The Question

This question is posted by ACE.

What countries use or have used video cameras/webcams in polling stations as a confidence-building and transparency measure? How have these countries assessed their experience, taking into account costs and the effect on public confidence?

Summary of Responses

PN members addressed the question by citing examples of various countries that have used video cameras and/or webcams in the voting process, stating issues and/or advantages with usage, recommending criteria for successful usage of video cameras and webcams in the voting process, and stating other measures sometimes used to promote transparency and build confidence. A summary of the responses follows:

1) Examples of countries that have used video cameras and/or webcams in the voting process:

• Russia (2012)
• Ukraine (2012)
• Georgia
• Azerbaijan (2003, 2008, 2010)
• Sierra Leone
• Colombia 
• Albania (2009)

2) Issues and/or advantages with usage:

Issues

• Placing cameras in polling stations can drastically reduce voter confidence if, for example, the secrecy of the ballot is compromised
• Also, fraud can occur at any time in the process, and installing video cameras will not necessarily promote transparency. Cameras tend to be used more during the actual voting process, and not so much during vote counting.
• Such practices could be quite pervasive, especially in advanced democracies, as well as for newcomers in electoral processes
• Sometimes the use of cameras goes unregulated, further compromising the secrecy of the ballot and intimidating voters
• Use of cameras in rural locations can intimidate voters; they assume voting is being observed, due to lack of voter education
• There are disadvantages to the procurement of equipment process, especially if expensive and only used once
• Cameras sometimes provide limited information—they can demonstrate “well-visualized” violations, but not manipulations in the voter lists.  Cameras can only capture certain aspects of the opening, voting, closing, and counting processes on Election Day.
• Vote-counting and tabulation sometimes takes place in areas where the cameras aren’t installed
• Cameras sometimes give poor, or unclear, visual quality
• Usage can add tension to the voting process
• Not all stakeholders are given access to tapes for assessment purposes; limited access to confirm voting irregularities
• Webcams cannot be a substitute for observation; they cannot be regarded as an ultimate safeguard against any political manipulations
• Observers have expressed concern that the government could use the footage to identify which observers were in particular polling stations to punish them for reporting problems
• Usage can be an extremely expensive, resource-intensive endeavor. The costs include equipment procurement, transport of equipment, maintenance and repairs, networking, installation, electricity, removal, and the human resources needed to carry out this work.
• There is the opportunity cost of diverting limited resources away from other, higher priority aspects of organizing elections
• Cameras need to be maintained, properly stored, or used for other purposes between elections, all of which involve significant costs
• There have been many cases where access to footage has been restricted, delayed, or overall limited. Those filing complaints have also been denied the use of footage as evidence in court in some cases

Advantages

• Use of video cameras and webcams are effective if guided by either the legal, administrative, or other institutional framework
• Usage can provide a snapshot of physical organization and layout of polling and counting facilities.
• Usage can allow for quick count of polling data, digitization of tally sheets from polling stations, and generates confidence in final stages of consolidating electoral information. 
• Usage prevents the practice of buying and selling votes
• Usage can prevent political persecution and can be used to monitor safety.

3) Recommended criteria for successful usage:

• Use of cameras should be a well-considered decision, agreed by all stakeholders, supported by the voters, and made in advance of the elections.  Usage should be regulated in the legislation consistently and properly.
• Equipment should be procured by a transparent and accountable procedure
• It is recommended that cameras are used to preserve the secrecy of the vote because it is a universal right of people and a fundamental condition of democracy
• Campaigns can increase public awareness of the measures to be implemented, such as the installation of cameras
• When implementing cameras in the voting process, some things that should be considered are: what the camera sees, who can access tapes, what the quality of the cameras will be like, if the tapes will be available to the public, if the tapes can be used as evidence in court, if the cameras will record centrally or at a polling station, and who will monitor and safeguard the camera output.
• Communication with stakeholders should be open 
• Governments concerned with ensuring transparency should provide international and citizen election observers with unfettered access to all aspects of the electoral process
• The bidding process should be competitive and open, and should be transparent for political parties, nonpartisan observers and the public
• If cameras are used, there should be simple, easy procedures for obtaining any and all footage

4) Other measures used to promote transparency and build confidence:

• In Mexico, use of video cameras is prohibited.  However, transparent plastic ballot boxes are used, making it apparent whether or not the boxes are empty before voting starts and what voters put inside it.

Contributing Members:

• David Jandura
• Aiah Stephen Mattia
• Julian Nundy
• Rafael Riva Palacio Galimberti
• Francisco Barrera
• Anna Shalimova
• Ingo Boltz
• Victor Hugo 
• Peter Eicher
• Michel Sabubwa
• Abdul Aziz Mbond
• Benny Goodnews Oguejiofor
• Ronan McDermott
• Michel McNulty

Suggested Resources:

“The effect of passive observation methods on Azerbaijan’s 2008 presidential election and 2009 referendum” by Erik Herron, 2010

Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan have all done this. In the case of Georgia it was a closed-circuit feed and not public. Professor Eric Herron has done some good research on the topic, mostly looking at the last example. In the case of Russia and Ukraine, I don't know of any internal assessment, and I doubt increasing transparency was the actual goal. Putting cameras in polling stations risks reducing confidence in voting if people feel it could compromise the secrecy of their ballot. Fraud can occur at many stages of the electoral cycle and a solution focused on one small aspect may not be a genuine or effective effort at reducing it. 

I do not readily know off-head of countries that use webcams/cameras in polling stations as "confidence building measures", but I presume such practices could be quite pervasive, especially in advanced democracies, as well as newcomers in electoral democracy.

However, in my country (Sierra Leone), and in some other countries where I have witnessed/observed elections, the use of cameras is guided by either the legal, administrative or other institutional framework. The secrecy of the ballot may be seriously compromised in instances where the use of cameras is unregulated. It also has a tendency of intimidating voters who may otherwise perceive an intention to expose the way and manner that they have cast their votes. This may be an issue in cultures where candidates use money or other overt or covert influences to oblige voters to vote for them.

That been said, cameras/webcams may add transparencey integrity values to polling activities provided snapshots are taken in a manner that they do not expose the intention of the voter on the ballot paper. Camera photos of voters in queues and the surrounding environment may tell the story of the physical organization and layout of polling/counting facilities, but the ability of a voter to cast a secret ballot should be respected as required by the UN Charter, and other national electoral legal frameworks.

Stephen Aiah Mattia

Ukraine used webcams in the 2012 parliamentary elections, but not in this year's presidential vote. In 2012, the cameras were directed at each polling station's electoral commissions and the ballot-boxes. There were strict rules about where they were to be placed and what they were permitted to watch. There were reports that some, especially rural, voters were intimidated, believing that their actual voting was being observed. In the event, what problems there were in that election occurred mainly during the count and not during the actual voting process which was monitored by the webcams. 

Julian Nundy

En Colombia se utilizan cámaras web, en la etapa los sitios  de escrutinios generales y en el proceso de conteo rápido de datos electorales, además de digitalización de las actas de escrutinio de las mesas de votación, esta práctica está autorizada en la ley 1475 de 2011 y fue solicitada por los partidos políticos, al parecer si genera más confianza en esta etapa definitiva de la consolidación de información electoral.

En cabio se prohíbe el uso de cámara o de teléfonos con esta herramienta, en el momento de ejercer el derecho al voto, pues es utilizada para el control de la práctica de compraventa de votos (mercaderes electorales), en algo que se denomina el “carrusel del voto”, sencillamente se comprueba por quien voto, esto amenaza la privacidad y el secreto del voto.

Regarding our Ukrainian experience, the following issues should be reiterated in addition to replies kindly provided by the experts earlier:

- Use of cameras should be a well-considered decision, agreed with all stakeholders, supported by the voters and made in advance before the elections. The issue should be regulated in the legislation consistently and properly. In Ukraine, the idea of using cameras appeared literally from nowhere. It was envisaged only in the law on parliamentary elections in 2012, so already in 2014 the whole thing shrivelled and died. It was critised and found inefficient by the international observation missions, local experts, NGOs and lateron - by the Central Election Commission representatives; 

-Equipment should be procured via a transparent and accountable procedure. In our case, the idea of introducing cameras seemed to be a vendor-driven malfesance: no competitive tender was conducted, and more than USD 100 mln were spent for the equipment that was used only once without any remarkable use;

- As mentioned by the previous contributors, the secrecy of vote should be respected while setting the cameras at the polling stations;

- One should be aware of the limited character of the information that the cameras can provide. They can demonstrate some "well-visualized" violations (like massive throwing-in of ballot papers), but not manipulations in the voter lists. Also, vote counting and tabulation, in most cases remained  because these processes took place not in the area observed via the cameras or the quality of the video wasn't high enough.

Hope this was helpful.

Albania actually used a system of cameras mounted over ballot counting tables to increase transparency and remote-monitor counting in 2009. Was more disciplined a process than dozens of party observers crowding around the tables and screaming at each other over disputed ballots. Locally built system, implemented by the election authority, with support from USAid.

En Ecuador no se utiliza cámaras en los centros de votación, para cuidar especialmente el secreto del sufragio; y por otra parte porque la cultura de la ciudadanía es contraria a este tipo de prácticas que se pueden usar para fines de persecusión política. En cambio, si se podría utilizar las cámaras fuera del lugar de votación para monitorear la seguridad.

Por lo tanto, dependerá de la cultura democrática del pueblo para aceptar el uso de estos dispositivos. El tema es bastante delicado. Lo importante es conservar el secreto del voto porque es un derecho universal de las personas y una condición fundamental de la democracia. Las demás áreas del recinto pueden ser monitoreadas, pero la condición fundamental es que se garantice que la información no se utilizará en contra de los ciudadanos.

Otro aspecto necesario es la ejecución de una campaña informativa para que la población conozca de las medidas a implementar.

En resumen, en Ecuador no se aplica la medida. En otros países se podría aplicar dependiendo de la cultura democrática del país, considerando estos elementos:

1. Mantener el secreto del voto

2. Garantías de uno usar la información en contra de los ciudadanos

3. Informar a la ciudadanía sobre las medidas a implementar.

Saludos cordiales

I headed the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to Azerbaijan for the 2003 presidential elections, when cameras were installed in all polling stations to film voting. It was a tense election, marred by violence, and filming added to the tensions and lack of trust. In the EOM Final Report of the mission we concluded:

“The practice of filming proceedings in almost all polling stations was regarded as intimidating by many voters. In some polling stations the filming was carried out in a very obtrusive manner that may have been intended to intimidate. Officials argued that filming was a reasonable precaution in a high security risk environment, especially in light of their contention that there were threats of attacks against polling stations. As it transpired, no polling stations were attacked.” (http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan/13467?download=true)

If I recall correctly, an additional problem was that the opposition was not given access to the tapes for polling stations in which they alleged irregularities had taken place.

L'usage du caméra dans les bureau de vote est extrêmement délicate. En effet, introduit à l'intérieur l'isoloir pour analyser le comportement des électeurs, le secret de vote serait violé. N'empêche que son usage se fasse dans les alentours pour monter par exemple que les électeurs sont sur la ligne d'attente; l' ambiance qui y règne ou encore les conditions générale de travail. 

Il faut se référer au cadre légal des élections de chaque pays pour savoir comment utiliser le camera le jour de vote. En outre, faire une sensibilisation auprès de la population électorale avant même la ténue  du scrutin est une bonne chose (bonne pratique électorale).

In Cameroon, such a practice in not allowed. Fot those countries that have experienced it, the use of cameras in polling stations should be guided by the legal framework otherwise it may be regarded as goind against the secrecy of the ballot.

In Nigeria we do not use cameras in polling stations, though it could be a good move toward ensuring transparency, however it could to tension and voters may feel that the secrecy of their votes is not guaranteed.

The use of video cameras in polling stations can be seen as another attempt to apply a technical "silver bullet" to problems facing the conduct of elections. It's fairly clear from the submissions above that the issue of voter trust in the technology has not always been taken into consideration.

Unfortunately Professor Herron's paper is behind an Elsevier paywall, perhaps ACE moderators could contact him and ask that he make the paper available to this discussion?

The plethora of technical solutions also requires us to be very specific about what we mean by cameras/webcams in polling stations. Some questions to be considered:

1. What will the camera be allowed to see?
   
2. Who will be allowed to see what the camera can see?
3. What is the quality of the camera - is it required, for example, that facial recognition be facilitated? If the output may be required for evidence, higher quality equipment will be needed.
   
4. Will the camera output be recorded? Will any recorded video be made available publicly? Will it be available as evidence in an elections court or tribunal? Is it admissible as evidence?
   
5. If the camera output is recorded, will this be done at the polling station or centrally? If at polling station, how will the captured data be collected, identified, secured (from manipulation or deletion), consolidated and analysed? If centrally, are the communications links required to transmit the data from all polling stations available?
   
6. If the camera output is not recorded, who will monitor it? An unmonitored camera may worse than no camera at all as it creates the illusion of monitoring.

As with any electoral technology, the best practise approach would be:

1. Conduct a comprehensive review and broad stakeholder consultation on the issues and problems occurring during polling.
2. Avoid the "big-bang" approach where a single solution is introduced nationwide in short timescales at a national election.
3. Conduct a proper feasibility study.
4. Consider several possible solutions and pilot these in order to gain hard knowledge on what will work in your context.
5. Ensure that you have adequate resources (financial, time, human) for the nationwide deployment of such systems.
6. Ensure that the legislative and regulatory frameworks are enabled so that any investment in such technologies has the greatest electoral benefits.
7. Be open to criticism and be prepared to incorporate reasonable changes based on real-world feedback and stakeholder responses.

There have been several useful responses already, but here are some additional and complementary considerations that are worth highlighting: 

Transparency Considerations 

• Some governments that have used webcams have claimed that cameras provide transparency on election day. While cameras could capture blatant acts of fraud that are perpetrated in view of the camera, such as stuffing several ballots into a ballot box at once, cameras are only able to capture certain aspects of the opening, voting, closing and counting processes on election day, and cannot allow the viewer to effectively observe all of those processes.  
• As the OSCE/ODIHR noted in its 2012 final report on Russian Federation’s presidential election, webcams “cannot be a substitute for observation. There are inherent limitations as to what web cameras can and cannot capture, and therefore from an outset they cannot be regarded as an ultimate safeguard against any possible manipulations.“
• As we all know, elections are a process, not an event. Electoral fraud and malpractice occurs at any point during the electoral cycle. The use of webcams could cause the public to focus too much on only a limited portion of activities (i.e., only those visible via the webcam on election day) in assessing whether the conduct of elections deserves their trust and confidence.  
• If governments and/or electoral management bodies want to ensure transparency, then providing international and citizen election observers with unfettered access to all aspects of the electoral process would be the top priority.

Intimidation and Secrecy of Ballot Concerns

•            In Russia (2012), Azerbaijan (2008 and 2010), and Ukraine (2012), civil society and voters have raised concerns that cameras can be used as a way to intimidate voters, particularly those who have been persuaded using administrative pressure, which is a frequently-documented violation in those countries. 
•             If used, webcams should be positioned in a way that ensures the secrecy of the ballot. In Azerbaijan, observers noted that cameras in a number of polling stations were placed right above the voting booths. 
•       Concerns have also been raised that cameras can be used as a form of intimidation of partisan pollwatchers and nonpartisan citizen observers. Observers have expressed concern that the government could use the footage to identify which observers were in particular polling stations, and to punish observers if they report problems.  Even if these concerns do not materialize, it can have a chilling effect on observers.

Decisionmaking Process of Using Webcams

•       As with the introduction of any new technologies in the electoral process, if webcams are proposed for possible use in polling stations, it is important to conduct an open consultation process. The opinions and concerns of stakeholders (political parties, civil society and the public) should be taken seriously.
•             This type of involvement will help ensure that a decision is made that takes into account whether there are potential benefits, realistically assesses the challenges, evaluates the full costs involved, and genuinely considers stakeholder concerns.

Cost-effectiveness and Sustainability

• The cost of installing hundreds or thousands of cameras in often remote locations across a country is an extremely expensive, resource intensive endeavor.  The costs include equipment procurement, transport of equipment, maintenance and repairs, networking, installation, electricity, removal, and the human resources needed to carry out this work.
•  In addition to the financial, physical and human resources needed, there is also the opportunity cost of diverting limited resources away from other, higher priority aspects of organizing elections.
• It is also important to consider what happens to the cameras after election day. They either need to be maintained, properly stored or used for other purposes in between elections – all of which involve significant costs. 
• All of the above costs should be weighed carefully against any potential benefits that webcams may bring.

Procurement Considerations

• The bidding process should be competitive and open, and should be transparent for political parties, nonpartisan observers and the public. 
• If not done openly and competitively, tendering contracts for procuring and installing cameras could provide an opportunity for corruption, particularly in countries where corruption in public procurement is already a major concern.

Obtaining and Using Video Footage

•           If cameras are used, there should be simple, easy procedures for obtaining any and all footage. In Russia, Central Election Commission instructions state that footage should be available without limitations within one year of the elections, but in practice there have been many reports of restrictions, long delays, and limitations on access.
•           Guaranteed rights and clear procedures should be established for using video footage as evidence in cases of electoral complaints, disputes and appeals. In Azerbaijan, those filing complaints have been denied the use of footage as evidence in court.

This response is posted by ACE on behalf of Erik Herron

Please find the paper 'The effect of passive observation methods on Azerbaijan’s 2008