More training conducted well in advance of election day should be planned by the Electoral Commission. A permanent register of polling officials should be maintained with regular training sessions conducted throughout the country.

Provisions to guarantee results are posted and displayed outside of polling stations for the public to inspect should be introduced. This process should also take place at all levels of the aggregation process to ensure maximum transparency in the results process.

The Elections Law should be amended and the SCER should adopt regulations to establish a clear framework for the tabulation and publication of results at every stage so as to ensure that all results are published speedily, completely and accurately. In particular:
i. Greater steps should be taken to ensure that copies of the results from every polling station are displayed at polling centres immediately following the count.
ii. Main District Committees should publish copies of the results protocols from polling centres and individual polling stations immediately as they are submitted. MDCs should also immediately publish the protocol of their tabulated results.
iii. Partial and preliminary results should be published by the SCER and Supervisory Committees as soon as they are available.
iv. When publishing partial, preliminary or final results, the SCER should publish all available data, including results for all candidates, the number of voters who voted and the number of invalid ballots.
v. The Electoral Law should be amended to detail exactly what information should be published.
vi. When publishing preliminary or final results, the results should be broken down by governorate, district, polling centre and polling station.
vii. If publishing partial results, the SCER should clearly identify them as such and provide explanations for any changes when publishing later results.

The SCER should clarify the framework for the casting of ballots in presidential elections by those persons in places other than their designated polling station on election day. The procedures should be in compliance with the Elections Law and prevent opportunities for voter fraud. All procedures should be adopted well ahead of a future election day.

Voters showed great commitment to the democratic process by arriving at polling stations very early in the morning. However the resulting long queues meant that polling stations were often very congested until midday and then empty in the afternoon. In order to avoid long queues and crowded polling stations, public information announcements before election day could try to encourage a steady flow of voters throughout the day

Consideration must be given to further increase the secrecy of ballot, such as a revision of the layout of polling stations, in particular the polling booth. In addition, the recording of voter card numbers on ballot counterfoils should be discontinued.

It was mandatory for the optical-marked recognition (OMR) results forms to be filled in with pencil. However, it would be preferable to use an ink pen in order to further enhance confidence in the process. In addition, the filling in of OMR forms must be practised sufficiently prior to polling day in order to avoid problems with their transmission.

As well as checking the physical presence of election material, it is essential that an audit of the results forms is conducted at the intake stage while the presiding officer is still present. Errors can be corrected at this point, thus avoiding problems later on during the tabulation and transmission processes.

Election results should be published as widely as possible. Copies of results should be published at polling station level after the count is completed. Election results at district level should be publicly displayed at the premises of the district election officer. It is also recommended that the ECZ ensures a prompt publication of all election day data in order to further increase confidence in the electoral process.

La mise à disposition de tous les mandataires présents d’une copie certifiée du procès-verbal est indispensable pour assurer la confiance de tous les acteurs dans l’intégrité du processus électoral. En raison du nombre potentiellement important de mandataires, un récépissé certifié résumant les résultats du dépouillement pourrait en tenir lieu.

La simultanéité des consultations et la complexité du scrutin législatif tel que défini par le projet de loi électorale en discussion au Parlement rendront les opérations de dépouillement et d’agrégation considérablement plus laborieuses que dans le cas du référendum. Pour des raisons d’efficacité et de transparence, il apparaît indispensable de décentraliser le processus de validation et d’agrégation des résultats – idéalement au niveau de chaque circonscription électorale. Pour des raisons de faisabilité, il apparaît néanmoins opportun d’en confier la responsabilité aux bureaux de liaison de la CEI. Le renforcement de ces structures locales nécessitera une assistance technique accru des experts du projet APEC.

L’affichage immédiat et la mise à disposition de tous les témoins de partis politiques présents d’une copie certifiée du procès-verbal de dépouillement apparaissent indispensables pour assurer la confiance de tous les acteurs dans l’intégrité du processus. En raison de la complexité des procès-verbaux de résultats du scrutin législatif et du nombre potentiellement élevé de témoins, un récépissé certifié résumant les résultats pourrait en tenir lieu.

La décentralisation du processus pourrait être accompagnée par la mise en place de panels de contrôle et de validation, faisant intervenir des magistrats formés à cet effet ainsi que les témoins des partis politiques et représentants des autorités coutumières. validation et d’agrégation des résultats.

La publication rapide de tendances partielles joue un rôle important pour renforcer la confiance du public et faciliter l’acceptation des résultats. La CEI devrait cependant améliorer significativement sa politique de communication et d’explication en la matière.

It could be considered to lower the age of eligibility for voting to 18, in line with the age of legal majority (attainment of full age) age of 18 years.

All polling board members should be appointed by the election administration, and should be given effective training and instructions prior to each elections and be clearly identifiable as elections officials.

The procedural arrangements, whereby each voter’s registration number is marked on the ballot counterfoil, results in all completed ballot papers being traceable. While this may be intended as a fraud-prevention mechanism, it fundamentally undermines the secrecy of the ballot. Therefore there should be no recording of registration numbers, or any other identifying information, so that each ballot paper remains untraceable.

The application process for casting of a postal ballot should be clarified and simplified so that voters are clear on their eligibility and the procedure involved. Time should be allowed for an appeal to any rejected application for postal voting. There should be a time limit on the implementation of postal polling, so that there can be a stronger observation presence by agents and observers. Those administering the postal voting in their places of work should receive more adequate training and should also be more subject to monitoring from the local election administration. Records should be kept at a district and central level of all applications, rejections, appeals and the turnout in the postal voting process.

The law is amended again to end the possibility for the use of the civil register for voting purposes, meaning that for future voting there are just regular polling
stations and regular polling lists.

Such transparency and confidence would be further enhanced if the results were also published down to polling station level. The Palestinian election is actually of
a very modest size compared to many, with just over 3,000 polling stations in total and such a prompt breakdown should be feasible.

Counting procedures should provide an acceptable timeframe within which complaints and request for re-polling can be lodged.

The introduction of a computerized tabulation process in the provinces was an important step towards increased modernisation in the running of elections. However the process suffered from numerous errors and insufficiencies arising from the software used and the database as well as the fact that staff was poorly trained.

The decision making power of the CPEs could be extended in order to enable them to decide on result sheets from the polling stations with errors or inconsistencies.

Training of computer operators at central and provincial level should be done in good time. As a proof of transparency, a copy of the software to be used for tabulation of results could be handed to political parties’ delegates and observers.

Ballot paper design should be made simpler and more user-friendly. Serial numbering and security features should be introduced at least for national election ballots.