Herramientas Personales
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Structure and Rules for Delimiting Electoral Districts
Countries that delimit electoral districts must establish rules and a formal structure for carrying out the process. Because different sets of districts can produce different election outcomes, even if underlying voting patterns remain the same, the choices involved in the design of the redistricting process are important. Included among those decisions are the following:
The task of drawing districts must be assigned to some boundary authority. The composition of the boundary authority and the degree of independence granted to this authority vary considerably from country to country. Traditionally, legislatures have been allowed to draw their own districts. Increasingly, however, countries are turning the process over to independent commissions. This is part of an international movement to eliminate "politics" from the redistricting process. Reforms that have replaced legislatures with redistricting commissions have also included provisions for increasing public access to the redistricting process and identifying formal criteria for commissioners to consider when drawing districts. These redistricting criteria are usually listed in the electoral laws of the country. The criteria often include factors such as equality of population, respect for local administrative boundaries and other geographic features such as natural (physically-defined) boundaries, and recognition of communities of interest. Countries usually have not adopted redistricting criteria pertaining to the actual outcome of the redistricting process--for example, fair representation for political parties or minority groups. This is because single-member districts, used by many of the countries that delimit electoral districts, cannot guarantee results that are proportional, or even minimal, for minority political parties or minority racial, ethnic, religious or special language groups in the population. Some countries, however, have adopted special provisions designed to modify the distorting effects of single-member districts and to ensure some degree of representation for minority groups. This section examines the choices countries have made for rules and a structure to carry out redistricting, including:
Designation of a Boundary AuthorityCountries that delimit electoral districts must designate a boundary authority and establish some machinery for carrying out the task of redistricting. The task assigned to the boundary authority is the same in all countries: divide the country into districts for the election of representatives. The composition of the boundary authority and the degree of independence from the legislature or partisan concerns granted to this authority, however, vary considerably from country to country. Some countries allow legislators to draw their own districts. Other countries, in an attempt to remove "politics" from the process, assign the task of redistricting to an independent boundary commission. In some countries, redistricting is centralised under a single redistricting authority while in other countries, states or provinces draw their own districts, with or without a uniform set of rules. In many countries, the boundary authority is granted the power to choose the final districting plan. But in some countries with non-legislative boundary authorities, the legislature or the government must approve the final districting plan before it can be implemented. The types of boundary authorities countries have established and the degree of independence countries have accorded these authorities cover a broad spectrum. At one end of the spectrum is the United States, where the redistricting process is very political and decentralised. The responsibility for drawing districts for the United States Congress rests individually with the fifty states. There are few limitations on the states, and the boundary authorities are almost always political entities, i.e., state legislatures. At the other end of the spectrum are many of the Commonwealth countries, where politicians have opted out of the redistricting process and granted the authority to redistrict to neutral or independent commissions. A central agency may draw districts for the entire country. If the central agency does not actually draw the districts, it establishes guidelines for regional commissions and oversees the redistribution process. The final decision as to which district boundaries should be implemented often rests with the commission and not with the legislature. This section will examine alternative approaches to the designation of a boundary authority. It will discuss the composition of the boundary authority, whether the authority should be partisan or non-partisan, and whether a central authority or regional authorities should perform the task of redistricting. Who has the authority to make the final decision as to which set of district boundaries are to be implemented will also be considered. Composition of the Boundary AuthorityA substantial majority of the countries that delimit electoral districts employ a specially designated boundary commission or an election management body to draw these boundaries. The legislature serves as the boundary authority in several countries. And in a few countries, government agencies are charged with the task of redistricting. Britain was an early pioneer of establishing an independent boundary commission to define electoral districts[1]. Many established democracies once governed by the United Kingdom followed this example and adopted boundary (or delimitation) commissions, including Australia and Canada, Caribbean countries such as the Bahamas, Barbados, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines and several Anglophone African countries (i.e., Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe) also adopted boundary commissions for delimiting constituencies. Composition of Boundary Commissions Boundary commissions tend to be relatively small in size, ranging from three to seven or nine members. Canada, for example, has three-member commissions, the United Kingdom has four-member commissions, and a number of Caribbean countries have five-member commissions (e.g., Bahamas, Barbados). New Zealand and Germany each have seven-member commissions; Albania has a nine-member commission. The commissions often include non-partisan (non-political) public officials with backgrounds in election administration, geography, and statistics. In Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, for example, the commissions incorporate electoral officers or registrar-generals, as well as the Director of Ordnance Survey (United Kingdom) and the Surveyor-General (Australia and New Zealand). Statisticians have an important role on Australian commissions because population projections are used to draw electoral district boundaries. In Canada, academics knowledgeable about elections and/or geography may be asked to serve on boundary commissions. Members of the judiciary are also well represented on districting commissions in many countries. They often chair the commissions, as in Canada and New Zealand. In the United Kingdom, senior judges serve as Deputy Chairs of the four Boundary Commissions in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. In India, two of the three members of the Delimitation Commission are required to be judges. Many countries with boundary commissions exclude anyone with political connections from serving on the commission. On the other hand, some countries specifically include representatives of the major political parties on the commission. For example, in New Zealand, two “political” appointees, one representing the governing party and one the opposition parties, serve on the seven-member Representation Commission. The theory behind their presence on the commission is that it helps ensure that any political bias in a proposed delimitation plan is recognized and rectified. However, because the two political appointees constitute a minority of the commission, they cannot outvote the non-political commissioners. Other countries that incorporate political party representatives on the boundary commission include Albania, Bahamas, Barbados, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and St. Vincent. Botswana is one of the countries that specifically excludes any person with political connections from serving on the boundary commission. Other examples include Australia, Canada, India, and Mauritius. Election Management Bodies Another, equally common, approach to delimiting constituencies is the use of the election commission. In some countries, the election commission is quite independent of the executive and the legislature (Lithuania, Mexico, and Poland, for example), but in other countries this is less true (e.g., Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania). Legislature Although many countries have delegated the task of delimitation to an authority other than the obviously self-interested legislature, in some countries the legislature has retained this responsibility. However, a number of countries in which the legislature is responsible for delimitation are countries with List Proportional Representation (List PR) electoral systems. The legislatures in these countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden) originally defined a set of electoral district boundaries (often multimember districts) in the constitution or electoral law, and these constituencies have remained in place for subsequent elections – although the number of seats assigned to the multimember constituencies vary over time depending on the population size. A second set of countries in which the legislature plays a role in the delimitation process are countries with mixed electoral systems like Italy, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, and Panama. The boundaries of the constituencies in these countries are of less political consequence than in those with a First Past the Post electoral system because a separate set of legislative seats are filled via proportional representation. Elections in mixed systems usually produce outcomes that are far more proportional than FPTP systems. The United States is one of the very few democracies that allows the legislature a dominant role in the delimitation process given that the election of legislators is based solely on single-member constituencies. The consequence of this approach, at least in the United States, is that partisan politics plays a very large role – and often quite explicit role – in the redistricting process. For example, on several occasions when a redistricting plan was challenged in court on the grounds that the plan constituted a racial gerrymandering, defendants claimed that politics, and not race, was the motivating factor behind the plan hence the plan was neither illegal nor unconstitutional. Notes: [1] New Zealand established an independent boundary commission in 1887 that included government-appointed members; however, the government-appointed members never exceeded the number of politically neutral
public servants included on the commission. Partisan Considerations in Choosing a Boundary AuthoritySince different electoral district configurations produce different election outcomes, even if voting patterns remain constant, the designation of a boundary authority and the powers granted to that authority are very important. In the nineteenth century, districts almost everywhere were drawn by the legislatures. Legislators from the majority political party were often tempted to draw districting plans that favoured their own candidates at the expense of the candidates from other parties. The redistricting, process came under increasing attack for political bias because of this practice. Over the past fifty years, a growing number of countries have moved to neutral or non-partisan commissions to avoid politically biased redistricting. In 1964, when Canada adopted independent electoral boundary commissions for redistricting, the United States was left as one of the few long-standing liberal democracies where the redistricting process remains in the hands of the politicians. The United States has also been one of the only countries to accept partisanship as an inevitable part of the redistricting process. Disagreeing with the proposition that politics cannot be removed from the redistricting process, many countries have established neutral commissions and enacted rules for drawing district boundaries. These commissions have no formal links to political parties, and commissioners are not permitted to consider political data when drawing district boundaries. Instead, commissioners are obliged to consider criteria such as equal population and respect for administrative boundaries in deciding upon district configurations. Since the adoption of these reforms, few have questioned the neutrality of the redistricting process in these countries. The only drawback to the non-partisan approach to redistricting is that it does not necessarily produce a politically unbiased redistricting plan: Ignoring politics does not mean that a districting plan has no political effect. The non-partisan approach guarantees only that any political bias in a districting plan is unintentional. Solutions for Political Bias in Redistricting Some countries have attempted to devise solutions to the problem of political bias in redistricting outcomes. One solution, for example, is to allow representatives of all the major political parties to serve on the body that makes redistricting decisions. Another solution is to permit representatives of major political parties to analyse the potential partisan impact of a districting plan before the plan is enacted and comment on the plans. In the United States, one or both of these approaches have been adopted by most of the states. In the United States, a legislative committee or a bipartisan commission may draw a districting plan. Political data to ascertain the potential partisan effect of a plan will almost certainly be employed. Because a districting plan is almost always enacted by the state legislature, the likely result, however, is a plan that knowingly favours one political party or the incumbent legislators of both parties rather than a politically unbiased plan. New Zealand has adopted another approach to the problem of politically biased outcomes: Two of the seven members of the New Zealand Representation Commission are political appointees. One of these two partisan members represents the governing party, the other one represents the opposition parties. Their presence on the commission helps to ensure that any egregious political bias is recognised and rectified. Because the two political appointees constitute a minority on the commission, they cannot outvote the non-political commissioners. The neutrality of the commission is, therefore, unquestioned. Degrees of Boundary Authority CentralisationCountries vary in the degree to which the delimitation process is centralised. At one end of the spectrum, the delimitation, or redistricting, process is very decentralised, with regional entities such as states or provinces responsible for drawing their own federal electoral districts. Little, if any, federal guidance is provided to these regional entities. At the other end of the spectrum are those countries in which a single central agency is charged with drawing districts for the entire country. In the middle of the spectrum are countries that have established central agencies, but these agencies do not actually draw federal electoral districts. Instead, they may establish guidelines for regional commissions to follow when drawing district boundaries, and they may oversee the federal redistricting process. The United States is at one end of the spectrum. There the redistricting process is completely decentralised. Once the U.S. Congress apportions congressional seats among the states, each of the fifty states is responsible for drawing the allotted number of congressional districts within its own borders. Each state adopts its own redistricting procedures and determines its own redistricting criteria. There is some guidance from the federal government and the courts, however, but this guidance is limited for the most part to the areas of population equality and minority voting rights. Australia and Canada, despite employing federal systems like the United States, have adopted redistricting procedures that are more centralised. In Australia, separate commissions for the redistribution of federal electoral districts were established in each state at the turn of the century. Canada borrowed this practice in 1964 when it determined that federal redistribution should be conducted by independent commissions established in each province. However, both Canada and Australia provide the state or provincial commissions charged with creating federal electoral districts with a uniform set of criteria for redistribution. Both countries also provide some degree of central co-ordination for federal redistribution. Elections Canada, a permanent federal agency, co-ordinates the process of federal redistribution in Canada by bringing commission chairpersons together for discussions before the process begins. Elections Canada also provides each provincial commission with a database for federal redistricting and trained support staff. In Australia, the federal electoral commissioner--the administrative head and one of the three members of the Australian Electoral Commission--has a seat on each of the state redistribution commissions charged with federal redistricting. The other two members of the Australian Electoral Commission are added to form augmented redistribution commissions for federal redistributions within each state. In most other countries, redistricting is centralised in a single federal agency that draws districts for the entire country. In Germany, a permanent seven-member constituency committee determines the district boundaries for the entire country (although each state has a voice in the process). In New Zealand, the seven-member Representation Commission undertakes redistribution for the entire country. In France, the Ministry of Interior drew district lines for the entire country when single-member districts were restored in 1986. And in India, when redistribution last occurred in 1973, a delimitation commission conducted the process administratively for the entire country. Conclusion A major advantage of a centralised redistricting process is that the redistricting criteria can be interpreted or applied without regional variation and, as a result, districts may be more uniform in construction. A major advantage of a decentralised process is that district boundaries are drawn by individuals more familiar with regional geography, communities of interest and other local circumstances. Authority for Choosing the Final Districting PlanIn the nineteenth century, in nearly every country that delimited districts, legislative approval was required before a redistricting plan could be implemented. Recent reforms designed to remove politics from the redistricting process have reduced the power of legislatures to approve redistricting plans. In many countries today, the legislature plays only a limited role or no role at all in the redistricting process. However, some countries do require executive approval, rather than legislative approval, before a redistricting plan can be implemented. While this removes the decision from legislators--those who directly benefit from the districting plan--it still leaves the redistricting process open to charges of political influence. In the majority of countries that assign election management bodies the task of delimiting constituencies, the election commission serves as the final authority; the approval of the legislature or executive is not required to implement the delimitation plan. This is less true of boundary commissions – more often than not, a constituency plan proposed by a boundary commission must be enacted by the legislature (or signed by the executive) before it can be implemented. However, in New Zealand, for example, the final plan of the Representation Committee, once published, cannot be changed or appealed. Since 1983, Australia’s augmented Electoral Commission has had the same power. The constituency boundaries created by the Delimitation Commission in India are also final. In other countries, the legislature can debate and, possibly, even delay the enactment of a commission's plan, but it cannot modify the plan. In Canada, for instance, the 1964 Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act removed the responsibility for redistricting from the Parliament and gave it to independent electoral commissions in each province. Parliament is permitted to consider plans produced by the commissions but has no vote on their implementation. Parliament used this provision to delay the implementation of plans, however, prompting a change in the law--there is now a sixty day limit on Parliamentary debate and consideration. In the United Kingdom, the final proposals of the four Boundary Commissions take effect only after an affirmative vote by Parliament. But Parliament's power to accept or reject a plan is a formality. It has almost always affirmed commission proposals; to do otherwise would be viewed as "political." The only two exceptions were in 1948, when Parliament proposed the addition of seventeen seats for under-represented urban areas, and in 1969, when Parliament delayed the implementation of a redistribution plan on the grounds that impending changes to local government boundaries would render the plan obsolete. Conservatives viewed both of these actions by the Labour government as political. Some countries have provisions requiring the legislature to either accept or reject the proposed delimitation plan, but specifically do not grant parliament the authority to modify the plan. Examples of this approach include Malaysia, Mauritius, and Papua New Guinea. The United States is the anomaly with regard to legislatures and the adoption of redistricting plans. Most states assign the task of federal redistricting to the state legislature. The few that assign the task to an agency or a commission still require an affirmative vote of the state legislature to enact a redistricting plan. Conclusion Allowing the legislature to accept or reject a plan--let alone create it--opens the redistricting process up to charges of political bias. In fact, many plans adopted by legislatures do favour one political party over others. Still, plans drawn by neutral commissions can also produce politically biased election outcomes, however unintentional. Frequency of Electoral District DelimitationThe majority of countries that delimit electoral districts have established some mandatory time interval within which delimitation must occur. Although there is no standard time period, the range of intervals for delimitation is not particularly large. The Seychelles requires the delimitation of new constituency boundaries as often as every three years if necessary. On the other hand, France requires the delimitation of electoral districts only every 12 to 14 years. The most popular choice for periodic delimitation appears to be ten years: Botswana, Canada, India, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, the United States, and Yemen all have electoral laws or constitutional provisions requiring delimitation at least every 10 years (in the case of Botswana, the requirement is every five to ten years; in Kenya, the law dictates that delimitation occur every eight to ten years). Albania, Bahamas, Fiji, New Zealand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe redraw their electoral districts every five years. Australia delimits at least every seven years. Ireland is required to delimit multimember constituencies for their Single Transferable Voting System every 12 years; the United Kingdom also permits up to twelve years to lapse before undertaking another delimitation exercise. Of course, the establishment of a mandatory time interval does not necessarily mean that redistricting will occur. After delimiting constituencies in 1973, India placed a moratorium on delimitation until after the year 2000, despite a legal provision requiring redistricting after every decennial census. No specific time interval has been established in about one third of the countries that delimit electoral districts. Common triggers for delimitation other than a specified time period include: following a national census, a change in the number of seats apportioned to an area, changes in administrative boundaries, and reaching a prescribed level of malapportionment. For example, in Macedonia, the degree of malapportionment cannot exceed three percent; if it does, delimitation must occur. In the Czech Republic, the prescribed level of malapportionment prompting a delimitation exercise is 15 percent; in Germany, the trigger is 25 percent. The disadvantage of infrequent redistricting is the wide discrepancies in district populations that often result over time. Districts that are drawn with very small population deviations at the beginning of a decade, for instance, may vary considerably in size by the end of the decade. Australia has adopted a unique solution to this problem. Rather than use current enrollent figures, federal electoral districts are redrawn using projections, such that the number of electors enrolled in each district will be equal three and one-half years into the future, the midpoint of Australia's seven-year redistricting cycle. Conclusion The disadvantages of frequent redistricting are the costs in money and time to undertake the process. In addition, frequent changes to district boundaries disrupt ties between representatives and their constituencies. To determine the optimal interval, countries must balance the costs of redistricting with the benefits of maintaining districts with some measure of population equality. Length of Time Permitted for the Delimitation ProcessWhile there are no time constraints on the delimitation process in some countries, other countries impose quite rigid constraints on the length of time permitted for the redistricting process. The existence or absence of a legal deadline, however, does not necessarily relate to the time actually taken to redraw districts. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom imposes a mandatory time limit for completion of the redistricting process. Although there is no federal law and few state constitutions that set time limits, candidate-filing deadlines for upcoming congressional elections serve as a practical deadline for federal redistricting in the United States. If a state legislature does not complete redistricting by the candidate-filing deadline, the courts will intervene and either draw a plan of their own or implement a districting plan proposed by one of the parties to the court case. Hence, the practical, if not legally imposed, time period for redistricting in the United States is two years, beginning with the date that numbers from the decennial census are released and ending with the candidate-filing deadline for the first congressional election of the decade. In the United Kingdom, the redistribution process can take more than twice as long as it does in the United States. In fact, the English Boundary Commission Report released in 1983 took seven years to complete. The last English Boundary Commission Report, completed in 1995, took four years to prepare. By contrast, redistricting in Australia and New Zealand takes less than one year. In 1984, for example, Australia undertook an extensive redistribution. Districts for the 125 seats in the Lower House were redrawn to create 148 new districts. The entire process--drawing up proposals, holding public inquiries, and modifying proposals to produce a final plan--took only six months to complete. Prior to 1993, the Representation Commission in New Zealand was required to publish a final plan no later than six months after formal deliberations began. The 1993 Electoral Act, however, does not contain this time restraint. Two factors that appear to affect the length of time needed for redistricting are the design of the public inquiry process and whether the legislature is permitted to debate or modify a redistricting plan. The elaborate public inquiry process utilised in the United Kingdom adds considerably to the time needed for redistribution. (See the case study of the United Kingdom, The United Kingdom Redistribution Process, for a description of the public inquiry process in that country.) In Canada, the major source of delay has traditionally been Parliament. A sixty-day restriction was eventually placed on Parliament for the review of proposed federal redistribution plans. Given the political nature of redistricting in the United States, it is remarkable how quickly the process is completed. Legislatures in most states are responsible for drawing the lines and enacting the final congressional districting plan. Part of the reason for the timeliness in most states is the lack of any structured public input into the redistricting process. While some states did hold public hearings during redistricting in 1991, it is doubtful that these hearings led to significant modifications in any redistricting plans. Conclusion The major disadvantage of a lengthy redistricting process is the same as that associated with a lengthy time interval between redistributions, i.e., large population deviations may result. In England, for example, there were wide discrepancies in district populations following the 1983 redistribution because the Boundary Commission redrew constituencies with voter registration counts from 1976, the year the redistribution process began. Public Access to the Delimitation ProcessOne distinction between countries with redistricting commissions and countries where legislatures or government agencies conduct redistricting is public access to the process. Many countries that have adopted neutral redistricting commissions have incorporated public access provisions as part of the reforms to limit the influence of legislators and political parties in the redistricting process. One of the aims of Canada's Electoral Boundaries Redistribution Act of 1964 was to increase the public's awareness of and involvement in the redistribution process. The Act, modelled on Australia's redistribution process, borrowed Australia's practice of granting the public an opportunity to present suggestions or objections to commission proposals. In Canada today, once an independent electoral commission has completed its proposal and published the map in the local newspapers, the general public is invited to present written briefs or oral representations at public hearings held by the commission. Commissions have received hundreds of comments from a wide variety of sources. Local jurisdictions, political parties, members of Parliament (MPs), candidates for Parliament, political activists and other interested citizens have all offered comments on proposed federal redistribution plans. Redistribution plans have often been revised after these hearings. Although Australia's redistribution process has been modified since Canada borrowed major portions of it, public involvement is still an important part of the process. In 1983, for example, the process was changed to give the public two opportunities to offer comments on proposed redistricting plans. Australia's four-member Redistribution Committee receives suggestions from the public, political parties, candidates, and MPs before beginning to draft a plan. Once the Redistribution Committee has completed a plan, the augmented Electoral Commission hears public objections to the proposed plan, if there are any, and produces a final map. The only avenue for legislators in Australia to comment on a federal redistribution plan is through the public hearing process. See the case study on Australia, Federal Redistribution in Australia, for more details on the public inquiry process in this country. In the United Kingdom, the process of public consultation is similar, although a public inquiry is held only if local authorities or at least one hundred electors object to the proposed map. Despite this caveat, the public consultation process takes much longer to complete in the United Kingdom than in other countries. One reason is that second inquiries may be held if a proposed plan is modified and new objections are raised. The public consultation process is described in detail in the case study of the United Kingdom, The United Kingdom Redistribution Process. In countries without standard procedures for public access, litigation may be the only avenue for the public to challenge a redistricting plan. In the United States, civil rights organisations, public interest groups, and interested citizens frequently file lawsuits if they deem a redistricting plan unfair. One consequence is that the number of redistricting lawsuits filed in the United States is enormous, far greater than in any other country. Increased public access to the redistricting process may or may not reduce the number of court challenges to redistricting plans in the United States since there are other reasons as well for the proliferation of lawsuits. But greater public access to the process would certainly make the process appear more open and democratic. Conclusion The primary advantage to granting public access to the redistricting process is that the outcome is more likely to be viewed as fair if the process is perceived as open and accessible. In countries with plurality or majority electoral systems, granting the public access to the process may be especially important because of the tendency of single-member districts to distort the relationship between the percentage of votes a political party receives and the number of seats the party wins. Establishment of Criteria for Delimiting DistrictsCountries often institute a set of formal rules, or criteria, for their boundary authorities to consider when drawing electoral districts. Although this is especially true in countries that employ boundary commissions or election commissions to draw districts, many countries that allow the legislature or a government agency to redistrict have enacted criteria as well. These rules are usually listed in the electoral law, but they can sometimes be found in the country's constitution. Examples of redistricting rules enacted by selected countries can be found in Election laws or constitutional provisions listing redistricting criteria for selected countries. The rules often specify that districts should be as equal in population as possible. Administrative and/or natural boundaries and other geographic features such as sparsely populated or isolated territory are factors also commonly listed. Respect for communities of interest is another factor many countries specify. In some countries, especially developing countries, redistricters are asked to consider the means of transportation and/or communication as well. Almost all countries that have formal redistricting criteria require that districts be as equal in population as possible. Many countries specify tolerance limits or allowable deviations from the population or electoral quota. The population or electoral quota is simply the population of the territory to be redistricted divided by the number of legislative seats (or districts) to be allocated to that territory. Although the representation of voters has taken precedence over the representation of communities in the twentieth century--as evidenced by the number of countries that require districts to be as equal in population as possible--respect for administrative areas, physically-defined natural communities and geographically concentrated communities of interest continue to play prominent roles in redistricting. In fact, a primary function of single-member districts is to provide representation for geographically-defined communities. Criteria Relating to Election Outcomes Equal population, geographic considerations and communities of interest are criteria that relate directly to the process of creating districts. Other criteria relate to the outcome of the redistricting process--for example, requiring that district plans be drawn so that political parties are fairly represented or that racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities have an equitable chance of representation. But countries that delimit districts usually do not adopt criteria relating to the fairness of the outcome. This is because countries with single-member districts can rarely meet these standards, if fairness of outcome is defined as proportional or near proportional representation for political parties and minority groups. Conclusion Redistricting criteria can conflict with one another. For instance, although almost all countries list population equality as a redistricting criterion, few countries actually have districts that are very close to equal in population. The reason is that other criteria have been deemed more important than strict adherence to population equality. Respect for administrative boundaries and natural communities, for example, often require districts to be smaller or larger than the electoral quota. Countries that establish redistricting criteria must either prioritise the criteria or accept certain inconsistencies in district configuration. Many countries choose to specify the most important criteria and/or place limits (such as tolerance limits) on the boundary authority, but still permit redistricters some discretion in balancing these criteria. Equal Population in RedistrictingThe most widely accepted rule for redistricting is that districts should be relatively equal in population. This is because representation by population is a central tenet of democracy, and, in countries that employ single-member districts, this rule translates into the principle of equal populations across districts. Equally populous districts are necessary if voters are to have an equally weighted voice in the election of representatives. If, for example, a representative is elected from a district that has twice as many voters as another district, voters in the larger district will have half as much influence as voters in the smaller district. The degree to which countries require population “equality” and the population figure (for example, total population, citizen population, registered voters) that is used to determine equality differs across countries. Approximately half of the countries that delimit districts use “total population” as the population base for determining equality across electoral districts. Another third of the countries employ registered voters as the population base. Several European countries use citizen population as the relevant base for determining population equality. Lesotho uses the voting age population as the base; Belarus uses the number of voters in the previous election. The degree to which countries demand population equality also varies. Many countries have no established tolerance limit regarding the extent to which constituencies are permitted to deviate from the population quota. Among those that have established limits there is a range from “virtually no deviation allowed” (the United States) to as high as a 30 percent tolerance limit (Singapore). Deviations from Population Quotas Minimal The United States is unique in its adherence to the doctrine of equal population. No other country requires deviations as minimal as the “one person, one vote” standard that has been imposed by U.S. courts since the early 1960s. In the 1983 court case Karcher v. Daggett, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is no point at which population deviations in a congressional redistricting plan can be considered inconsequential: “there are no de minimus variations which could practically be avoided but which nonetheless meet the standard of Article I, Section 2 [of the U.S. Constitution] without justification.” The Court went on to reject a New Jersey congressional redistricting plan that had a total population deviation of only .7 percent. Following this decision, most states interpreted Karcher as requiring the adoption of congressional redistricting plans with exact mathematical population equality or, at minimum, with the lowest possible population deviation. Although the courts later upheld the legality of some redistricting plans that had less than the absolute de minimus population variation possible, none of the plans upheld contained total deviations of even one percent. Medium Macedonia, with a Regional List PR electoral system and six electoral districts, comes closest to this strict standard, with allowable deviations of no more than plus or minus three percent from the population quota. New Zealand, Albania, and Yemen allow deviations of up to five percent from the population quota. Australia, Belarus, Italy, and the Ukraine specify 10 percent as the maximum allowable deviation. The population requirement in Australia, however, is actually more complicated than a 10 percent tolerance limit: Australian election law also requires that electoral districts deviate by no more than 3.5 percent, three years and six months after the expected completion of the redistribution. This criterion was devised to produce equality of population halfway through the seven-year Australian districting cycle and to avoid wide discrepancies at the end of the delimitation cycle. To meet this requirement, the Australian delimitation commission (referred to as the Redistribution Commission) must use population projections as well as current population data. Australia's close attention to population equality is relatively recent. Thirty years ago, the practice of heavy rural loading--creating rural districts that were much smaller in population than urban districts--was quite common. (For more information on Australian redistricting practices, see the case study on Australia, Federal Redistribution in Australia.) Large Armenia, Germany, and the Czech Republic allow population deviations of no more than 15 percent. (In Germany, proposed electoral districts cannot deviate by more than 15 percent, and districts that deviate by more than 25 percent must be redrawn.) Zimbabwe and Papua New Guinea have set the maximum allowable deviation at 20 percent. In Canada, the independent commissions charged with creating federal electoral districts are allowed to deviate by up to 25 percent from the provincial quotas. But since 1986, commissions have been permitted to exceed the 25 percent limit under "extraordinary circumstances." This provision was used to create five of the 295 seats in the Canadian House of Commons in 1987, and two of 301 seats in 1996. In 1996, one Quebec seat was created with a population 40.2 percent below the provincial average, and one Newfoundland district was created with a population 62.5 percent below the provincial average. (For more information on Canadian redistribution, see the case study on Canada, Representation in the Canadian Parliament.) The United Kingdom allows even larger deviations in district populations. The original standard was set at 25 percent in 1944. But the standard was repealed only two years later. The current rule requires that constituencies be "as equal as possible," but this rule must be balanced against the principle of respect for local boundaries as much as possible. Equally populous districts can also be disregarded for "special geographic circumstances." Allowances for natural communities prompted English boundary commissioners in 1983 to leave the Isle of Wight with 95,000 electors as a single constituency, while respect for local London boundaries left suburban Surbiton with only 48,000 electors. Likewise, recognising the difficulties of island travel, the commissioners in Scotland granted the Western Isles (population 24,000) and Orkney and Shetland (population 31,000) their own representatives. Conclusion The degree to which a country adheres to strict equality of population is related to the significance attached to individual political equality. The United States is strongly committed to individual rights, so perhaps it is not surprising that it developed the strictest population deviation standards of any country using single-member districts. Other countries, while recognising the importance of population equality, have chosen to balance this factor against other redistricting criteria perceived as equally valid. In the United Kingdom, respect for local administrative boundaries is given precedence over exact equality of number. In many African countries, the need to keep individual tribes intact in a single electoral district may take precedence over population equality. Each country must determine how much variation from the ideal of exact population equality will be tolerated to accommodate other redistricting goals. Geographic Criteria for Delimiting Electoral Districts
In many countries, the electoral laws specify that geography, or certain geographic factors, be taken into account when delimiting electoral district lines. Geographic criteria can be divided into two categories--criteria relating to geographic boundaries and criteria relating to geographic size and/or shape. A boundary authority may be asked to consider factors from either or both criteria. Criteria Related to Geographic Boundaries Respect for clearly established boundary lines is often specified as a criterion for those redistricting to consider when drawing electoral district lines. These boundaries can include administrative boundaries such as county and municipality lines and/or natural boundaries created by dominant topographical features such as mountain ranges, rivers or islands. Perhaps the most commonly mentioned geographic factor listed by countries is consideration for local administrative boundaries. Dozens of countries list this as a criterion to consider including: Albania, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Fiji, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Tanzania, Uganda, United Kingdom, and Yemen. Botswana’s Constitution specifies consideration of not only administrative district boundaries, but the boundaries of tribal territories. Another geographic feature commonly listed is population density or sparseness of population. Several Caribbean countries as well as Kenya, Mauritius, Nepal and Papua New Guinea identify this as a factor to take into account when redistricting. In Malaysia, the Election Commission is required to weight sparsely populated rural constituencies in a manner to guarantee their over-representation in the legislature. Geographic redistricting criteria such as respect for administrative boundaries and physically defined natural communities are a higher priority in some countries than in others. In the United Kingdom, for example, respect for local administrative boundaries and natural communities is the most important concept guiding boundary commissioners. Large population disparities are tolerated as a result. Criteria Related to Geographic Size and Shape Two other factors that are sometimes listed as redistricting criteria relate specifically to the geometric shape of a district: contiguity and compactness. Advocates of these criteria hold that districts should not be oddly shaped and that all pieces of a district should be inter-connected. The election commission in Mexico, for example, is required to create electoral districts in which the perimeters are regular in shape. Other countries that specify that constituencies be compact include Albania, Armenia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Dominican Republic, India, Italy, Pakistan, and the United States. In the United States, district compactness has not been required by federal law since 1929, but when a number of states created some bizarrely-shaped districts in the1990s round of redistricting, the U.S. Supreme ordered the redrawing of a number of these districts. Although the shape of these districts was not actually the basis for the Court's decision, the fact that the districts were not compact was considered evidence of an impermissible motive in creating the district boundaries. (For additional discussion of these court cases see Role of the Courts in Electoral District Delimitation.)
Special Provisions for Minority Groups When Delimiting Electoral DistrictsCriteria specifying fairness for minority groups within a country focus on the electoral outcome, rather than the process, of redistricting. Electoral systems that rely on single-member districts, however, cannot guarantee proportional representation or even some minimal percentage of seats for ethnic, racial, religious or other minority groups in the population. This is particularly true of electoral systems that rely solely on single-member districts for the election of representatives (i.e., FPTP and AV systems). On the other hand, List PR and Mixed systems – such as Parallel and MMP systems – can accommodate requirements for minority representation within the context of the party lists if so desired. In districted systems, voters of a specific minority group will find it very difficult to elect members of their group to legislative office if voting is polarized along majority-minority lines. Only if separate seats are reserved for this minority group, or if special electoral districts are drawn for the group, will minority voters succeed in electing minority representatives. A few countries have made such special provisions to ensure that racial, ethnic, or religious minorities are represented in the legislature. Examples of these countries include Croatia, Fiji, India, Mauritius, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, and the United States. Croatia, which has a List PR electoral system with electoral districts that are not typically redrawn, reserves specific districts for members of the (1) Hungarian, (2) Czech and Slovak, and (3) Ruthenian and Ukrainian and German and Austrian minorities. In addition, three seats are specifically reserved for the Serbian minority within the Republic of Croatia. In the Block Vote (or Party Block Vote) systems of Mauritius, Singapore, and the Palestinian Territories, a number of seats are reserved for minorities:
India and Pakistan, both with FPTP electoral systems, have specifically reserved single-member districts to ensure the representation of certain minorities:
Fiji and Papua New Guinea, each with Alternative Vote systems, have separate sets of communal seats to guarantee representation of the major ethnic groups. In Fiji, for example, the 71 legislative constituencies are comprised of 46 “communal” constituencies and 25 “open” constituencies (where all eligible voters, regardless of race/ethnicity, caste votes), with the “communal” members elected as follows:
Minority Representation in the United States The United States, because of its sizeable racial and ethnic minority population and its history of discrimination against certain minority groups, has had to address the issue of fairness to minorities in promulgating redistricting plans. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its amendments in 1982 have established that a redistricting plan that dilutes the voting strength of minority voters by dividing the minority community among different districts may be invalid. Protected minority groups (blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans) must meet three conditions to qualify for this protection:
If a minority group is able to satisfy all three of these conditions, a redistricting plan must be fashioned such that minority voters constitute a majority of voters in one or more districts. The minority community must demonstrate that these conditions are satisfied in a court proceeding. In fact, in a series of recent court decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court held that several jurisdictions that created "majority minority" districts voluntarily--that is, without being required by a court to do so--must redraw these "majority minority" districts without taking race or ethnicity into account. The Voting Rights Act guarantees racial and ethnic fairness in some minimal sense in the United States. It is minimal because only minority communities that are able to satisfy all three of the conditions are given an opportunity to form the majority of a district and elect a candidate of choice. Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans are far from proportionally represented in the United States Congress. The minority community in New Zealand is better represented in the legislature because of a more effective provision. Minority Representation in New Zealand A unique feature of New Zealand's electoral system is a provision for representation of the descendants of New Zealand's aboriginal Maori population. In addition to sixty general legislative districts, the Representation Commission creates several Maori districts (five Maori districts were created in 1993, six in 1998, and seven in 2001, for example). These Maori districts are geographically defined and overlay the general electoral districts. To vote in a Maori district, rather than a general election district, a Maori voter must register on the Maori roll. Registration on this roll is optional; Maoris can choose to register on the general roll instead. Because of this electoral feature, Maoris have been represented in the legislature roughly in proportion to their percentage of the population for more than a decade. (See the case study on New Zealand, Electoral Redistribution in New Zealand, for a more detailed description of this provision.) Conclusion Countries that delimit single-member districts cannot guarantee proportional representation to minority political parties or to minority groups within their borders, at least not without special provisions or additional seats elected by a party list vote. Instead, redistricting criteria may be adopted to ensure a fair and impartial redistricting process. Although this will not necessarily produce proportional, or even minimal, representation for minority parties or groups, it does guarantee that any bias is unintentional. Countries with deep racial, ethnic or religious divisions usually opt for some form of proportional representation rather than relying on single-member districts to elect representatives. Unless the minority group is geographically concentrated or special provisions for minority representation are adopted, the election outcome produced by single-member districts will benefit some groups at the expense of others. In a deeply divided country, this fact may well lead to instability rather than foster strong and stable governments. Communities of Interest: Delimiting Boundaries
Because of requirements that single-member districts be relatively equal in population, single-member districts often do not reflect distinct geographic communities as signified by municipal, county or other administrative boundary lines. This does not mean, however, that political representation has been divorced from the notion of "community" in countries that delimit single-member districts. Many countries that delimit single-member districts continue to emphasise the importance of creating districts that correspond as closely as possible to pre-existing communities, defined as administrative divisions and/or "communities of interest." The rationale for recognising communities in redistricting is that electoral districts should be more than conglomerations of arbitrary, random groups of individuals. Districts should, as much as possible, be cohesive units with common interests related to representation. This makes a representative's job of articulating the interests of his or her constituency much easier. Defining Communities of Interest A "community of interest" is rarely defined by statute but it is generally thought of as a group of individuals united by shared interests or values. These shared interests may be the result of a common history or culture, a common ethnic or tribal background, or a variety of other ties that create a community of voters with distinct interests. Although the perimeter of a community of interest may correspond to the boundaries of an administrative division, this is not necessarily the case. For example, a river may form a boundary between two administrative divisions, but the entire river valley may comprise a unified community of interest. In this instance, an electoral district that follows the administrative boundary would divide a community of interest. In general, criteria related to communities of interest can be divided into three categories: (1) criteria related to administrative or geographic boundaries; (2) criteria related to common interests or common characteristics; and (3) criteria related to patterns of interaction. Criteria related to administrative or geographic boundaries are discussed under Geographic Criteria for Delimiting Electoral Districts. Some of the criteria related to common interests or characteristics are:
Some of the criteria related to patterns of interaction are:
Most countries’ electoral laws do not elaborate on what specific communities of interest are relevant to delimitation; the boundary authority is simply instructed to take into account “communities of interest.” German electoral law states that constituencies should form a “coherent” area. Nepal, Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea electoral law instruct the boundary authority to consider “community and diversity of interest” or “homogeneity and heterogeneity of the community.” Australian electoral law offers more guidance, stating that the Redistribution Committee shall give due consideration to “community of interests within the proposed Electoral Division, including economic, social and regional interests.” A handful of countries offer more explicit instructions as to what communities of interest are particularly pertinent when delimiting constituencies. In Hungary, for example, the boundary authority is to take account of ethnic, religious, historical, and other local characteristics when creating electoral districts. Panama and the Ukraine also require consideration of minority populations: in the Ukraine, the “density of national minority populations” is to be taken into account; in Panama, “concentrations of indigenous populations” must be considered. Minus electoral law provisions specifically designed to promote minority representation, however, criteria requiring “due consideration” of the minority population is likely to have little impact on integrating the halls of government with minority representatives. Conclusion Redistricting criteria inevitably conflict with one another. One possible means of resolving a conflict between criteria is to determine the most salient or most important "community of interest" in a given instance. Public hearings are essential to this process. For example, a redistricting plan that follows ethnic community boundaries rather than administrative boundaries may prevail if members of the public assert that the ethnic community boundaries are more relevant to them than administrative boundaries.
Role of the Courts in Electoral District DelimitationIt appears that the courts have no role at all in the delimitation process in the majority of countries that delimit electoral districts. In fact, in some countries, such as Pakistan and Tanzania, there is a specific bar against court involvement in the delimitation process. Other countries grant the court some function in the delimitation process, although in some instances, only in a very limited capacity. Examples of countries in which the court has a role in the delimitation process include Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Fiji, France, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Lithuania, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, United Kingdom, and the United States. Delimitation plans can be challenged, and have been to a limited degree, in the courts in Nigeria, Uganda and other Anglophone African countries. In Fiji, judicial review is permitted, but no one has challenged a delimitation plan to date. The only court challenge to a delimitation plan filed to date in the United Kingdom was unsuccessful, and this appears to have discouraged subsequent litigation on the issue of fairness of a delimitation plan or the delimitation process in this country. The Canadian courts have only recently ventured into consideration of delimitation acts; the first challenge to a federal electoral district plan was filed in Canada in 1987. The major exception to limited judicial involvement is the United States, where the courts have decided hundreds of cases brought against congressional and state legislative districting plans. Britain In 1982, the Labour Party brought suit against the English Boundary Commission, challenging the Commission's newly completed redistribution plan. The Labour Party argued that the commission had given too much weight to "natural communities" and county boundaries in the plan and too little weight to ensuring equal electorates. There were, in fact, large disparities in population across constituencies. Both the Isle of Wight and the London suburb of Surbiton, for example, were designated as single seats, but the Isle of Wight had an electorate of 95,000 and Surbiton had only 48,000 electors. The court, however, in its decision in R. v. Boundary Commission for England ex parte Foot[1], found no evidence that the commission had failed to undertake its statutory obligation to ensure equality of numbers. The court found that the boundary commission necessarily enjoyed a considerable degree of flexibility in interpreting redistribution rules. Furthermore, the court indicated a reluctance to interfere in a sphere that was clearly within Parliament's jurisdiction. To date, the court in Britain has not been asked to consider the fairness of another redistribution plan. United States American courts entered the political thicket of redistricting in 1962 when the United States Supreme Court ruled in Baker v. Carr that voters could challenge redistricting plans. Prior to this decision, the courts had refused to become involved in the line drawing process. The courts considered redistricting to be a political question, best resolved by the state legislatures. Since the Baker decision, the courts have become active participants in the redistricting process to an extent unparalleled in any other country. Courts have established many of the rules that govern the redistricting process in the United States. These include rules on equal population, minority voting rights, political and racial gerrymandering, and numerous provisions of individual state redistricting laws. In addition, the courts are frequently called upon to draw district boundaries when the legislatures are unable to agree on redistricting plans that satisfy legal or constitutional requirements. The United States Supreme Court's initial involvement with the redistricting process concerned the issue of equal population between districts. During the early part of the twentieth century, the American population was largely transformed from a rural to an urban majority. Politicians from rural areas, afraid of losing power and representation in the legislatures, either refused to redraw districts or redrew districts that clearly favoured the rural minority. As a result, legislative districts were often severely malapportioned. Although originally hesitant to address the issue, the Supreme Court ultimately determined, beginning with Baker, that large inequalities in district populations violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In the case of Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), the Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. Constitution required congressional districts to have populations that were as "nearly equal as practicable." This standard was further refined in Karcher v. Daggett (1983), in which the Court rejected a congressional redistricting plan for the State of New Jersey that contained a population deviation between districts of less that one percent. Under Karcher, unless a congressional redistricting plan contains the least possible population deviation between districts, a state may be required to prove that the deviation was necessary to achieve a legitimate goal. The practical effect of this ruling has been to require states to draw congressional districts with nearly the exact same populations. Equality of population is not the only redistricting criterion American courts have addressed. The United States Supreme Court has also recognised the right of voters to challenge redistricting plans as dilutive of minority voting rights under the Voting Rights Act or as unconstitutional partisan or racial gerrymanders under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Davis v. Bandemer (1986), the United States Supreme Court ruled that a redistricting plan that discriminates against an identifiable political group or party may violate the U.S. Constitution. The Court recognised, however, the highly partisan nature of the American redistricting process and imposed a very difficult burden on voters who make such a claim. To succeed, voters must prove that they have been denied any influence in the electoral system and that they are substantially shut out of the political process. Despite a number of challenges, no congressional or state legislative redistricting plan has been invalidated by the courts on the grounds that the plan constitutes a partisan gerrymander. Voters seeking redress for redistricting plans that dilute minority voting strength have been far more successful, until recently. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was designed to prevent the dilution or abridgement of the voting rights of minority voters. The Act was amended in 1982 to make it clear that redistricting plans that diluted minority voting strength were illegal. In Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), the Supreme Court was asked to consider the 1982 amendments to the Act. The Court ruled in Gingles that to succeed on a voting rights act claim, minority voters must establish three factors:
The Gingles decision established a clear and objective standard for minority claimants to satisfy, which encouraged minority groups to bring suits against redistricting plans that they felt were discriminatory. If minority groups were able to satisfy the three Gingles factors, the courts required the redrawing of the district boundaries. This led to a substantial increase in the number of "majority minority" districts and to an increase in the number of minority representatives elected to office. These gains in minority representation, however, have recently been threatened. In a string of court cases beginning with Shaw v. Reno in 1993, the United States Supreme Court ruled that voters could challenge a redistricting plan that contained "majority minority" districts drawn on the basis of race. If voters can prove that race was the predominant motivating factor in the drawing of particular districts, a state must show that the challenged districts were "narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest." This standard has proved virtually impossible for states to satisfy. The effect of Shaw and successive decisions has been to place in jeopardy numerous majority black and Hispanic districts that were drawn following the 1990 census and to make it more difficult to create such districts in the future. (For a more detailed discussion of the role of the U.S. courts in the creation of "majority minority" districts, see US: Ethnic Minorities and Single-Member Districts.) In a single generation, American courts have moved from declining to exercise jurisdiction in redistricting disputes to participating in the redistricting process as one of the key players. Today in the United States, it is not at all unusual for a redistricting plan not only to be challenged in court but even to be drawn by a court. Canada The role of Canadian courts in the redistricting process has been minor compared to the very active role played by courts in the United States [2]. In fact, it was only recently that Canadian voters could even request that the courts consider the fairness of an electoral boundaries plan. Prior to the passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, opponents of a redistricting plan had no recourse in the courts. The charter provided the first constitutional mechanism for challenging electoral boundaries and the legislation under which electoral commissions carry out their mandates. The first case to accept the justiciability of the issue of fairness of an electoral boundaries map was Dixon v. Attorney General of British Columbia. The Dixon case, decided in 1989, involved a challenge to British Columbia's provincial electoral map. The B.C. Supreme Court found that the province's electoral districts, varying in population from 5,511 to 68,347, violated the right to vote guaranteed by Section 3 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The province had used a complex quota system rather than a tolerance limit, such as the 25 percent rule that guided the drawing of federal electoral maps. The British Columbia Supreme Court decreed that "equality of voting power is the single most important factor to be considered in determining electoral boundaries." It ruled that a new set of districts with more equitable populations must be created. A second challenge to a provincial map was filed two years later in Saskatchewan. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal found the electoral boundaries to be unconstitutional on the grounds that the right to vote includes the requirement that "one person, one vote" must be the ideal in evaluating electoral distribution schemes. It objected to constituencies that ranged in population from 6,309 to 12,567 electors and to the legislatively prescribed distribution of constituencies among urban and rural seats. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which reversed the lower court decision in Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries, Saskatchewan (1991), commonly referred to as the Carter decision. In Carter, the Supreme Court of Canada reinstated the Saskatchewan district plan and held that "the purpose of the right to vote enshrined in Section 3 of the Charter is not equality of voting power per se, but the right to 'effective representation.'" In rejecting a strict population equality requirement, the Court indicated that effective representation could be achieved by "relative parity of voting power," modified where necessary to take into account other valid factors. In the Court's view, geography, community history, community interest, and minority representation should also be considered when redrawing district boundaries "to ensure that our legislative assemblies effectively represent the diversity of our social mosaic." The courts have been called upon to render opinions on the constitutionality of provincial electoral maps or the legislation under which the commissions carry out their mandates in other provinces as well. For example, in 1991, the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld electoral boundary legislation which included a variance rule of 25 percent, with some exceptions for sparsely populated areas. In a subsequent case decided in 1994, the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld an electoral map produced by a committee of the legislature that had undertaken its work independently of the prescribed readjustment rules. The Prince Edward Island provincial electoral map that replaced an earlier, unconstitutional map was upheld in 1996. The original provincial map, which had remained largely unchanged for a hundred years, and contained very large differences in population across districts, was struck down in Mackinnon v. Prince Edward Island in 1993. Its successor map, while containing no population deviations in excess of 25 percent, was challenged on the grounds that it over-represented rural areas and failed to conform to the municipal boundaries of cities such as Charlottetown. The Prince Edward Island Supreme Court, however, in City of Charlottetown et al. v. Prince Edward Island et al. (1996) upheld the map. The only redistricting issue the Canadian courts have been asked to address thus far is the issue of voter equality. And the Canadian courts have clearly chosen not to follow the path of American courts and their very strict adherence to population equality. Whether Canadian courts can avoid the profusion of redistricting lawsuits on other redistricting issues that has been experienced in the United States, however, remains to be seen. An explanation of the relative paucity of court challenges in Canada could simply be the relatively short history of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Alternatively, the explanation for the relatively few number of court challenges may lie in the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada has accepted both the 25 percent population deviation limits and the "extraordinary circumstances" clause permitting deviations in excess of 25 percent. This acceptance may provide independent electoral commissions with sufficient leeway to save their maps from legal challenge [3]. Conclusion In most countries, court challenges to electoral district boundaries are few in number or non-existent – either there is no right to appeal a redistricting plan to the courts or the grounds for such an appeal are very limited. It is only in the United States that the courts play a major role in the redistricting process. But in the United States redistricting tends to be very partisan, and public access to the process is very limited. Often, the only recourse voters have to challenge a plan is through the courts. The courts, at least in theory, serve as the safeguard against egregiously unfair redistricting plans in the United States. Notes: [1] The discussion of R. v. Boundary Commission for England ex parte Foot is based on Robert Waller, "The 1983 Boundary Commission: Policies and Effects," Electoral Studies 2, no. 3 (1983): 195-206. [2] The discussion of the role of the courts in Canadian redistribution draws heavily from a paper by Jennifer Smith entitled "Drawing Electoral Boundaries in Canada: Current Representation Dilemmas." This paper was presented at a conference hosted by the National Center for Geographic Information and Analysis in Buffalo, New York, October 24-26, 1997. [3] This observation was offered by John Courtney, a Canadian academic with considerable experience with and insight into the redistribution process in Canada. |
