The Question

This question is posted by ACE on behalf of Sumedh Rao, GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services.

I am working on a helpdesk query, a short piece of research designed to inform decisions surrounding a donor's election programming. I am interested in evidence from all contexts and sources (evaluations, academic studies, case studies) but with a focus on evidence - identifying what has and has not worked, rather than more theoretical or general guidance material. 

• Please identify literature on lessons learned for dealing with election-related violence in fragile and conflict-affected states. 
• Where possible, look for literature on running elections in sub-national conflict areas and how armed groups have interacted with an election process – both positively and negatively.

The report will be made publicly available on our website (www.gsdrc.org) once it is finished (in a couple of weeks’ time). 

 

Summary of Responses

Practitioners' Network members addressed the question by providing country-specific examples, mentioning general techniques used to reduce violence in conflict-affected states, as well as suggesting literature. A summary of the responses follows: 

1) Country-specific examples of dealing with election violence in fragile and conflict-affected states:

Kenya

• The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission was established.
• Returning Officers were trained on conflict mitigation and dispute resolution, and, with the support of donor partners, the Commission established Conflict Mediation Panels.
• The commission identified organized criminal groups and engaged them through voter education to bring them on board.
• The commission developed an electoral security tool (ESAP) and Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERMT) with the help of International IDEA.
• Contestants and their parties signed the Electoral Code of Conduct, which bound them to promote peace and shun violence. In addition, Returning Officers and security officers held meetings to discuss the campaign timetable of candidates to minimize conflict.
• Constant engagement with the Media and Political Parties as key stakeholders was paramount. The IEBC developed guidelines on Election Media Reporting in conjunction with the Media Counsel. This structured media sensitive reporting of the election results.

Democratic Republic of the Congo/Congo Brazzaville

• Independent Electoral Commission was established
• Electoral mediators have been formed through the Republic to overcome some minor conflicts at the voting center and government offices.
• All involved parties signed the Code of Conduct 
• An electoral code has been established and armed groups have formed political parties and contest the vote in political elections.

 

Burundi

• With the help of the international community and mediation successively from Tanzania and South Africa, the belligerents were able to meet and sign the Arusha Accords in 2000. 
• The agreements assisted with the reconstruction of the country’s constitution, allowing it to successfully organize general democratic elections in 2005 and 2010. 

 

2) General techniques used to reduce violence in conflict-affected areas:

 

• The Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) has developed a model that draws on trained mediators who act as a resource to the electoral authority to contribute to minimizing and resolving election related conflict. First used in South Africa in partnership with the South African Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) for the 1999 national and provincial elections and subsequently for local government elections as well. Mediators are identified and drawn from the community and trained in conflict management skills with particular emphasis on election-related conflict. 
• This model has been adapted and successfully implemented in other EISA offices as well as countries where EISA has not had offices, such as DRC, Chad, Madagascar, Burundi, Zambia, and Malawi. 

I recommend you have a look at 'Countering Electoral Violence with Electoral Education' by Gregory Kehailia, formerly at IFES, as background.

Following the 2007 General Election, Kenya erupted into violence of unimaginable magnitude, upon declaration of the winner of the Presidential election, that saw loss of life and destruction of property. Civilians were turned into Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) as violence rocked the country. The African Union had to come to the aid of the country by sending mediators led by Koffi Annan to broker peace that saw the formation of a coalition government between the declared President, Mwai Kibaki and his closest rival, Raila Odinga.

The then Electoral Commission of Kenya was disbanded, paving way for the establishment of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. The Commission embarked on strengthening structures within the Commission and outside the Commission to address electoral security. 

The Constituency Election Coordinators who are gazetted Returning Officers in an election were trained on Conflict mitigation and Dispute Resolution. With support from donor partners the Commission established Conflict Mediation Panels comprised of respected members of the community. 

During the voter registration exercise challenges were faced in certain parts of the Country with organized criminals i.e. MRC in Mombasa calling for cessation on claims that it was not part of Kenya. The Commission identified such groups and engaged them through voter education to bring them on board.

Further the Commission developed an electoral security tool (ESAP) with the help of International IDEA for identification and mapping of hotspot areas within the the country. This would then inform adequate measures being put in place to forestall electoral related violence. 

Contestants and their Political Parties also sign the Electoral Code of Conduct which bind them to promote peace and shun violence. These efforts saw a marked tolerance on the part of Political Parties during campaigns. To minimize conflict between supporters of candidates, the Returning Officer together with the security officers in an electoral area hold meetings and discuss the campaign timetable of candidates. 

Constant engagement with the Media and the Political Parties as key stakeholders is paramount. A guideline on Election Media Reporting was developed in conjunction with the Media Counsel. These efforts together with structured media sensitive reporting of the the election results, held in check tension and succeeded in delivering an election free of violence in the 2013 general election.

Praxedes Tororey, Director Legal and Public Affairs, Kenya.

International IDEA's Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERMT) piloted in Kenya for the 2013 General Elections among other countries is a software application with knowledge/resource module, an analytical module and Prevention/mitigation module. You will find alot of literature including reference from research work on Electoral violence and some of the common risk factors be it internal risk factors or structural factors(eexternal) In the coastal counties of Kenya a secessionist group called the Mombasa Republican Council(MRC) had vowed to boycott the elections and disrupt the electoral activities, infrastructure/installation and kill election personnel during the Biometric Voter registration mass registration exercise in 2012 and the subsequent activities including the actual elections on 4th March 2013. Through the tool election related violence was greatly reduced/mitigated as risk maps were generated in all the 47 counties and specific prevention and mitigation actions recommended to the EMB, Security Sector Agencies and Peace builders such as the National Steering Committee on Peace building Conflict Management. The pre-election maps helped reduce the election day violence although still latent post election violence have occurred in some counties that were considered high risk with over 80% likelihood of electoral violence occurring due to some structural factors like negative ethnicity. For example, Marsabit county of Kenya. As one among those privileged to apply the tool, it's indeed a very interactive tool which can truly help advice and recommend appropriate immediate action on Electoral violence prevention or mitigation. Its only weakness is when those given the recommendation to act to prevent or mitigate a specific risk factor act as fast as possible or act at all (especially the security sector agencies or EMB top policy makers or top management) Please visit International IDEA website for materials like the manual on the ERMT. IFES has also done something to help on Electoral Security literature. Thank you.

UNDP Nepal's Electroal Support Project Commissioned a study on "Electoral Violence Mitigation Assessment" which I believe should be in their website.

As mentioned by Hussein, the ERMT Action point guide may help. It includes approx. 100 action points and case studies designed to inspire  EMBs, SSA, and other statet and none-state actors to take preventive action to specific risks throughout the electoral cycle. http://www.idea.int/elections/ermtool/upload/ERMT-Guide-on-Action-Points.pdf

You may also what to look at the following report from hd centre, it focuses somewhat on mediation between armed groups in Mindanao ahead of elections. http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/61Preventingelectionrelatedviolence2011.pdf

Best

Excellent. Many thanks for your responses so far which I will look over now. Please do keep them coming.

I will refer you to some of write up or some pieces of write ups on related election violence from Nigeria which can light up your knowledge on various causes of election violence and ways to curb or preventing such. My references are as follows: 1. Jega, A. M. Et.Al.,Strategies for curbing Election-Related Political Violence in Nigeria's North-West Zone, Mambaya House,Kano,2003 2. Tamuno, T.,Peace and Violence in Nigeria,Lagos 1991 3. Abdul Abdullahi Smith Centre for Historical Research, Election Violence in Nigeria: The Terrible experience 1952 2002. Vanguard Printers and Publishers Ltd.,Kaduna,2002. 4. Party Discipline, Political Violence and Quest for Public office: Implications for Peace and Development in Nigeria -paper presented by Hajiya Bilkisu,mni, at the All Parties Conference Organized by the National Orientation Agency (NOA) January 2003, Abuja. IDEA, IFES website would also serves as good source due to their wide coverage.

I will refer you to some of write up or some pieces of write ups on related election violence from Nigeria which can light up your knowledge on various causes of election violence and ways to curb or preventing such. My references are as follows: 1. Jega, A. M. Et.Al.,Strategies for curbing Election-Related Political Violence in Nigeria's North-West Zone, Mambaya House,Kano,2003 2. Tamuno, T.,Peace and Violence in Nigeria,Lagos 1991 3. Abdul Abdullahi Smith Centre for Historical Research, Election Violence in Nigeria: The Terrible experience 1952 2002. Vanguard Printers and Publishers Ltd.,Kaduna,2002. 4. Party Discipline, Political Violence and Quest for Public office: Implications for Peace and Development in Nigeria -paper presented by Hajiya Bilkisu,mni, at the All Parties Conference Organized by the National Orientation Agency (NOA) January 2003, Abuja. IDEA, IFES website would also serves as good source due to their wide coverage.

I believe "Nepal Votes for Peace" a publication of Cambridge University Press (India), 2013 could be helpful to you in this endeavor. As a chief election commissioner to led that process,  I have narrated my personal stories/lessons in managing Nepal's 2008 post-conflict election. I have given the examples what work and does not work while managing a conflict/post conflict environment for a peaceful election. I have also given the details of my interactions with the rebels. 

• The Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa ( EISA) has developed  a  model that draws on trained mediators  who act as a resource to the electoral authority to contribute to minimising and resolving election related conflict ie  Conflict Management Panels (CMPs). First used in South Africa in partnership with the South African Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) for the 1999 national and provincial elections and subsequently for  local government elections as well. MEdiators are identified and drawn from the community, trained in conflict management skills with particular emphasis on election related conflict. This model has been adapted and successfully implemented in other EISA offices  as well as countries where EISA  has not had offices, such as the DRC  (2006)(where 3300 mediators were trained and deployed countrywide), Chad, Madagascar, Burundi, Zambia, Malawi . In addition Election Management Bodies in SADC have identified Commissioners and senior staff  who have undergone  similar training. Elections are a contestation for power and those involved in the election will be called upon at some point to intervene in a conflict situation.  To be effective mediators must be available at national, district/ regional/provincial and local level and have the confidence of citizens in their non partisanship and neutrality. Depending on the context mediators come from faith based organisations, the legal fraternity, the religious fraternity, CSOs etc . The EISA website www.eisa.org.za has information on literature. ACE has extensive information as does IFES.

La République Démocratique du Congo est compté en ce qui me concerne, parmi les Etats fragiles avec ses multiples guerres à répétition, avec comme corollaire, la crise de légitimité. le pays a connu une dictatures pendant 32 ans, une longue transition de 16 ans. les élections de 2006 ont été celles des belligérants c'est-à-dire la guerre de l'AFDL, du RDC, du MLC, du RCD/KML, RDC/Mbusa et consort avaient fractionné le pays, chacun avait sa portion du territoire qu'il dirigeait. la voie de sortie était le dialogue inter-congolais tenu en Afrique du Sud où un gouvernement d'un Chef d'Etat et quatre vice-présidents était mis en place. une Commission Électorale Indépendante fut mis en place.Comme personne n'avait confiance à personne, tous les belligérants ont leurs représentants en son sein, avec l'aide de la communauté internationale, les rebelles avaient déposer les armes et le pays réunifié. pendant les élections, les médiateurs électoraux ont été formé à travers la République pour palier à certains conflits mineurs au niveau des Centres de vote, des bureaux de vote et dans les centres de compilation. si tous ces médiateurs ont formé par la communauté internationale, c'est pour prévenir les conflits déjà au niveau de la base. des missions de la MONUC, de la société civile et du gouvernement ont été à plusieurs reprises dépêcher sur terrain pour prévenir les conflits. la feuille de route électorale, le code de bonne conduite ont été signés par tous les partis impliqués dans le processus électorale. l’Effort de gage de transparence électorale a été fait par la CEI, justement pour prévenir les conflits. 

mais après le premier tour des élections présidentielles, la tension avait monté d'un camps, l'union européenne enverra une mission de militaires appelée EUFOR parce que les deux candidats avec des militaires dont l'un les forces républicaines et l'autre une milice privée, c'est qui fait qu'au second tour, il y a eu guerre au cœur de la capitale. mais si le bain de sang a été éviter, c'est l'implication de la communauté internationale à travers la MONUC, l'EUFOR et les chancelleries occidentales qui sont entrées en danse. 

mais la démarche des unités de médiations dans les bureaux, centres de vote est plus préventive, plus pratique pour éviter que les pays s'enlise dans la violence et garantir la transparence dans l'organisation et la publication des résultats.

I recommend UNDP's publication Understanding Electoral Violence in Asia.  It has country case studies from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand.  See the link: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/UNDP_elections_violence_AP.pdf 

Also, the UNDP publication Election and Conflict Prevention Guide has some good examples as well.  See the links:  English, French, Arabic

Maître Christine Ndayishimiye

La question mérite une attention particulière du moment que les élections, surtout en Afrique, constituent un élément conflictogène. Je pense que l'exemple de mon pays le Burundi pourrait servir de leçon. Alors que les élections pluralistes de 1993 avaient été une réussite sur le plan organisationnel et que même les nouvelles institutions démocratiquement élues venaient de fonctionner seulement pendant trois mois, le Président qui venait de gagner les élections a été sauvagement assassiné. Un longue guerre civile s'en est suivi et avait comme support des élans éthnistes. Cette guerre a duré une décennie. Avec l'aide de la communauté internationale et la médiation successivement de la Tanzanie et de l'Afrique du Sud, les belligérants ont pu se rencontrer et signer les Accords d'Arusha  en 2000. Ces derniers   consacraient entre autre les principes de base de partage du pouvoir. Depuis lors, ces Accords inspirent notre constitution et le pays a pu organiser avec succès des élections générales et  démocratiques en 2005 et en 2010; Je pense donc que ces Accords de paix peuvent inspirer plus d'un.

Many thanks to everyone on their input for the paper. The final report reference and a link to the PDF is here:

Rao, S. (2014). Dealing with election-related violence in fragile and conflict-affected states. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1126. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HDQ1126.pdf

I have uploaded the PDF and there is also a GSDRC summary here: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=1126

The key findings were:

"There are a number of causes of election-related violence, which can occur at different stages of the electoral cycle. Dealing with this violence very much depends on understanding these causes and tailoring measures to address them.

This report draws on guidance material, evaluation literature and empirical studies to provide a brief overview of measures to prevent and address electoral violence, and outline lessons learned. There are a wide range of measures available to prevent and reduce electoral violence:

• Election-related security and security sector reform
• Election monitoring
• Media monitoring
• Voter education and public awareness
• Civil society and public engagement initiatives
• Legal framework reforms
• Electoral management bodies
• Electoral dispute resolution
• Social and economic support
• Other measures: Including trust building, an inclusive process and building on local ownership. Timing of elections is important; elections that take place soon after civil war can lead to a resumption of conflict. 

Emerging literature on armed groups and elections highlights the relationship between armed groups and political forces, and the access of armed groups to independent resources. These determine whether armed groups are maintained by the government, eliminated, or continue despite opposition. Subnational conflict often relates to perceived injustice, marginalisation, and a sense of threatened identity. Such conflict can be ethnopolitical in nature, where the type of electoral system can have an impact on electoral violence levels."

Many thanks once again for all your help and I hope you find the final report of interest.

Je voudrais par la présente vous partagez l'expérience congolaise en la matière.  En effet, mon pays le Congo Brazzaville a passé des moments difficiles au sortir des conflits armés de 1997, peut avant la fin du mandat du mandat du président démocratiquement élus au suffrage universel direct. Cette guerre avait durée près de deux ans. Un dialogue s'est engagé par l'intermédiaire des fils du pays (diaspora) afin que cesse les hostilités d'abord d'ou la signature des premiers accords de pointe-noire. Les conflits ont cessez dans certaines zones. Mais la communauté internationale s'était investi d'où la signature des accords de Brazzaville sous l'égide du président Bongo. Après cette concertation,  un code électoral a été établi et les groupes armées se sont transformés en partis politique et concours actuellement au suffrage par les elections politiques.

Mais pour réussir dans cette entreprise,  il faut qu'il y ait une volonté manifeste des cadres et fils du pays à adhérer au processus de paix et que , le cadre juridique qui organise les elections soit accepté de tous les protagonistes.