In systems where control of ballots issued is the primary integrity mechanism, the number of ballots issued, accounting for any spoilt ballots (those surrendered by the voter and a new ballot issued in its place), should equal the number of voters recorded as having voted.
In those systems using control of issue of ballot envelopes as the prime integrity mechanism, envelopes issued to voters should equal the number of voters recorded as having voted.
This reconciliation would preferably take place at the voting station and be formally recorded by the voting station manager and be countersigned by any party/candidate representatives present.
Often, due to time pressures, this is done on a national basis following return of materials from the count.
This method often leads to disputes about eligible and actual voter numbers, which are more difficult to resolve without those responsible for the issuing of ballot material being present.
Where automated methods for calculating voter numbers can be used, such as where voting is by computer, or optical scannable voters lists are used, it may more effectively be undertaken at a central location.
Data Sources
Figures for the number of ballots issued, or of ballot envelopes issued, should already be obtainable from the ballot or envelope accounting records.
Records of the number of voters apparently issued ballot material could be obtainable from a number of sources, depending on the recording methods used, for example:
• by counting the number of voters marked as having voted on the voters list(s) plus records for the number of voters not on the voters lists(s) who established an entitlement to vote and were issued ballots at the voting station;
• by counting the entries on any separate lists of voters issued ballots, or check sheets/score cards of numbers of voters issued with ballots, where these are maintained by ballot issuing officers during voting;
• by counting applications from voters for ballots, where these are used;
• by counting the number of voter identification cards surrendered, where this control is used.
Generally, the most effective source of numbers of ballots (or envelopes) issued is from counting those voters marked on the certified voter’s list as having voted, adjusted for any voters voting from a supplementary list compiled from:
• voting day registrations, or
• by provisional/tendered ballots, or
• using certificates issued where it has been established voters have been wrongly omitted from the voters list.
Where voters must provide applications for votes, counting the applications may be a preferable primary reconciliation figure source.
Where neither voters lists are used, nor applications required, some other method, such as maintaining a list of voters issued ballots, will need to be implemented.
Multiple Data Sources
Maintaining multiple sources of such information creates a greater possibility of error and thus perceptions/allegations of malpractice. Voting station officials are not perfect. If required to maintain the same information in two or more different ways, it is highly likely that there will be discrepancies at the end of a long working day.
For example, where voters lists are used and marked, the practice of also manually maintaining a separate list of voters issued ballot papers is an inefficient use of resources and can create problems during voting station reconciliations or later checks where the two records differ.
Even where check sheets or score cards marked to indicate voter flows and service levels at varying times of voting day are maintained, they should be clearly unofficial records of the number of voters who have voted.
Discrepancies
Any discrepancy between figures for ballots issued (or, where relevant, ballot envelopes issued) and voters recorded as having voted requires immediate investigation and report on the resolution by the voting station manager (or electoral management body officials, if this check is done after voting day).
• Where discrepancies are found to be the result of error, such a finding would preferably be countersigned by party/candidate representatives.
• Where discrepancies are significant and inexplicable, further investigation is required before any count can be finalised.
Later reconciliations during the count of number of ballots actually in the ballot box plus the number of any discarded/rejected ballots compared to the total number of voters recorded as having voted will refine this integrity check.
