Monitoring of the process by
organized national NGOs acting as independent observers is an essential tool
for promoting election integrity. These groups span a wide spectrum of
organizations and other civil society groups, including national and local
citizen groups, citizen networks, human rights groups, student associations,
professional bodies and religious groups.[1]
The sponsoring organizations
typically collect information in a systematic way from their observer teams,
analyze the significance of their findings, and assess the overall quality of
electoral procedures and the electoral process more generally, and publish
their findings. Well-organized national observers can be very effective
guardians of election integrity, especially in countries in transition. The activities
of national observers foster transparency and accountability on the part of the
electoral administration, and can help to instill public confidence in the
integrity of the electoral process. Codes of conduct for observers set ethical
and professional standards for observing elections.
An outstanding example of
domestic monitoring was during the 1997 elections in Kenya,
for which civil society organizations trained more than 28,000 national
observers. These were posted at nearly 12,600 polling stations and each vote
counting station. Their pervasive presence also encouraged voter turnout.[2]
In Indonesia,
more than 600,000 national observers covered the 1999 elections and helped
ensure the integrity of the election results through their close monitoring of
the count. However, in the 2004 presidential elections, Indonesia’s General Electoral
Commission refused to accredit the Independent Monitoring Committee of the
Election (KIPP) because that body had published an observation report on the
previous legislative elections without approval from the election authorities.[3] Some
countries impose severe restrictions on organized national observation. In the
2004 Ukrainian presidential election, the law limited national observation to
candidates’ representatives. Ukraine’s
Committee of Voters nonetheless deployed thousands of observers accredited as
journalists. In that capacity, however, the observers were not entitled to
receive copies of electoral documents or to demand that these documents be made
public.[4]
In Ethiopia’s 2005 parliamentary elections, the
country’s EMB limited the access of national observers, an action that was
challenged before the Supreme Court. The Court ruled against the electoral
management body but the decision was not handed down until the day before the
election, when it was too late for national observers to effectively carry out
their monitoring activities on a large scale.
Similar issues were averted in
Romania in 1996, during the
historic first regular national elections of the post-Ceausescu period. In Romanian elections, so-called “phantom”
NGOs have often interfered with legitimate election-related activities. (The phantoms are NGOs that are registered
with the Ministry of Justice – some believe with the support of the former
security service, the Securitate – but apparently are inactive most of the
time.)
A well-established NGO in Romania, the
Pro-Democracy Association (APD) had put considerable organizational effort into
plans to field some 10,000 NGO observers on election day. Under the election law only one
independent observer could be admitted to each polling station, if necessary, by
drawing lots. As election day
approached, a number of phantom NGOs sought accreditation for their
“observers”, which could have displaced real observers on election day and
ruined the process of gaining accreditation for the large number of legitimate
observers.
With the assistance of IFES,
the Romanian Central Election Bureau (BEC) came up with a solution that
addressed the legal and logistical issues.
Organizations seeking to accredit observers were instructed to submit
their names in database format. A
multi-stage computer lottery was held at the Palace of the Press, with the
computer combing the databases and assigning an observer to each available
polling station. In case of multiple
applications for a station, the observer’s accreditation was shifted to the
next available station numerically.
(Fortunately, in Romania,
polling station numbers are assigned in a geographical series; so that an
observer would ordinarily not be too disadvantaged by having to go instead to
the next polling station.)
Expecting that “observers”
from phantom NGOs, as in the past, would not actually turn up on election day,
it was also provided that observers who failed to receive accreditation during
the lottery were assigned as “alternates”.
(If the accredited observer did not show up at the polling station by
the time when election officers were scheduled to arrive, the alternate could
claim the accreditation.)
This system – implemented by
very talented volunteer computer programmers – worked smoothly even though the
phantom organizations did not submit accurate data. In the event, APD was able to get
accreditations out to over 10,000 observers at the last moment using the
country’s railway network. The fairness
of these elections was widely praised, and was attributed in great part to the
presence of the observers along with aggressive reporting by a newly-energized
press.[5]
Benefits
of National Observation
In a few cases the presence of
international observers is indispensable—for instance, elections in countries
requiring a peacekeeping force or undergoing a difficult transition, or where
non-partisan civil society groups are virtually non-existent or non-functional.
In the long term, the forming of domestic groups that are able to
monitor elections without external assistance is an essential part of
democratic development.
National election observers
have important advantages over international observers. They can more easily
turn out in large numbers, even in the thousands. They know the political
culture, language and territory. Consequently, they are able to notice many
things that may pass unremarked by foreign observers.[6]
National monitoring groups are
often better equipped than international observers to carry out particular
types of specialized monitoring efficiently. Examples include verifying the
voter registry, monitoring the complaints process, documenting instances of
intimidation and human rights violations, and media monitoring. Unlike
international observers, national civic organizations have an important role to
play in implementing civic education programs and actively promoting (not
simply recommending) electoral reform.[7]
Accrediting
Observers
Observers and monitors can
function more effectively if they are officially accredited by the electoral
management or policy-making body. Accreditation gives them access to election
sites. Integrity problems may arise if accreditation procedures or requirements
are used to limit the number of observers, or to deny access to certain groups
of observers or monitors. If the procedure is too time-consuming and cannot be
completed before election day, or if accreditation is selective, the electoral process
may lose credibility and the election management body will be viewed as having
something to hide.
Most electoral systems
establish eligibility requirements for observers and monitors in the election
laws or procedures. For example, the law often requires that NGOs proposing
accreditation of observers should have democracy, human rights and/or elections
included in their purposes as registered in their organizational charters. In addition, the EMB may be given authority
to assess applicant organizations in terms of their past performance, not
solely legal registration. Straightforward
and objective requirements for NGOs to seek observer status can help minimize
problems such as discrimination or favouritism.
Sometimes additional behavioural
conditions are added to eligibility requirements. These are generally used to
exclude persons considered to be anti-democratic or whose activities might
threaten the peace. In South Africa,
for example, accreditation is provided only to observers who will pledge to uphold
conditions conducive to a free and fair election, including impartiality and
independence from any political party or candidate contesting the election,
competent and professional observation, and adherence to the code of conduct
for observers.
Security
Problems and National Observation
In countries undergoing
transition or in a post-conflict situation, national observers may be subject
to intimidation and/or threats. This situation may affect the observers’
ability to travel, observe freely and report on the information collected
without self-censorship or fear of retribution. For example, a report on the
1998 national elections in Cambodia
indicates, “Threats, intimidation and violence were daunting challenges to the
Cambodian observers during this year’s election process. None of the groups
suggested that their ability to release public statements was compromised by
the political environment. They noted, though, that intimidation affected their
ability to gather information on the process and that threats coloured the
reports … received from observers.”[8]
[1] Bjornlund, Eric C., Beyond Free and Fair:
Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy, Washington,
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson
Center Press, 2004
[2] Barkan, Joel and Ng’ethe, Njuguma, “Kenya Tries Again,” Journal of
Democracy, 9(2), 1998
[3] The Carter Center, The Carter Center 2004
Indonesia
Election Report, June 2005
[4] OSCE/ODIHR, Ukraine, Presidential Election: 31 October, 21 November and
26 December 2004. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw,
May 2005.
[5] IFES, Romania:
Technical Assistance to the Central Election Bureau, (D. Finn,
author), Washington,
November 1996, 33 pp. + 66 pp annexes
[6] Carothers, Thomas, “The Observers Observed,” Journal
of Democracy, 8(3), 1997, p. 25
[7] International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance, The Future of International Electoral Observation: Lessons
Learned and Recommendations, 1999
[8] National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs, Asian Monitoring Network Conference, October 1998
