Election observation is fundamentally an exercise in support of democracy. Election observers serve as impartial watchdogs who can assess whether the results of an election truly reflect the will of the people. Genuine democratic elections do not guarantee democratic governance, but are a prerequisite for it. They provide political legitimacy for elected leaders and a foundation from which to govern, reducing the scope for non-democratic challenges to power. They serve to resolve competition for political power peacefully and are more likely to lead to stability than non-democratic forms of succession.

The ACE Encyclopaedia covers both international observation and citizen observation. International and citizen election observation are activities that have emerged over the last few decades in an effort to promote transitions to democratic forms of governance. The objectives and impact of observers must not be overstated. While often attributed a wide range of aims and objectives, election observation’s core goals are modest but important. They are to; provide accurate and impartial reporting on the quality of elections to the public, media, and international community; and demonstrate the interest of the international community and the civil society in the host country’s elections and democratization.

By Chloe Bordewich, Avery Davis-Roberts & David Carroll, The Carter Center

I. Introduction

“Genuine democratic elections are an expression of sovereignty, which belongs to the people of a country, the free expression of whose will provides the basis for the authority and legitimacy of a government,” begins the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation. [1] Election observation is fundamentally an exercise in support of this principle. International observers serve as impartial watchdogs who can assess whether the results of an election truly reflect the will of the people. 

Genuine democratic elections do not guarantee democratic governance, but are a prerequisite for it. They provide political legitimacy for elected leaders and a foundation from which to govern, reducing the scope for non-democratic challenges to power. They serve to resolve competition for political power peacefully and are more likely to lead to stability than non-democratic forms of succession.

International election observation is one of several activities that have emerged over the last few decades in an effort to promote transitions to democratic forms of governance. From the mid-1980s to 2004, the proportion of elections in “non-established democracies” monitored by international observers rose from less than 10 percent to 85 percent. [2] By another measure, 80 percent of elections worldwide were monitored in 2006. [3] As Susan Hyde notes, the public now views with suspicion elections from which international observers are barred, and leaders of semi-democratic or transitional regimes are more eager than ever to win international observers’ imprimatur. The observation norm has spread beyond Western democracies. In 2009, for example, The Bangkok Post and the Iranian League for the Defense of Human Rights, as well as U.S. President Barack Obama, expressed grave doubts about Iran’s election results based on the absence of observers. [4]

The objectives and impact of observers must not be overstated. While often attributed a wide range of aims and objectives, election observation’s core goals are modest but important. They are to: 

1. Provide accurate and impartial reporting on the quality of elections to the public, media, and international community, including the degree to which the conduct of elections meets international standards; and
2. Demonstrate the interest of the international community in the host country’s elections and democratization.

International election observation in the interest of promoting genuine democratic elections ultimately should strive to make itself unnecessary. For the foreseeable future, however, international observation will continue to play an important role. One observed election that upholds a country’s international commitments does not consolidate democratic governance and backsliding to authoritarianism, with or without elections, is not uncommon. Observers must continue to innovate in order to meet the challenges brought by the emergence of new topic areas and the evolving use of technology. In addition, international election observers must maximize the mutual benefits of working side-by-side with citizen observers.

This Focus On provides an analysis of the factors that guide, influence, and challenge international observation organizations and individual observers. 

Part II, “What is International Election Observation?” introduces the field. It defines international election observation and its goals, and outlines conditions for observation. 

Part III, “Origins and Evolution of International Observation,” surveys the birth and growth of monitoring from its roots in the mid-20th-century to the streamlining of methodology and proliferation of practitioners in the 2000s. 

Part IV, “Approaches to Observation: Methodology and Tools,” examines efforts to reach consensus on assessment standards, compares mission models across observation organizations, and reviews tools developed to aid observers in their work. 

Part V, “Stakeholder Relationships,” explores international observers’ interactions with host governments, citizen observers, political parties, media, donors, and each other. 

Part VI, “Challenges to International Observation,” outlines unresolved questions and obstacles to the field, and 

Part VII, “Conclusion,” speculates on its future.

[1] United Nations, Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers (New York: United Nations, 2005), 1. 

[2] Judith G. Kelley, Monitoring Democracy: When Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 16.

[3] Susan D. Hyde, The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became an International Norm (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 3.

[4] Hyde, Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma, 1-2.

The Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers form the framework shared by all major organizations engaged in observation. Adopted in 2005 at the United Nations (U.N.) in a ceremony co-chaired by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the Declaration sets forth guidelines for the conduct of professional and impartial observation. Initially, 22 nongovernmental (e.g., The Carter Center, National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)) and intergovernmental (e.g., UN Electoral Assistance Division, Organization of American States (OAS), Council of Europe (CoE)) organizations endorsed the Declaration of Principles and accompanying Code of Conduct. Since then, the Declaration of Principles community has grown to 49 organizations. 

The Declaration of Principles defines three components of international election observation, carried out as “organized efforts of intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations”: [5]

(1) “The systematic, comprehensive, and accurate gathering of information concerning the laws, process, and institutions related to the conduct of elections and other factors concerning the overall electoral environment;

(2) The impartial and professional analysis of such information; and

(3) The drawing of conclusions about the character of electoral processes based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis.”  [6]

Observers, in other words, are responsible for gathering data, analyzing it, and providing an assessment of an electoral process. Based on that assessment, they provide recommendations for improving the integrity and effectiveness of future elections to bring them better into alignment with a country’s international commitments. The observers who carry out this work, according to the Declaration of Principles, must be “free from any political, economic, or other conflicts of interest,” that would influence their ability to conduct an assessment impartially. This precludes citizens of a country from participating in observation missions there that are, by definition, international. It also rules out the possibility of a mission accepting funds or support from a host government and requires transparency regarding sources of funding. [7]

In addition to demonstrating international interest in and support for elections that meet international standards, observation amplifies the efforts of civil society and citizen observer organizations to improve the electoral process and can lend credibility to their findings. The watchful presence of observers also can discourage electoral stakeholders from engaging in violence and can promote instead public confidence in the process (as warranted) and political participation. Finally, it aims to enhance international understanding of elections and their context by making key electoral data and mission reports publicly accessible.

Conditions for observation

While more than 100 national elections take place worldwide each year, not all are ripe for observation. [8] Observation organizations must invest resources where they are most valuable -- usually not in established democracies or clearly authoritarian contexts -- and weigh practical concerns such as availability of funding and the security of those they deploy. Most importantly, however, specific conditions for observation, spelled out in the Declaration of Principles, should be met for observers to conduct their work “effectively and credibly.” Absence of these conditions may serve as justification for a mission’s withdrawal. They include:

1. Invitation. The relevant government authority, usually the electoral management body (EMB) or ministry of foreign affairs, must issue an official invitation to the observer group(s) it welcomes to observe sufficiently in advance of an electoral event so as to allow observers access to important parts of the process ahead of polling. An invitation demonstrates good will on the part of the host government and indicates responsibility to fulfill the other conditions. Most observer organizations also view as important the acceptance of their engagement from stakeholders across the political spectrum. 
2. Unimpeded access to electoral processes and technologies. Observers must have access to all phases of the electoral process (including pre- and post-election) and to all technologies used, including electronic registration and voting, as well as to the certification processes for these technologies. Electoral authorities must not require observers to sign nondisclosure agreements regarding technologies used. 
3. Unimpeded access to stakeholders. A comprehensive and impartial assessment requires that observers be able to speak with government supporters and critics of all kinds. Stakeholders to whom observers’ access must not be obstructed include electoral officials at all levels, legislators, relevant government and security officials, political parties, candidates (qualified and disqualified), media, and civil society. In the case of election officials and other government authorities, meetings should be granted upon “reasonable request.” 
4. Freedom of movement. Security conditions are taken into careful consideration. Observers must not be banned from observing in or traveling to any part of the country as limits on observers’ movement preclude missions from knowing if findings are representative and can give the appearance of manipulation.  
5. Freedom to issue reports. Observer missions must not be prevented from releasing statements or reports, no matter how critical their findings. As reports are the primary vehicle for providing information about electoral processes, the right to make them public, in full and uncensored, is a pre-condition of credible and effective observation.
6. Absence of interference in mission composition. Governmental authorities must guarantee that they will not attempt to influence the outcome of a mission by limiting its size or interfering in the selection of observers. 
7. Accreditation. As long as election observation missions (EOMs) comply with reasonable and non-discriminatory requirements for observers, government authorities must ensure full, nationwide accreditation for all those submitted. Accreditation entails the issuance of any identification document needed to conduct observation. Observers should receive their accreditation in sufficient time to observe all relevant parts of the process.
8. Absence of interference in observation. Broadly, government authorities should not interfere with EOM activities. Access to the electoral process is of limited value if observers are pressured, antagonized, or forced to adapt to unreasonable requirements.
9. Protection of interlocutors. Authorities must not intimidate or punish anyone who works for, cooperates with, or shares information with an EOM. [9]

A memorandum of understanding (MoU) between a host government and observer group can help solidify mutual understanding of these principles. A clear enumeration of government assurances and observer responsibilities may be necessary especially in countries that are hosting international observers for the first time. Although observation has spread across all continents, transitional regimes still may wish to maintain more influence over a mission’s activities than agreed upon principles allow. 

[5] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 4.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., para. 4

[8] “IFES Election Guide,” IFES, accessed July 15, 2014, http://www.electionguide.org.

[9] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 12.

Democracy promotion after World War II

Democracy promotion as an interest of Western governments stretches back to the reordering of the international community following World War II. In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) made democratic principles a foundation of the new prevailing system. “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government,” it proclaimed, and “this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.” [10] The same year, the Charter of the Organization of American States stated as one of the body’s essential purposes: “to promote and consolidate representative democracy,” [11] as did the Council of Europe’s founding statute in 1949, thus reinforcing the emergence of this new prerogative. 

Eighteen years after the adoption of the UDHR, the U.N. codified its aspirational language on democratic elections in a binding international treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Drafters of the UDHR recognized immediately the need to give weight and concreteness to their document, but the U.N. General Assembly’s adoption of the ICCPR was delayed for 12 years due to hesitation on the part of both the United States and the Soviet Union. [12] An idealistic wave of former colonial states achieving self-determination in the 1950s and 1960s, however, pushed the ICCPR to the fore. 

In this environment the first small election observation missions were deployed. The U.N., in particular, began overseeing referenda on independence in territories under U.N. trusteeship as a precursor to accepting countries into the international community of sovereign states. The early missions included elements of supervision or assistance as well as assessment. In 1948, a special Temporary Commission on Korea supervised and monitored the country’s by-elections in the U.S.-controlled South following an attempt by the General Assembly to unite the two Koreas under one government. [13] The U.N. Plebiscite Commissioner in British Togoland’s 1956 referendum on integration with an independent Gold Coast (Ghana) similarly played this dual role. This report marked the first use of the language “free and fair” to certify the integrity of a vote. [14] In its 1958 mission for French Togoland’s Legislative Assembly elections, the U.N. deployed 21 observers and 12 staff to ensure the legitimacy of a legislature that could achieve independence. [15] Despite the small mission and its short time-frame (two months), as well as flawed electoral laws, the U.N. Commissioner ultimately certified that, “the outcome of the elections faithfully reflects the wishes of the people of Togoland.” [16]

The OAS was also an early pioneer of observation, launching its inaugural mission in 1962 to Costa Rica. Framed as a technical assistance project, the OAS mission to Costa Rica nevertheless reported on the integrity of the election and established a precedent for future missions to six Latin American countries in the 1960s and 1970s. Like the U.N. in this period, the OAS did not emphasize its independence or neutrality. Instead, it underscored its “moral support” for democracy. [17] The organization’s decision to shift from a firm position of nonintervention toward active support for democratization coincided with a U.S.-backed push to suspend Cuba’s membership. [18]

Collapse of communism and new opportunities 

The collapse of Communism and thaw of Cold War tensions in the 1980s provided a new impetus for election observation, enabling the field to grow. This spurred, in turn, reflection on its parameters and methodology. As new opportunities for international engagement appeared in Eastern Europe and Latin America, the salient motivation for monitoring elections shifted from supporting self-determination to advancing democratic values where authoritarian regimes were crumbling. 

The Cold War placed democratic elections into an economic context, linking them explicitly to the free market. Between 1989 and 1992, many of the largest providers of foreign aid, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), United States, Great Britain, France, and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), had announced that funding decisions would tie good governance to capitalist reforms. [19] Multi-party elections came to be seen as a pre-condition of economic liberalism. [20] This approach led some critics to see financial and ideological aims in the decision of Western governments to fund observation missions.

Increased demand for international monitors highlighted the need for standardization and the definition of a professional field with specific expertise. In 1984, the International Human Rights Law Group produced the first handbook for election observation, Guidelines for International Election Observing. Authored by Larry Garber and funded by USAID, the handbook recognized that international human rights instruments were vague on what constituted “free,” “genuine,” and “periodic” elections, and that this had led in part to inconsistent observer reports. Garber cited specifically the 1979 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and 1982 El Salvador elections as demonstrating the need for clearer standards, noting that political agendas and divergent methodologies had resulted in harmful conflicting assessments. [21]

Emphasizing the role of election observation missions in promoting human rights, Garber’s Guidelines addressed issues such as criteria for deciding where to observe, mission composition and length, reporting (including sample checklists), and minimum conditions for a “free and fair” election. The momentum of election observation during this period also was reflected in the U.S. Congress’s creation in 1983 of the National Endowment for Democracy. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republication Institute (IRI), two of its four original grantees, sought to develop significant election observation programs. 

The U.N. had continued to supervise and observe elections since Togoland in 1958 under mandates from the General Assembly, Security Council, or Trusteeship Council. [22] Yet by 1989, when it supervised elections in Namibia, it was inaugurating a new phase of engagement in democracy-building that was broader than its previous focus on decolonization. A year earlier, the U.N. General Assembly issued a resolution entitled “Efforts of Governments to Promote or Consolidate New or Restored Democracies.” U.N. observation in Nicaragua in February 1990 and in Haiti in 1991 solidified the reversal in the body’s previous position that it would only be involved elections where a threat existed to internal peace. Instead, it also would pursue democratization directly. [23] Growing U.N. and international interest led to the designation in 1991 of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs as a focal point for electoral assistance and the creation of the U.N. Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD) to support that work. [24]

Simultaneously, the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), predecessor of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), began discussions of deploying observers. Its 1989 Conference on the Human Dimension of Security precipitated an important precedent, whereby CSCE member states agreed in June 1990 to issue a collective standing invitation to observers for all future elections. [25] The following year, CSCE established an Office of Free Elections (now Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)) to meet this demand. In the Western Hemisphere, the end of the Cold War provided an opening for the OAS General Assembly to recommend in 1989 that the body send observers to any member state that requested them. [26] At the same time, the Commonwealth Secretariat began monitoring elections with a new focus on national contests rather than on territories seeking independence, and the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) made its first foray into observation during Namibia’s 1989 elections in concert with the U.N. [27]

The growth of observation was not limited to international organizations. The first major citizen election observation organization, National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), emerged in the mid-1980s in the Philippines with the aim of raising awareness of manipulation by the repressive military regime of Ferdinand Marcos. NAMFREL members initially organized for the 1984 Congressional elections, but it was their success fielding 500,000 volunteers for a snap presidential election in 1986 that helped allay skepticism about the utility of citizens observing their own elections and paved the way for the growth of the practice around the world in parallel with international observation. In this case, NAMFREL’s exposure of fraud on the part of the Marcos government contributed significantly to the ouster of the regime. [28]

This formative period saw groups experimenting with closer collaboration, testing new methodologies, and setting precedents for observer conduct. In 1989, NDI and IRI, along with The Carter Center’s Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, jointly deployed a mission to Panama led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. [29] This marked Carter’s debut in election observation, a field in which The Carter Center would become a leader over the next decade. In the run-up to the election, Carter resisted attempts by military strongman Manuel Noriega and his presidential designee, Carlos Duque, to restrict the mission to a symbolic delegation consisting of President and Mrs. Carter, former U.S. President Gerald Ford, and three staff. By threatening to skip the election altogether if the Panamanian government did not yield to the observer organizations’ conditions for a larger, professional mission, Eric Bjornlund notes, President Carter established a new standard of independence for election observation. [30] This autonomous model contrasted with the common practice in the 1980s of foreign governments sending official delegations to observe and reaffirm relations between countries. As Garber noted in his 1984 handbook, “their primary purpose often [was] to signify support for the electoral process.”  [31] Carter’s position was also at odds with another partisan model, employed in Panama during the same election: A coalition of domestic opposition groups, the Committee to Support International Observers, hosted and even paid the stipends of 270 international observers. [32]

The joint mission to Panama demonstrated observers’ growing influence over the international community’s perceptions of electoral processes. The mission’s widely publicized denunciation of the government’s falsification of results, followed by nullification of the elections, was based on a parallel vote tabulation (PVT), or “quick count,” of a statistically significant sample of polling stations that showed a substantial opposition victory. [33] “The effective repression of the democratic impulses of the Panamanian people,” the final report noted, “provides encouragement to those governments in the region and beyond who cling to power, despite the contrary aspirations of the majority of their people.” [34] While Carter was unable to broker a peaceful resolution to the electoral conflict, the mission’s findings helped catalyze global condemnation of Noriega’s rule.

The 1990s: growth and professionalization of the field

Judith Kelley demonstrates that the sharpest rise in number of missions conducted annually worldwide occurred between 1989 (30 percent of elections) and 1991 (46 percent). [35] The end of the Cold War provided an opening for election observation to boom and for more organizations to join the field, including the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) in 1992 and the European Parliament in 1994. And by the late 1990s, regional, non-Western actors were active, including the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the South African Development Community (SADC), and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, later changed to the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). [36]

The spread of observation and proliferation of groups put pressure on national leaders to allow monitoring in their countries or, in other terms, brought governments to realize the utility. As Susan Hyde notes, even undemocratic leaders (like Noriega in Panama) became willing to invite observers based on the benefits of foreign aid and relationships that could come after a positive assessment, at the risk of being caught red-handed at manipulation. [37] Kelley adds: “Election monitoring continued to spread because external actors increased democratic conditionality and because the stigma associated with not inviting monitors motivated even cheating governments to invite monitors to avoid an automatic stamp of illegitimacy.” [38] Yet, as more countries became open to observation, observer groups with increasing depth of expertise also demonstrated greater willingness to issue critical reports. In the 1980s, international observer groups only questioned seriously the legitimacy of an electoral process four times. In the 1990s, the number of negative reports rose sharply to a high of 16 elections in 2000. [39]

Increased confidence in observers’ assertions of fraud could be due in part to the honing of statistical methods over the same period. Parallel vote tabulations (PVTs) can project results ahead of official announcements or verify their accuracy based on an independent count of a statistically significant sample. Following the successful detection of malpractice in Panama and Nicaragua, as well as NAMFREL’s innovative 1986 PVT in the Philippines, the technique was used in Africa during the 1991 Zambian national elections. NDI trained and oversaw Zambian counters whose data enabled the groups to confirm an opposition victory on election night – results that were not officially announced until significantly later. [40] NDI continued to develop PVT methodology throughout the 1990s, emphasizing international support to national civil society organizations with the capacity to field thousands of volunteers in a given country. This quantitative data complemented the qualitative reporting from a necessarily smaller number of international observers where the two worked alongside one another. During Indonesia’s 1999 legislative elections, for example, the NDI-Carter Center joint mission announced in its preliminary statement on counting and tabulation that PVT results from a civil society group, the Rectors’ Forum, supported its assessment of a fair process: “Significantly, the results of these various unofficial tabulations do not provide any evidence to support allegations of widespread or significant fraud or tampering designed to benefit any particular party or parties.” [41]

The establishment of international election observation as a norm in the 1990s brought certain challenges. Critics voiced concerns about the quality of observation and the frequency with which groups observing the same election reached conflicting conclusions. 

In 1997, Thomas Carothers attributed the first shortcoming to overcrowding of the field and amateur techniques of less experienced groups, citing the example of Nicaragua’s 1996 general elections, for which the country had hosted 80 international observer groups. [42] Aside from a handful of experienced organizations (including those already discussed), he wrote, “many of the rest are ‘dabblers’ who come in for high-profile elections with short-term, poorly prepared delegations.” [43] He also criticized the overemphasis on polling and consequent failure to catch violations occurring in other parts of the process; the phenomenon of “electoral tourism” by those driven more by curiosity than methodological rigor; and lack of impartiality. [44]

The abundance of observers also fostered a diversity of methodologies that sometimes resulted in discord. Observer groups commonly used “free and fair” as the standard for a successful election. Yet even in cases where the somewhat less ambiguous phrases “met international standards” or “fulfilled international commitments” were used, organizations were often unclear about what those standards and commitments were or, most often, what constituted meeting them – especially when an election’s results were not overtly fraudulent. 

The lack of clear and consistent methodologies and assessment criteria among observers was compounded by the question of whether observers’ assessments should be conditioned by the country context. Carothers found in 1997 that some groups applied lower standards in places with a poor track record of democracy or a lesser degree of political development. “The notion that it is important to offer at least some encouragement to societies that are struggling with the basics,” he writes, “leads them to downplay serious problems.” [45]

Zimbabwe’s conflicted national elections in 2000 and 2002 demonstrated how contradictory assessments could dull the impact of observation and exacerbate domestic tensions. The fraught context of the 2000 vote raised questions about the conditions under which observers should agree to operate in the first place. The government of President Robert Mugabe attempted to cherry-pick groups and categories of observers it thought would reach favorable conclusions, restricting the size of missions, denying accreditation to some groups, and preventing observers from monitoring critical pre-election activities. Some groups adapted their delegations to the government’s restrictions, while others denounced the move even ahead of polling. [46] No definitive conditions existed in the election observation community for withdrawing. 

In Zimbabwe, observer groups’ assessments reflected the obstacles they faced. NDI and IRI, which were refused accreditation, flatly denounced the process, as did the EU, whose delegation was restricted. Referencing Zimbabwe’s constitution as well as both the UDHR and African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, NDI stated: “The conditions for credible democracy do not exist in Zimbabwe at this time.” [47] The Commonwealth voiced concerns, particularly with electoral violence and intimidation, but ultimately concluded that “the conditions constitute a climate for the growth of multiparty democracy” after a long period of single-party rule.  [48] SADC and the OAU, neither of which bore the brunt of Mugabe’s anti-Western rhetoric, were even more positive about the election: SADC’s Parliamentary Forum noted that it hoped for an electoral climate like Zimbabwe’s to prevail in all its member states. [49] The overall message of the international community was unclear and contradictory, placing the efficacy of observation missions and validity of their methods into question. Mugabe’s relative success at manipulating missions in 2000 empowered him to employ similar tactics in 2002. This time, however, the SADC Parliamentary Forum and Commonwealth were far less complimentary in their reports. Only the OAU issued a statement that praised the electoral process. [50]

Defining principles and building consensus

After their experience in Zimbabwe, leading observer groups recognized the need to provide greater clarity about their objectives and methods. Some guidelines already existed, contained in handbooks published by NDI and OSCE/ODIHR, as well as Larry Garber’s 1984 handbook, the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice (1994), and International IDEA’s Code of Conduct for Ethical and Professional Observation of Elections (1997), which was produced in consultation with other major organizations and EMBs. This document concisely presented observation’s objectives and standards of good practice, organized around ethical principles (such as transparency and neutrality) central to meaningful observation. [51] Building on this premise, NDI’s Integrity Project, and lessons learned from Zimbabwe and other contentious elections of the early 2000s, The Carter Center, NDI, and UNEAD began meeting formally to build consensus and professionalism in the field of election observation. In October 2003, The Carter Center hosted a regionally diverse group of 15 intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in Atlanta to share collective experience with the aim of determining the parameters, content, and format of a Declaration of Principles and Code of Conduct. The consultation process continued with a Carter Center-EISA forum in 2004 in Johannesburg, South Africa that brought together citizen observer groups and members of African EMBs to ensure sensitivity to African perspectives in the drafting process, followed by a European Commission-sponsored meeting in Brussels where final details were decided. [52]

On Oct. 27, 2005, 22 organizations endorsed the Declaration of Principles in a formal session of the United Nations in New York. Participants agreed that it would not be legally binding, but would rather serve as a set of best practices, retain flexibility, and be open for endorsement indefinitely. A key difference between the Declaration of Principles and earlier guidelines was that endorsers quickly developed a community of practice that meets regularly to monitor and ensure the document’s implementation. This process began in London in 2006 with the first of what are annual “implementation meetings” of the Declaration of Principles endorsers. The 2006 meeting focused on the donor community’s role in fostering effective observation.

Recognizing that meeting the Declaration of Principles’ standards of professionalism required a holistic look at the electoral process, observer groups pushed further the emerging trend toward long-term observation in the years following its adoption. Emphasis had evolved from early high-level political delegations to a focus on election day polling procedures, then to missions that paired high levels of technical and political expertise with teams of long-term observers to assess the entire electoral cycle where possible. The next decade also inaugurated the use of tablet and mobile phone technology to speed reporting and synthesis of data collected by observers, the solidification of assessment standards, and the testing of new modes of collaboration with citizen observers. At the forefront of these changes, the annual Declaration of Principles implementation meetings sought to share best practices and confront mutual challenges. Recurrent themes during the first 10 years included the harmonization of meaningful standards for assessing electoral technologies; building consensus on international obligations as a basis for assessment; follow-up to observer recommendations, or how to translate them into reform; coordination with citizen observers; and methods for evaluating the impact of observation.

[10] U.N. General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: United Nations, 1948), art. 21(3).

[11] Organization of American States, Charter of the Organization of American States (Bogota: Organization of American States, 1948-1993), art. 1.

[12] Christian Tomuschat, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” United Nations, accessed July 15, 2014, http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/iccpr/iccpr_e.pdf.

[13] Eric C. Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 54-5. 

[14] Jørgen Elklit and Palle Svensson, “What Makes Elections Free and Fair?”, Journal of Democracy 8, no. 3 (1997): 32, doi: 10.1353/jod.1997.0041. 

[15] Yves Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda, and National Elections (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 133.

[16] Ibid. 

[17] Hyde, Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma, 97-8.

[18] Ibid., 99.

[19] Kelley, Monitoring Democracy, 29.

[20] Gisela Geisler, “Fair? What Has Fairness Got to Do With It? Vagaries of Election Observations and Democratic Standards,” Journal of Modern African Studies 31, no. 4 (1993): 630-1, doi: 10.1017/S0022278X00012271. 

[21] Larry Garber, Guidelines for International Election Observing (Washington, DC: International Human Rights Law Group, 1984), i.

[22] Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair, 55.

[23] Ibid., 56.

[24] U.N. General Assembly, Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections, A/RES/46/137 (New York: United Nations, 1991).

[25] Kelley, Monitoring Democracy, 16.

[26] OAS General Assembly, “Human Rights and Electoral Monitoring,” AG/RES. 991 (XIX-O/89), Nineteenth Regular Session, Washington, D.C., November 13-18, 1989: Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States General Secretariat), 37. 

[27] Kelley, Monitoring Democracy, 37.

[28] Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair,212-215.

[29] The Carter Center engaged in efforts to avert electoral conflict prior to the Panama mission, including in Haiti in 1987, but did not deploy observers. 

[30] Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair, 77.

[31] Garber, Guidelines, 4.

[32] NDI and IRI, The May 7, 1989 Panamanian Elections: International Delegation Report (Washington, D.C.: National Democratic Institute & National Republican Institute, 1989), 63-64. 

[33] Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair, 77.

[34] NDI and IRI, May 7, 1989 Panamanian Elections, 4. 

[35] Kelley, Monitoring Democracy, 16-17. 

[36] Ibid., 35-36.

[37] Hyde, Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma, 109

[38] Kelley, Monitoring Democracy, 31.

[39] Hyde, Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma, 112.

[40] Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair, 88.

[41] NDI and The Carter Center, “Post-Election Statement No. 3 of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and The Carter Center International Election Observation Mission: Indonesia’s June 7, 1999, Legislative Elections” (Jakarta: NDI/The Carter Center, 1999), 2, https://www.ndi.org/files/212_id_3rdelect_0.pdf. 

[42] Thomas Carothers, “The Observers Observed,” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 3 (1997): 21, doi: 10.1353/jod.1997.0037. 

[43] Ibid., 21.

[44] Ibid., 22-25.

[45] Carothers, “Observers Observed,” 25.

[46] Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair, 200-201.

[47] NDI, Zimbabwe Parliamentary Elections 2000: Report of the NDI Pre-election Delegation, May 15-22, 2000 (Harare: National Democratic Institute, 2000), 9.

[48] Commonwealth Secretariat, The Parliamentary Elections in Zimbabwe: 24-25 June 2000: Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000), 34. 

[49] SADC, “Zimbabwe 2000: SADC Parliamentary Forum Mission Interim Statement,” SADC Parliamentary Forum, accessed August 18, 2014, http://www.content.eisa.org.za/old-page/zimbabwe-2000-sadc-parliamentary-forum-mission-interim-statement. 

[50] Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair, 195.

[51] International IDEA, Code of Conduct for Ethical and Professional Observation of Elections (Stockholm: International IDEA, 1997).

[52] Carter Center, Building Consensus on Principles for International Election Observation (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2006), 4-7, http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/CC%20Elec%20Standards%20G_final.pdf. 

Overall evaluations: the decline of “free and fair”

Even before the endorsement of the Declaration of Principles in 2005, professional observer groups and critics of observation alike articulated a critical need to define rigorous assessment criteria. While “free and fair” remained the most frequently used benchmark, experts were uncomfortable with its inability to express nuance. As Elklit and Svensson testified as early as 1997, “The phrase ‘free and fair’ cannot denote compliance with a fixed, universal standard of electoral competition: No such standard exists, and the complexity of the electoral process makes the notion of any simple formula unrealistic.” [53] With this in mind, the Declaration of Principles conspicuously avoided use of the term. At the same time, while it urged endorsers to harmonize their methodologies, it did not provide more detail on what standards election observers should use.

The appeal of “free and fair” was that it was a blanket assessment of an election that was easy for the public to digest. By distancing themselves from “free and fair,” observer groups faced the challenge of finding alternative formulations to express their overall evaluation. The move toward long-term observation, and its pairing in most cases with short-term observation, increased the amount and diversified the types of data observers collected. Carroll and Davis-Roberts explain the fundamental question with which observer groups continue to grapple:

The most difficult challenge is to evaluate the extent and significance of observed problems during various stages of the election, and to assess the degree to which they fundamentally undermine the integrity of the entire election and the final results. Such analysis raises the core question of how much weight or value to give to various parts of the electoral process and the relevant obligations. [54]

Observers recognize that the quality of an election can be compromised during the pre-election campaign period or during post-election dispute resolution, just as on election day itself. To this end, the discrete parts of the electoral process have been identified to ensure that reporting addresses all aspects sufficiently. Acknowledging that any part of the process can be compromised, the question remains: are all equally important? While the models used differ slightly, observer groups avoid imposing a hierarchy, recognizing that context will determine the challenges of each election. 

Logistical and financial limitations often force groups to make difficult choices about what to observe when they cannot observe everything. To best allocate resources, they must evaluate where vulnerabilities to manipulation or fraud are greatest and the relative degree to which different types of potential violations would undermine the integrity of the process. In some political or cultural contexts, observers may know in advance to devote resources to past problem areas, but often these are hard to predict. 

International obligations: a consensus approach

Dissatisfaction with “free and fair” and the need for a more systematic framework suited to the rigorous observation of all aspects of the electoral process led to the emergence of a new methodological paradigm. State obligations under public international law had underpinned the values of observers since the start, but were not articulated as a comprehensive assessment framework. The establishment of the Declaration of Principles community in 2005 helped observation organizations further coalesce around an approach palatable to states themselves and which enables observers to make specific, compelling arguments regarding the fulfillment of universal human rights in the electoral process.

Public international law includes treaties, judicial decisions, political commitments, and other sources of best practice. U.N. treaties are the starting point for obligations-based frameworks because they are instruments that countries around the world have voluntarily agreed through ratification to uphold. Examples include the ICCPR and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Where applicable, regional treaties such as the African Union’s African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are also important and may grant a greater degree of contextual specificity to obligations.    

Treaties address rights and freedoms broadly but often lack detail that can help interpret how they should be applied in practice. In addition, new standards evolve that are not immediately codified in binding treaties. Interpretive documents, which include judicial decisions by intergovernmental courts (e.g., International Court of Justice, Inter-American Court Human Rights) and General Comments issued by treaty-monitoring bodies (e.g., U.N. Human Rights Committee), explain the intent of treaty principles. Political commitments are non-binding instruments that provide evidence of emerging norms. Examples include OAS’ Inter-American Democratic Charter and the AU’s Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa. Finally, handbooks and other works of established experts (e.g., EU Handbook for European Union Election Observation or Norwegian Helsinki Committee’s Manual on Human Rights Monitoring) provide evidence of best state practices and are often cited in international court decisions.

 

ODIHR, for example, which observes in OSCE member states, cites as its primary benchmark the 1990 Copenhagen Document, a political commitment that outlines standards for democratic elections in the OSCE and enshrines the role of observers in helping to uphold those standards. ODIHR’s framework, outlined in its Election Observation Handbook, also incorporates universal human rights instruments, including the UDHR, ICCPR, CEDAW, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Human rights instruments of other regional bodies to which OSCE member states have acceded are also applied, such as the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. The Handbook also acknowledges the value of non-binding documents that may be used for “providing guidance to participating States” and which “provide examples of how international or regional obligations might be carried out.” [55]

Observers are often asked how national law fits into an obligations-based assessment framework. Analysis of a country’s legal framework for elections and the conditions it provides for democratic governance is a crucial part of any mission. On one hand, observers do assess the extent to which laws are implemented during the electoral process. On the other, while ratification of a treaty commits a state to take the necessary steps to harmonize national law with its principles, this does not always occur. Some countries include in their constitutional framework a provision for automatically adopting international treaties as national law upon ratification; others make the legislature responsible for passing the appropriate legislation. In evaluating national laws, then, observers should highlight places where national law can be improved to bring it into alignment with a country’s international obligations. 

What are the obligations?

While organizations now draw their criteria from essentially the same body of sources, some differences exist in how they translate them into a comprehensive assessment framework for observers to use. In each case, the goal is to define the essential characteristics of a democratic electoral process based on international obligations and to develop criteria for determining whether they are fulfilled.

The Carter Center and International IDEA, for example, have agreed upon 21 obligations that form the basis of their methodology. Every obligation is drawn from an international treaty (often the ICCPR) and supported by other sources. “Genuine Elections that Reflect the Free Expression of the Will of the People” is the framework’s overarching obligation, as it defines the essence of democratic elections. This language comes directly from Article 21 of the UDHR and was reinforced in the ICCPR. All fundamental rights must be broadly respected for the overarching obligation of Genuine Elections to be met. The Carter Center organizes obligations into three types: “foundational obligations,” related to the state’s responsibility to protect freedoms and rule of law; “process-focused obligations,” which deal specifically with the electoral process, and “individual rights and freedoms.” [56] 

In 2000, representatives of the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Electoral Commissions Forum began drafting a document that outlined standards-based criteria for assessing each part of the electoral process, with particular reference to African regional instruments. Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO) (2003) identifies between five and 12 key principles for each sub-part of the electoral process that taken together make up “free and fair, credible, and legitimate elections in a climate of peace and security.” [57] Criteria for “Constitutional and Legal Framework,” for example, require that it, “provide for the establishment of an independent and impartial electoral management body,” “provide for the regular scheduling of elections,” etc. [58] The former corresponds in the Carter Center framework with “Freedom from Discrimination and Equality Before the Law” and the latter with “Periodic Elections.” 

OAS starts with four key descriptors (“attributes”) of a democratic process. According to A Manual for OAS Electoral Observation Missions, they consist of: 

• Inclusive Elections: All citizens must be effectively enabled to exercise their right to vote in the electoral process.
• Clean Elections: Voters’ preferences must be respected and faithfully registered.
• Competitive Elections: They must offer the electorate an unbiased choice among alternatives.
• Elective Public Offices: The main public offices must be accessed through periodic elections, and the results expressed through the citizens’ votes must not be reversed.  

Each attribute is broken down into two “components.” “Competitive Elections,” for instance, comprises (1) “Right to run for office,” and (2) “Basic guarantees for an electoral campaign.” Some break down further into “subcomponents”: “Basic guarantees for an electoral campaign” includes freedoms of association, assembly, expression, and movement; access to information; equal playing field; and security. Each component or subcomponent is then translated into a question (“issue at stake”) which, if answered in the affirmative, verifies the presence of democratic attributes. The question “Are there unreasonable hurdles to become a candidate?,” for instance, corresponds with “Right to run for office,” which is one of two components of “Competitive Elections.” [60]

ODIHR’s Election Observation Handbook excerpts clauses of the Copenhagen Document that explicitly relate to elections. Because ODIHR’s mandate largely derives from Copenhagen, these principles can stand alone as obligations to a large extent. ODIHR does, however, designate eight criteria delineated in the Copenhagen Document and other source documents: (1) Periodic elections; (2) Genuine elections; (3) Free elections; (4) Fair elections; (5) Universal suffrage; (6) Equal suffrage; (7) Voting by secret ballot; and (8) Honest counting and reporting of results. [61] “Free and fair” appear as only two of eight characteristics, not as all-inclusive descriptors. Each category comprises specific elements: “Free elections” includes, e.g., freedom of assembly, association, expression, and movement.

The assessment frameworks used by The Carter Center, EISA, OAS, ODIHR, and other organizations differ primarily in their structure, not in their criteria. Some organizations use a larger number of obligations linked to specific treaty stipulations, while others synthesize the essence of the source documents and assign qualitative labels. It is easy to identify the common principles, however. For example, the elements of the OAS’s “Basic guarantees for an electoral campaign,” a component of the “Competitive Elections” attribute, roughly equate to the criteria assessed under ODIHR’s “Free Elections” category, as well as to individual Carter Center obligations (“Freedom of Association,” “Freedom of Opinion and Expression,” “Freedom of Assembly,” etc.). 

Just as it is not possible to establish a hierarchy of importance of different parts of the process, “the relative significance of obligations,” Carroll and Davis-Roberts note, “is inextricably tied to the local context.” [62] In some cases an obligation may be violated without critically undermining the integrity of the process. While the principle of secrecy of the vote, for instance, is widely agreed upon as a democratic standard that protects voters from intimidation, voters in some societies report a lack of concern about more public forms of voting. [63] While observers should note the absence of ballot secrecy, they need not underscore it as a detriment to the free expression of voters’ will. When gauging the relative significance of violated obligations in any context, observers also must consider whether the margin of victory is narrow enough that the failure to uphold a given obligation could have spoiled the process.  

Existing obligations-based frameworks cannot tackle every issue related to the electoral process. Some standards are still evolving or remain undefined. OAS notes abstentionism, compulsory voting, and certain aspects of boundary delimitation and allocation of representatives as examples. [64] As the body of international law grows and observers and human rights groups work more closely together, these issues may be addressed over time. 

Putting methodology to work: election day checklists 

An obligations-based assessment framework is most useful when groups can find ways to collect data that correlate reliably with those obligations or standards. One basic tool of observers in this regard is the election day checklist. Short-term observers (STOs) use these forms to record their findings at each polling station where they observe. Since Garber included a sample checklist in his 1984 handbook, forms have become more sophisticated but have retained common elements. Observers still record when they arrive and depart, whether ballot boxes are properly sealed, whether voters are intimidated, and whether the setup of the polling station preserves secrecy of the vote, for example. But most groups now use different checklists for different parts of election day, including opening procedures, polling, closing and counting, and tabulation of votes. Groups also customize questions for particular country contexts. A question that asks about unauthorized persons present in the polling station, for instance, will reflect national laws on the subject and will exclude “security personnel” if no restrictions on security personnel exist. The range of topics covered also has expanded. Observers may collect information on numbers of female polling officials and other indicators of gender inequality, as well as on accommodations for speakers of minority languages and voters with disabilities.

The most important issue guiding checklist design, however, is how to collect accurate information that can be compared meaningfully from a large number of observers reporting from different locations. Forms are now engineered to elicit the most specific and objective information possible, allowing less space for individual observer bias. What was once asked as “Are voters identified as prescribed by law?” [65] might expand to a series of questions that guide observers through discrete procedural steps (e.g., “Did the PEC [precinct election commission staff] check the voters’ IDs?” “Did the PEC sign and stamp the ballot?” “Did the voters sign the voter list?”). [66] Detailed checklist questions help focus observers on specific aspects of what can be a chaotic process, but they also enable staff analyzing reports to identify where procedures are breaking down or where laws are consistently violated. Most checklist questions today also give observers a range of answers to specify the frequency of observed irregularities.

A shift away from open-ended questions to yes/no and multiple-choice questions is another critical methodological development. A question such as “How were unused ballots disposed of?” is better worded as, for example, “Were the voter list, unused ballots, and spoiled ballots packed in separate envelopes and sealed?” Open-ended questions complicate data analysis and synthesis, making it difficult to reach meaningful conclusions about the fulfillment of obligations. They also give observers leeway to evaluate the process subjectively and potentially miss crucial data points. However, most forms do instruct observers to elaborate on irregularities they have observed so that reports of misconduct can be traced and reviewed later. Expert staff then review the data as a whole and identify patterns.

While observer groups continue to tweak their checklists to extract ever more precise data, significant challenges remain. The most important one is the development of an overall evaluation question that provides clear and reliable information regarding the general quality of the process at each polling station or tabulation center. ODIHR, for instance, asks: “The overall conduct of the voting of this polling station was: (1) Very good; (2) Good; (3) Bad; or (4) Very bad” [67] and The Carter Center currently asks: “What was the overall assessment of the election environment and process at this station? (1) Very good; (2) Reasonable; (3) Poor; (4) Not credible.” Determining the best way to word this question in order to receive consistent and reliable results is a microcosm of the methodological challenge discussed at the beginning of this section: How do we weigh different parts of the process in order to arrive at an overall assessment? Some scales may elicit more or less reliable information than others. But how bad is “very bad”? Or, more challenging, what makes a polling station good enough? Observers themselves may view violations they have witnessed more or less seriously depending on comparative personal experience or preconceived dispositions toward the process.

Long-term reporting

The assessment frameworks of almost all major organizations include aspects of the electoral process that require long-term observation. Long-term observers (LTOs) contribute qualitative analysis to a mission, helping establish the electoral context. LTO reports, in contrast to short-term observer (STO) checklists, involve long-form answers to open-ended questions. Therefore, LTOs must have a stronger grasp of standards and obligations than their short-term counterparts. While organizations are still developing ever more effective ways to correlate LTO reports with specific assessment criteria, a standard range of tools already exists. Most missions require LTOs to compile weekly reports synthesizing findings in their areas of responsibility, providing information on meetings with political stakeholders, campaign events, and any pre- or post-election procedures observed (e.g., voter registration, voter education, poll-worker training, dispute adjudication), as well as identification of potential problem areas and gathering of documentation. Obligations and assessment criteria should shape the language used to guide LTOs in their work.

In addition to the comprehensive weekly report, many groups use variations on three types of shorter LTO reports as needed: campaign rally reports, flash or incident reports, and case files. A campaign rally report collects data on attendees, any instances of intimidation or violence, respect for freedom of assembly and expression, and the tenor of rhetoric. Flash or incident reports capture urgent developments between weekly reports, often including violence or sudden changes in election rules. Case files track complaints and legal violations related to the electoral process. As ODIHR’s LTO manual notes, core team staff may compile case files into a database to track systematic problems. [68]

OAS missions use another type of form, the Document of Indicators on the Electoral Process, which is the responsibility of a designated Indicators Specialist and focuses directly on aligning the electoral environment with obligations in the assessment framework. This document concentrates on the compliance of the country’s own legal framework with its international obligations but incorporates reporting from other core team members and deployed observers. [69]

Reporting with technology: the example of ELMO 

Comprehensive EOMs generate hundreds or even thousands of checklists on election day. Collecting and analyzing checklists from around the country at headquarters after the polls close in order to reach meaningful and statistically significant conclusions, all in time to release a preliminary assessment and hold a press conference within a day or two of voting, is incredibly demanding. This pressure has inspired the development of faster observation technologies. Several observer groups, including The Carter Center, National Democratic Institute (NDI), Democracy International (DI), and others now use mobile technologies in the field for missions. Each has three basic components. First, staff design checklists online, similar to those on paper. Then, observers complete and submit their checklists through mobile platforms adapted for smart phones or tablets. Finally, software aggregates and maps results, enabling headquarters staff to follow observer reports in real time. 

Observation technologies allow staff to identify problems as they occur and focus their attention on drafting statements instead of coding checklist responses. They also provide quick yet powerful tools for presenting the data collected in tables, graphs, charts, or maps. In addition, some programs can prompt observers to correct errors in their submissions, and broadcast messages or edited checklists from headquarters to teams already deployed in the field. 

The Carter Center piloted its mobile observation technology, ELMO (Election Monitoring),  during the 2011 elections in the Cherokee Nation and Liberia. [70] The Center then developed expanded functions for full operational use by STOs in 2012 and 2013 in Egypt, Libya, Kenya, and Nepal. ELMO, like the technologies used by several organizations, builds its user (observer) end on Open Data Kit, a customizable, open-source form collector for tablets. 

Using technology for observation can be challenging where the technological infrastructure is limited. Missions should be well aware of conditions before deployment and have contingency plans in place. ELMO mitigates the risk of losing connectivity by allowing observers to save their forms to their tablets or to USBs until access is available. Staff also equip observers with emergency paper checklists. 

Another alternative where connectivity is limited is the submission of forms by SMS. SMS reporting by 750 citizen observers in Indonesia in 2005 as a replacement for unreliable land line phones, then by international observers in an NDI pilot project during the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, sparked a sustained NDI initiative aimed at supporting citizen observers’ more widespread use of SMS reporting. [71] As Ian Schuler notes, SMS technology provided the first opportunity for observer data to be delivered directly from the observer into a database, without the cost or labor of an intermediary in a call center to receive and record the information. [72] While a predecessor to tablet-based reporting, which allows for more information to be viewed and communicated quickly, SMS remains the most effective option in many less developed countries.

The next phase of technological developments in observation will bring greater integration of platforms with methodological resources, allowing observers, for example, to link relevant obligations to each checklist question. User interfaces will become available in a variety of languages and with accommodations for users with disabilities, making them effective tools for more international and citizen observers in more places. Observer groups also must determine how best to harness form-based technologies for long-term reporting.

Methodological resources 

The codification of observation methodology in the form of online and published materials is essential not only for building consensus, but also for training observers and ensuring that their work is transparent and understood by stakeholders. ODIHR, EU, and OAS have published comprehensive manuals for observers that combine methodological and practical instructions for carrying out a professional mission. Documents like ODIHR’s Election Observation Handbook (6th ed., 2010), the EU’s Handbook for European Union Election Observation (2nd ed., 2008), and OAS’ Manual for OAS Electoral Observation Missions (2009) help ensure consistency across missions and build a common body of knowledge among observers and staff. They also can serve as guides for newer organizations, both international and national, interested in developing observation programs.

Since EISA and SADC published PEMMO (discussed above) in 2003, several other organizations have expanded the effort to provide observers with useful guides on the use of international obligations. The EU, for instance, has published the Compendium of International Standards for Elections, which offers observers step-by-step instructions for applying public international law in their analysis and offers a printed matrix of countries’ ratification statuses. In 2010, The Carter Center launched an online Database of Obligations (re-designed in fall 2014 as the Election Obligations and Standards Database, or EOS). EOS consolidates text from nearly 200 sources of public international law, providing summaries of the democratic standards established in the source documents and linking each to relevant parts of the electoral process. Observers and core staff, assistance providers, researchers, and citizens can search by obligation, election part, country, authoring organization, or keyword, extract relevant quotes, and know the source from which those quotes are derived. Observers can then make immediate use of the texts in their reports, ensuring that international law directly supports their assessments. The database’s companion handbook, Election Obligations and Standards: A Carter Center Assessment Manual, breaks down the 21 obligations into detailed, topical assessment criteria for all aspects of the electoral process.

A significant body also exists of thematic manuals that detail methodologies for observing specific components of the electoral process. In 2001, ODIHR and International IDEA drafted the first handbook on electoral legal frameworks, Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections. In 2013 ODIHR released an updated edition of the Guidelines to reflect new case law and the emergence of electronic voting systems. The goals of the manual are to enable observers to identify gaps in legal protections and to guide authorities to improve electoral legislation. [73] Separately, IDEA released International Obligations for Elections: Guidelines for Legal Frameworks in 2014. Observer groups also have recognized the importance of monitoring areas such as media, campaign finance, gender equality, and voter registration. Methodology for Media Observation during Elections: A Manual for OAS Electoral Observation Missions (2011) articulates the objective of media observation as “[analyzing] the existence or not of conditions of equity to compete in an election, observing, for example, access to media outlets by political actors…” [74] This handbook, as well as ODIHR’s Handbook on Media Monitoring for Election Observation Missions (2012), discusses how to collect and process media coverage, looking for balance of coverage as well as at voter education content. ODIHR likewise has published manuals on monitoring women’s political participation and voter registration, and OAS on campaign finance.

The advent of electronic voting and related technologies in the last decade has presented the greatest challenge to observation methodology because standard methods are often inapplicable. Observers working in countries using technology need to ask new types of questions. Some may be obvious, such as: Is there a contingency plan in case of equipment failure? But observers also need a sufficient technical understanding of the technologies used to assess independently whether systems are secure from hackers, for example, or whether ballot verification measures (such as a voter-verified paper trail, or VVPAT) are functioning properly. The Carter Center first published its Baseline Survey for Observing Electronic Voting in 2007, after testing it in Venezuela’s 2006 presidential election, in an attempt to equip observers with a comprehensive set of tailored questions for stakeholders. [75] The Center’s Handbook on Observing Electronic Voting (2nd ed., 2012), as well as ODIHR’s Handbook for the Observation of New Voting Technologies (2013) and OAS’ Observing the Use of Electoral Technologies (2010) outline the specialized expertise necessary for a mission involving observation of e-voting or even e-registration and extrapolate established obligations to technological applications. Most recently, in 2013, NDI and IFES released Implementing and Overseeing Electronic Voting and Counting Technologies, a guide geared both to electoral management bodies implementing technologies and to observers, political parties, and civil society seeking to understand and monitor their use. Drawing on real case studies, the manual addresses legal issues, timelines for implementation, sustainability, trust and integrity, and data security, as well as the extent to which technologies reflect international standards of transparency, accountability, and ballot secrecy. [76]

As the volume of printed resources is now immense, some groups have experimented with moving parts of their observer training online. ODIHR, for instance, has developed a free, four-module, web-based course for STOs that introduces them to OSCE commitments and other relevant international standards; their mandate, role within the mission, and daily responsibilities as observers; and the Code of Conduct. [77] THE EU invites STOs to complete a six-module course on “Safety and Security in the Field,” and IFES produced a 30-minute video tutorial on Ukrainian election procedures specific to international and citizen observers deploying for the country’s May 2014 presidential vote. [78]

Mission models

The Declaration of Principles emphasizes long-term observation with enough depth and breadth to meet certain criteria: it must be “process oriented”; report periodically, accurately, and impartially; publicly announce its mandate; and employ observers without conflicts of interest. [79] A mission must be “of sufficient size to determine independently and impartially the character of election processes… and must be of sufficient duration to determine the character of all of the critical elements of the election process in the pre-election, election-day, and post election period.” [80] At the same time, the Declaration of Principles makes clear that observer groups might decide to deploy limited missions, but in this case they must identify appropriate foci and neither overstate their parameters nor draw conclusions about parts of the process they did not observe. As long as groups fulfill these conditions, the Declaration does not require that a specific mission model must be used.

Financial resources, organizational size and support capacity, and group profile are the most important factors that drive organizations’ mission structure and methods. Each organization has a comprehensive election observation mission model when conditions are conducive to a robust observer presence throughout the country and for an extended period of time. When considering deployment of a mission, observer groups generally send a small assessment mission of headquarters staff and/or country experts a few months to a year before elections to investigate the pre-electoral environment. They determine whether a mission would be a smart investment of resources and gauge the host government’s willingness to welcome observers. Intergovernmental organizations usually have existing diplomatic ties in the host country. In the EU’s case, European Commission officials based in the host country are able to lay the groundwork for a mission before observers arrive, [81] and ODIHR has a standing invitation to observe in all member states. 

A standard comprehensive international observation mission comprises a core team of managers and topic experts based in the host country’s capital, long-term observers, and short-term observers. The size of delegation, division of responsibilities, and average duration of stay vary. ODIHR deploys some of the largest missions, with a core team of 10-15 international experts. The team, which begins operations in the host country six to eight weeks before election day, includes a head of mission and deputy, reporting officer, election analyst, political analyst, legal analyst, media analyst, statistical analyst, LTO coordinator, and occasionally a specialist in women’s participation, national minorities, e-voting, or campaign finance. [82] Particular to ODIHR as an arm of the OSCE is the parliamentary liaison officer, who coordinates with parliamentarians from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, or European Parliament who also are observing. [83] EU missions appoint a chief observer who is a member of the European Parliament, though the mission is independent from the EU. [84] Otherwise, EU teams have a similar composition to those of ODIHR, and sometimes include a human rights expert to cover women, minorities, and disabilities together. [85] All organizations require operational support in the areas of security, logistics and procurement, and finance, usually provided by both international and local staff.

The Carter Center, as a smaller, nongovernmental organization, deploys core teams with a similar composition but fewer members: at minimum, a field office director, observer coordinator, legal analyst, and security manager. Experts may play multiple roles, e.g., an LTO coordinator with a statistical background who is able to analyze as well as collect data from observers. The Carter Center, NDI, EISA, and OAS all recruit former heads of state or similarly eminent individuals from the host country region to lead their missions on election day. This brings visibility to observers’ findings and demonstrates keen international interest in electoral conduct.

The OAS model largely employs its own specialist staff from the OAS General Secretariat Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation (DECO) as core team members instead of consultants. Aside from the non-staff chief of mission, core teams include a deputy chief, general coordinator, press specialist, electoral organization specialist (the EMB liaison), legal specialist, electoral technology specialist, electoral analyst, indicators specialist, and operational support. [86]

International observation missions nearly always employ a handful of staff who are citizens of the host country. While national staff cannot be accredited as observers, they often play an integral role in advising international experts on local context and laws, interpreting, and monitoring media.

Most organizations deploy long-term observers (LTOs) to the host country shortly after the core team establishes itself, sometimes as soon as one week. There is no set number of LTOs that must be present to constitute a comprehensive mission. However, the combined number of short- and long-term observers needed for sufficient coverage ranges from 10-50 (EISA) to “16 or more” (Carter Center), to more than 100 (ODIHR and EU missions). The precise number generally is contingent on factors such as country size, number of polling stations, political structure, and electoral system. LTOs must commit to as long as several months in country and deliver informed, analytical weekly reports based on daily meetings with candidates, political parties, regional electoral officials, civil society actors, and security personnel during this period. They also often scout a deployment plan for STOs assigned to their areas of responsibility. 

Observers may be recruited through open calls seeking country expertise, civil society background, or elections experience, or through rosters of trained individuals maintained by the intergovernmental organizations that use them. In ODIHR’s case, OSCE member states second observers to missions, though efforts are made to recruit and fund a diverse pool of observers from states that do not participate regularly in this process. [87] Organizations usually deploy LTOs in pairs of mixed nationality and gender to a representative sample of regions nationwide. Leading groups define the duration of long-term observation as averaging between six weeks and six months (though it may last longer if elections are delayed or results are disputed), with some organizations such as The Carter Center preferring a minimum of three months for long-term observation.

During a comprehensive mission, short-term observers complement long-term observers’ analysis by collecting data from a large number of polling stations on election day. As with LTOs, efforts are made to recruit STOs with diverse nationalities and with a gender balance. 

In many cases, short-term observation is also an opportunity to bring citizen observers from neighboring countries or those with upcoming elections to observe with an international mission. EISA, for example, frequently recruits representatives from African civil society organizations and members of EMBs to serve as STOs. [88] Unlike LTOs, STOs are not present long enough to establish relationships with stakeholders. Instead, they must be accurate, efficient, and able to evaluate what they observe in and around polling stations using mission checklists.They remain in the host country for one to two weeks immediately surrounding an election. After training with the core team, they often have one day to familiarize themselves with their areas of responsibility (AORs) and meet with nearby LTOs. STOs remain a few days for counting and tabulation but do not stay indefinitely if the announcement of final results is protracted.  

Long-term observers and core team members may stay on for weeks after voting ends. After releasing a preliminary statement within several days of voting, LTOs and staff work on a longer and more detailed comprehensive final report that incorporates analysis of pre-election conditions, voting procedures, and post-election developments, including electoral dispute resolution, post-election violence, and political dialogue. Most organizations issue these reports within two to three months of the elections. Many also send post-election delegations to convene stakeholders for roundtable discussions of its mission’s recommendations. [89]

Comprehensive missions demand extensive financial and human resources to support a robust long- and short-term presence. Limited missions, in contrast, adapt rigorous obligations-based methodology on a smaller scale, often with a more modest number of observers who have a clearly delineated regional or topical mandate. For example, in some instances, NDI and others observe pre- and post-election developments, eschewing direct observation of polling. ODIHR’s Limited Election Observation Mission (LEOM) model has the same duration and structure as a comprehensive mission without STOs. One might deploy if “serious and widespread problems on election day at the polling-station level are unlikely, but… observation of the entire long-term process throughout the country might still produce useful recommendations” or, conversely, when major flaws are expected but key political forces express interest in recommendations to move their country forwards. [90] ODIHR’s other limited model is the Election Assessment Mission (EAM), which focuses on a specific issue such as minority or women’s rights, campaign finance, technology, electoral dispute resolution, etc. In this case, the organization does not deploy observers outside the capital, but core team members (of whom there may be as many as 12) leave headquarters in pairs to collect information from the provinces. [91] The duration can be as short as two weeks and the mission will issue only a final report. [92] Again, the impetus to deploy an EAM may be positive or negative: either confidence in political pluralism is already strong and does not merit the expense of a large delegation, or a genuine choice among candidates is clearly absent but ODIHR wishes to maintain open dialogue with major stakeholders. [93]

Organizations sometimes employ other variations of a small, “limited” mission. For example, The Carter Center’s Election Experts Mission and ODIHR’s Election Expert Team (EET) rely on the analysis produced by a small team of experts in the field. These missions may last no more than a couple weeks or may be an outgrowth of an established field office monitoring a protracted transition. EISA’s model is the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM), which lasts a minimum of 10 days. A TAM consists of six or fewer analysts with specific topics of expertise. Generally these individuals are permanent EISA staff or on the group’s expert roster. [94] EISA TAMs issue a final report but no preliminary statement.

[53] Elklit and Svensson, “What Makes Elections Free and Fair?” 43.

[54] David J. Carroll and Avery Davis-Roberts, “The Carter Center and Election Observation: An Obligations-Based Approach for Assessing Elections,” Election Law Journal 12, no. 1 (2013): 93, doi: 10.1089/elj.2013.1215.

[55] OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Handbook, Sixth Edition (Warsaw: OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2010), 17-21, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/68439?download=true. 

[56] Carter Center, Election Obligations and Standards: A Carter Center Assessment Manual (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2014). 

[57] SADC Electoral Commissions Forum and EISA, Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the SADC Region (Johannesburg: SADC ECF/EISA, 2003), 2.

[58] Ibid., 8.

[59] OAS, Methods for Election Observation: A Manual for OAS Electoral Observation Missions (Washington, DC: Organization of American States, 2007), 7. 

[60] Ibid., 8.

[61] OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Handbook, 6th ed., 23-4.

[62] Carroll and Davis-Roberts, “The Carter Center and Election Observation: An Obligations-Based Approach for Assessing Elections,” 93.

[63] Ibid.

[64] OAS, Methods (2007), 9.

[65] Garber, Guidelines, 49.

[66] OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Handbook, 111.

[67] Ibid.

[68] OSCE/ODIHR, Handbook for Long-term Election Observers: Beyond Election Day Observation (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2007), 20. 

[69] OAS, Manual for OAS Electoral Observation Missions (Washington, DC: OAS, 2009), 15.

[70] “About,” GetELMO (The Carter Center), http://getelmo.org/about.

[71] Ian Schuler, “SMS as a Tool in Election Observation,” Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization 3, no. 2 (2008): 146, doi:101162/itgg.2008.3.2.143.

[72] Ibid., 148.

[73] OSCE/ODIHR, Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2013), 2.

[74] OAS, Methodology for Media Observation during Elections: A Manual for OAS Electoral Observation Missions (Washington, D.C.: OAS, 2011), 2.

[75] Carter Center, The Carter Center Handbook on Observing Electronic Voting, Second Edition (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2012), 3. 

[76] Ben Goldsmith and Holly Ruthrauff, Implementing and Overseeing Electronic Voting and Counting Technologies (Washington, DC: IFES and NDI, 2013), 21. 

[77] “E-learning Course for Short-Term Election Observers,” OSCE/ODIHR, accessed December 3, 2014, http://www.osce.org/odihr/92974.

[78] “Elearning,” EU/EODS, accessed August 1, 2014, http://www.eods.eu/elearning; “Video Tutorial on Election Day Procedures for May 25 Ukraine Election Observers,” YouTube video clip, 33:25, uploaded May 16, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7_UBs_rG50&feature=youtu.be. 

[79] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 6-7.

[80] Ibid., para. 19.

[81] European Commission, Handbook for European Union Election Observation, 108. 

[82] OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Handbook: Sixth Edition, 37.

[83] Ibid., 42.

[84] European Commission, Handbook for European Union Election Observation, Second Edition (Brussels: European Commission, 2008), 116, http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/handbook-eueom-en-2nd-edition_en.pdf. 

[85] Ibid., 117.

[86] OAS, Manual (2009), 26.

[87] OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Handbook, 32.

[88] EISA, “EISA Election Observation Mission Models,” in e-mail to author, 2.

[89] “NDI’s Comprehensive Approach to International Election Observation,” in e-mail to author, 6.

[90] ODIHR, Election Observation Handbook, 30.

[91] Ibid., 31.

[92] Ibid., 31-2.

[93] Ibid., 32.

[94] EISA, “EISA Election Observation Mission Models,” in e-mail to author, 2.

To establish and retain credibility as impartial actors in a sovereign country’s political process, international observers must strive for constructive relationships with all stakeholders. Staff and observers should actively pursue meetings with government authorities, political party representatives, journalists, citizen observers, and CSOs across the political spectrum, and not wait for actors to approach them. 

Government authorities

In general, an observation mission cannot move forward without the permission of the host government. The Declaration of Principles states: “International election observation missions must actively seek cooperation with host country electoral authorities and must not obstruct the election process.” [95] If there are serious doubts about the host government’s will to conduct a transparent and democratic process from the outset, organizations should consider whether a mission is helpful and appropriate. It is important to note, however, that a decision to observe should not be considered legitimization of the process. [96]

As international observation became a norm, governments with varying degrees of commitment to democratic principles came to see the presence of – and, they hoped, validation from – observers as being to their advantage. Examples exist of governments (e.g., Zimbabwe in 2000 and 2002 and Peru in 2000) that believed they could invite observers and restrict their activities and access without negative repercussions. Others have strategically invited groups they presume will be the least critical, even if they are less professional. A majority of those that welcome observers, however, recognize that facilitating smooth access to the process is required in order for a mission to be considered credible. 

If both observers and the host government are interested in observation, a memorandum of understanding with the relevant authority, usually the electoral management body (EMB), is drafted. A memorandum of understanding states the host country’s responsibilities toward observers and observers’ responsibilities toward the host country. Host countries agree to uphold the conditions listed in Part II, while observers agree to maintain impartiality, publicly report their findings, comply with national labor laws, act ethically, and respect national sovereignty by refraining from interference in the electoral process. As discussed, the Declaration of Principles asserts that host governments should facilitate access but should not fund or provide in-kind support to monitors. [97] Further, the Declaration of Principles indicates that the host government should issue accreditation in a timely manner to the observer organization as a whole and to all individual observers whose credentials are submitted. The EMB or ministry of foreign affairs is usually responsible for accreditation.

A mission’s most frequent government contact is the EMB. Headquarters staff attend the central body’s meetings and LTOs the meetings of its regional branches, as well as trainings. Observers also should arrange periodic individual meetings with EMB members to follow up on administrative decisions and request documentation of voter and polling staff breakdown. These meetings are indicators of the EMB’s transparency and an important means of posing questions about candidate or party registration, the election calendar, training of polling officials, and internal EMB procedures. [98]

Observers also often meet with other government authorities whose work affects the electoral process, including the ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of justice, ministry of interior (MoI) and police, state media, and any national human rights body. [99] Open communication between a mission’s security staff and the MoI or other body responsible for electoral security is essential for mapping a sound deployment plan, tracking the potential for violence, and obtaining assurances that observers will be protected.

Political parties and candidates

The Declaration of Principles stipulates that EOMs “should seek and may require acceptance of their presence by all major political competitors.” [100] While ruling parties or incumbent candidates may view observation as a way to confer international legitimacy or showcase their commitment to democracy, opposition parties or candidates often seek out observers in the hope that they will hold the ruling party, and the state, accountable, or bring attention to perceived injustices. This assumes that opposition parties have sufficient faith in the political process to participate. In environments of deep mistrust, especially post-conflict, the desire for observers may be broadly shared. [101] Apprehension can breed a demand for impartial international eyes to verify that all sides are playing by the rules.

Impartiality is essential to the success of election observation missions. Observers must be wary of an unintentional bias, e.g., giving greater credence to opposition complaints than to more positive reports on the process. Observers should seek evidence when receiving complaints, as the goal of observation is neither to rubberstamp the process for those in power nor to give voice to accusations from the opposition if they are unsubstantiated. 

To report impartially and accurately on the electoral process, observers must ensure that they are afforded equal access to competitors. As early as a pre-election assessment, political parties and candidates are crucial sources for determining whether a country’s key players are able and willing to communicate freely and openly with observers. During a mission, observers meet with parties and candidates across the spectrum and gauge the extent of their confidence in the process. Candidates and party representatives report whether they feel they have been treated equitably in terms of registration restrictions, funding, media access, security, and the right to public assembly and expression, which helps observers determine whether the right of all citizens to be elected is fulfilled. Attending party rallies can give them an understanding of how candidates present themselves to their supporters, and whether they face overt intimidation. Some observer groups also examine the extent to which political parties’ internal structures and candidate selection processes reflect democratic principles. [102]

The Declaration of Principles makes clear that accredited political party and candidate agents should be allowed to be present at polling stations on election day and have access to the entire process from registration through tabulation and dispute resolution, just as observers do. [103] However, while party agents and observers follow procedures side-by-side, their mandates are not the same. Party agents’ mandate is to ensure equitable treatment of their candidates, and may voice complaints to polling staff if they witness violations. International observers must only observe and report.

Media

During election season, journalists are both indispensable sources of analysis and the subject of it. Observers meet with state (public) and private (including partisan) media outlets both to gauge the extent of press freedom and to develop a better understanding of the electoral environment and its key actors. Many organizations engage in formal media monitoring, coding content from major outlets and developing statistical assessments of air time balance, bias, voter education content, and hot-button issues in an attempt to evaluate whether candidates are competing on a level playing field. OAS, for instance, provides its media teams with instructions on how to survey a representative sample of coverage from newspapers, radio, and television, isolating seven types of relevant “spaces” to be followed: news pieces, polls, debates, paid advertising, electoral advertising, governmental advertising, and free spaces (if granted by law). [104] Organizations also have begun to watch social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter for candidates’ own updates as well as the pulse of public opinion. While social media harvesting tools suitable for election contexts already exist, observers have not yet codified a methodology for using them as they have for traditional media. 

Whether or not a mission employs a media expert, it must keep channels of communication open not only to absorb information but also to ensure a platform for publicizing its own mandate and findings. Transparent, regular coverage of an EOM can reduce suspicion and misperceptions about its purpose and establish a direct connection between international observers and local audiences that may be unfamiliar with the practice of observation. 

Citizen observers 

A strong relationship between international observers and their citizen counterparts has great potential to enrich the overall quality of election reporting, but must be navigated with sensitivity to both groups’ independence. While both employ similar methodologies, the basis of their mandate differs. Citizens’ right to observe the electoral process in their own country derives from the guarantee in Article 25 of the ICCPR that every citizen has the fundamental right to participate in public affairs. In contrast, states are not obligated under public international law to invite international observers. They do so because it can lend credibility, which in turn yields higher status and more aid. Because this salient motive for accrediting foreign observers is less powerful in regard to citizen observers, the benefits of facilitating citizen observation can be less obvious to states not wholly committed to democracy. 

For international observers, an integral part of assessing states’ fulfillment of international obligations is monitoring the rights accorded to their citizen observer counterparts. They track reports of intimidation and follow closely the degree to which authorities provide accreditation and access to all parts of the electoral process. Beyond evaluating and reporting on the status of citizen observation, the Declaration of Principles establishes a responsibility of international observers to “advocate for the right of citizens to conduct domestic nonpartisan election observation without any undue restrictions or interference.” [105] By drawing attention to governments’ failure to facilitate citizen accreditation as a violation of international commitments, international groups can press governments to change their policies. 

In addition to advocating for citizen observers’ right to access, they can complement the latter in potential areas of weakness. As voters, for example, citizen observers may be prone to be more politicized in their assessment, or at least may be perceived as less impartial than their counterparts from abroad. In addition, international observers often play an important role in amplifying the substance of their findings, assuming they are compatible with those of international groups and based on sound, evidence-driven methods. International groups generally have more extensive comparative experience and greater visibility, which results in a larger impact on domestic and international opinion alike. Yet by drawing attention to the efforts of citizen groups and demonstrating the consistency of their findings with those of accredited international organizations, international observers can lend credibility to those citizen groups for future elections, when there may not be an international presence. 

Standards for international observation also have had significant influence on the crystallization of citizen observation methodology. On April 3, 2012, 150 citizen observer groups attended the U.N. commemoration of the Declaration of Global Principles for Non-partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations, a document developed by the Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM), an alliance whose formation NDI facilitated in 2009. The Declaration of Global Principles (DoGP) was modeled on the international Declaration of Principles and explicitly makes reference to the common principles shared by the two groups and outlined in both documents. In pursuit of consensus, the DoGP reprises two Declaration of Principles articles on genuine democratic elections establishing the authority of government through free expression of the people’s will. Thirteen international observer groups signed the DoGP in solidarity with the GNDEM partners. This forged a closer link between two communities that had been operating in parallel since the 1980s, a relationship that recognizes the differences in scope and profile but commits to shared methodological standards. 

Just as observers’ visibility and comparative experience can boost the impact of citizen observation, citizen observation has important advantages which can improve the depth and breadth of international missions. First, citizen observers live in the host country. While their formal deployment may be much shorter than international LTOs, they can place election day observations within the context of the entire electoral cycle. While international observers generally depart within a few weeks of voting, and often move on to observe in another country, citizen observers are able to focus their time, resources, and attention year-round to a single process. In addition, citizen observers have valuable contacts and knowledge of politics, language, geography, and logistics. International observers who absorb the contextual knowledge of their citizen counterparts, while recognizing the influence of partisanship or special interests, are best positioned to make informed and nuanced assessments of the pieces of the electoral process they observe themselves. The longevity of citizen observation projects also can position them to pursue follow-up to EOM recommendations, advising government authorities how to resolve gaps in national law or its implementation relative to international standards, and monitoring the progress of steps taken to do so. Finally, because the cost of deploying observers locally is much lower than deploying them internationally, citizen groups can field many times the number of international observers. Their findings, gathered from a larger percentage of polling stations nationwide, should corroborate the targeted sample monitored by foreign observers.  

What forms cooperation between citizen and international observers should take is still a topic for debate. The Declaration of Principles establishes that international EOMs “should identify, establish regular communications with, and cooperate as appropriate with credible domestic nonpartisan election monitoring organizations.” It further states that international groups should verify but value information provided by national civil society organizations (CSOs), yet “international election observation missions must remain independent.” [106] Meeting with local civil society (including groups working on human rights, good governance, and media) and sharing findings is essential for any international EOM, as they represent the most informed citizens and can brief international observers on political developments. Open and frequent information-sharing differs, however, from outright financial support or training for citizen groups. Many groups that engage in international observation, including NDI, EISA, The Carter Center, and others also run civil society capacity-building programs between elections. Yet if the international groups also decide to deploy observers for elections, they must ensure the independence of both parties. Professional observation requires the independence of both citizen and international groups not only to avoid the undue influence of local political biases, which should be minimized by adherence to the DoGP’s professional standards, but also because it can lead to a strained balance of power or threaten the external credibility of either group. Perceptions of impartiality matter nearly as much as impartiality itself in determining observers’ effectiveness. Moreover, international groups operating jointly with citizen groups may receive more attention and overpower the voices of their local partners instead of amplifying them.

That said, capacity-building programs for citizen observers have grown over the last decade, resulting in fewer resources available for international observers. Civil society-building activities tied to elections stem from the recognition that international recommendations for improving democratic processes cannot be put into practice without sustained monitoring and advocacy beyond the time horizon, capacity, or mandate of invited EOMs. NDI, for example, which has been a leader in this area since its PVT support for national observers in the late 1980s, now frequently embeds international experts with local civil society groups for extended periods to develop not only their methodology but also organizational skills (e.g., fundraising, communications, planning, etc.) that will make their programs sustainable. [107] A different model is The Carter Center’s political transition monitoring work in Nepal following the 2008 Constituent Assembly elections. Between 2009 and 2013, teams made up of a citizen and an international observer jointly produced thematic reports on issues such as local governance and party youth wings. When the time came to transition from a long-term political monitoring effort to an election observation mission for the 2013 Constituent Assembly elections, however, Nepali nationals had to assume a different role as regional coordinators to ensure compliance with Declaration of Principles criteria for an independent international EOM. When the international observers left, Nepali observers’ built on the methodological rigor and technical expertise cultivated over four years of collaborative monitoring to form a new organization, Democracy Resource Center Nepal, to continue the work they had begun together.

NDI and The Carter Center’s activities, among others, suggest that close collaboration between international and citizen groups may be most viable where international organizations have a long-term presence. A sustained relationship outside of the immediate election cycle provides the opportunity to build trust, equality, and reputation with civil society groups, citizens, and host governments, giving them a chance to understand the role of each type of observer.

Other international observers

The chaos and window for manipulation that conflicting observer reports created in Zimbabwe in 2000 demonstrated the most basic reason for coordination between groups. Today, annual Implementation Meetings of the endorsers of the Declaration of Principles, as well as frequent contact on an informal basis, help ensure that at least among the major organizations there is little chance for serious discord. But with more than 40 groups now formally engaged in international observation, the most fraught elections sometimes attract interest from a wide variety of groups. 

Saturation is a concern when resources are finite, and groups want to invest where they will not duplicate others’ efforts. Some, like ODIHR and EISA, generally maintain regional focuses for historical and/or strategic reasons. Others select specific themes on which to concentrate, especially for limited missions. But when groups do decide to observe the same election, they communicate frequently and share findings. 

Two groups also may decide to conduct a joint mission where complementary expertise and pooled resources would be an advantage. These offer an opportunity for groups to strengthen ties and build further consensus on methodology. Partners may issue joint or separate statements. A disadvantage of a joint mission can be the additional effort necessary to designate staff roles and harmonize the logistical operations of two organizations with different regulations and/or financial capacity. 

Donors 

Observation projects are often subject to the priorities of the donors who fund them. Unilateral and multilateral governmental donors employ their own democracy and governance experts who determine where to invest financial resources for each electoral cycle. They may designate international observation as a priority, or decide to focus on supporting citizen observation or providing technical assistance to the EMB. Coordination is required among observer groups, between observers and donors, and among the donor community to harmonize observers’ priorities with those of donors and ensure that funds are not unduly concentrated on one group, election, or type of activity, leaving others neglected. Political exigencies in donor countries and their relations with those where they fund activities necessarily influence the ebb and flow of available aid for observation. The 2011 Arab Spring, for instance, transformed a negligible pool of European aid money for Arab democratization into a major target.

The primary funders of democracy and governance programs, including election observation, are Northern and Western European and North American governments, as well as the multilateral UNDP and EU. Newer and non-Western democracies, such as India, Brazil, and Japan, have not funded democracy promotion on a significant scale. One reason is a tradition of non-alignment and concerns about respecting national sovereignty. [108] While intergovernmental observer groups such as EU, OSCE/ODIHR, and OAS are funded directly by member states, nongovernmental organizations must seek out election-specific grants from external donors.

Beginning with the trend toward long-term observation, the greatest challenge to donor relationships has been how to incentivize and effectively structure donor support through an entire electoral process. “Donor support for elections has traditionally been event-driven,” wrote Vidar Helgesen, Secretary-General of International IDEA, in the proceedings of the organization’s 2006 Ottawa Conference on Effective Electoral Assistance. “Ample resources have often been available for a first transitional election, but much less for subsequent elections.” [109] From donors’ perspective, treating elections not as isolated events but as ongoing processes is complicated by the difficulty of defining a clear scope of activities with measurable outcomes once an election is over. For grantmaking and reporting purposes, shorter-term projects with definite parameters are preferred. Observer groups themselves struggle to assign end-dates to important post-election activities that may continue indefinitely or blur into the next electoral cycle. 

At the Ottawa Conference and the first Declaration of Principles Implementation Meeting later the same month, observer groups collectively began exploring ways to meet donor needs while maintaining the methodological integrity of the electoral cycle approach. [110] A key suggestion was the integration of donors into the follow-up to EOM recommendations by encouraging donors to link funding for observation with funding for electoral assistance to the same country. [111] In other words, the observation community urged donors to use observers’ election assessments and recommendations to guide the funding of related initiatives on good governance and human rights, not necessarily administered by the same organizations. 

Donors have experimented with this approach to some extent, but even while they recognize the need for sustainable progress, logistical constraints have kept funding discrete events the norm. In some cases, donor governments solicit proposals for observation, especially in highly strategic contexts where the severing or resumption of aid hangs on a successful election. In other instances, observer groups seeking to observe in countries they deem priorities may find themselves scrambling competitively for available funds each time an election nears. When groups seek to observe all phases of the electoral process, observers often must be deployed much earlier than designated donor funds activities are available. 

Another question that arises in the context of donor-observer relations is the extent to which donors pressure observers for specific outcomes. Even when no explicit request is made, observers are aware of their funders’ policy positions and some may feel obliged to moderate criticism of a host country accordingly. Yet the principle of independence integral to professional observation applies to independence from donor agendas just as it does independence from host country political factions. Organizations with high professional standards recognize that their credibility rests on their impartiality and independence from political pressures. Conversely, one might assume that an observer group that highlights its connection with its donor or sponsor could leverage that relationship to elicit better practices from a semi-democratic host country government eager to receive more aid. In practice, Kelley shows, fear of losing power generally trumps this leverage. [112]

[95] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 10.

[96] Ibid., para. 11.

[97] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 6.

[98] European Commission, Handbook for European Union Election Observation, 126-9.

[99] Ibid., 108.

[100] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 13.

[101] Kelley, Monitoring Democracy, 33.

[102] European Commission, Handbook for European Union Election Observation, 133.

[103] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 14.

[104] OAS, Methodology for Media Observation, 14-15.

[105] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 16.

[106] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 17.

[107] “Citizen Participation,” NDI, accessed August 8, 2014, https://www.ndi.org/citizen-participation?quicktabs_functional_area_tabs=0#quicktabs-functional_area_tabs. 

[108] Thomas Carothers, Richard Youngs, et al., “Non-Western Roots of International Democracy Support,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed August 11, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/03/non-western-roots-of-international-democracy-support/hcc1. 

[109] Vidar Helgesen, foreword to Effective Electoral Assistance: Moving from Event-based Support to Process Support: Conference Report and Conclusions (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2006), 5.

[110] “International Meetings on Implementation of the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation,” Marlborough House (Commonwealth Secretariat), London, May 31-June 1, 2006, accessed August 11, 2014, http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/des/Summary-1stImplementationMeeting-London.pdf, 2.

[111] International IDEA, Effective Electoral Assistance, 8.

[112] Kelley, Monitoring Democracy, 109.

Many of the most pressing issues facing professional observers have come to light already. As discussed in Part IV, at the heart of observers’ work, and their most fundamental challenge, is arriving at an overall of the electoral process clearly and meaningfully but without oversimplification. This requires that observer groups judge how to weigh the relative importance of different parts of the electoral process, different obligations, and contextual influences in light of an increasing emphasis on standardized assessment criteria. This paper also has touched on challenges inherent in using and observing technology, following up on recommendations, avoiding the legitimization of undemocratic processes, and harmonizing donor approaches with long-term observation models. Three broad areas deserve further discussion: 

1. maintaining the quality of observation and adherence of observer groups to their mandate;
2. developing useful standards for the observation of election technologies; and 
3. ensuring and measuring observation’s impact on democratic development.

Quality control

The professionalization of international observation along the lines laid out in the Declaration of Principles aims for high common standards among practitioners. Host countries and the international community should be able to trust the independence and methodological rigor of observers based on their endorsement of the Declaration of Principles. As the document has gained recognition, many new groups have sought to add their names. This has raised the question of variances across groups with respect to their degree of professionalism and methodological credibility. While the Declaration of Principles aims to raise standards for observation among all practitioners, and not to be exclusive, there is no mechanism in place for assessing or monitoring the quality of observation carried out by endorsers. There is no vetting process or trial period.

A separate question is whether groups blur the lines between various democracy-building activities. As funding for international observation has waned among some donors and in some parts of the world, groups have broadened their reach, trying to conduct observation as well as follow-up activities. While in principle this kind of holistic approach is logical, it complicates the traditional boundary between observation and assistance. Advising an EMB on procurement or a legislature on boundary delimitation precludes the possibility of assessing the performance of these bodies or their affiliates in a neutral manner. 

The third challenge related to quality of observation is the criticism that observers are not accurate or critical enough in their assessments. Kelley, for examples, holds that the objectivity (and thus credibility) of otherwise rigorous and well-intentioned organizations can be hamstrung by inherent or implicit biases. As she points out, not all “biases,” or influences, are by definition bad, but an awareness of them is necessary if groups are to mitigate their effects and strengthen their credibility. [113] Kelley contrasts intergovernmental observer organizations with nongovernmental organizations, arguing that intergovernmental groups whose membership consists of less democratic states are least likely to criticize other less democratic states (perhaps to deflect criticism of member states’ own practices). [114] Second, she demonstrates that negative overall assessments are much more likely when fraud is overt and occurs around election day, while administrative or pre-election problems are less likely to trigger a negative evaluation. [115] While Kelley labels this the “subtlety bias,” it can be difficult to separate from observers’ intentional weighting of different parts and obligations. The third “bias,” already mentioned, is the influence of donor governments’ policy priorities – particularly where control of aid is concerned. [116] The fourth comes from the fact that while observer groups are impartial with regard to political actors, they are not without a stance: they are inherently pro-democracy. Because building democracy is explicitly a goal, Kelley writes, “When progress is partial but the election still falls short of meeting democratic standards, monitors may praise the progress, hoping their encouragement will help consolidate the gains.” [117] Observers may be tempted, in other words, to downplay the missteps of a country that appears to be advancing overall toward democracy, and whose authorities seem to have the will to guide the country thus.  The fifth consideration is that of how assessments will influence stability in the host country. [118] It is important to note, however, that high-quality observation does not require desensitization from the impact of one’s statements. Where a statement has a good chance of inciting violence, the issuing organization may appropriately delay its release until the electoral climate calms.

Technology and public confidence 

E-voting and related technologies have provided a new frontier in observation methodology. While harmonizing methodologies, groups must understand whether and how each type of technology is observable. “Technology” can range from biometric voter registration (BVR) to use of the direct recording electronic system (DRE) for voting, to mobile ballot boxes, to ballot scanning tabulation systems like optical mark recognition (OMR). As noted, they require a substantial degree of technical knowledge to evaluate, and any mission operating in a country employing voting technologies requires some specialized field staff. Yet observers also must be able to assess how aspects of the technology’s implementation correspond with core international obligations. Even if technology is soundly built, it is unlikely to inspire public confidence if its design and use are not transparent enough to be observed and assessed by impartial monitors. As ODIHR’s 2013 manual on new voting technologies (NVT) underscores, successful implementation of these technologies relies on voter confidence in election administrators. [119] Observers meanwhile cannot contribute to building public confidence in the electoral process if unable to draw informed conclusions about the integrity of technologies used.

In addition to the challenge of observability, new technologies bring overt risks of “technical failure, external interference…, internal malfeasance, and the loss of oversight by and the accountability of the election management bodies.” [120] One of the most serious concerns in this regard is the regulation and observation of development by the vendors who design, provide, and may advise on the implementation of technologies. In many cases, authorities look to foreign companies with expertise unavailable in their own country. Transparency or the perception thereof can be clouded by lack of information regarding the compensation of vendor staff or their design process. Regardless of where and by whom a technology is developed, even if by electoral management body staff, the observation of coding is extremely difficult.

Certification of voting technologies by experts is often discussed and some bodies, including the Council of Europe, have developed guidelines for doing so. The Council of Europe’s “Certification of E-voting Systems” includes a provision ensuring that all steps in the certification process are open to accredited observers. [121] But these guidelines are neither binding nor universal. The Council leaves the decision to engage a certifying body and the design to individual member states. However, the recommended principles against which certifiers would evaluate technologies can be used by observers even if no certification process is in place. If allowed full access, observers with the proper training can assess, for example, whether the system offers robust security, adequate protection of ballot secrecy, and a paper trail for verification of votes – as well as whether those assigned to operate the technology use it properly. A key challenge remains linking technology-specific lines of inquiry to the obligations-based assessment framework that guides reporting on the rest of the process.

Measuring impact

Once a mission has issued recommendations stemming from its observation of an electoral process, it faces the dual challenge of ensuring that they have an impact on the host country’s political development and of measuring that impact. As noted, formal follow-up activities to EOMs are a relatively new component of observation. They are hard to define for donors and to explain to host countries, absorb resources for an indeterminate period of time, and may lead to few tangible achievements. The difficulty of maintaining an international presence often results in responsibility for follow-up being transferred to citizen organizations willing to and capable of playing an advocacy role. If coordinated carefully, this entrusts local groups with ownership of their own political process. They should not feel, however, that they are being pressed to push an external reform agenda. Follow-up can take the form of both monitoring and advocacy, encouraging governments to implement suggested changes to bring practices into alignment with international standards, as well as reporting systematically on the status of such efforts. International treaty-monitoring bodies such as the U.N. Human Rights Committee, which tracks states’ compliance with the ICCPR, employ mechanisms for domestic and international NGOs to submit shadow reports containing their findings. These may influence the treaty body’s assessments. With a more prominent international profile, treaty bodies’ reports could exert continuous pressure on states to improve electoral practices even when not in the election-day spotlight.

Establishing the causal impact of observers’ reports and recommendations on behavioral changes among political actors is extremely difficult if not impossible. For this reason, most observer groups do not claim that their intended outcome is altering the way stakeholders act. Instead, they concentrate on shaping perceptions of national and international stakeholders. Perceptions are easier to gauge through public and private statements and opinion polls. Candidates are unlikely to report that they decided not to engage in fraud or intimidation, for example, because of the presence of observers or the embarrassment caused by their internationally syndicated statements. Nevertheless, international observation reports do sometimes have a direct influence on other states’ policies toward countries where elections were observed. In Madagascar in 2013, for example, a positive assessment of presidential elections was an explicit condition for the country’s re-entry into the international system after four years of isolation. Following a 2009 coup, sanctions had devastated the country’s economy, and the African Union suspended its membership. Reports by EISA, the EU, The Carter Center, and the AU confirmed a peaceful and largely democratic transfer of power in December 2013, resulting in the lifting of the sanctions and reinstatement of AU membership.

Determining the degree to which observation in general improves election quality is difficult also because, as Kelley states, observers’ decision to monitor a given election is not random. It depends both on their evaluation of whether a country has high potential for progress and on authorities’ willingness to host observers. In other words, “If the anticipated quality of an election influences whether monitors are present, then monitors may not influence quality at all, but merely respond to it. That is, monitors may simply go to elections that are more likely to improve.” [122]

Election observers want to bring about positive democratic change over the long term, not only deter misconduct for a single election cycle. Many observer recommendations require time to take effect. Legal changes can be slow in coming, but transforming the prevailing political culture, especially in countries with long traditions of repressive authoritarian rule, is even more gradual and may depend on a generational shift. Observers frequently monitor elections in a given country multiple times, giving them the opportunity to evaluate progress. Ultimately, the extent of observers’ influence does not follow a simple formula: sometimes countries implement rapid, major improvements; sometimes they advance in limited areas and not in others; sometimes very gradual change takes effect; and sometimes promising developments are followed by a backslide to authoritarianism or disorder. Yet patterns exist in terms of areas of the electoral process most likely to improve following observation, notably electoral laws, voter lists, and the efficacy and timeliness of polling procedures (related to training). [123] Closer and longer-term tracking of changes in electoral and political conditions in countries previously observed can help shape observers’ approach to recommendations and follow-up, as well as their understanding of their own strengths and weaknesses. The ACE Database of Recommendations, which compiles recommendations issued by all major organizations, as well as groups’ collective effort to articulate to whom their recommendations are targeted, have made this process more systematic and better suited to a long-range approach to democratic reform.

[113] Kelley, Monitoring Democracy, 60. 

[114] Ibid., 65.

[115] Ibid., 66.

[116] Ibid., 70.

[117] Ibid., 71.

[118] Ibid., 72.

[119] OSCE/ODIHR, Handbook for the Observation of New Voting Technologies (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2013), 5.

[120] Carter Center, Electronic Voting, 1.

[121] Council of Europe, Certification of E-voting systems (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Directorate General of Democracy and Political Affairs, 2011), 5.

[122] Kelley, Monitoring Democracy, 112.

[123] Ibid., 137-9.

The near decade since the adoption of the Declaration of Principles has been one focused on consolidation of and reflection on the objectives and methodology of the field. While the growth of international observation has leveled off since its rapid ascent in the 1980s and 1990s, the community of organizations worldwide committed to the high professional standards codified in the Declaration of Principles has swelled to 49 members. The emphasis is no longer on maximizing the number of observed elections, but on deepening the quality of observation and maximizing its long-term impact. 

In this light, synergy with citizen observation groups is especially valuable. As the practice of citizen observation has grown more widespread and more professional, with the encouragement of the international observation community, donors have begun allotting more resources directly to local groups. The two types of observer should complement, not compete with, one another, but this requires a sustained discussion of the comparative advantages of each.

The changing dynamics of observation also should inspire contemplation of how international observers can continue to innovate. This could be through honing observer expertise in emerging issues areas, including campaign finance, gender, and technology. Or, it could entail the development of more robust transition monitoring methodologies to adapt to protracted political uncertainty. It also could involve imagining new approaches to mentoring and partnering with citizen observers while respecting the principle of independence. Without relinquishing their role in assessing individual states’ fulfillment of obligations, international observers can use the credibility and stature they have built over the last few decades to advocate for more thorough integration of political and electoral rights into international human rights discourse. This is a logical next step in the re-envisioning of observation as a comprehensive activity stretching far beyond the technical exercise of polling. In doing so, they can raise the stakes for protecting rights and freedoms and continue to advance genuine elections that reflect the will of peoples around the world. 

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