The Question

This question was posted on behalf of Tim Sheehy, member of the Practitioners' Network

I am writing a paper on managing the power of “incumbency” – i.e. what are the constitutional, legal, regulatory, and institutional mechanisms needed to ensure that an election is in reality a competition among political parties (and/or individual candidates) with the State holding the ring rather than a competition between the State (on behalf of the ruling party/individual) and the opposition. I would be interested in any recently published discussion of this (admittedly broad) topic and practical examples of good practice.

Summary of responses
One expert laments that incumbents abusing power in the context of elections is a long-standing problem, and one where little has changed in recent years. The main mechanism intended to curb the excesses of incumbency is electoral laws and regulations. India and Bangladesh are cited as countries where there has been some success in this regard. Another reply notes that such laws and regulations are often not applied uniformly in African countries - to the benefit of the incumbent party.

Curbing the abuse of incumbency has been more successful in some aspects of power and influence than others: little progress, for example, has been made tackling the state bias of publicly owned media in developing democracies. On the other hand, there is said to have been more success in the realms of public funds and the civil service.

Two further examples of measures taken to check an incumbent unduly influencing elections are that or Senegal, where the Court of Appeals ruled that parliamentary election campaigns cannot use the effigy of the country’s president, and Pakistan’s practice of installing a caretaker government during election periods.

International or regional codes of conduct are advocated to establish international norms in this area.

Examples of related ACE Articles and Resources
Encyclopaedia:
• Overview of electoral integrity

External Resources
• IFES
• Democracy Reporting International  
• Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti (1994)
• Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign, Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, William N. McPhee (1986)

Names of contributors
• Carl Dundas
• Innocent Campos
• Monte McMurchy
• Manuel Wally

Hi Tim,

I am afraid the clock has not moved very much on this issue. Various methods and instruments have been used to mitigate the overt abuse of incumbency, particularly during election campaign periods. Stipulations in the Electoral Act and or in codes of conduct for political parties in a given country are the traditional methods used to curb the excesses of incumbency, with varying degrees of success, as in India and to a lesser extent in Bangladesh. In countries like Uganda measures against incumbency go only part of the way, exempting the Head of States when campaigning as a candidate, from significant provisions that apply to incumbency. The curb on abuse of incumbency is more effective with respect to the use of some publicly owned resources than others. Creating a level playing field regarding the bias of the publicly owned media by incumbents has been largely unsuccessful in emerging democracies. Perhaps more relative success has been meted out regarding the use of public funds and civil servants by incumbents. I believe this is a field in which an international or regional codes are required to establish international norms.

Cher Monsieur,

Les lands marks électorales sont clairement définis par le cadre institutionnel à savoir: la constitution du pays considéré, la charte des partis politiques, les instances de gestions des élections( CENA CENI ministère de l'intérieur) et l'artitre du jeu électoral qu'est  la cour ou le conseil constitutionnel. En marge de ce cadre institutionnel, il existe des principes de convergences constitutionnelles qui s'imposent comme normes de gouvernance démocratiques aux Etats. Je veux parler du Protocole de la CEDEAO, et de la Charte de l'Union africaine.  Dès lors, je n'entrevois pas pas d'autres issues de régulation des élections  en dehors de ces balises juridiques. La violation des normes et standards relatives aux élections ( accès inégal des candidats aux média de service public, utilisation des moyens de l'Etat en période électorale, empêchement de certains  candidats de faire librement campagne dans certaines localités du pays  favorables à un ou plusieurs candidats, achat de conscience des électeurs, bourrages des urnes, insécurité sur les lieux du vote, transports des urnes après la fermeture du strutin par des moyens inappropriés, etc...) devront se référer  et se gérer strictement par rapport au cadre institutionnel prévu à cet effet. A mon humble avis,  la quasi totalité des pays africains se dotent  de normes  légales et réglementaires  pour gérer toutes les différentes phases des élections. Cependant force est de constater que  les biais qui sont souvent observés sur  le terrain tendent à être le fait des militants du pouvoir en place. Dans le meilleur des cas, lorsque les faits de violations des normes électorales sont avérés, les militants en cause sont arrêtés juste pour leur protection. Quelques instants après, ils sont relaxés purement et simplement par le procureur. Or une bonne  l'application des textes peut avoir un effet  pédagogique pour tous les électeurs sans discrimination. Par contre  lorsque les militants  de l'opposition sont arrêtés en période électorale, soit parcequ'ils dénoncent certaines irrégularités, par eux,  constatées soit parceque l'autre camp les soupçonne de fraudes,  l'application des textes est très stricte à leur encontre. En définitive, l'égalité devant la loi pénale en cas de violation des textes électoraux est fonction des rapports de force force entre opposition et majorité présidentuielle. Ce qui n'augure pas des lendemains meilleurs pour la consolidation du respect des principes  démocratique en Afrique notamment celui de  l'alternance démocratique.  

Unfortunately the residual influence and concomitant power of incumbency is well trenched in civic electoral society which when taken to extreme is indeed most pernicious in terms of potential future civic electoral engagement. The previous two writers are correct in their respective assessments which unfortunately fails to advance strong prescriptive solutions which may very well indicate the strong atavistic influence incumbency does have in todays electoral society. One only need look to the United States where the return of incumbent members in the House of Representatives is extremely high and change occurs when the incumbent either elects not to seek another term or scandal grounded in 'moral turpitude' is so strong so as to even frustrate this return. The hight cost associated in seeking public office regardless of the office does indeed favour the well endowed financially which tends to reward incumbency. Suggestions as to readings might include Robert Putnam Making Democracy Work and Voting by Barelson, Lazarsfeld and McFee published 40 years ago and yet still resonates.

Dear Tim,

Senegal's parliamentary elections saw an interesting case brought against Bennoo Bokk Yakaar, the coalition endorsed by President Macky Sall. The Court of Appeals ruled, on a broad reading of the electoral code, as well as on a hardened "political convention", that parliamentary election campaigns cannot use the effigy of the President of the Republic. The decision represents a landmark ruling in as much as it curbs the power of incumbency. The court seems to have taken the decision off of its homepage, but I'll gladly send it to you.

[email protected]

Further to my above reply, the mother of all fetters on the power of incumbency rules over Pakistan's election periods, notably in the form of a temporary caretaker government. For more detailed info, search the homepages of IFES and Democracy Reporting International. Manuel