To establish and retain credibility as impartial actors in a sovereign country’s political process, international observers must strive for constructive relationships with all stakeholders. Staff and observers should actively pursue meetings with government authorities, political party representatives, journalists, citizen observers, and CSOs across the political spectrum, and not wait for actors to approach them.
Government authorities
In general, an observation mission cannot move forward without the permission of the host government. The Declaration of Principles states: “International election observation missions must actively seek cooperation with host country electoral authorities and must not obstruct the election process.” [95] If there are serious doubts about the host government’s will to conduct a transparent and democratic process from the outset, organizations should consider whether a mission is helpful and appropriate. It is important to note, however, that a decision to observe should not be considered legitimization of the process. [96]
As international observation became a norm, governments with varying degrees of commitment to democratic principles came to see the presence of – and, they hoped, validation from – observers as being to their advantage. Examples exist of governments (e.g., Zimbabwe in 2000 and 2002 and Peru in 2000) that believed they could invite observers and restrict their activities and access without negative repercussions. Others have strategically invited groups they presume will be the least critical, even if they are less professional. A majority of those that welcome observers, however, recognize that facilitating smooth access to the process is required in order for a mission to be considered credible.
If both observers and the host government are interested in observation, a memorandum of understanding with the relevant authority, usually the electoral management body (EMB), is drafted. A memorandum of understanding states the host country’s responsibilities toward observers and observers’ responsibilities toward the host country. Host countries agree to uphold the conditions listed in Part II, while observers agree to maintain impartiality, publicly report their findings, comply with national labor laws, act ethically, and respect national sovereignty by refraining from interference in the electoral process. As discussed, the Declaration of Principles asserts that host governments should facilitate access but should not fund or provide in-kind support to monitors. [97] Further, the Declaration of Principles indicates that the host government should issue accreditation in a timely manner to the observer organization as a whole and to all individual observers whose credentials are submitted. The EMB or ministry of foreign affairs is usually responsible for accreditation.
A mission’s most frequent government contact is the EMB. Headquarters staff attend the central body’s meetings and LTOs the meetings of its regional branches, as well as trainings. Observers also should arrange periodic individual meetings with EMB members to follow up on administrative decisions and request documentation of voter and polling staff breakdown. These meetings are indicators of the EMB’s transparency and an important means of posing questions about candidate or party registration, the election calendar, training of polling officials, and internal EMB procedures. [98]
Observers also often meet with other government authorities whose work affects the electoral process, including the ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of justice, ministry of interior (MoI) and police, state media, and any national human rights body. [99] Open communication between a mission’s security staff and the MoI or other body responsible for electoral security is essential for mapping a sound deployment plan, tracking the potential for violence, and obtaining assurances that observers will be protected.
Political parties and candidates
The Declaration of Principles stipulates that EOMs “should seek and may require acceptance of their presence by all major political competitors.” [100] While ruling parties or incumbent candidates may view observation as a way to confer international legitimacy or showcase their commitment to democracy, opposition parties or candidates often seek out observers in the hope that they will hold the ruling party, and the state, accountable, or bring attention to perceived injustices. This assumes that opposition parties have sufficient faith in the political process to participate. In environments of deep mistrust, especially post-conflict, the desire for observers may be broadly shared. [101] Apprehension can breed a demand for impartial international eyes to verify that all sides are playing by the rules.
Impartiality is essential to the success of election observation missions. Observers must be wary of an unintentional bias, e.g., giving greater credence to opposition complaints than to more positive reports on the process. Observers should seek evidence when receiving complaints, as the goal of observation is neither to rubberstamp the process for those in power nor to give voice to accusations from the opposition if they are unsubstantiated.
To report impartially and accurately on the electoral process, observers must ensure that they are afforded equal access to competitors. As early as a pre-election assessment, political parties and candidates are crucial sources for determining whether a country’s key players are able and willing to communicate freely and openly with observers. During a mission, observers meet with parties and candidates across the spectrum and gauge the extent of their confidence in the process. Candidates and party representatives report whether they feel they have been treated equitably in terms of registration restrictions, funding, media access, security, and the right to public assembly and expression, which helps observers determine whether the right of all citizens to be elected is fulfilled. Attending party rallies can give them an understanding of how candidates present themselves to their supporters, and whether they face overt intimidation. Some observer groups also examine the extent to which political parties’ internal structures and candidate selection processes reflect democratic principles. [102]
The Declaration of Principles makes clear that accredited political party and candidate agents should be allowed to be present at polling stations on election day and have access to the entire process from registration through tabulation and dispute resolution, just as observers do. [103] However, while party agents and observers follow procedures side-by-side, their mandates are not the same. Party agents’ mandate is to ensure equitable treatment of their candidates, and may voice complaints to polling staff if they witness violations. International observers must only observe and report.
Media
During election season, journalists are both indispensable sources of analysis and the subject of it. Observers meet with state (public) and private (including partisan) media outlets both to gauge the extent of press freedom and to develop a better understanding of the electoral environment and its key actors. Many organizations engage in formal media monitoring, coding content from major outlets and developing statistical assessments of air time balance, bias, voter education content, and hot-button issues in an attempt to evaluate whether candidates are competing on a level playing field. OAS, for instance, provides its media teams with instructions on how to survey a representative sample of coverage from newspapers, radio, and television, isolating seven types of relevant “spaces” to be followed: news pieces, polls, debates, paid advertising, electoral advertising, governmental advertising, and free spaces (if granted by law). [104] Organizations also have begun to watch social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter for candidates’ own updates as well as the pulse of public opinion. While social media harvesting tools suitable for election contexts already exist, observers have not yet codified a methodology for using them as they have for traditional media.
Whether or not a mission employs a media expert, it must keep channels of communication open not only to absorb information but also to ensure a platform for publicizing its own mandate and findings. Transparent, regular coverage of an EOM can reduce suspicion and misperceptions about its purpose and establish a direct connection between international observers and local audiences that may be unfamiliar with the practice of observation.
Citizen observers
A strong relationship between international observers and their citizen counterparts has great potential to enrich the overall quality of election reporting, but must be navigated with sensitivity to both groups’ independence. While both employ similar methodologies, the basis of their mandate differs. Citizens’ right to observe the electoral process in their own country derives from the guarantee in Article 25 of the ICCPR that every citizen has the fundamental right to participate in public affairs. In contrast, states are not obligated under public international law to invite international observers. They do so because it can lend credibility, which in turn yields higher status and more aid. Because this salient motive for accrediting foreign observers is less powerful in regard to citizen observers, the benefits of facilitating citizen observation can be less obvious to states not wholly committed to democracy.
For international observers, an integral part of assessing states’ fulfillment of international obligations is monitoring the rights accorded to their citizen observer counterparts. They track reports of intimidation and follow closely the degree to which authorities provide accreditation and access to all parts of the electoral process. Beyond evaluating and reporting on the status of citizen observation, the Declaration of Principles establishes a responsibility of international observers to “advocate for the right of citizens to conduct domestic nonpartisan election observation without any undue restrictions or interference.” [105] By drawing attention to governments’ failure to facilitate citizen accreditation as a violation of international commitments, international groups can press governments to change their policies.
In addition to advocating for citizen observers’ right to access, they can complement the latter in potential areas of weakness. As voters, for example, citizen observers may be prone to be more politicized in their assessment, or at least may be perceived as less impartial than their counterparts from abroad. In addition, international observers often play an important role in amplifying the substance of their findings, assuming they are compatible with those of international groups and based on sound, evidence-driven methods. International groups generally have more extensive comparative experience and greater visibility, which results in a larger impact on domestic and international opinion alike. Yet by drawing attention to the efforts of citizen groups and demonstrating the consistency of their findings with those of accredited international organizations, international observers can lend credibility to those citizen groups for future elections, when there may not be an international presence.
Standards for international observation also have had significant influence on the crystallization of citizen observation methodology. On April 3, 2012, 150 citizen observer groups attended the U.N. commemoration of the Declaration of Global Principles for Non-partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations, a document developed by the Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM), an alliance whose formation NDI facilitated in 2009. The Declaration of Global Principles (DoGP) was modeled on the international Declaration of Principles and explicitly makes reference to the common principles shared by the two groups and outlined in both documents. In pursuit of consensus, the DoGP reprises two Declaration of Principles articles on genuine democratic elections establishing the authority of government through free expression of the people’s will. Thirteen international observer groups signed the DoGP in solidarity with the GNDEM partners. This forged a closer link between two communities that had been operating in parallel since the 1980s, a relationship that recognizes the differences in scope and profile but commits to shared methodological standards.
Just as observers’ visibility and comparative experience can boost the impact of citizen observation, citizen observation has important advantages which can improve the depth and breadth of international missions. First, citizen observers live in the host country. While their formal deployment may be much shorter than international LTOs, they can place election day observations within the context of the entire electoral cycle. While international observers generally depart within a few weeks of voting, and often move on to observe in another country, citizen observers are able to focus their time, resources, and attention year-round to a single process. In addition, citizen observers have valuable contacts and knowledge of politics, language, geography, and logistics. International observers who absorb the contextual knowledge of their citizen counterparts, while recognizing the influence of partisanship or special interests, are best positioned to make informed and nuanced assessments of the pieces of the electoral process they observe themselves. The longevity of citizen observation projects also can position them to pursue follow-up to EOM recommendations, advising government authorities how to resolve gaps in national law or its implementation relative to international standards, and monitoring the progress of steps taken to do so. Finally, because the cost of deploying observers locally is much lower than deploying them internationally, citizen groups can field many times the number of international observers. Their findings, gathered from a larger percentage of polling stations nationwide, should corroborate the targeted sample monitored by foreign observers.
What forms cooperation between citizen and international observers should take is still a topic for debate. The Declaration of Principles establishes that international EOMs “should identify, establish regular communications with, and cooperate as appropriate with credible domestic nonpartisan election monitoring organizations.” It further states that international groups should verify but value information provided by national civil society organizations (CSOs), yet “international election observation missions must remain independent.” [106] Meeting with local civil society (including groups working on human rights, good governance, and media) and sharing findings is essential for any international EOM, as they represent the most informed citizens and can brief international observers on political developments. Open and frequent information-sharing differs, however, from outright financial support or training for citizen groups. Many groups that engage in international observation, including NDI, EISA, The Carter Center, and others also run civil society capacity-building programs between elections. Yet if the international groups also decide to deploy observers for elections, they must ensure the independence of both parties. Professional observation requires the independence of both citizen and international groups not only to avoid the undue influence of local political biases, which should be minimized by adherence to the DoGP’s professional standards, but also because it can lead to a strained balance of power or threaten the external credibility of either group. Perceptions of impartiality matter nearly as much as impartiality itself in determining observers’ effectiveness. Moreover, international groups operating jointly with citizen groups may receive more attention and overpower the voices of their local partners instead of amplifying them.
That said, capacity-building programs for citizen observers have grown over the last decade, resulting in fewer resources available for international observers. Civil society-building activities tied to elections stem from the recognition that international recommendations for improving democratic processes cannot be put into practice without sustained monitoring and advocacy beyond the time horizon, capacity, or mandate of invited EOMs. NDI, for example, which has been a leader in this area since its PVT support for national observers in the late 1980s, now frequently embeds international experts with local civil society groups for extended periods to develop not only their methodology but also organizational skills (e.g., fundraising, communications, planning, etc.) that will make their programs sustainable. [107] A different model is The Carter Center’s political transition monitoring work in Nepal following the 2008 Constituent Assembly elections. Between 2009 and 2013, teams made up of a citizen and an international observer jointly produced thematic reports on issues such as local governance and party youth wings. When the time came to transition from a long-term political monitoring effort to an election observation mission for the 2013 Constituent Assembly elections, however, Nepali nationals had to assume a different role as regional coordinators to ensure compliance with Declaration of Principles criteria for an independent international EOM. When the international observers left, Nepali observers’ built on the methodological rigor and technical expertise cultivated over four years of collaborative monitoring to form a new organization, Democracy Resource Center Nepal, to continue the work they had begun together.
NDI and The Carter Center’s activities, among others, suggest that close collaboration between international and citizen groups may be most viable where international organizations have a long-term presence. A sustained relationship outside of the immediate election cycle provides the opportunity to build trust, equality, and reputation with civil society groups, citizens, and host governments, giving them a chance to understand the role of each type of observer.
Other international observers
The chaos and window for manipulation that conflicting observer reports created in Zimbabwe in 2000 demonstrated the most basic reason for coordination between groups. Today, annual Implementation Meetings of the endorsers of the Declaration of Principles, as well as frequent contact on an informal basis, help ensure that at least among the major organizations there is little chance for serious discord. But with more than 40 groups now formally engaged in international observation, the most fraught elections sometimes attract interest from a wide variety of groups.
Saturation is a concern when resources are finite, and groups want to invest where they will not duplicate others’ efforts. Some, like ODIHR and EISA, generally maintain regional focuses for historical and/or strategic reasons. Others select specific themes on which to concentrate, especially for limited missions. But when groups do decide to observe the same election, they communicate frequently and share findings.
Two groups also may decide to conduct a joint mission where complementary expertise and pooled resources would be an advantage. These offer an opportunity for groups to strengthen ties and build further consensus on methodology. Partners may issue joint or separate statements. A disadvantage of a joint mission can be the additional effort necessary to designate staff roles and harmonize the logistical operations of two organizations with different regulations and/or financial capacity.
Donors
Observation projects are often subject to the priorities of the donors who fund them. Unilateral and multilateral governmental donors employ their own democracy and governance experts who determine where to invest financial resources for each electoral cycle. They may designate international observation as a priority, or decide to focus on supporting citizen observation or providing technical assistance to the EMB. Coordination is required among observer groups, between observers and donors, and among the donor community to harmonize observers’ priorities with those of donors and ensure that funds are not unduly concentrated on one group, election, or type of activity, leaving others neglected. Political exigencies in donor countries and their relations with those where they fund activities necessarily influence the ebb and flow of available aid for observation. The 2011 Arab Spring, for instance, transformed a negligible pool of European aid money for Arab democratization into a major target.
The primary funders of democracy and governance programs, including election observation, are Northern and Western European and North American governments, as well as the multilateral UNDP and EU. Newer and non-Western democracies, such as India, Brazil, and Japan, have not funded democracy promotion on a significant scale. One reason is a tradition of non-alignment and concerns about respecting national sovereignty. [108] While intergovernmental observer groups such as EU, OSCE/ODIHR, and OAS are funded directly by member states, nongovernmental organizations must seek out election-specific grants from external donors.
Beginning with the trend toward long-term observation, the greatest challenge to donor relationships has been how to incentivize and effectively structure donor support through an entire electoral process. “Donor support for elections has traditionally been event-driven,” wrote Vidar Helgesen, Secretary-General of International IDEA, in the proceedings of the organization’s 2006 Ottawa Conference on Effective Electoral Assistance. “Ample resources have often been available for a first transitional election, but much less for subsequent elections.” [109] From donors’ perspective, treating elections not as isolated events but as ongoing processes is complicated by the difficulty of defining a clear scope of activities with measurable outcomes once an election is over. For grantmaking and reporting purposes, shorter-term projects with definite parameters are preferred. Observer groups themselves struggle to assign end-dates to important post-election activities that may continue indefinitely or blur into the next electoral cycle.
At the Ottawa Conference and the first Declaration of Principles Implementation Meeting later the same month, observer groups collectively began exploring ways to meet donor needs while maintaining the methodological integrity of the electoral cycle approach. [110] A key suggestion was the integration of donors into the follow-up to EOM recommendations by encouraging donors to link funding for observation with funding for electoral assistance to the same country. [111] In other words, the observation community urged donors to use observers’ election assessments and recommendations to guide the funding of related initiatives on good governance and human rights, not necessarily administered by the same organizations.
Donors have experimented with this approach to some extent, but even while they recognize the need for sustainable progress, logistical constraints have kept funding discrete events the norm. In some cases, donor governments solicit proposals for observation, especially in highly strategic contexts where the severing or resumption of aid hangs on a successful election. In other instances, observer groups seeking to observe in countries they deem priorities may find themselves scrambling competitively for available funds each time an election nears. When groups seek to observe all phases of the electoral process, observers often must be deployed much earlier than designated donor funds activities are available.
Another question that arises in the context of donor-observer relations is the extent to which donors pressure observers for specific outcomes. Even when no explicit request is made, observers are aware of their funders’ policy positions and some may feel obliged to moderate criticism of a host country accordingly. Yet the principle of independence integral to professional observation applies to independence from donor agendas just as it does independence from host country political factions. Organizations with high professional standards recognize that their credibility rests on their impartiality and independence from political pressures. Conversely, one might assume that an observer group that highlights its connection with its donor or sponsor could leverage that relationship to elicit better practices from a semi-democratic host country government eager to receive more aid. In practice, Kelley shows, fear of losing power generally trumps this leverage. [112]
[95] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 10.
[96] Ibid., para. 11.
[97] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 6.
[98] European Commission, Handbook for European Union Election Observation, 126-9.
[99] Ibid., 108.
[100] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 13.
[101] Kelley, Monitoring Democracy, 33.
[102] European Commission, Handbook for European Union Election Observation, 133.
[103] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 14.
[104] OAS, Methodology for Media Observation, 14-15.
[105] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 16.
[106] U.N., Declaration of Principles, para. 17.
[107] “Citizen Participation,” NDI, accessed August 8, 2014, https://www.ndi.org/citizen-participation?quicktabs_functional_area_tabs=0#quicktabs-functional_area_tabs.
[108] Thomas Carothers, Richard Youngs, et al., “Non-Western Roots of International Democracy Support,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed August 11, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/03/non-western-roots-of-international-democracy-support/hcc1.
[109] Vidar Helgesen, foreword to Effective Electoral Assistance: Moving from Event-based Support to Process Support: Conference Report and Conclusions (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2006), 5.
[110] “International Meetings on Implementation of the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation,” Marlborough House (Commonwealth Secretariat), London, May 31-June 1, 2006, accessed August 11, 2014, http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/des/Summary-1stImplementationMeeting-London.pdf, 2.
[111] International IDEA, Effective Electoral Assistance, 8.
[112] Kelley, Monitoring Democracy, 109.
