Close of Voting

Basic Issues

The close of the voting station can be an intensely pressurized period for voting station officials, especially if:

• there are considerable numbers of voters still waiting to vote at the appointed time for closure;

• there is pressure to commence counts quickly.

Clear systems and instructions, backed by checklists of actions to be taken, will aid correct decision-making during this period.

Use of Roving Supervisors

Where roving voting station supervisors are used, they should ensure that they are at a voting station, rather than in transit, at the time of close of voting and preparation for and commencement of the count.

It will be most effective if they adjust their schedule to ensure that they are present at voting stations where management has been less effective during voting hours.

Preparation for Close of Voting

Under normal circumstances, the voting station should close exactly at the time specified in legislation. It is essential that voting station managers synchronise their watches and clocks with an official time source, so that there can be no later argument as to whether the voting station closed at the correct time.

During the last hour the voting station is open, there may be actions that can be taken in preparation for the close of voting:

• If there are few voters turning out during this period, it may be possible to commence dismantling or packaging some excess equipment and material.

• If the count is to take place at the voting station, some furniture can be reorganise to the layout required for the count.

However, this should only be done if it will not adversely affect voter service during the remainder of voting hours, and no preparation of accountable voting material for the count should occur until voting has closed. Where staffs are eligible to vote at their voting station, voting station managers should ensure that they have had the opportunity to do so before voting closes.

Voters Still Queued to Vote at Time of Closing

Equitable voting procedures will contain provisions that allow all voters inside the voting station area at the time of close of voting to vote. If large crowds of voters are still waiting to vote at the time of close of voting; this would be the result of inadequate voting station resourcing or efficiency, rather than any fault of the voters.

As a service to voters, voting station managers should ensure, wherever possible, that voting station officials move any voters still waiting outside the voting station inside the designated voting station area before the time for close of voting.

If those waiting cannot fit inside the voting station premises (so the doors may be closed), it may be possible to designate the end of the line of voters who arrived before close of voting with rope, tape, or a similar barrier, or the stationing of a voting station official or security officer at the appropriate point.

In compulsory voting systems, an additional service can be provided to voters if voting station officials guarding entrances to the voting station at the close of voting note the details of those voters who arrive after close of voting, for reference during any action regarding failure to vote.

Extension of Voting Hours

Election rules and regulations should define the circumstances under which the hours of voting may be extended and who is accountable for making such a decision. Extension of voting hours can be a very contentious decision.

Voting station managers should not take it upon themselves to decide to extend the hours of voting. To do so will be to invite almost certain challenge to the result of the election.

If considerable numbers of voters are still outside the voting station area waiting to vote or are arriving to vote after the time of close of voting, guidance must be sought from senior electoral management body officials regarding any possible extension to voting hours.

Reasonably effective monitoring of and reporting from voting stations would identify the probabilities of this well before the time for close of voting.

It may be prudent that the electoral management body extends voting hours, or extend voting to a further day. This should be done in accordance with any provisions within the election rules, which would require consultation with all political participants and government executive authorities, and possibly with judicial authorities.

There may be situations threaten the personal safety of voting station staff, or the security of voting materials, and security forces are insufficient to offer protection or unable to provide rapid response. Common sense and self-preservation must prevail in such situations.

If the only way to preserve safety is to allow those who were not at the voting station at the time of close of voting to vote, efforts should be made to keep their ballots and voting records separate, pending a decision on extension of voting or for later adjudication as to their validity.

 

Actions at Close of Voting

At the exact time of close of voting, the voting station manager should officially announce that voting is closed, and the entrances and exits to the voting station should be closed and secured (if the voting station is not within a building, the perimeter of the voting station area will need to be secured).

In environments of low security risk, this could be done by voting station officials; in situations of higher security risk it would be more prudent for security forces to guard entrances/exits.

At the same time, external signs identifying the voting station should be taken down, and voters still in the voting station should be moved outside courteously as soon as they have finished voting. From this time on (unless any extension to voting hours is approved) the only persons who should be in the voting station are those holding official authorisation to be there under the election rules. This would normally include:

• Voting station officials assigned to that voting station;

• Accredited representatives of political parties/candidates

• Accredited independent observers;

• Authorized law enforcement/security force officers;

• Authorized electoral management body staff or other official observers.

This restriction must be rigorously enforced to provide integrity of the materials collecting and packaging processes.

Whether ballots are to be counted at the voting station itself, or at another location, at the close of voting, the following procedures should be followed:

• Ballot box slots should be closed and sealed immediately upon the close of voting.

Where machines or computers are used for voting, check numbers for the last vote or transaction recorded at close of voting should be recorded and witnessed, the machines locked and sealed, or computer vote entry screens securely closed to prevent further use.

• All voting materials should be collected and ballot issue records reconciled in preparation for the start of counting (see Collection of Ballots).

• Any special votes (absentee, provisional/tendered or similar) accepted in the voting station should be collected and reconciled with their ballot issue records (see Closing Arrangements for Special Voting).

• Reports on voting activity should be completed by the voting station manager.

• All other voting material not required for the count should be collected to be packaged and prepared for return to the electoral management body (see Verification and Packing of Materials).

Where counts are to be conducted at the voting station itself:

• Staff involved in the count will need to be organised and briefed.

• Count equipment and the voting station physical layout will need to be prepared for the count (see Preparation for Ballot Count).

Where counts are to be conducted at another location:

• Provisions for the secure transport of all voting station material and records to the count centre need to be implemented.

• All staff attendance and payment records should be correctly completed. If payments are made on conclusion of duty, the voting station manager should make correct payments to staff.

• All voting equipment and additional furniture should be prepared for collection or disposal.

• Any arrangements for retrieval of voting station staff should be executed

• Following collection of all election material, the premises should be tidied, locked and secured, and premises keys should be returned according to agreements made.

Additional special procedures may be required for voting locations dealing solely with special votes (see Closing Arrangements for Special Voting) and for mobile voting stations (see Close of Voting for Mobile Voting Stations).

Variable Closing Times

Some election systems allow discretion to voting station managers to close the voting station earlier than the advertised hours of voting if they believe that all voters on the voters list for that voting station have already voted.

This can be a dangerous practice, however, and where implemented has led in some instances to allegations of abuse. Even if allowed by electoral law, it is not to be encouraged by electoral management bodies. "All registered voters having voted," can too easily turn into "all registered voters that we think will vote have voted." It also does not allow for errors in voters lists, or any further service in redirecting voters turning out at the wrong voting station.

Voting Station Managers' Reports and Voting Records

It is important that following the close of voting, the voting station manager compiles a report on activities at the voting station. This report would be returned to the electoral management body with other apt voting station materials.

If ballot counts are to be conducted at another location, it should accompany the ballot material to the count.

Contents of the report would include:

• records related to voting in the voting station;

• voter service records;

• staffing and payment information;

• Reports on premises and occurrences during voting hours. If ballot counts are undertaken at the voting station, records of the counts could also be included in the same report.

(For discussion of the detail useful to include in voting station managers' reports, see Voting Station Managers' Reports.)

Collection of Ballots

Liable Materials

The immediate concern after the close of voting is to ensure that all apt voting materials in the voting station are collected, accounted for, and secured in preparation for conduct of the count. The focus of this will be on the following areas:

• securing of ballot boxes (or, if used, voting machines or computers);

• collection of other accountable voting materials--unused ballots or ballot envelopes, spoilt, or otherwise cancelled ballots or envelopes, certified voters lists, and any supplementary records of persons voting;

• Reconciliation of ballots (or envelopes) and their issuing records. Where the prime integrity control mechanism is the ballot itself, reconciliations of ballot stocks are necessary. Where the prime integrity control mechanism is a ballot envelope issued to eligible voters, reconciliations will instead involve these ballot envelopes.

Collection and accounting for ballots (or ballot envelopes where relevant) should not begin until all voters and any other unauthorized people have been moved outside the voting station.

Where there are no observers or party/candidate representatives present, it may be useful to request that a small number of voters remain to witness this accounting. If this is done, it is preferable that these voters first signed the same oath or conduct declaration required of accredited observers.

The voting station manager should collect official seals or stamps used to authenticate ballots or ballot envelopes (at the same time as the ballots are being collected). They should be formally accounted for and held under security until packaged.

Initial Reconciliations

No matter whether the count is undertaken an initial reconciliation of ballots (or ballot envelopes) received at to ballots (or ballot envelopes) that should be on hand after voting must be undertaken at the voting station. This is to establish the number of ballots or envelopes that should be in the ballot boxes.

This reconciliation should occur before any material is packaged for transportation to the counting centre, or before any ballot boxes are opened if the count is to occur at the voting station.

It is a useful control process for the integrity of voting and the count. It is also a process that is often recorded incorrectly, and can thus cause later disputes. Accuracy of reconciliations requires emphasis in voting station manager training and care in execution.

Where voting machines or computers are used, accurate internal integrity check mechanisms or software to prevent illegal exclusion or addition of votes must be installed.

For further details of this reconciliation, see Reconciliation of Ballots or Envelopes Received.

Reconciliation of Ballots Issued to Voters

The other major integrity check on ballots that needs to be implemented is a reconciliation of records of the number of voters who voted to records of the number of ballots issued or ballot envelopes issued (see Reconciliation of Ballots or Envelopes Issued).

Later reconciliations at the count should reconcile the number of voters recorded as having voted against the number of ballots extracted from the ballot box.

Discrepancies in Ballot or Ballot Envelope Accounting

Discrepancies in close of voting ballot (or ballot envelope) and voter numbers accounting can occur for a number of reasons apart from fraud. However, any discrepancy, for whatever reason, will arouse suspicion about the integrity of voting station operations.

Strict controls, care, and perhaps a little additional time spent at each stage of the ballot (or ballot envelope) handling process can prevent embarrassing and inexplicable ballot (or ballot envelope) accounting and reconciliation discrepancies.

Common non-fraudulent reasons for discrepancies in ballot/ballot envelope and voter number accounting include:

Ballots or ballot envelopes received at the voting station were not correctly and accurately counted before use. Even counter foiled, numbered, ballot booklets can have missing ballots. Loosely packed ballots or ballot envelopes, particularly without numbered counterfoils, are even more susceptible to error in post-production packaging.

It is essential that ballots, or ballot envelopes received at each voting station are counted and any discrepancy between delivery advices and actual stocks received is noted in ballot accounting records. The voting station manager should endorse the results of the check and these figures be used in all subsequent ballot/ballot envelope accounting calculations.

Failure to record properly any official movements of unused ballots or ballot envelopes to and from the voting station during voting day.

Voting station official errors in maintaining records of voters who voted. This is a task that requires continual monitoring during voting to ensure that each voter issued a ballot (or ballot envelope where this is the control mechanism) is recorded as having received a ballot or ballot envelope, and that this is done in the correct, consistent manner to aid counting of total figures. Where ballots are the integrity control mechanism, spoilt or discarded/rejected ballots not being immediately sealed/secured in an envelope or container and kept under security so that they cannot be later placed in the ballot box.

Counting and calculation errors. Each count and calculation required for accounting should be rechecked by another voting station official before being entered into the ballot account and voter reconciliation records.

Reconciliation of Ballots or Envelopes Received

In voting systems whose prime control on the integrity of ballots is control of issue of the ballots to voters, all ballot stocks received at the voting station will need to be accounted for. Accounting for ballots at the close of voting is most effectively undertaken if it follows a series of simple steps.

All steps in this process should be recorded on official ballot account forms that are endorsed by the voting station manager and by any party/candidate representatives present.

While this reconciliation is being done, the voting station should be thoroughly searched, particularly the areas around the voting compartments; checking at floor level under furniture, in any cracks between tables, and in any areas that could be used for storage, would ensure that all ballots at the voting station are included in the accounting.

This important reconciliation of ballots can be undertaken using the following steps:

• establish Number of Ballots Received;

• establish Number of Ballots Issued to Voters;

• count Spoilt/Discarded/Rejected Ballots;

• calculate Number of Ballots Apparently in Ballot Box;

• count Unused Ballots;

• preliminary Reconciliation.

Where voting machines or computers are used the reconciliation will be entirely different (see Automated Voting below).

Where the liable item is the ballot envelope (and not the ballot itself) the procedures will also differ (see Ballot Envelope Reconciliation below).

Establishing Number of Ballots Received

The first step is to establish the total number of ballots that should be on hand in the voting station This is done by counting the number of ballots received before or during voting (adjusted for any discrepancies found during delivery checking and subtracting any ballots officially removed from the voting station (in some systems this may occur if emergency re-supply for other neighbouring voting stations is necessary).

It is important that this figure is correctly calculated. At the conclusion of the count this figure for total ballots on hand should be equal to the number of votes counted during the count (including any spoilt or otherwise cancelled ballots) and the unused ballots.

Any discrepancy between the initial calculation of total ballots at the voting station and the figure calculated at the end of vote counting would suggest tampering or error in the election, and will require thorough recount of all ballots and investigation at the count.

Establishing Number of Ballots Issued to Voters

The second step is to establish the number of ballots issued to voters. If there is more than one table issuing ballots to voters in the voting station (e.g., if there are different issuing tables according to an alphabetical split of voters' names), this figure should be first established separately for every issuing table, and only when these figures are endorsed by the voting station manager, added up to a total for the voting station.

Depending on the style of the ballot, and the control systems for ballot material in the voting station, the methods of doing this will vary:

• Where ballots have numbered stubs or counterfoils, and there is only one ballot issuing table, or a separate counterfoil number range has been given to each issuing table, ballot issues may be established by subtracting the number on the stub of the first ballot issued from that on the stub of the next remaining unused ballot at close of voting. This simple method should only be used if there is strict control over ballot issuing during voting to ensure ballots are issued in strict numerical order of the stubs.

• Where counter foiled ballots have been issued out of strict numerical order, which may particularly occur if there is more than one table for issuing ballots or if there has been a re-supply of ballots to the voting station during voting, the number of stubs/counterfoils from which ballots have been torn off should be counted at each issuing table.

• Where ballots without counterfoils/stubs are used, staff at each issuing table should count the number of unused ballots left at the end of voting, and subtract that from the number of ballots provided to that issuing table during voting day.

It is thus important that all supply of ballots to issuing tables (including any from voting station reserves during voting hours) is carefully recorded during the course of voting day.

Counting Spoilt/Discarded/Rejected Ballots

The third step is to count the number of ballots that have been retained by voting station officials as:

• spoilt-that is, the voter surrendered the ballot before placing it in the ballot box and requested a fresh ballot to complete, or the ballot was damaged and could not be issued;

• discarded or rejected-that is, the ballot was issued to a voter but was then left by the voter somewhere in the voting station other than the ballot box, or rejected when issued.

Many systems may treat such ballots as a single category of cancelled ballots.

Calculating Number of Ballots Apparently in Ballot Box

The fourth step is to calculate the number of ballots that should be in the ballot box. This is calculated by subtracting the number of spoilt, discarded, and rejected ballots from the total number of ballots issued to voters.

Where absentee ballots from voters registered to vote at that voting station are merged on voting day with normal ballots cast at the voting station, these will also need to be included.

It is vital that this figure is correctly calculated, as it is the figure to which the initial count of ballots in the ballot box, on opening of the ballot box at the count, must reconcile. Any discrepancy would suggest tampering or error in the election, and will require thorough recount and investigation at the count.

Counting Unused Ballots

The fifth step is to count the unused ballots. Again, the method of doing this, whether by simple subtraction of counterfoil numbers, counting of unused ballot counterfoils, or of the ballots themselves, will depend on the ballot style and control methods within the voting station.

It is important that all unused ballots are accounted for, not just those remaining at the voting materials issuing tables, but any reserves held by the voting station manager.

Preliminary Reconciliation

The sixth step is a preliminary reconciliation: The figure for total ballots at the voting station should equal the sum of ballots issued to voters, plus spoilt/discarded/rejected ballots, plus unused ballots. Any discrepancies between these two figures should be noted and investigated.

Automated Voting Reconciliation

Where voting machines are used, reading the start and finish numbers on an automatic counter of voters using the machine is an integral part of reconciling the numbers of votes completed.

Similarly, for computer voting, a log totalling the number of relevant voter transactions entered into the computer must be maintained.

Ballot Envelope Reconciliation

In systems where the primary control on the issue of ballots to voters is an envelope in which voter must place their ballot, the focus of reconciliation is rather on envelopes received at the voting station and those remaining at the close of voting. Procedures for ensuring accuracy of accounting for use of these ballot envelopes must be implemented.

Similar to procedures based on accountability of the ballot itself, these procedures would involve:

• accurate recording of the numbers of ballot envelopes received at the voting station, including adjustments for any authorised further stocks received or despatches to other voting locations during the hours of voting;

• establishing how many ballot envelopes have been issued to voters during the course of voting;

• establishing the number of ballot envelopes remaining unused at the close of voting.

If envelopes are stubbed or counter foiled, this may be calculated by counting the torn off stubs or counterfoils. If not, it should be calculated by subtracting the ballot envelopes remaining unused at the close of voting from figures for ballot envelopes received at the voting station.

All steps in this process should be recorded on official ballot envelope account forms which are endorsed by the voting station manager and which party/candidate representatives present are invited to endorse.

Where there are multiple tables issuing ballot envelopes to voters, these calculations should be done individually at each issuing table and verified before adding them up.

The figure derived for ballot envelopes issued should be the same as the number of ballot envelopes found in the ballot box. It is vital that this figure is correctly calculated, as it is the figure to which initial counts of ballot box contents must be reconciled. Any discrepancy would suggest tampering or error in the election, and will require thorough recount and investigation at the count.

Reconciliation of Ballots or Envelopes Issued

In systems where control of ballots issued is the primary integrity mechanism, the number of ballots issued, accounting for any spoilt ballots (those surrendered by the voter and a new ballot issued in its place), should equal the number of voters recorded as having voted.

In those systems using control of issue of ballot envelopes as the prime integrity mechanism, envelopes issued to voters should equal the number of voters recorded as having voted.

This reconciliation would preferably take place at the voting station and be formally recorded by the voting station manager and be countersigned by any party/candidate representatives present.

Often, due to time pressures, this is done on a national basis following return of materials from the count.

This method often leads to disputes about eligible and actual voter numbers, which are more difficult to resolve without those responsible for the issuing of ballot material being present.

Where automated methods for calculating voter numbers can be used, such as where voting is by computer, or optical scannable voters lists are used, it may more effectively be undertaken at a central location.

Data Sources

Figures for the number of ballots issued, or of ballot envelopes issued, should already be obtainable from the ballot or envelope accounting records.

Records of the number of voters apparently issued ballot material could be obtainable from a number of sources, depending on the recording methods used, for example:

• by counting the number of voters marked as having voted on the voters list(s) plus records for the number of voters not on the voters lists(s) who established an entitlement to vote and were issued ballots at the voting station;

• by counting the entries on any separate lists of voters issued ballots, or check sheets/score cards of numbers of voters issued with ballots, where these are maintained by ballot issuing officers during voting;

• by counting applications from voters for ballots, where these are used;

• by counting the number of voter identification cards surrendered, where this control is used.

Generally, the most effective source of numbers of ballots (or envelopes) issued is from counting those voters marked on the certified voter’s list as having voted, adjusted for any voters voting from a supplementary list compiled from:

• voting day registrations, or

• by provisional/tendered ballots, or

• using certificates issued where it has been established voters have been wrongly omitted from the voters list.

Where voters must provide applications for votes, counting the applications may be a preferable primary reconciliation figure source.

Where neither voters lists are used, nor applications required, some other method, such as maintaining a list of voters issued ballots, will need to be implemented.

Multiple Data Sources

Maintaining multiple sources of such information creates a greater possibility of error and thus perceptions/allegations of malpractice. Voting station officials are not perfect. If required to maintain the same information in two or more different ways, it is highly likely that there will be discrepancies at the end of a long working day.

For example, where voters lists are used and marked, the practice of also manually maintaining a separate list of voters issued ballot papers is an inefficient use of resources and can create problems during voting station reconciliations or later checks where the two records differ.

Even where check sheets or score cards marked to indicate voter flows and service levels at varying times of voting day are maintained, they should be clearly unofficial records of the number of voters who have voted.

Discrepancies

Any discrepancy between figures for ballots issued (or, where relevant, ballot envelopes issued) and voters recorded as having voted requires immediate investigation and report on the resolution by the voting station manager (or electoral management body officials, if this check is done after voting day).

• Where discrepancies are found to be the result of error, such a finding would preferably be countersigned by party/candidate representatives.

• Where discrepancies are significant and inexplicable, further investigation is required before any count can be finalised.

Later reconciliations during the count of number of ballots actually in the ballot box plus the number of any discarded/rejected ballots compared to the total number of voters recorded as having voted will refine this integrity check.

Verification and Packing of Materials

Following the completion of accounting for voting materials or simultaneously, if sufficient staff are on hand, all materials in the voting station need to be sorted and organised for packaging.

A thorough search of the voting station should be undertaken to ensure that no material has been placed or left during the day in obscure or unusual places.

Accountable materials, those required for voting, electoral or financial integrity purposes, should be verified wherever possible against supply or other records to ensure that none are missing. Such materials would include:

• receipts for ballots or ballot envelopes;

• other ballot accounting records;

• official seals or marks for ballots;

• ballot or ballot envelope issue records maintained by voting station officials;

• information on voters including any voting day registrations;

• records of challenges and disputes;

• financial and staff attendance records.

Time of Packaging

Where counts are to be conducted at a different location, all voting station material should be packaged immediately following accounting for and reconciliations of ballot material and their verification, and despatched with the ballot boxes to the counting centre 

As a precaution against any apt material being misplaced, it is preferable that all packages of material from the voting station go to the counting centre.

Where counting is to take place at the voting station, all materials should be sorted following the close of voting. Accountable materials not needed during the count--unused ballots or prone envelopes, voters lists, and the like--should be packaged and sealed immediately following the completion of any reconciliations for which they are required.

If access to these packages is required during the count (e.g., in searches for any missing or wrongly packaged material) breaking of the seals of these packages, and resealing, should be formally recorded (including a note of the reasons) and witnessed by party/candidate representatives.

If there is confidence in the professionalism and integrity of count officials, and the security situation is favourable, it may be preferable not to fully package and seal other materials until the count at the voting station has been completed, to make searching for any missing items needed during the count considerably easier.

Rather, after sorting, material not required for the count could be maintained under appropriate security in an area separate from the counting area.

Packaging

Packaging of voting station materials is an activity that is often regarded as an unimportant adjunct to voting. It occurs at the end of the day when major tasks appear to have been completed and staffs are likely to be fatigued. However, incorrect packaging can cause considerable dysfunction and suspicions of improper practices, especially at counting locations or at later challenges where much time can be wasted and emotions aroused looking for missing material that has been mispackaged.

It is important that the packaging of voting station materials be governed by clear guidelines and is undertaken in a professional and efficient manner under strict supervision by senior voting station officials. Care must be taken during packaging that all material is retrieved from within the voting station and packaged.

One common reason why packaging of voting station material is incorrectly implemented is that the packaging systems used are too complex.

Systems requiring a series of envelopes within larger envelopes within other envelopes within boxes within other boxes within bags, all too often distinguished only by strikingly similar identifying labels or numbers, can become bewildering to staff at the end of a very long day, no matter how intensive their training. Simple packaging systems that separate and identify essential accountable material, and, where affordable, are based on a colour-coded system, will assist correct packaging of material after voting or the count.

Packaging System

The packaging system for voting station materials has a number of basic objectives:

• to separate materials relevant to the count and integrity of voting from other materials;

• to separate materials relevant to different elections held at the same voting station, be they elections for different representative structures in the same electoral district, or where a voting station issues ballots for more than one electoral district;

• to logically group materials so that packages contain related material;

• to protect materials during transport to counting centres (if required), for transport to any later check counts, and for storage of ballot material until the period for challenge to the election has elapsed.

Depending on local costs, the amount of material to be packaged, and the security environment, the packaging system may use envelopes, cartons, high density plastic bags, locked containers or a combination of these.

Non-Accountable Materials

The easiest materials to deal with are those with no relevance to the count or integrity of the election. Given that the major priority at the time is the count, these materials could be all packed in the one, clearly labelled container, for later sorting.

Such materials would include:

• manuals and procedural guides used by voting station officials;

• posters, signs, and other voting station official and voter information and reference materials;

• unused non-accountable forms, such as those for voter challenges, voter service monitoring and complaints, voter registration (possibly including ballot envelopes, but only where these are not accountable materials used as a control for ballot issue);

• other minor voting equipment, such as badges, pens, pencils, note paper, unused ballot box and package seals, tape, string, torches, lamps for checking if a voter has been marked with ink and so forth.

Apt Materials

It is very important that appropriate materials are sorted in a consistent, disciplined fashion for packaging. It is possible to logically group such materials to aid retrieval.

Each separate material classification requires a clear distinguishing and easily recognisable label to be attached to or on the package. Each label should bear the contents of the package (type(s) of material and number of articles of each type). Where more than one package is used for a single classification of material, the labels should bear standard part-consignment notations. The voting station manager must ensure that these package content notations are accurately completed by voting station officials and formally endorse their accuracy.

Each package must be sealed in such a fashion that any tampering with the package will be noticeable, using a method and packaging materials robust enough to prevent accidental breakage of the package during normal transport and handling. Depending on the packaging container used, this may be by using plastic or metal seals (with appropriate recording of their numbers) paper seals or packaging tape.

Where seals or tape are used, the voting station manager should sign over the top of the seals. Political party/candidate representatives and independent observers present should be invited to sign endorsement of the contents and sign over the seals of the packages.

The details of the types of liable material to be packaged will depend on the voting system and procedures used. The following classifications provide a sound basis for categorising particular types of materials within a logical framework

1. Ballots deposited by electors in the appropriate ballot boxes. If ballots are to be counted by hand, these will remain in the ballot boxes until they are required for counting.

If machine counted at another location, they may need to be partially processed at the voting station  and replaced in the ballot box or another container. These must be sealed, and political party/candidate representatives and observers present invited to formally witness the sealing. Following counts, these ballots should remain bundled or packaged as sorted by candidate preference, for repackaging in either a ballot box (if the security situation warrants) or other sealed containers.

This post-count packaging of ballots should also be formally recorded and witnessed by political party/candidate representatives and observers.

1. Other ballot material. For voting systems in which the ballot itself is the prime integrity control, and thus all ballots must be accountable, this could include:

• unused ballot papers or cards;

• stubs of ballots issued (if detached on issue);

• spoilt ballots (those for which a voter has requested and been issued a fresh ballot);

• discarded or rejected ballots (those that voters have been issued but which were not placed by the voter in the ballot box);

• official marks or seals used to authenticate ballots when issued;

• voting machine keys. In systems where issue of a ballot envelope to a voter is the prime integrity control, rather than the ballot itself, this category would include unused ballot envelopes, discarded ballot envelopes, stubs or counterfoils of ballot envelopes issued (if detached on issue). It may be useful to package each of these sub-categories in separate packages within the one container.

1. Records of voters turning out at the voting station. This would include:

• all copies of voters lists issued to the voting station;

• applications for ballots completed by electors (except where these are attached to the ballot itself in the ballot box);

• any records compiled in the voting station of ballots issuedto voters ;

• details of and forms for voting day registrations where electors were issued a ballot or certificates from civil authorities certifying that voters were incorrectly omitted from the voters list;

• voting machine or computer readings and reports on numbers of voters voting;

• completed forms relating to challenged voters.

1. Voting station managers reports and voting records. By whatever name, poll books, voting reports, voting records, or in whatever format, as an integrated booklet or series of forms, this category contains all data relevant to management of the voting station's operations. This will include:

• receipts for material;

• ballot accounting records and reconciliations;

• records of issue of any special ballots;

• ballot box sealing records;

• reports on any challenges, incidents, and disputes over voting;

• staffing and attendance, payment, expense, and evaluation records;

• voter service and premises suitability reports.

1. Records of any special votes issued.
2. Voter and political party/candidate representative and observer information. Depending on the electoral system, relevant contents (if any at all) will vary widely. It could include data such as accreditation documents that political party/candidate representatives or observers are required to hand over or information on or from voters relevant to their registration.

In packaging these materials, voting material relevant to elections for different representative bodies or different electoral districts held in the same voting station should be kept clearly separate, by colour coding package labels or envelopes, for example, according to different colours of ballots used. When packaged, all material should be securely prepared for transport, and any transport control documentation completed.

If at all possible, all materials packages from a voting station should be secured in a single container (ballot boxes may need to be handled separately). Such containers should enclose material from one voting station only. Each package and outer container from a voting station must be clearly marked with the voting station identity (name and/or number) and the electoral district to which it belongs. Care needs to be taken in this regard when there is more than one voting station occupying a voting location.

Storage of Voting Station Materials

Following finalisation of counts of ballots, arrangements for sorting of election materials and equipment into those to be stored, and those to be destroyed, need to be implemented.

The periods, for which election materials must be in storage, the manner of their storage, and the accountabilities for their maintenance or destruction would usually be specified in the electoral legal framework. 

Preparation for Ballot Count

Reorganising for the Count

Where voting stations are used for the count, in addition to dealing with materials (see Collection of Ballots and Verification and Packing of Materials) and party/candidate representative issues (see Role of Party/Candidate Representatives), there are some preparatory actions that need to be undertaken to turn the area into an efficient facility for counting.

The exact preparatory actions taken and the nature of the reorganisation will depend on the manner of voting--manually, by machine or computer--whether a single or multiple elections have occurred, and the method of the count.

Preparatory Actions

Where paper or card ballots are used, there are some general guidelines within which these actions should be undertaken:

• collection and reconciliations of voting materials (see Collection of Ballots and Verification and Packing of Materials);

• following a thorough check for any ballot materials left in the area, the voting compartments should be dismantled and moved to an area out of the way of counting staff;

• any crowd control barriers within the voting station should be dismantled to provide an uncluttered count space;

• if all ballot boxes are not opened simultaneously, set up an area for secure holding of ballot boxes not yet being counted;

• reorganise available furniture in the configuration required for the count;

• distribute and set up any equipment required for the count--ballot counting machines, calculators, tally boards--according to the requirements of the count;

• where special ballots are also being counted, set up the facilities required for counting these.

If large numbers of party/candidate representatives and/or observers are present, there may be a need to place some barriers to allow free movement of count officials around the count tables and prevent party/candidate representatives and observers from handling ballots or intimidating voting station officials. If this is necessary, barriers should not be erected at such a distance to prevent party/candidate representatives from fully observing count processes.

Reorganisation of Furniture

Furniture will need to be reorganised to provide a counting area, a table from which the voting station manager can supervise the count, an area for party/candidate representatives, and a rest area for staff. The count area configuration will vary according to the count method.

When using efficient production line-style count methods, with the ballot papers progressing through areas for emptying of ballot boxes and unfolding of ballots, sorting to candidate/party, counting, counting and recording, and parcelling, an elongated double "T" formation for count tables is effective. An example of this style of layout is shown below.

The layout of the count area will also depend on:

• whether there are ballots for more than one election to be counted (e.g., president and legislative body, or multiple legislative bodies);

• whether the elections use a single ballot or multiple ballots;

• whether counts for different elections are to be held simultaneously (in which case extreme care needs to taken that ballots from different elections are not mixed) or consecutively.

Where different ballots from the same voters are counted simultaneously, and particularly where ballots for different parts of a representative body or representative bodies have been placed in the same ballot box, a U-shaped table layout can be effective. An example of this type of layout is shown below.

Where voting machines or computers are used, radical reorganisation of the voting station furniture will generally not be necessary if the count is to take place in the voting station. Count totals taken from the machines can be added and processed at a single table.A small area set up for reconciliations of voter records to ballots counted, with any required count area for special votes, should also be set up.

Voting Station Staff

No matter what the pressure for an immediate start to the count, the voting station manager should ensure that all staff who have been working all day on voting station duties have an opportunity for a break between close of voting and commencement of the count.

This may be achieved by the employment of unskilled or junior staff for a short period to reorganise furniture and clean up the voting station.

Prior to the count commencing, all staff should also be briefed by the voting station/count manager. A quick review of essential features of the procedures and any specific instructions for the particular count location should be given. Observers and party/candidate representatives present for the count should also be invited to attend this briefing.

Role of Party/Candidate Representatives

Transparency of Action

At the close of voting it is important that candidate and party representatives present are clear as to the proceedings and their rights.

Actions to be taken at the close of voting need to be clearly explained to party/candidate representatives present, so that these representatives are aware of the basis of activities like:

• the rights of voters in the voting station to vote,

• the barring of voters who arrive after the closing time,.

• any preparations for counting occurring before the voting closing time.

It can be of assistance to have an information sheet:

• explaining briefly the actions at close of voting, rules and procedures to be applied during the count, and

• defining the roles of party/candidate representatives at the count, prepared for distribution to all candidate/party representatives attending the count.

Accreditation of Party/Candidate Representatives

Where the count is to be conducted at the voting station, there may be different or additional party/candidate representatives accredited to the count.

Their accreditation needs to be checked by voting station officials, and it must be ensured that no unaccredited persons enter the voting station count area. Whether candidates for a particular election can themselves act as a party/candidate representative during its count is a matter generally addressed in election law.

It would be a reasonable legal requirement that only parties or candidates running in an election should have their representatives present at the count. The number of representatives that each party/candidate may have present at a count location at any one time varies under different election frameworks:

• Ideally, each party/candidate would be allowed an equal number of representatives to the number of counting staff. Any more restrictive provisions than these would, prima facie, appear to be a restriction on the ability to observe all that is occurring during the count.

• Space restrictions in counting locations may lead to legal restrictions on the number of party/candidate representatives allowed to be present. Any such restrictions should still ensure that each party or candidate in the election may have at least one representative present.

One criterion for the identification of suitable count locations would be that there is sufficient room for party/candidate representatives and observers. The issue of available space should not be used to manipulate the observation of the count.

Invitation to Staff Briefings

It is useful to invite party/candidate representatives present to listen to any briefing provided by the voting station manager to voting station officials prior to the commencement of the count (see Preparation for Ballot Count):

• Informed party/candidate representatives are a necessary part of the transparency and integrity measures for the count.

• With a refreshed knowledge of the procedures to be used, they are less likely to delay proceedings with challenges to approved procedures.

The alternative would be to brief them separately.

Behaviour of Representatives

The rights and responsibilities of party/candidate representatives at ballot counts would normally be defined in the legal framework for the election. In any case:

• It is important that party/candidate representatives understand, before the count begins, that they have a duty to maintain election integrity in their handling of all election material, particularly ballot material, but also any other election materials being packaged for return or undergoing counts.

• It is also important to reinforce to these representatives that they must not communicate with counting officials about progressive count totals or results.

• Party/candidate representatives should be made aware that breaches of their responsibilities will lead to sanctions on their activities, which may include their removal from the voting station.

Party/candidate representatives present should be invited to witness, formally, the completion of ballot issue reconciliation records and the unsealing of ballot boxes, and provide comment where they believe correct procedures have not been followed.

They should be reminded that, at this stage of proceedings, and during the count, the decision of the voting station or count centre manager will prevail. Not all disputes will be capable of resolution on the spot.

Where party/candidate representatives do not agree with a decision of the voting station or count centre manager, they can be reminded of their right to lodge a formal complaint in writing to the electoral management body or other authorities that are legally charged with resolving electoral disputes.

Count at Counting Centres

Where the count is to be conducted at a location other than the voting station, it should also be made very clear to party/candidate representatives present that:

• they are not permitted to handle any election materials, and particularly ballot materials, while they are being, or after they have been, packaged for transport,

• or during transport, and

• that breaches of this requirement will be dealt with according to sanctions under the election law.

As with counts held in voting stations, party/candidate representatives present should be invited to witness, formally, any preliminary ballot reconciliation documents of total ballots received at the voting station and of ballots issued to voters shown as having voted.

Additionally, when ballot material has been packaged for transport to the counting centre, party/candidate representatives should be invited to witness the sealing of all packages and endorse their disclosed contents; a similar invitation should be extended to formally witness seals and contents of packages of other election materials.

Where party/candidate representatives refuse to endorse or witness the contents, they should be provided with the opportunity to state their reasons in writing and have these included with the voting station manager's report on voting.

Arrangements should also be made for party/candidate representatives to be invited to accompany ballot materials during their transport to the counting centre.

Closing Arrangements for Special Voting

The specific additional measures that need to be taken at the closing of voting for special voting facilities will depend on:

• how restrictive these facilities are in terms of pre-qualifications and applications required;

• the method of issue of ballots;

• whether special voting facilities are located with normal voting stations or occupy separate locations;

• for which electoral districts they issue ballots;

• whether these facilities are open for a single day or multiple days;

• whether the ballots they issue are to be counted at a voting station or taken to special counting locations for special ballots.

The type of special voting facilities offered will also affect the procedures at close of voting. For details of procedures see the following:

• Provisional or tendered votes: Close of Voting for Provisional Votes.

• Early voting: Close of Voting for Early Voting.

• Absentee voting: Close of Voting for Absentee Voting.

• Mail voting: Close of Voting for Mail Voting.

• Voting in a foreign country: Close of Voting for Votes Cast Outside the Country.

• Mobile voting stations: Close of Voting for Mobile Voting Stations.

Special Voting Location Managers' Reports

The general content of voting station reports is discussed at Voting Station Managers' Reports.

Where special voting facilities are provided in normal voting stations, reports on special voting activities, such as ballots and materials reconciliations, record of different types of special votes issued and for which electoral districts, can be included in the overall report of the voting station manager to avoid unnecessary additional documentation.

Where special voting facilities are provided at separate locations, their reports can still be based on those for a normal voting station, with modified forms, where necessary, for:

• ballot accounting--for reconciling ballots for different electoral districts received and issued;

• records of votes issued for each electoral district;

• where operating for more than one day, progressive daily ballot issue and reconciliation forms and modified forms on which to record sealing and unsealing of ballot boxes at the commencement and completion of voting for each day.

Close of Voting for Provisional Votes

Where provisional or tendered votes have been issued to voters not on the voters list at a voting station, at the close of voting these ballots will need to be totalled and reconciled separately against any application forms required and records of issue.

If voter details are attached to or within provisional ballot envelopes they may require checking against voter registration data prior to the ballot being accepted for counting . They are more effectively counted at a central administration location for the whole electoral district.

Thus, after reconciling with issue records they would be parcelled separately from normal ballots. During voting, use of a ballot box for provisional ballots separate from that used for normal ballots will assist this.

Where the same ballot stocks are used for provisional ballots as for normal ballots, ballot accounting records may need to be adjusted for the number of provisional ballots issued, if these will not be found in the ballot box for the voting night count.

If separate ballot stocks are used, a full accounting must be completed for provisional ballot stocks and included with other ballot accounts with the voting station manager's report. The accounting should be done in a style similar to that for normal ballots.

Ballot Envelopes

Where envelopes used for containing provisional or tendered ballots are also strictly accountable, reconciliations will need to be undertaken for:

• stocks of these on hand at the close of voting to stocks received, less envelopes recorded as issued;

• Envelopes issued to voters listed as having been issued provisional or tendered ballots.

Close of Voting for Early Voting

Procedure Factors

Actions at close of voting will depend on whether early voting locations:

• Can issue ballots only for the electoral district within which the early voting station is located, or whether ballots for other locations can be issued.

Are open for a single day, or several days; this will affect the format of the records to be completed during voting and at close of early voting.

The following discussion deals with early voting in person. (For close of voting procedures for mail voting, see Close of Voting for Mail Voting.)

Ballots Issued for Same Electoral District Only

Procedures at close of the early voting, whenever that is legally determined, can follow those for a normal voting station:

• where an early voting station can only issue ballots for the electoral district within which it is located, and

• Issues these votes by reference to a voters list for the electoral district.

If applications for an early vote are required, these should also be reconciled to ballot issues. Material can be returned to the voting operations administration office following closure of early voting, and ballots may be stored in the ballot box until counted after the close of voting on voting day. They should not be counted earlier than this.

With this method of issue, it would be more efficient to count these ballots at a single location in the electoral district, rather than distribute to relevant normal voting stations for the count.

If early ballots are issued for the home electoral district only, but as special enveloped ballots with accompanying elector details, rather than by reference to voters lists, the same ballot and/or envelope accounting methods can be used at close of voting, and voter eligibility and counting undertaken at a single counting location. While eligibility checking of the voters' identity information can usefully occur before voting day, the ballots should not be counted before close of voting.

Ballots Issued for Multiple Electoral Districts

Ballot accounting at close of voting becomes more complex when early voting stations can issue ballots for multiple electoral districts.

Separate ballot accounting records will need to be completed for each electoral district for which ballots may be issued.—District reconciliations should be done for:

• ballots issued;

• unused ballots;

• applications for early ballots received (if required);

• ballot issue records;

• envelopes (where used);

• voters marked on lists as having voted.

Where early voting stations issue ballots for multiple electoral districts from lists of early voters for each electoral district, it can be effective to count all early ballots issued at the early voting stations or at a location in that electoral district (particularly if these counts can be combined with counts of similarly-issued absentee ballots on voting day).

In such cases, early ballots can be stored under security in their ballot boxes until the count. Advice of counts should be transmitted to relevant electoral districts as soon as counts are completed, with supporting ballots and documentation despatched by secure transport to the relevant electoral districts following the packaging of all count material.

However, it can also be efficient to package and return these ballots immediately following the close of voting to a central location for sorting to electoral district and counting.

Where early voting stations issue ballots for multiple electoral districts as special enveloped ballots with accompanying voter identification information, rather than by reference to voters lists, it can be more cost-effective, and easier to maintain integrity controls, to despatch all early ballots, in their ballot boxes, and accompanied by ballot issue records, for voter eligibility checking and counting at a single central location for all electoral districts.

This will require high quality, centralised voter registration data, a fairly complex count centre set-up, and, if electoral districts are dealt with consecutively, may cause delays in some count results.

If early voting is conducted using special enveloped ballots, but they are not all to be counted at one central location, at the close of early voting:

• Envelopes containing all early ballots issued in an electoral district will need to be removed from the ballot box(es), sorted according to electoral districts, counted by electoral districts, and reconciled with ballot issue records. This should be done in the presence of and witnessed by party/candidate representatives.

• Secure packages of ballots for each electoral district (sealed lightweight ballot boxes could be used for this) should be prepared for secure transport to the relevant electoral districts for voter eligibility checking and counting. If a long period is allowed for early voting, more than one such despatch may be required.

• Notices of the early ballots to be sent to each electoral district should be prepared and sent under separate immediate cover to the relevant electoral districts.

• On arrival, reconciliations of ballot envelopes received to despatch notices should be instituted by the receiving electoral districts, and when reconciled, officials could proceed to check the ballot envelopes for voter eligibility and counting of ballots.

 Unless relatively costly, very well-controlled, and accurate recording and despatch systems are implemented, it is all too easy for this cross swapping of ballots to break down. Manual systems are generally not up to the task. Centralised counting and transmission of results to the relevant electoral district requires considerably less complex logistical controls and can concentrate resources.

Multiple Day Early Voting

If early voting locations are open for more than one day,

• a count of ballots issued and remaining unused, reconciled to total ballots received at the voting station, and

• a count of applications processed during the day (where applications are required) and records of ballot issues, reconciled to actual ballot stocks remaining, Should be progressively undertaken at the end of each day to retain control over ballot accounting and make reconciliations at close of voting easier.

Where early voting stations can issue ballots for multiple electoral districts, this progressive ballot accounting will need to be a more complex document containing separate ballot accounting records for each electoral district.

Close of Voting for Absentee Voting

Where absentee voting in person is allowed on voting day, close of voting procedures will depend on:

• the method adopted for voting (from pre-prepared absentee voters lists or enveloped ballots, in designated absentee voting stations or at any normal voting station) and

• the number of electoral districts for which ballots may be issued at any voting station.

The following discussion relates to absentee voting in person on voting day. (For close of voting issues relating to absentee voting by mail, see Close of Voting for Mail Voting and absentee early voting at Close of Voting for Early Voting.)

Special Absentee Voters Lists Used

Where absentee votes are issued from a list of absentee voters at special absentee voting stations, close of voting procedures can be similar to those for a normal voting station.

However, separate ballot accounting records must be completed for each electoral district for which voters were registered to cast absentee votes. Reconciliations should be done for:

• ballots issued;

• unused ballots;

• ballot issue records;

• voters marked on lists as having voted.

As for early voting, there can be speed and control advantages in counting these ballots where they were issued, if management at absentee voting stations is sufficiently robust and skilled.

Particularly where ballots for large numbers of electoral districts have been issued, it can be safer, and more effective, to securely package all absentee voting material immediately following the close of voting and despatch it securely to a central facility for sorting to electoral district and counting.

Enveloped Ballot Systems

Where absentee voting procedures allow anyone to claim an in-person absentee vote on voting day, through a system of special enveloped ballots, close of voting ballot accounting should reconcile:

• ballots issued;

• unused ballots;

• ballot issue records;

• any applications required for absentee voting in relation to each electoral district.

If all absentee ballots are to be sent to a central location for voter eligibility checking and ballot counts, following close of voting, absentee ballots can be despatched in their sealed ballot boxes, and accompanied by ballot issue records, to the central count centre.

However, if these absentee ballots are to be returned to the voter’s home electoral district for eligibility checking and counting, a system parallel with that described at Close of Voting for Early Voting for dealing with early votes under similar circumstances will need to be implemented at close of voting.

Again the logistical complexity of such an exercise makes this method generally inadvisable.

Close of Voting for Mail Voting

Basic Issues

Close of voting procedures for absentee voting by mail will vary according to:

• When the cut-off date for return receipt of mail ballots is defined, prior to voting day, as at close of voting on voting day or at some later date;

• Whether mail voting facilities in electoral districts can issue mail ballots for their own electoral district only, or for all electoral districts;

• The return addresses to which mail ballots are sent.

Regardless, there are some general guidelines that should be followed, both for the close of issuing of mail ballots and for the deadline for receipt of returned mail ballots.

Progressive Reconciliations of Material Issued

Ballot accounting records should be maintained on a daily basis and final reconciliations of ballot stocks conducted following the closing time for issuing mail ballots. Records that should be kept daily include:

• A count of ballots and any special return envelopes issued and remaining unused, reconciled to total ballots (and envelopes if applicable) received at the voting location;

• Mail ballot applications processed during the day and/or mail ballot issues from permanent mail voter lists reconciled to records of ballot issues and to actual ballot stocks remaining.

Where mail ballots can be issued from the one location for multiple electoral districts, ballot accounting records would need to be maintained for each electoral district for which ballots are issued.

Returned Mail Ballots

From progressive daily records of returned mail ballots received, the total mail ballots that should be in the ballot box must be calculated for reconciliation at the count.

Where mail ballots may be issued within an electoral district for that electoral district only, and the return address is to that electoral district, this is a simple process of marking returned ballots against issue records.

Where voting locations in an electoral district may also issue mail ballots for other electoral districts, and particularly if mail ballots are returned to a location other than the issuing location, this may be a process of considerable complexity requiring very strict control systems.

If the return address for mail ballots from all electoral districts is to a central location, a system for matching issue records to returned ballots will be needed. The structure of this system will depend on whether mail ballots are retained at the central location, or returned to the electoral district of registration for the count.

If mail ballots can be issued from locations in an electoral district on application by voters from any electoral district, with the ballots returned to the voters electoral district of registration, a complex system of monitoring advice between electoral district administration offices, and for forwarding mail ballot applications to the voters' own electoral district office, and then reconciling these to ballots returned will need to be implemented.

It is also essential that at the deadline for receipt of returned mail ballots, mail-clearing procedures be implemented:

• In particular, any mail boxes used as return addresses for mail ballots should be cleared at the time specified as the closing time for receipt of ballots by mail.

• Additionally, all mail ballots returned need to be time and date stamped immediately on receipt; time stamps need to clearly distinguish between returned mail ballots received before and after the legal deadline for return.

Packaging and Transport

Procedures for packaging and transport of mail ballots and issue records following the deadline for mail ballot return will depend on where these ballots are to be counted.

If the deadline is before voting day, and particularly if each electoral district can only issue mail ballots to voters registered in that electoral district, it may be possible for returned ballots to be security delivered on voting day to the voting station relevant to each voter's registration for inclusion with the normal count. This, however, will add further complexity to sorting and transport requirements.

If mail ballots are to be counted in the electoral district in which each mail voter is registered, and return deadlines are on or after voting day, where the return mail address for mail ballots is to a single central location, security distribution arrangements must be implemented to deliver mail ballots to the appropriate electoral district office. More than one such shipment may be required, depending on the length of time allowed for return of mail ballots.

Where the return mail address is to the voter's electoral district administration office, ballot envelopes may remain in ballot boxes until the close of voting.

If mail ballots are to be checked and counted at a single central location, the return mail address for all mail ballots would preferably be that location, with returned ballots sorted on arrival to a ballot box for their relevant electoral district in preparation for the count.

Timing of Count

Checking of voter details accompanying the ballot to determine eligibility of the vote can usefully occur before voting day to determine which ballots will be accepted for counting. Counts of mail ballots, however, should not begin until after the close of voting.

Close of Voting for Votes Cast Outside the Country

Basic Issues

Following close of voting in voting stations in a foreign country, the measures to be taken will depend on the manner of the controls placed on issuing ballots.

Special Foreign Voters Lists Used

If voting is from lists of voters located in other countries, the counts of foreign votes for each relevant electoral district could be undertaken at the foreign location, with results electronically communicated to the electoral management body.

Material can be packaged for secure courier return to the electoral management body in a similar fashion as a normal voting station after the count, except that ballots and any supporting documentation for each electoral district should be separately bundled within packages.

Counts at foreign locations would be better regarded as preliminary only, with a thorough recheck of all ballot and other liable materials, in the presence of party/candidate representatives, being undertaken following return of the material to the home country.

However, as it is unlikely that there will be opportunity for party/candidate representatives to be present at these counts, for integrity reasons it may be more prudent that following close of voting all election material is packaged and sealed at the foreign location and returned to the home country for counting, either at a central location or for distribution to the relevant electoral districts for counting.

Other Ballot Controls Used

For all other methods of issue, if the foreign location acts as a mail ballot issue and return point, or a location for early or absentee voting in person without the use of a special foreign voters lists, at the close of voting, reconciliations of ballots (and special ballot envelopes if used), ballot issue records, voter applications, and completed mail or other ballots received should be carried out in the same way as for a local absentee, mail, or in-person early voting location issuing ballots for multiple electoral districts (see Close of Voting for Early Voting and Close of Voting for Mail Voting).

Advice to Electoral Management Body

Ballot issue and reconciliation records should be transmitted electronically to the electoral management body immediately after close of voting. Arrangements should also be made for fast and secure courier transport of ballots and supporting material back to the electoral management body for eligibility checking and counting.

Voting Equipment

It would generally be cost-effective for voting equipment--ballot boxes, voting compartments and the like--not to be returned to the home country but maintained at the nearest diplomatic mission office.

Close of Voting for Mobile Voting Stations

Basic Issues

Mobile voting stations undertake a series of closing of voting at each location that they visit. Procedures for closing voting at each of the locations visited will generally require the same actions as at other types of voting stations (see Close of Voting), but some variations may be required.

Schedules

Mobile voting would preferably be carried out according to a pre-determined and advertised schedule, rather than in response to ad hoc voting day requests . It may also be allowed to operate during a specified period prior to the normal voting day.

If voters are still waiting to vote at a mobile location at the time scheduled for the close of voting at that location, scheduling arrangements should be flexible enough to allow those present to vote.

In terms of flexibility, the following are useful guidelines:

• Mobile voting stations should remain longer at locations than scheduled, if necessary, to allow all those wanting to vote to vote (except, of course, allowing voting at any location after the time for the general close of voting on voting day itself; mobile voting stations should be bound by normal closure procedures at that time).

• Mobile voting stations should not leave any location before the scheduled and advertised time of cessation of voting.

• Where a mobile voting station, through transport or other delays, arrives late at a voting location, it should remain there at least for the full number of hours scheduled and advertised, and not cut this time short by closing voting at the scheduled time; any potential late arrival at a location should be announced, wherever possible, to the community or institution concerned.

Care of Ballot Boxes

To use a separate ballot box for each mobile voting location would be wasteful.

Ballot slots in ballot boxes used will need to be sealed at the conclusion of voting at each location, and the sealing witnessed (by party/candidate representatives, if present, by voters), opened at the next location with the opening witnessed, and so on.

Numbered

seals--polypropylene ties or similar--on a slot closure mechanism, rather than plain paper seals over the slots will provide more effective control. It is important that sealing and unsealing of ballot box slots is rigorously implemented, recorded, and witnessed by party/candidate representatives, observers, or some other witness.

Ballot Accounting

In maintaining ballot accounting, it will be more effective to account for ballots issued at the conclusion of voting at each location, in a progressive table, rather than leaving ballot accounting until the conclusion of the mobile voting station's activities.

This will allow earlier detection and resolution of any problems and is most important when a mobile station's activities extend over several days.

Mobile voting stations visiting hospitals and other institutions may also be dealing with voters registered for a wide variety of electoral units. Where mobile stations may issue absentee ballots, careful accounting for these by electoral district will be required.

Counts of Ballots

It is more practicable for ballot and other material from mobile voting stations to be returned to another location for counting. This could be a voting station or a more central counting centre. For accountability purposes, it is useful that ballots from each mobile voting station should be counted and parcelled separately.

However, where only small numbers of votes are taken by a mobile voting station, it is highly preferable that these be amalgamated, either with a normal voting station's or other mobile voting stations' ballots, before actual counting of ballots commences, to ensure voting secrecy is preserved.

Return of Material

Mobile voting station schedules should be arranged to allow return of material for counting as soon as possible after the time for closing of voting on the general voting day.

As for normal voting stations (see Verification and Packing of Materials), care should be taken in packaging material to ensure that electoral material is securely and separately packaged.

Mobile voting stations (particularly those operating in remote areas) may have considerable amounts of non-election material to be returned, such as camping gear, provisions, and other equipment. This material also needs to be carefully checked on return; however, this should not occur at a location or time that would interfere with ballot material checks and counts.

Mobile Voting Station Managers' Reports

At the completion of a mobile voting station's itinerary, and before returning all material to the district electoral officer or other authorised person at the voting operations administration centre, managers of mobile voting stations should complete a report.

The content of the report will vary, depending on what type of area the mobile voting station was covering. The report may be a series of separate forms, or, more effectively, be combined in a single stapled or bound booklet.

In addition to the items common to other voting station reports (see Voting Station Managers' Reports), further information should be recorded regarding:

• mobile voting station itinerary and whether there were any variations from planned schedules;

• record of ballots issued at each mobile voting location;

• progressive ballot accounting (see Collection of Ballots) recorded following conclusion of voting at each place visited and at the end of each day's voting, if the mobile voting station is in operation for more than one day;

• particularly if operating in remote areas, a communications schedule or checklist and time of communications with base;

• diary commenting on facilities and conditions at mobile voting locations, noting disputes, and incidents, travelling time, other useful data for future mobile voting station planning;

• records of reimbursable expenses. 

Voting Station Managers' Reports

Content of Reports

While supervising close of voting activities, the voting station manager may be able to commence the completion of the voting records and a report on voting activities.

The contents of these reports will vary, particularly between voting stations where counts are to be conducted, where the count details may be included in an overall report, and those where ballots are counted at a different location.

The voting records and reports may be a series of separate forms, or, more effectively, be combined in a single stapled or bound booklet for each voting station. The reports should be fully completed before the voting station manager leaves the voting station, and information required should be clearly identified in the voting station manager's activity checklist.

The content of  these reports falls into two broad categories: accountable information and service information.

Apt Information

The liable information to be provided in voting station managers' reports would normally cover:

• witnessed records of the sealing and, if the count takes place at the voting station, unsealing of ballot boxes, with the numbers of the seals or locks placed on each ballot box recorded;

• where paper or card ballots are used, an accounting record for ballot stocks received at the voting station against those on hand at the close of voting (see Collection of Ballots) (where issue of ballots to voters is controlled through envelopes, this accounting would relate to envelope, rather than ballot stocks);

• a reconciliation of total numbers of ballots issued (or registered on a machine/computer) with total numbers of voters marked on voters lists as having voted at the voting station (see Collection of Ballots) (in some partially or semi-automated ballot information systems, reconciliation may be more efficiently and accurately done centrally by computer rather than at each voting station);

• if the voting station is used for any form of special voting, a summary of the special votes received, by category (if any of these are votes for another electoral district, this summary should be categorised by electoral district);

• where applications are required to be completed for the issue of any vote, a reconciliation of numbers of completed applications received with numbers of ballots issued;

• reports and statements on any challenges, disputes, accidents, involvement of security forces, and interruptions to voting.

Where the count is conducted at a different location, the accountable information should accompany the voting material, under security, to that location (or if a centralised count of computer or machine votes is undertaken, to the computer processing centre). Where the count is undertaken at the voting station itself, these completed reports should be returned at the conclusion of the count, under security with voting materials, to the electoral district manager at the voting operations administration centre.

Service Information

The service information to be provided in voting station managers' reports would include:

• correctly completed attendance records (and if paid at the voting station, payment records) for voting station staff to provide an audit trail;

• performance evaluations of all staff employed at the voting station, indicating their suitability for future voting station employment, including suitability for higher responsibilities;

• voter service, length of voting queues and time voters had to wait to vote, effectiveness of voter information provided in the voting station, any need to provide assistance in future to voters with lower literacy, different languages, or physical disabilities;

• the premises used, its facilities, and suitability for continued use as a voting station;

• any petty expenditures for reimbursement;

• any appointments of substitute officers, in the event of illness or other absences, to voting station staff.

Where the count is conducted at a different location, it may be preferable to send this material to the counting centre with the liable materials. While it may seem that this would result in irrelevant information being sent to the counting centre, a split of information destinations runs the risk of material not being at the counting centre when required.

Where the count is undertaken at the voting station itself, these completed reports should be returned, at the completion of the count and under security, with other voting materials to the electoral district manager at the voting operations administration centre.

Records of Multi-Day Voting

If voting is conducted over more than one day, some issues covered in voting station manager's reports and voting records will require separate recording at the end of each day. This will include essential areas such as:

• reconciliations of ballots, voters marked as having voted and any applications for votes, to allow early identification of any errors or suspicious figures;

• reports on challenges, interruptions, disputes.

The design of form or report formats provided to managers of multi-day voting locations must cater to this need.