’s Elections: Mugabe’s Last Stand. Africa Briefing N°95 29 Jul 2013. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/b095-zimbabwes-elections-mugabes-last-stand.pdf. Accessed November 12, 2014.
[2] See for instance Richard Lee. Civil society's present and future role in Zimbabwe. Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa. July 27th, 2011. http://www.osisa.org/openspace/zimbabwe/civil-societys-present-and-future-role-zimbabwe. Accessed Nov 12, 2014.
[3] The CSOs included in the study represent entities focusing on human rights, election observation, civic and voter education, rule of law and good governance research. These interviews were conducted during the months of February and March, 2014 in Harare. Due to the sensitive nature of the data the names of respondents and the organization they represent are being withheld.
[4] For more information regarding the diversity of Zimbabwe’s civil society, Zigomo, K. (2012) A Community-Based Approach to Sustainable Development: The Role of Civil Society in Rebuilding Zimbabwe. 2 April, Solidarity Peace Trust: http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/1159/community-based-approach-to-sustainable-development/. Accessed Nov 12, 2014.
[5] Action for Southern Africa, Zimbabwe Update Issue 3/2014, August 7, 2014: http://www.actsa.org/newsroom/2014/08/zimbabwe-update-issue-32014. Accessed November 12, 2014.
[6] Zimbabwe Independent, Zim Civil Society Misunderstood, May 23, 2014: http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2014/05/23/zim-civil-society-misunderstood. Accessed November 12, 2014.
[7] Allen Hungwe. Uncomfortable questions for Zimbabwe civil society! The Financial Gazette. 5 Sep 2013: http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/uncomfortable-questions-for-zimbabwe-civil-society/. Accessed Nov 12, 2014.
[8] See Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, Advocacy Toolkit: http://cso-effectiveness.org/
[9] Emerging Democracies in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities, The African Executive, Dr. Jerry Rawlings, July 3, 2013: http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=7297. Accessed November 12, 2014.
About the Author
Ms. Fontanés is an institutional strengthening specialist with extensive experience managing and implementing development programs focusing on democracy and governance issues. Her work with civil society organizations has included institutional strengthening, citizen engagement, and advocacy initiatives. Ms. Fontanés served as Senior Program Manager for the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) overseeing its East and Southern Africa portfolio where Zimbabwe was one of its focal countries. Her most recent work in Zimbabwe included conducting an assessment of advocacy and election technical expertise of targeted civil society organizations funded by DFID. Prior to her work at IFES, Ms. Fontanés served as Project Manager for Chemonics International in the Africa and Asia Regions managing economic growth and environmental projects in South Africa, Southeast Asia and South Asia. While at Chemonics, she also worked in Lusaka, Zambia as a long-term operations specialist under an anti-corruption and business development process project funded by USAID.
