Irrespective
of the method of vote counting; manual or automated, each jurisdictions’ vote
counting process often consist of the following:
- verification
and reconciling of the ballots and other voting material,
- sorting
of the ballots into piles representing the different political parties,
candidates and, in the case of referendum, choices,
- counting
of the ballots,
- completion
of the results forms or statement of results,
- capturing
the results,
- announcement
of results,
- Transmission
of results to the next level by one or more channels
Verification
Verification
includes:
- Recording
the number of unused ballots and spoiled ballots. (Spoiled ballots are
those that a voter has inadvertently spoiled by marking it
incorrectly, and then exchanged for a new blank ballot, or ballots that
are improperly printed, torn, soiled, or otherwise marked in a way that
could be linked to an individual voter and does not guarantee vote
secrecy):
- Determining
the total of number of voters who voted according to the voter’s list;
- Unsealing
the ballot box and counting the number of ballots;
- Reconciling
the number of ballots in the box with the number of voters according to
the voters' list or other record of the total number of persons who cast
ballots.
Sorting
The ballots are sorted
according to political parties or candidates (in the case of referendums, by
choices).
In some jurisdictions party
and candidate agents will have an opportunity to object to the sorting by
objecting to the counting officer in charge of counting, either verbally or in
writing, as prescribed by legislation. The counting officer in charge of the
counting will then have to determine action on the objection. (see
Criteria to determine
when votes should count as valid).
Counting
The counting officers then count the number of votes
cast for each party or candidate.
In some jurisdictions party and
candidate agents will have an opportunity to object to the counting by
objecting to the counting officer in charge of counting, either verbally or in
writing, as prescribed by legislation. The counting officer in charge of the
counting will then have to determine action on the objection.
The
counting officer will set aside challenged ballots and determine acceptance or
rejection of challenged ballots according to established rules. (see Criteria to determine
when votes should count as valid).
Completing the results sheet or statement of the vote and capturing the
results
The
statement of the vote, or the results sheet, is compiled, signed, and
transmitted to a local office before being transmitted to the regional or
national level. Representatives of political parties and national and
international electoral observers should receive an official copy of the
results. A copy of the statement of the vote should be made public to the
electorate by posting it at a public and easily accessible spot at the voting
station thereby adhere to the transparency requirement as per international
best practise.
There
is no interruption in the process until the statement of the vote of the voting
station is released and sent in a secure manner together with other election
results relevant material to the local office of the electoral management body.
The results forms are often transported in a tamper-evident bag, or sealed
inside the ballot box with ballot papers, voters list and other pivotal
material. This material is transported by a pre-determined EMB official, who
ought to be accompanied by observers and party agents. Prior to departing the
very same results are often communicated directly to the next level of the results
system hierarchy and/or to the national tally centre in order to facilitate the
release of interim results.
As with
all other aspects of conducting an election, there are administrative
considerations, which are directly or indirectly related to vote counting at
voting stations. Each of these procedural components has particularities and
subtleties associated with it.
Representatives
of political parties and candidates should be able to examine the ballots, and
if they do not agree with the decision of the counting officer, be allowed to
make formal objections that can form the basis for contesting the results of
the count. In many countries, observers and party agents are not allowed to
physically handle any official election material, including ballot papers. As a
result, the counting process must be laid out in such a way that it facilitates
visual access to the count.
Using a
count sheet, all valid ballots are recorded, as well as spoiled and rejected
ballots. All ballots are counted and none are destroyed. A verification of the
count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement
of the vote to avoid any mathematical errors or inconsistencies.
The
ballot box can then be re-sealed (with the new seal number duly noted by party
and candidate representatives and observers), and appropriate counting
documentation can either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a
separate sealed tamper-evident bag.
In some
countries, party and candidate representatives have the opportunity affix their
seals or signatures to the resealed ballot box/es.
The
count at the voting station itself is now over, and all the electoral materials
may be transported to a secure local storage room. In the event of a recount,
all the prepared documents are needed, so elaborate precautions, and sealing
the ballot box contents, are important as not to break the chain of custody.
The
local/national office of the electoral management body totals the results
transmitted by all voting stations of the electoral district, as well as
results of any special ballots, advance polls, and mobile voting stations.
However, observers, party agents and media representatives should always be
able to trace the results from a single voting station through the tabulation
process and verify that the results remain constant, unless a recount prove the
results incorrect, or the results form contains mathematical errors.
Interim
results should include all types of ballots, so as to avoid discrepancies
between interim results and final results. In addition, these results should be
for each political party and candidate and posted on a wall, board, or
spreadsheet, as they become available.
Unofficial
interim results should be publicized as soon as possible. This is often done by
the media or political parties, leaving the announcement of final results to
the electoral management body.
In the
following days, the local offices of the electoral management body may perform
the final count and prepare the official results. If results are challenged,
additional procedures may apply.
Manual or automated vote counting, or a combination of both?
While
the use of manually counted paper ballots is still the most common method of
voting, automated methods of voting and vote counting are becoming more accessible
and effective, and more countries are opting to use them, despite the sometimes
high initial investment required.
Automated
counting, using appropriate technologies and properly procured can be cheaper,
faster, and more accurate than manual counting.
It can
also improve the democratic process by making the counting of complex electoral
systems easier to use. Moreover, in general, it makes the counting process
safer from fraud, since less people are manipulating the ballots.
Technological
approaches can be used to replace traditional paper ballots. Voting directly
using mechanical or electronic devices, or using machine-readable ballots, can
eliminate the need to count ballots manually and greatly speed up the counting
process.
Computing
technology is often used to tabulate the results of manual ballot counts, to
produce summaries at the counting centre, and regional, or national level.
Standard off-the-shelf office software products, such as spreadsheet or
relational database software, can be used to aggregate individual counts and
produce summary totals and various reports, either in paper or electronic
format. However, more sophisticated software applications, using client/server
or web architectures, customised data input screens, data validation, strict
security, auditing and logging controls, are typically necessary to raise the
standard and performance offered by generic database or spreadsheet
applications.
Computer
vote counting systems require care to function correctly. Faulty calculations,
data entry errors, or loss of data can seriously compromise the conduct of an
election.
Rigorous
testing is necessary to ensure electronic election systems work flawlessly
before they are placed in production, even if they are to be used only to
compile preliminary results, or used only for a short time.
Data
entry forms should be designed to minimize error and to facilitate the data
entry process. It is common practice to design data input forms so that they
mirror the data entry screen. Training of persons who manually complete these
forms must stress the importance of legibility and arithmetic accuracy.
As with
any vote counting process, it is crucial that checks and balances be built into
any computerized counting system. Clear audit trails should be in place to
track the progress of the count. Balancing figures should be used to check that
output results are consistent with inputs.
For
example, it should not be possible to calculate a total vote figure for any
level of counting that is higher than the number of ballot papers issued to
voters at that level.
Data
entered into a computerized vote counting system should always be checked
against the original input data. This can be done by checking figures after
data entry against the input documents, or by entering each set of data twice,
by different operators using what is known as double blind data entry.
Contingency
plans should also be built into any computerized vote counting system. Data
should be regularly backed up (and stored off-site if the counting proceeds for
some time). Spare hardware should be available in case of hardware failure.
Where a network server is used, it is common to have a duplicate server set up
that can take over if the main server fails.
Trained
support technicians should be on hand if problems arise. Back up power supplies
should be available to guard against power failure, even in the most developed
countries.
Power
supplies should be protected against power surges that can corrupt or destroy
computer files. Even simple steps, such as regularly saving live data from RAM
memory to hard disk, are sometimes overlooked, and can cause serious problems.
Worst-case
scenarios should also be anticipated. Provision should be made to switch to a
completely manual operation if the computer system fails and cannot be
recovered. Portable calculators are valuable emergency devices. (See Elections and Technology).
