Public assurance measures are an integral part of the implementation strategy of any electoral technology that can affect the public. Such measures are another means by which the risks of implementing technology can be minimised.
There are a range of strategies that can be used to assure the public of the reliability of new electoral technology.
Voter information campaigns
Where new electoral technology is introduced, it is important to include the public as stakeholders and to gain their trust in the new system. This may entail a large-scale communications campaign to inform the voting population of the proposed changes.
Before attempting such communication, it may be desirable to use market research methods to test proposals with focus groups or by surveying samples of the population. Significant changes, like the introduction of electronic or Internet voting, may be subject to public inquiries, such as a commission of inquiry or a parliamentary committee inquiry. Public inquiries are a good opportunity to gauge reaction by means of both submissions from the public and the media interest generated by their conduct.
Logic and accuracy tests
Some segments of the public will need more than a voter information campaign to satisfy them that new electoral technology is reliable. These people (such as election candidates, political parties and election reform groups) may need to be convinced that the technology works effectively.
This need can be met by conducting logic and accuracy tests to demonstrate that the technology performs according to specifications, followed by making these test results public.
Code visibility
Another way to satisfy special interest groups of the reliably of electoral technology is to publish the code used for electoral computer programs so that they can be independently analysed. This allows all interested groups to verify, if they wish, that the code being used performs its intended functions.
Where code is published in this way, procedures need to be in place to verify that the code used in practice is the same as the code that has been published. This can be achieved by lodging "escrow" copies of the code with independent authorities, who can compare the escrow copies with the copies used by the election management body and verify that the code is the same.
Publishing code is not routinely done, and is normally only contemplated where a system being used is particularly sensitive, such as an electronic voting or electronic counting system.
Care needs to be taken when code is published, since making it publicly available may expose weaknesses that could be exploited by anyone with access to the code once it is in use.
