The Question
This question was posted on behalf of Jack Zaba, member of the ACE Practitioners’ Network

I would like to learn more about existing strategies which can be used by the electorate to protect their vote. What case studies are there in which citizens or their political parties successfully designed and implemented strategies to deter electoral fraud. In addition, what vote protection mechanisms are suitable in the context of a heavily repressive state with a history of electoral fraud, violence and military involvement in electoral politics? I am in the process of developing vote protection strategies for my country Zimbabwe, in order for citizens to defend their vote during imminent general elections.

Summary of responses
The majority of replies stress the important role that election observers and political party agents at the polling station and counting centre can play in deterring electoral fraud. Examples given for the success of both these tools include Zambia, Tanzania and Cambodia.

One reply places particular emphasis on the need for party agents to pay close attention that results are reported accurately from their respective results tabulation centres, while another stresses the need for monitoring the main preparatory processes of an election, e.g. voter registration.  In Cambodia, the monitoring group CONFREL conducts parallel voter tabulation to verify results, and a survey and audit of the voter registration list to assess its integrity.

In Nigeria in 2011, some voters protected their votes in a very direct way by remaining at the voting station after casting their vote and observing the remaining voting and then counting process - a strategy that was encouraged by the electoral commission. This strategy is particularly appropriate where voter trust in the process is low and where voters are sufficiently educated. Likewise, in Zambia, there were cases where voters themselves raised questions regarding aspects of voting operations on election day.

Technology can also pay it role, with crowdsourcing via mobile phones and the internet used to gather information and map data from the general public on electoral fraud.

Another strategy is insisting that cast ballots are kept until the next election, so that recounts can be conducted in the event of allegations of electoral fraud. This measure has been proposed by the opposition in Ukraine.

On the subject of measures to protect the vote in repressive regimes, one expert concludes that a professional and independent electoral management body is essential and that there is little that other stakeholders can do.

Examples of related ACE Articles and Resources
Encyclopaedia:
• Monitors of Electoral Integrity 
• Enforcement of Electoral Integrity 

External Resources
• Civil Society Election Coaltion (CSEC), Verification of Official Results Statement, 2011 Zambian Tripartite Elections 
• Mobile Active.org, In Benin, SMS Observations and Lessons

Names of contributors
1. Delphine Blanchet
2. Elijah Rubvuta
3. Issa Khamis Khamis
4. Belinda Musanhu
5. John Maphephe
6. Carl Dundas
7. Monte McMurchy
8. Amon Emmanuel Chaligha
9. Koul Panha
10. Debashis Sen
11. Shahid Iqbal
12. Horacio Boneo
13. Valery Shyrokov
14. Ola Pettersson
15. Ray Kennedy
16. Kasiwa Muliro Mufuya

Election observation can be a powerful tool when well prepared, well implemeted, and when its conclusions are clear, credible, and media can relay them.  The preparatory phase implies internal and external activities, by external I include advocacy and lobby (to ensure presence of observers will be accepted during all phases of the process), and by internal I mean organizational and methodological.  The implementation phase is crucial t ensure credibility of the conclusions of the observation (hence the importance of totale adherence to a code of coduct)  and, at the same time,  because of its deterrence effect on fraud, violence, irregularities etc. Finally, the last phase needs to be well planned and prepared: the communication strategy of the conclusions. This message can travel far! Good luck!

We just had an exciting experience in Zambia where he election results defied the influence of money, electoral bribes, and several other enticements through scaled-up development projects amidst high media biases, among others), to deliver an election victory to the opposition.

The key to safeguarding the votes by citizens, candidates and political parties is to invest in deploying a committed team of trained and dedicated Party Polling Agents and Domestic Election Monitoring/Observation across all voting centres. However, the success of this can dependent on a number of factors:

- an Independent Electoral Commission that is accessible and open to share and avail electoral information in good time - (e.g. you need to know the exact number of voting centres, their locations and the distribution of registered voters in those centres well ahead of time to allow for all stakeholders to plan their monitoring strategies);

- full information by the Electoral Commission on how the voting and more importantly the Counting and results process will be managed and at what levels, including the level of access by monitors/party agents to the results process;

- whether or not (or to what extent) independent groups are allowed to do thei own results verification efforts: In some countries, their appear to be uneasiness or apprehension over Parallel Vote tabulation. However, where such is not permitted, it would still be possible to use other means of results verification using other means though more costly. The key to this is to aim at having the results before the Electoral Commission announces the final results because this should give leverage to you to be able to agree or question the official results when they are announced;

- you need to have a pool of committed, dedicated and trained party agents and monitors. Particular attention need to be given to then need for Party agents to ENSURE that they know the results transmitted from their centres, through the other levels of results tabulation to the National Results Tabulation centre: Any variances need to be noted. It is not enough to for the party agents to just pay attention to who has been reported as having won from their centre, but to pay attention to whether the results figures (including the rejected and/or spoilt ballots) have been reported correctly at every stage of the Results Tabulation Centres. Any variances need to be noted and Party agents have a stronger position to demand clarifications from electoral officials before the results are transmitted to the next level.

- Party agents and Monitors need to remain vigilant at all times, including after the results are announced at their centres, until after the declaration of final results. Even voters can help by being alert: (In a number of polling stations in Lusaka, it was the voters who questioned certain unusual practices such as Ballot Boxes not having lids, and a few anomalies in the administration of voting materials by electoral officers).

The Civil Society Elections Coalition (CSEC) in Zambia can share more in detail on this important subject which I feel needs to be given due attention in all election monitoring/observation efforts across the continent. I attch CSEC's Statement on Results Verification for ease of reference.

IT IS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF GENUINE FREE AND FAIR ELECTION THAT ONE PERSON ONE VOTE, AND THE VOTE OF ANY PERSON IS A VOICE TOWARDS THE GOVERNANCE OF THE STATE THUS THIS VOTE NEEDS TO BE PROTECTED AND SECURED.

IN ZANZIBAR PROTECTORATE PROTECT THIER VOTES BY USING POLING AGENTS PFOM THEIR POLITICAL PARTIES T IS HOWEVER NOT ALL PARTIES MANAGE TO INSTALL AGENTS IN ALL PALING CENTER AND OTHERS HAVE NO POLITICAL AFFILATION.

THE USE OF LOCAL AND INTERNATIONA OBSERVERS IS ANOTHER WAY USED IN ZANZIBAR TO SAFEGUADR THE WILL OF ELECTORATED THROUGH VOTES

ANOTHER WAY USED TO PREVENT VOTE FRAUD, EVEN IF UNOFFICIAL VOTERS AFTER CASTING THEIR VOTES, IS TO REMAIN 200M FROM THE POLING STATION TO MAKE SURE THAT ONLY ELIGIBLE VOTERS GET ACCESS TO THE POLNG CENTERS. THIS MOST OF THE TIME ENDED UP WITH CHAOS AND VIOLENCE.

Your question reminds me of my experience during the elections in Nigeria in April this year where voters were encouraged (by the electoral commission)  to remain at the voting station AFTER voting and UNTIL the counting was finished and the voting station results announced. This is unlike in most countries where electoral regulations and established practice require that voters vacate the voting station environs unless they are casting their votes or preparing to do so (in the queue). This is done to prevent rowdiness and possible disruption or interference in the voting process by over-enthusiastic voters.  And it assumes that observers being non-partisan will represent the interests of the voters. However some countries do not have enough observers to cover every polling station. Or in extremely polarised situations, at times even the observers themselves are not trusted (deservedly or not).

In Nigeria voters therefore protected their votes in a very direct and participatory way by visually observing the voting and counting. At times, it was loud and very raucous but always convivial.  Some voters did not know the procedures well and would make inappropriate interventions. In some communities supporting a particular candidate, observers were barred from observing voting and counting and its possible that voters themselves participated in electoral fraud.  Broadly speaking however that I thought it worked well in most instances. That kind of voter participation is useful in countries where the voters do not trust the EMB as it allows each voter to protect her own ballot. It deters fraud on the part of polling station officials when they know the voters are watching them  and it works very well when the voters are correctly informed about voting and counting procedures.  As long as voters are well informed, well behaved and non-intimidatory and as long as election officials can do their work in an safe and secure enviroment without interference and obstruction on the part of voters, I think it is worth a try in Zimbabwe. Good Luck

There are a great many ways to do this, both at registration and at polling.  At polling the problem is that the vote must be open and be seen to be counted openly.  So that means:

a.      Observers at the polls to prevent stuffing

b.      Secret voting in person: no electronic voting, proxy voting, postal voting or anything that could change a vote.

c.       Inking fingers to prevent multiple voting

d.      Counting at the polling station so that everyone can see that the count is honest

e.      A parallel vote tabulation, so that eh numbers are not changed

f.        Visible tallying and final declarations at the centre.

This of course is to ignore the problems of fixing the voter register, disqualifying candidates, gerrymandering, intimidation, or using incumbency advantage to lock out the opposition. (Much as is done in Lesotho you may want to visit IEC Lesotho website and contact the revelant officer for more information. This information has been shared through contribution of David Mathieson Electoral Reform International Services (ERIS)

Election fraud covers such a wide and disparate range of issues that it is difficult to deal comprehensively with this matter in such a limited space. Irregularities in electoral organization and planning may begin with the EMB itself and if the corruption starts at the source of the process, there may be little safeguard, except thorough vigilance to ensure transparency. Major preparatory processes such as delimitation of constituencies, registration of voters and sometimes even the nomination process (registration of parties or candidates to contest an election) are often the target for improper interference in the electoral process. Thorough monitoring by stakeholders and keen observation of these processes can help in reducing irregularities.

Among the most vulnerable phases of election preparation and conduct are the voting, counting (including tallying and collation) of the votes and the announcement of results. As the Kriegler Kenyan report showed, these processes in the later stages of election conduct may be easily taken off track by a mixture of election fraud, incompetence and even  inadequate training. Actually, to use the abused phrase, there is 'no silver bullet' to prevent or obliterate election fraud. Competence on the part of the EMB and careful monitoring of the preparatory and polling processes will go a far way in preventing the more blatant fraudulent practices.

While sound independent monitoring and observation might go a far way in assisting voters to protect against electoral fraud, protection against a repressive regime can possibly best be done by the EMB and staff being truly professional and independent of political influence. Other measures by stakeholders will help but unless the EMB is willing and able to stand against improper invasion of the integrity of the electoral process, a repressive regime will always have its way.

Cases abound on electoral fraud, including a couple of volumes on election cases in selected Commonwealth countries which I published through the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1996-98.

I congratulate you on your courage in advancing this most fundamental salient issue of concern; how to ensure that each vote is valid and secure which in Zimbabwe is an issue of urgent import.

My extensive time in Zimbabwe has allowed me to develop a deep full profound appreciation as to the exigent civic electoral issues directly affecting the conduct of an election conducted under the imprimatur of Mugabe under the indirect aegis of the ZANU-PF.

On the micro level, elections in Zimbabwe are most efficient in terms of tabulating the count and processing those who enter onto the electoral confines in order to cast a ballot. However, this in no manner validates the integrity of the election on the macro scale where outright violence and other elements of intimidation ensure that the status quo will prevail which in any normative electoral criteria ensure that these elections are of no prescriptive and descriptive value as to integrity of the process.

Civil society in Zimbabwe unfortunately is not strong as the government will allow no political party public discourse other than the ZANU-PF. 

Peter Godwin, a good friend and I have shared civic electoral public policy insights which are expressed most elequently in his book "The Fear" which tabulates in excruciating detail the extreme roiling which happened prior to and during the flawed 2008 Presidential Election.

Until civil society is allowed complete freedom of opportunity for full expression without fear from the ZANU-PF thugs; the situation which you have advanced is unlikely in the short term to be subject to any modification in that all the electorate are under scrutiny and only those who support the ZANU-PF are availed of the opportunity to vote in what has been and will continue to be a most flawed civic electoral process.

Under separate mail I am most prepared to share my contacts and insights as to your most essential question of issue which goes to the rood of the civic electoral process.

Candidates and political parties can protect their votes by placing in a polling station committed polling agents. The responsibility of such agents is to ensure that the electoral process is respected, that ballot boxes used are empty, that all seals are in place, that only qualified voters are allowed to cast their ballots and that votes are properly counted within the polling station soon after the station is closed. This is the practice in Tanzania. Party/candidate agents who witnesses the counting are given a copy of the signed result forms and a copy placed outside the polling station. Furthermore, both local and international election observers placed in a polling station helps to minimize possibilities of election fraud.

In Cambodia COMFREL’s experiences ( www.comfrel.org) in electoral engagement have proven that systematic and comprehensive monitoring contributes to improve the election environment and its administration. Although vote buying and political intimidation remain as serious concerns, the comprehensive monitoring of elections resulted in reduction of technical irregularities and violence (election related murdered) compared to earlier elections.

For instance, two election projects were undertaken by COMFREL during this program period, one for the 2007 Commune Council Election-CCE and another for the 2008 National Assembly Election-NAE. The major activities relate to election preparations through planning, the training of observers, developing procedures and election monitoring.

Recently COMFREL has developed a system that voters or electorates can send information or reports through website ( www.cambodianvotervoice.org) and voicemail of mobile phone. The system will be used for coming elections.

1-Long term Observation: LTOs conducted monitoring, and investigation of the pre-election situation. They monitored the post-election situation including the handover of power to newly elected officials. COMFREL deployed 270 long-term observers in 24 provinces/municipalities and 176 districts to observe the election process for at leat 9 months period from voter registration, electoral campaign candidate registration and prior to polling day as well as following up on electoral complaints. 15 special observers were trained to monitor the use of broadcast media.

2 Short Term Election Observation-STOs: During polling day, COMFREL trained and deployed around more than 10,000 observers across the country in polling /counting stations in order to deter, detect and report intimidation or violence and irregularities including fraud during voting and counting. For the strategy, it deployed short-term observers in major/competitive provinces, assigned persons to observe the situation outside the polling location for any irregularities and helped voters find their name on the voter list. Reporting systems were needed for both the Constitutional Council and NA elections. COMFREL developed and provided several manuals and checklists for election observers. COMFREL also produced VCDs of the video spot on polling and counting day explaining to how to fill out forms and how to observe irregularities.

3 Parallel Voter Tabulation/Quick Count- the PVT/Quick Count. The PVT/Quick Count ensures a quick count and produces the election results which are announced by an election counting official. The PVT-quick count verifies the election results announced by counting station officers to detect possible fraud patterns. These Master Trainers provided 2 days of training with 223 trainees from 176 districts. Furthermore, the Master Trainers and District Assistants provided 223 courses to 9,196 local observers (7,887 COMFREL short-term observers-STO and 1,319 parallel vote tabulation observers-PVT). Training and coaching was provided to 1,319 observers on the Parallel Voter Tabulation/Quick Count-PVT in 1,319 randomly selected polling stations which sends results and irregularities to COMFREL headquarters.

The rapid survey: After the PVT/Quick Count, all observers conducted interviews with eligible voters in the PVT’s sampling location or polling station. Observers interviewed 8 eligible voters. To select eligible voters, the observers used convenience sampling with a quota (a non-probability sample) from 5 voters stained by indelible ink and 3 voters without indelible inks at each polling station. The main purpose was to gain insight into voter opinion as to why they voted or why they did not vote. The detail methodology and questionnaires was reviewed and the results were developed for future use.

4-Survey and Audit of Voter Registration and List-SVR/VRA: The purpose of The SVR/VRA was to identify voters’ problems of the voter registration and verify and assess the accuracy of the voter list, as well as to provide the NEC and other stakeholders with information and recommendations. The SVR/VRA is systematic and statically relevant interviews, observations and investigations of the quality of the voter registration and accuracy of the voter’s list. 250 local observers were established and divided into 50 teams which were deployed to conduct audit and monitoring with the sample size of around 8% of polling stations/or villages.

5. Voter information and education to increase voters’ awareness about voting procedures and voters’ rights and responsibilities

COMFREL supported the overall national election project by maintaining its objectivity to increase and improve the understanding of voters and citizens as a whole through various media means, including TV/Radio broadcasts, written publications and social media such as the website ( www.cambodianvotervoice.org), email lists, and voicemail.

Video recording by Election Commission is also an effective tool. Video streaming is also being experimented with.

Appointment of impartial, professional and well trained staff to run polling business on election day is extremely vital to protect voting rights. Selection of staff can make or break voting processes.

I just read an interesting article on the approach used in Benin, based on mobile phones. The original stuff was included in the page of an organization called MobileActive.org. I lifted the article I was interested in and you will find it below as an attachment.

Since we got in touch through here, I would take advantage of the opportunity to pick up your brains in relation to an study I am doing for UNDP on the relations between EMBs and observers, where Zimbabwe will be one of the country case studies. Send me a mail and I will send you the description of the study.

Legions of international, local and party observers, impartial polling station staff, technical solutions employed to detect and report fraud etc are all great measures. I would like to propose a legislative measure which, although may not have immediate effect, will serve well to fight the irregularities and restore justice in the long run using any legal redress tools available. It is about the shelf life of the cast ballots.

This measure might be difficult to implement if the Legislature is dominated by one or several parties in power who will inavitably oppose such initiative. But this an extremely powerful measure which offers enormous possibilities to channel grievances through the complaints process.

Example? Turn your sight to Ukraine, - in anticipation of electoral fraud, the opposition parties have proposed to keep the cast ballots untill the next election. This measure, if implemented, will secure the possibility of counting and recounting the ballots as many times as necessary and bring well substantiated cases to the court.

Many good suggestions mentioned here. A fairly new tool to complement activities such as electoral observation and PVT is crowdsourcing, using cell phones and internet to gather information from the general public on electoral fraud and violence. 

Examples of crowdsourcing in elections include the ushahidi case in Kenya as well as Bantuwatch used in the recent Zambian elections.  

Yes, trained party pollwatchers are critically important, but trained how?  One of the best examples I encountered over the years was a training manual produced by one of the smaller Venezuelan parties (Causa R, I think) that showed, step by step, various ways fraud had been committed in previous elections and specific instructions on what to do in case of any abnormalities.  A copy of the manual should be in the F. Clifton White Resource Center collection at IFES; the title was something like "Dile No al Robavoto!" [Say No to the Vote Thief!]

Reply originally posted in French. See below for original version.

Strategies for the protection of the population vote are the presence of civil society observers in the polling and vote counting centers, and at the compilation of the results - both at local and national centers. The political parties also have to accredit their observers so they can scrutinise voting. This will help prevent electoral fraud. However, civic and electoral education of the voters must be assured, because often the voting population itself cannot understand the procedures related to the electoral process and does not even understand the elections’ issues. 

Les stratégies pour la protection de vote de la population c'est la présence des observateurs de la societé civile dans les bureau de vote et de dépuillement ; au centre local de compulation des résultats et au centre national de compulation des résultat. Et les parties politiques doivent aussi accrédités les temoins à tous les nivaeux du scrutin et donc cela evitera le vol de vote de la population . Mais il faut aussi que l'éducation civique et électorale de la population soit assurée car la population n'arrive pas souvent à comprendre la procedure du déroulement de sélections et voir meme elle ne comprend pas le senjeux des élections.