At all
levels of the results tabulation process, procedures and logistics should be
carefully planned for receiving results from several locations at the same
time. The tabulation exercise should ensure transparency, accuracy and minimize
risks of tampering with results forms, or genuine mistakes by enforcing clear
instructions based on an effective staff training program and close supervision
of the results-generating exercise.
A form
with spaces for pre-printed information needed during vote result collection
should be provided to staff answering the phone. In addition, a procedure
requiring the recipient of the results to read back the results received to the
sender for confirmation would reduce the error rate considerably.
Depending
on the level of technology used for results tabulation, various tools could be
utilized to enhance transparency. A wall chart, large white board, or computer
spreadsheet projected on screen listing each voting station could be completed
as the results come in. Once all the information for each election is received,
the combined result for the entire electoral district should be updated. Best
international practice indicates that both aggregated results and results by
voting stations be transmitted to the next level, as this will enable party
agents and observer to track individual statements of votes throughout the
entire results-generating process, without which the transparency requirement
has not been met.
National Level
At the
national level, the same type of logistics should be used, but on a larger
scale. Data communications are easier at the national level and therefore more
commonly used. Since the information needed is often already in electronic
format, it can help to speed up the process for data entry, as well as enabling
pre-developed software checks and manual verification on received results data.
Also, both aggregated results and by voting stations are pro-actively shared
with party representatives, observers and media at the national level.
Even
when results are received from local levels in electronic format, the EMB
cannot accept the results at face value. A first quality control check is done
to verify if the results appear to be correct. Data should be checked for
mathematical correctness, but the software used often includes triggers
requiring closer scrutiny by senior EMB official before cleared for inclusion.
Triggers could be set off by unusually high voter turnout or unprecedented
results in favor of one party. A more exhaustive quality control checking
procedure for each electoral district and its voting stations, will need to be
done when the actual statement of votes forms arrive and are compiled prior to
release of final results.
If a
country is divided into several time zones, the results will come in at
different times of the day at the national level (depending on the closing hour
of the election). The required staff should be carefully scheduled to be
available when they are needed to compile the national interim results.
For
interim results, all types of ballots (if possible) should be included to avoid
any major discrepancy between interim results and final results.
Special
ballots, write-in ballots, mail ballots, as well as ballots cast on ordinary
voting, advance voting, and mobile voting should be part of the count for
interim results.
Depending
on the amount of delay that is acceptable, special ballots can be counted a few
days prior to Election Day, or after the close of voting on Election Day. If
the latter is the case, then the counting procedure should be
designed carefully, so it will still be possible to include special ballot results
in the interim results.
For the
special ballots (mail and write-in ballots), envelopes received at the head
office of the electoral management body are sorted by category: absentee, armed
forces, etc. Different coloured envelopes will facilitate the sorting by
category.
For
mail ballots, three envelopes are originally sent to the voter: a return
mailing envelope containing an outer envelope (on which may appear the bar code
and signature of the voter or other administrative information), and a secrecy
envelope containing the ballot.
After
verification of proper registration and no previous voting having been taken,
and the creation of the audit trail, the secrecy envelope is put into a ballot
box with its ballot still inside.
If the
special ballots are counted a few days prior to Election Day, the results
should be securely kept and only released at the close of the election. In some
jurisdictions special ballots are counted after the Election Day, and in
others, on Election Day.
If advanced-voting
takes place over several days, reconciliation can be done at the end of each
day, but the ballot choices are not counted. The number of ballots must match
the number of voters of each day. This reconciliation measure is done to create
an audit trail of ballot usage.
The
advance vote ballot boxes are then kept safely until voting day, and counting
should take place at an office of the electoral management body at the closing
time of the ordinary voting. The counting of advance voting ballots should be
done in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates and
observers. The counting procedures are nearly identical to those used for
ordinary voting.
Counting
for mobile voting stations may take place at the last place visited, or at an
office of the electoral management body. To count the votes of incarcerated
voters, the procedures used for advance voting may be applied, but, of course,
this will only be possible if voting by incarcerated or imprisoned voters takes
place prior to Election Day.
If
ballot boxes and results are delivered simultaneously (i.e. where telephones,
fax etc. are not available), the local office of the electoral management body
should carefully plan the reception of the ballot boxes and the results.
Planning
must ensure that provision is made for all the ballot boxes and results
arriving at the same time. First, to respect the order of arrival, a receiving
official could immediately give a number to the person arriving from a voting
station with the ballot box and the results.
Then,
in chronological order, the identity of each delivery person should be
verified, the voting station identified, and the results should immediately be
taken and placed in a specified area ready to be compiled.
The
receiving official should then verify the ballot box, and the authenticity of
its seals, and prepare a receipt for the person who delivered the materials, as
well as one for the electoral management body. If the receiving
officer has concerns regarding the ballot box and/or the statement of votes
form, the voting station material should be quarantined for further
investigation. An especially dedicated team of EMB officials trained for such a
task should before this duty. The ballot box should then be removed from the
reception area and be placed in a secure storage room where more detailed
verification can be done.
Use of Technology
Telephones,
SMS and fixed or mobile internet technologies are widely used in the
transmission of electoral results. To ensure the identity of the person transmitting
results, such systems should include authentication of the users and similar
security protocols. In some systems, only pre-authorized cell phones can be
used to transmit results. This is an efficient way to avoid unauthorized people
reporting false results.
As a
general rule, all data transmitted should be encrypted and communication should
use appropriate protocols. The use of encryption and protocols allows us to
enhance the integrity of data in three ways:
- We can ensure that a message
sent from A to B has actually arrived at B
- We can be sure that the message
that arrives at B has not been altered in any way
- We can be sure that a message
arriving at B from A is indeed from A and not from someone masquerading as A.
For all types of transmission, the systems must be
tested prior to voting day to verify their capacity under the heavy use they
will encounter on election night. A technical specialist should also be
available at any time, in case of system failure. A contingency back-up system
should also be created, tested, and fully available.
